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The repressed form of self (RFS) that is caused by repressive social impositions in its 
different degrees is prevalent in post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese (PTRIC) 
societies. Certain non-Confucianist (non-Ruist) scholars identify it as a significant factor 
causing a variety of emotional, psychological, interpersonal and communicative 
problems, to the extent that in some cases it acts as a risk factor towards suicide. 
Accordingly, the need to analyse, reflect on, and overcome this problem related to a 
relational understanding of selfhood in PTRIC contexts is imperative. However, many 
post-traditional Ruists, such as Tu Weiming, claim this problem is caused by a relational 
selfhood derived from the small folk tradition of Confucianism (Ruism) that is not directly 
related to orthodox Ruist traditions. 
This research starts by exploring Tu Weiming’s responses to this research problem 
through examining critically his interpretations of and arguments for New Ruist relational 
selfhood, which he claims to be stemming from orthodox Ruist traditions. In terms of his 
attitudes, I claim that the responsive Tu possesses a potential to solve the problem, but 
not the resistant Tu. In terms of his interpretations, I demonstrate that the features of Tu’s 
relational selfhood are not significantly different from the features of PTRIC relational 
selfhood in shaping a closed and repressively imposed relational self.  
Subsequently, this research presents and examines critically Jürgen Moltmann’s 
responses to this research problem through his account of Christian social trinitarian 
relational selfhood. One of the most important features of Moltmann’s account is an open 
relational self embedded within a dynamic diversity in unity as well as a unity in diversity. 
Though there are other issues that complicate Moltmann’s claims, I argue that his account 
of relational selfhood contains a positive potentiality to liberate the RFS. 
Finally, this research critically compares these two theoretical accounts of relational 
selfhood by means of a thorough analysis of the similarities and essential differences in 
their presuppositions and claims. In conclusion, three possible alternative solutions for 
the problem are put forth: 1. the responsive Tu’s account; 2. the selective combination of 
the resistant Tu’s account and Moltmann’s account; and 3. Moltmann’s account. 
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ADDITIONAL NOTES REGARDING FORMAT AND STYLE 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all Scripture quotations are from the New Revised 
Standard Bible (NRSV). 
2. Since there are many non-English sources referred in this thesis, the English 
translations of those sources are generally this author’s translations, except when 
other translators’ names are specified. 
3. When Chinese and Korean persons’ names appear without their Western given names, 
their English-spelt family names come first without a comma before their personal 
names, as is customary in Chinese and Korean styles of naming. Otherwise, their 
Western given names come first, followed by their Chinese or Korean given names, 
as is customary in Anglophone and Western European styles of naming. 
4. Since there is no consistency of whether or not a hyphen is used between two words 
of a Chinese or Korean person’s first name, even for the same person, a hyphen will 
generally be not used for it in these cases within this thesis, except when a quotation 
is involved. 
5. Chinese characters for the same names and terms, including Pīnyīn with tone marks 
for the same Chinese characters, are given in the first instance, and are not usually 
repeated. 
6. Underlining is only used for indicating non-English languages in their transcribed form. 
Non-English words in their transcribed form that are names of people, institutions, 
languages, or places are not underlined. 
7. Italics is generally used for published titles and the emphasizing of a particular word or 
phrase in the text. Within the bibliography or bibliographic references, however, bold 
fonts are included for the book titles found in English titles of works and single quotation 
marks (in the book titles) or double quotation marks (in the journal titles) for the original 
emphasis of a particular word or phrase by the authors of sources. 
8. When any section number (S#) or footnote number (F#) is mentioned without specifying 
the chapter (C#) or the appendix (A-capital letter), it is in the current chapter or appendix. 
1 
Chapter One 
Introduction: The Contexts and the Problem 
 
A repressed form of self (RFS) resulting from the relational selfhood among the Chinese 
has been disclosed, described, and discussed by more and more Chinese and non-Chinese 
non-Ruist 1  scholars2  since, but not limited to, the 1970s-1980s in the contemporary 
Chinese contexts. This prevalent feature is a fact affirmed and tacitly consented to by both 
Chinese and foreign scholars. Most of these scholars’ studies point out that such a RFS is 
a product of the relational dynamics, social structure, and ideology influenced by Ruism. 
They also indicate that this feature of the repressed self might be to some extent one of 
the factors preventing Chinese people from attaining a true liberated inner transformation 
of character and virtue because they continuously strive to reach a goal of performance 
dictated by forms of moral cultivation emphasized in Ruism (see C2 and A-F). How do 
contemporary Ruists or Ruist scholars respond to this criticism? While Ruification3 is 
also a very common phenomenon among some contemporary Chinese societies and even, 
not limited only to,4 Chinese Christian groups,5 how can they respond to or overcome this 
                                                
1 The terms Ru/Confucian, Ruist/Confucianist, Ruism/Confucianism, and Ruification/Confucianization are 
interchangeable in general usage in this thesis. However, there is some subtle difference of meaning 
between them that are explained in A-M. Therefore, the term Ruist/Ruism, rather than 
Confucian/Confucianism, might be a more helpful and pertinent description. 
2 The term non-Ruist scholars used in this research indicates those scholars whose academic fields are not 
mainly in Ruism or Ruist studies, irrespective of nationality or ethnicity. 
3 Sinicized Buddhism has been a typical example of Ruification since five hundred years after Buddhism 
was transmitted into China in the Han Dynasty (Sòng, Jūn 宋軍 2016). Ruification, in the context of post-
traditional Chinese Christians, describes Christian lives lived more in a Confucian way rather than a 
Christian way because the Ruist influence in their daily life, to some extent, is stronger than Christianity 
since it still dominantly influencea contemporary Chinese people and societies. For example, sermons that 
usually focus on moral teachings and admonition and some traditional and post-traditional Ruist teachings, 
such as moral self-cultivation and the goodness and perfectibility of human nature, are still taken as golden 
rules even when they contradict Christian doctrines. 
4 So is it among other East Asian Christians (Koh, Byongik 1996). See also Oh Myungseon (2003:132) and 
Helen Lee (2006). 
5 This observation resonates with many Chinese Christians and is supported by a number of scholars, for 
example, Tan Cheming 陳濟民 (p. Chén Jìmín) (1988:18-21), Andrew Chiu 丘恩處 (p. Qiū Ēnchù) 
(1999:222-3), Yáng Fènggǎng 楊鳳崗 (2004), Jackson Wu (2011), and Tsai Leechen 蔡麗貞 (p. Cài 
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obstacle to inner transformation? These are practical and fundamental questions 
deserving exploration and research, but, first of all, the research context and the nature of 
the problem will be identified in this introductory chapter. 
1. The Post-Traditional Ru-Influenced Chinese Contexts 
Before introducing my research problem based on non-Ruist scholars’ findings and 
criticisms, I first need to clarify the context of Ruism in the Ru-based cultural heritage 
they deal with because most scholars tend to use the term Ruism as a generalization 
without specifying the school, or tradition of Ruist influence. A new term, post-traditional 
Ru-influenced Chinese (PTRIC) is coined in this research for solving this problem of 
generalization and ambiguity.6 Most of the literature I investigated which is relevant to 
such issues within Chinese Ruism does not cover a geographically and generationally 
specific Chinese people group. Therefore, in this research, I am dealing with specific 
problems occurring generally among contemporary Chinese people7 who fall under the 
influence of Ruism. 
                                                
Lìzhēn) (2014:205) as well as foreign missionaries and scholars, for example, Wright Doyle (2006:website; 
2011:email). However, there are many discussions on the issue of Ruification of Christianity in Chinese 
communities. Since it is not the focus of this research, only some scholars and related sources are listed 
here for reference: Paul Fong 封尚禮 (1967:50f., 79-81, 297), Sūn Zàishēng 孫再生 (1915-2001) (1975:27, 
76), Julia Ching (1934-2001) (1977:143), Willard G Oxtoby (1933-2003) (1983), Tu Weiming (1985), Lǐ 
Dàoshēng 李道生 (1987:328), Zhōu Jīnshēng 周金聲 (1988:277), Hé Shìmíng 何世明 (-1996) (1991:62–
77), Wang Ssu-Sheng 王賜生 (p. Wáng Cìshēng) (1997:13), Yang Fenggang (2004; 2014, cited in Doyle 
2014:2; 2014 in 2014:17), Chankei Thong and Charlene L. Fu (2009), and David Marshall (2012). See also 
Toynbee and Ikeda (1989), Julia Ching and Küng (1993:279–83), and Huáng Bǎoluó 黃保羅 (also as 
Paulos Huang) (2011). It is worth noting that Ruification of Christianity has been adopted as a means of 
controlling politically the development of Christianity in Mainland China according to the new religious 
policy set by Xí Jìnpíng 習近平 in 2016 (Song, Jun 2016). 
6 Ideally one would avoid all generalizations, let alone over-generalizations, such as Ruism or Christianity, 
both of which have pluralistic forms, and seek to avoid the stereotypes or over-simplistic and discursive 
conceptualization of understanding that can be produced, especially via dichotomized pairs of terms, for 
example, Western and Eastern or Chinese, collectivism and individualism, or spiritual and secular. See 
Johnson (1985:91–2) and Solomon (1994:22). Since such generalizations and dichotomies are adopted in 
most of the literature I have explored, I cannot entirely avoid their use. However, I will use them as little 
as possible. About the pluralistic forms of Ruism, see Lauren Pfister (2015a) and the pluralistic forms of 
Christianity, see Andrew Walls (1996). 
7 It is notable that terms such as Chinese people, Chinese culture, Chinese society, and Chinese tradition 
are ethnicity not about nationality in this thesis, otherwise their specific nationality will be indicated.  
3 
1.1 The Terms Ru and Ruism 
Most Chinese people proudly recognize Ruism as a Chinese tradition and culture, an 
essential legacy inherited from their Chinese ancestors. The term Ruism to some extent 
has been used and abused as a synonym of Chinese culture, especially by western 
sinologists (Zhèng, Zhìmíng 鄭志明 1986:333–4).8 Even if not many Chinese people 
claim to be Ruists or believe in Ruism, their value system, ethical standards, worldview, 
educational and thinking style, the manner in which they deal with their neighbours and 
other people, their customs and etiquette in daily life are all subtly influenced, both 
tangibly and intangibly, by Ruism.9 However, Liu Shuhsien 劉述先 (p. Liú Shùxiān) 
(1934-2016) (1996a:92), a contemporary New Ruist, indicates the ambiguous meaning 
of the word ‘Confucianism’ due to the different ways in which even Ruist scholars 
understand it.10 Tu Weiming (1985:113) also states that Ruist views on ‘perennial issues’ 
can never be generalized because of Ruism’s ‘elasticity’ and ‘vicissitudes’ during its long 
history.11 From a more general understanding one can confirm that Ru is the major 
Chinese tradition that emphasized from ancient times the interrelationship between 
‘politics, ethics and religion’ by way of enhancing ‘ritual, education’, and moral 
cultivation (ibid.).  
                                                
8 See also Táng Duānzhèng 唐端正 (1988 in 1997:346) and Yú Yīngshí 余英時 (1988 in 1997:29). 
9 Tu Weiming (2010 in Hóng, Gǔ 洪鵠 2010) identifies the greatly close relationship between the deep 
value of (both traditional and post-traditional) Chinese culture and Ruist tradition. 
10  The interpretations of some Ruist doctrines and teachings are also quite divergent and subject to 
continuous change (de Bary 1996:xi–xiii). See also Yú Dūnkāng 余敦康 (1988 in Tu, Weiming 1997a:64–
5), Xie Wenyu (1997:56), Flakk (2003:42–3), Ralph Weber (2007:7–8), Pfister (2013b:126), and Cài 
Zhìdòng 蔡志棟 (2013:116–18). 
11 Some scholars interpret it as ‘a philosophy of evolutionary change and continual adaptation’ (Roy, AT 
1903, cited in Abbott 1970:293). 
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1.2 The Development of Ruism 
Ruism is mainly related to hermeneutics, epistemology and methodology in the realm of 
moral ethics. But Ruist scholars, even though they portrayed themselves as Confucius’ 
faithful followers, had no enduring consensus on the understanding and adoption of the 
ancient traditions, especially ‘the true Way in the world’ because of their different 
approaches and methodologies (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:2). Thus, even from the period 
immediately following Confucius’ death, there were at least eight distinct and competing 
schools,12 let alone the different schools and divergent interpretations that emerged during 
the more than two-millennia-long evolving history of Ruism. There is no consensus 
among contemporary scholars on the existence, development, and evolution of Ruism 
over its more than 2,500 years in Chinese history. The generally recognized historical 
development after the formation of Ruism in the pre-Qin period is briefly introduced in 
A-A. Generally speaking, however, there were two major renaissances after the formation 
of Ruism in the pre-Qin period: the first one in the Han-Jin period (206 BCE-420 CE) 
and the second in the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127), the latter being commonly 
called Neo-Ruism (Neo-Confucianism) because of its responses to the challenges from 
both Chinese Buddhism and Daoism. In the twentieth century, another revival movement 
based on Neo-Ruism arose, known as (Contemporary or Modern) New Ruism, one facing 
challenges from aggressive and dominating forms of international cultures, primarily 
from European and American intellectuals (Mou, Tsungsan 1949 in 2003a:1–16).13 
After the end of the imperial age in 1911, Ruist education no longer dominated 
educational curricula and the national examination based on Ruist principles had been 
replaced. At that point in time which marks a new beginning era of post-tradition, Ruist 
                                                
12 That is ‘during the Warring States period’ (475-221 BCE) (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:2). 
13 It is notable that this third revival movement or developmental epoch of Ruism is not recognized by all 
scholars, for example, not by Tang Yijie (1988 in 1997:302). 
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thinking no longer occupied the status of ‘a state religion or ideology’ (Bresciani 
2001:410). Rather, the development of society’s structure, economy, and social values 
evolved rapidly in all Chinese societies across the globe. Individualistic ideologies 
became evermore strongly promoted and developed significantly within Chinese societies 
(Hong, Guiyoung 2004:61). But still there were scholars who claim that the main ‘ideas 
and ideals’ of Ruism continuously formed ‘the basics of the way of life’, values, and 
ethics in modern China and other East Asian countries (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:5). 14 
Although all the ‘Three Teachings’ (Sānjiāo 三教)15 — Ruism, Daoism, and Buddhism 
— have been influencing traditional Chinese culture, the personalities of Chinese people 
were formed and nurtured predominantly by Ruist ethics (Lo, Pilgrim WK 2009:168).16 
Although the influence of Ruism had been a main target challenged by the May Fourth 
New Cultural Movement (1920s), it became yet an object of derision and was scheduled 
for destruction during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1960s) and the Anti-
Confucius and anti-Lin campaign (1970s). Still, in spite of all these harsh realities, Ruist 
influences on most Chinese people in reality never completely disappeared (ibid.).17 
Therefore, the tendency of some of the main contemporary Chinese values can be 
easily associated with the Ru-nurtured Chinese cultural tradition. Traditional Ruist 
cultural values and relational ethics still play a very important role deep in the hearts of 
most Chinese people (Berger 1988:7–8).18 These observations are supported by many 
                                                
14 See also Lau Sing et al. (1990:677) and Tu Weiming (1997 in Lín, Sīqí 林思齊 et al. 1997:8–9). 
15 Tu (1985:19) refers the Three Teachings in East Asia discussed in this context to the ‘Mencian line of 
Confucianism, the Chuang Tzu [莊子 p. Zhuāngzi (ca. 369-286 BCE)] tradition of Taoism [(Daoism)], and 
the Ch’an (Zen) [p. chán 禪] interpretation of Buddhism’. 
16 See also Xie Wenyu (1997:55). Various forms of Ruism even influenced the developments of Chinese 
Buddhism (Yáng, Huìnán 楊惠南 2000), Chinese folk religious practices and other religions, such as 
Daoism, Islam, and Christianity (Xiè, Wényù 謝文郁 2011:18f.). See also Huáng Shīrú 黃詩茹 (2008:121–
2). 
17 See also Thomas A. Metzger (1977), Karl-Heinz Pohl (2009:91), and Alexander Chow (2013:23). 
18 Even now Marxism in China cannot escape the tendency of being Ruified. For example, Marx’s class 
struggle in China cannot but give way to ‘rénqíng’ ｢人情｣ (favour) and ‘héxié’ ｢和諧｣ (harmony) (Xie, 
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scholars’ studies and empirical research19 in different fields,20 especially as seen in a 
project report21 by Klaus Nielsen (n.d.).  
1.3 The Main Categories of Ruist Tradition 
But what does Ruist tradition mean, since as Liu Shuhsien points out ambiguities in the 
use of the word ‘Ruism’ still persist? Liu Shuhsien (1996b:85) generally differentiates 
Ruist tradition into three categories:22  
                                                
Wenyu 2011:18f.) that are stressed and valued more in human relationships in Ruism. For other examples, 
see also Lucian Pye (1988:30–35), Jīn Guāntāo 金觀濤 (1988 in 1997) and C5F68. 
19 For example, a recent survey by Li Changjun (2010) verifies the vitality of Ruist collectivism among 
many Chinese intellectuals. He claims that these intellectuals portray themselves as individualists in 
response to direct questions, but show that they are in fact collectivists in response to indirect questions 
designed by the ‘behaviour scenario method’ (noting down and collecting responders’ behavioural 
responses to the designed situation provided by the scenario questions). 
20 Such references are innumerable. Besides the aforementioned, only some references can be given here: 
Singh and Huang Sophia Chang (1962), David Yaufai Ho and Lee Lingyü (1974), Kahn (1979:118, 122), 
Metzger (1981:7), Lucian W. Pye and Mary W. Pye (1985:55–89), Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi (1988), 
Zhāng Ǎizhū 張靄珠 (1991:8–9), Jochim (1992), Tu Weiming (1993c:144; 1997b:471), Kuo Chienlin and 
Kavanagh (1994:554–5), David Y. F. Ho (1994:349; 1995:135), Koh Byongik (1996), Robert J. Smith 
(1996), Gold (1996:256–8), Liu Shuhsien (1996a:111), Westwood (1997), Xia Guang (1997), Slote and de 
Vos (1998), Tucker (1998:website), Li Minlong and Yang Kuoshu (1998), Hwang Kwangkuo 黃光國 (p. 
Huáng Guāngguó) (1999:178–80; 2006), Lee Jeongkyu (2001), Terence Chong (2002), Arcodia (2003), 
Keating (2004:website), Bedford (2004:50), Evasdottir (2005), Chuang Yaochia (2005), Xiè Yào 謝曜 
(2005), Leonard (2006:website), Moskowitz (2007), Rooney (2008:website), Hays (2008:blog), Mullis 
(2008:176), Lin Honghsin 林鴻信 (p. Lín Hóngxìn) (2008b:205–7), Jīn Shènghuá 金盛華 et al. (2009), 
Universitaet Duisburg Essen (2009:website), Broadbent (2010), Lǐ Chāngjùn 李昌俊 (2010), Lin Xiaodong 
(2010), Gary K. G. Choong (2011:1–3), Hang Lin (2011), Charles Wang (2012:blog), Hwang, Grace 
Huichen and Gove (2012:10–12), University of Florida (2012:website), Lu Yu (2013:Lecture), Śleziak 
(2013), David Y. H. Wu and Tseng Wenshing (1985:10f.), David Y. F. Ho et al. (2012), Wang Minglei 
(2013), Rhyne (2014:website), Fan Lizhu and Chen Na (2015:27), and Nielsen (n.d.:1). 
21 It consists of a comprehensive literature review on the background and history of Ruism, and providing 
summaries from the results of empirical research on Chinese societies. 
22 See also Liu Shuhsien (2002:56–7). Wang Gungwu (1930-) (1988:4) differentiates Ruist tradition into 
two categories: ‘high’ Ruism and ‘low’ Ruism. According to their definition, high Ruism includes Liu 
Shuhsien’s first two categories and low Ruism Liu Shuhsien’s third category. Lǐ, Mínghuī 李明輝 
(2001b:144) classifies Ruist tradition into four meanings: (1) Ruism as the tradition of spirit and thought; 
(2) Institutionalized Ruism; (3) Socialized Ruism (the value system that standardizes people’s social 
behaviour and social relationship at the level of civil society; and (4) Deepened Ruism (the psychological 
accumulation of people’s thinking mode and behavioural custom influenced subtly and insensibly in the 
deep cultural structure. The first and second meanings in Li Minghui’s classification are respectively the 
same as the first and second categories in Liu Shuhsien’s. Li Minghui classifies Liu Shuhsien’s third 
category into his third and fourth meanings so that his classification can be more helpful in embodying and 
understanding PTRIC contexts. There are some similar categorizations of Ruist tradition with different 
category titles by other scholars in F23 and F27. 
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(1) ‘Rújiā jīngshén de dàchuántǒng’ ｢儒家精神的大傳統｣ (the great tradition of the 
Ruist refined intellectual spirit), adhering to what Mou Tsungsan 牟宗三 (p. Móu 
Zōngsān, 1909-95) (1959 in 2003a:1–15) calls the three developmental epochs of 
Ruism, as described in Appendix A;  
(2) ‘Zhèngzhìhuà Rújiā de dàotǒng’ ｢政治化儒家的道統｣ (the tradition of the Way 
expressed in politicized Ruism) that is imperially-oriented in the name of Ruism, but 
synthesized with Daoism and Legalism after the Han dynasty; 
(3) ‘Mínjiān de xiǎochuántǒng’ ｢民間的小傳統｣ (the small folk tradition) that has 
existed for over centuries and been influenced by the above two traditions is the 
mental habits and behavioural customs of the majority of common Chinese people 
from ancient times to the present, accumulated for a long time.23 The third Ruist 
tradition indicates wider and looser meanings of Ruism that must be interpreted by 
researchers rather than ordinary people themselves (Liu, Shuhsien 1996b:85).24 How 
much overlapping it has with and how much distortion it has from the above two 
                                                
23 Robert Bellah (1927-2013) (1983) coins ‘bourgeois Confucianism’ for this final category which Tu 
Weiming (2008b:63, eo) terms as the Ruist ‘habits of the heart’, Peter Berger (1929-) (1988:7) names this 
as the Ru-‘derived values in the lives of ordinary people’; Kim Kyongdong (2002:99) calls it the 
‘secularized version’ of Ruism, while Amborse Y. C. King 金耀基 (p. Jīn Yàojī) (1992:166) calls it 
‘shèhuìxìng rúxué’「社會性儒學」(social Ruism), Lín Ānwú 林安梧 (1995:2) calls it ‘shēnghuóhuà de 
rúxué’「生活化的儒學」(lively Ruism). Jiǎng Qìng 蔣慶  (2003 quoted in Chén, Hóngyì 陳弘毅
2009:website) calls it ‘shēngmìng rúxué’「生命儒學」(life Ruism), while Peng Lipchung 彭立忠 (p. Péng 
Lìzhōng) (1995) calls it ‘shùmín rújiào’「庶民儒教」(Vulgar Ruism). Still other portrayals are offered. 
These other scholars call it Ruist ‘wénhuà—xīnlǐ jiégòu’ ｢文化—心理結構｣ (cultural-psychological 
structure) (Li, Zehou 1980:77), ‘shēncéng de xīnlǐ jiégòu’ ｢深層的心理結構｣  (deep psychological 
structure) (Hwang, Kwangkuo 1988:46, 55), ‘shēncéng jiégòu’ ｢深層結構｣ (deep structure) (Sun, Lungkee 
1983, reprinted in 2004; Hwang, Kwangkuo 1995:224, 262; 2002:129), or ‘nèizài jiégòu’ ｢內在結構｣ 
(inner structure) (Hwang, Kwangkuo 2002). 
24 This also can be explained by Triandis’ (1989:512) observation that ‘when a person is socialized in a 
given culture, the person can use that custom as a substitute for thought, and save time’. The most typical 
example in the context of PTRIC society for Triandis’ observation is the custom of filial piety influenced 
and formed by Ruist tradition, so that the shadow of ‘fàn xiào zhǔyì’ 「泛孝主義」 (pan-filialism) can be 
found within the lives of Chinese people (Yang, Kuoshu et al. 1988:171–4). Pan-filialism denotes the 
extensive application of the parent-child ethics of filial piety to all other superior-inferior relationships. 
Concerning the description and discussions of such phenomenon in detail, see also Hsieh Yuwei (1967), 
Yang Kuoshu and Yeh Kuanghui 葉光輝 (p. Yè Guānghuī) (1991:194–5, 208–9, 236), Yeh Kuanghui 




traditions, therefore, cannot be explored by empirical studies without the data of the 
ancient traditions but can be studied theoretically by the interpretations of them. 
1.4 The Characteristics of Post-Traditional Ru-Influenced Chinese Contexts 
The integrated evidence of relevant literature for Ruist influence in the contemporary 
world can be summarized into three main features:  
(1) The influence of a post-traditional form of Ruism persists, although it might weaken 
in part due to modernization, industrialization, and external cultural influences (such 
as democracy and egalitarianism);25  
(2) Its influence varies because of changes in geographical location, ethnographic 
background, levels of education, socio-economic status, age, and gender;26 
(3) The majority of ordinary Chinese people are inspired in their daily language use, 
mental habits and behavioural customs by this post-traditional expression of Ruism, 
even if they have had little or no Ruist education, and so cannot self-consciously 
recognize the origins of special sayings or explanations, specific mental habits and 
behavioural customs as traceable to Ruist positions and interpretations.27 
So the question remains: What kind of traditions and interpretations within the Ruist 
traditions are actually influencing and being ingrained in the contemporary or post-
traditional Chinese cultural contexts after 1911? Moreover, considering the constant 
changes that Ruist teachings have endured throughout Chinese and other histories, there 
                                                
25 David Y. F. Ho and Kang T. K. (1984), Yang Kuoshu (1986a; 1994:127–9), Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi 
(1988), Yang Kuoshu et al. (1988:173), Metzger (1988), Yeh Kuanghui (1997), David Y. F. Ho (1996), 
Hwang Kwangkuo (1999:178–81), Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford (2003:225), Chang Yutzung and Chu 
Yunhan (2004:22), Lù Luò 陸洛 et al. (2006:244, 267), Yan Yunxiang (2011) and Jīn Càncàn 金燦燦 et 
al. (2011:622). 
26 David Y. F. Ho and Kang T. K. (1984), Yang Kuoshu (1986a; 1994:127–9), Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi 
(1988), Metzger (1988), Yang Kuoshu et al. (1988), Zhuāng Yàojiā 莊耀嘉 and Yang Kuoshu (1989), 
David Y. F. Ho (1994; 1996), Yeh Kuanghui (1997), Lù Luò 陸洛 et al. (2006), Angel N.M. Leung et al. 
(2010), and Jīn Càncàn 金燦燦 et al. (2011). 
27 Liu Shuhsien (1996b:85) and F22. 
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must surely be a plurality of interpretations of Ruist traditions that do not follow classical 
forms (such as those found in the Classic of Filial Piety). 28  For the purpose of 
differentiation and further discussion, therefore, I would suggest on the basis of an 
integration of many scholars’ studies,29 that the phrase post-traditional Ru-influenced 
Chinese (PTRIC) persons indicates those post-traditional Chinese persons whose mental 
habits and behavioural customs are more of the small folk Ruist tradition mentioned 
above and influenced by a Ru-based, or Ru-derived, cultural heritage.30 Some are Ru-
inspired explicitly because they consciously adopt orthodox or classical version of Ruist 
teachings for their own expression; and they claim or sense Ruism consciously as the 
source of their own expressions as a direct inspiration. Many others are only Ru-
influenced implicitly because they neither necessarily adopt any orthodox or classical 
version of Ruist teachings for their own expression, nor do they claim or sense Ruism 
consciously as the source of their own expressions as a direct inspiration.31 Such Ru-
influenced persons take some common Ruist value system or worldview for granted but 
without dictating how the influence came, such as performance-emphasized moral self-
cultivation, hierarchical social structure (or power distance and gender-bias), and a 
                                                
28 Lín Ānwú 林安梧 (1997:70f.) points out that contemporary Chinese intellectuals often disregard the 
pluralistic traditions of Ruism. 
29 Amborse Y. C. King (1992:166), Lin Anwu (1995:2), Peng Lipchung (1995), Jiang Qing (2003 quoted 
in Chen, Hongyi 2009:website), and Zhōu Cuìshān 周翠珊 (2006:website). 
30  Roderick MacFarquhar (1980) and Peter Berger (1988:7–8) use ‘post-Confucian’ and ‘Confucian-
derived’ to describe Chinese cultural settings, which are cited by Tu Weming (1998c:134) later. Tu 
(2008c:96 n.6) also equates ‘New[-]Confucian’ to ‘Post-Confucian’, the meanings of both of which seem 
to me contradicting each other because he claims New Ruism as the third epoch of the great orthodox 
tradition of Ruist spirit but post-Ruism indicates a secularized, non-orthodox from of Ruist tradition. 
However, post-traditional Ru-influenced might serve the purposes of this research in a clearer and more 
precise way because it refers to the contemporary Chinese setting on the basis of a self-conscious historical 
awareness of the ideological shift in the way Ruism is presented after 1911. 
31 These features can also be seen in Ru-influenced Japanese society (de Vos 1993:130). 
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relation-based (or collectivistic)32 self (Nielsen n.d.:5, 16f.).33 But some Ru-inspired ones 
might consciously adopt a post-traditional mode of Ruist expression without even being 
conscious of their own more liberal interpretation of Ruist tradition, that is to some extent 
a twisted and refractory form of the better (or more orthodox or classical) Ruist sub-
tradition,. Since Ru-influenced Chinese people would normally (in the sense of the term) 
include Ru-inspired Chinese, PTRIC in this thesis includes Ru-inspired ones. 
2. The Research Problem: A Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts  
2.1 Ruist Contributions in PTRIC Contexts 
Ruism has contributed to education, the establishment of family relationships and social 
order through building fundamental relationships in a society based on:  
(1) a social ethics highly emphasizing ‘responsibility’ (Broadbent 2010:18) or 
‘obligation’ (Tong, Cheekiong 2007:115);34 
(2) the nurture of an ‘attitude of valuing diligence, integrity’ (Liu, Shuhsien 1996a:111) 
and ‘loyalty, dedication … commitment’ through intensifying ‘identification with the 
organization and one’s role’ in it (Kahn 1979:122);35 
(3) the exploration of the value of cultivated humaneness (rén 仁) and the reality of the 
self through the cultivation of ‘moral greatness’ (Ching, Julia 1993b:90).  
                                                
32 The Oxford English Dictionary gives different nuanced definitions for individualist and individualistic 
as adjectives. Individualist denotes the stronger meaning of individualism: ‘Relating to or characterized by 
the habit or principle of being independent and self-reliant’ or ‘Relating to or denoting a social theory 
favouring freedom of action for individuals over collective or state control’ (Oxford Dictionaries 2016c) 
while Individualistic refers to: ‘More interested in individual people than in society as a whole’ or ‘Marked 
by or expressing individuality; unconventional’ (Oxford Dictionaries 2016d). Oxford English Dictionary 
(2016a) defines the adjective collectivist as ‘Relating to the practice or principle of giving a group priority 
over each individual in it’. But it does not give the adjective collectivistic under the word collectivist any 
additional definition. Based on the nuanced differences between individualist and individualistic, in this 
thesis I use collectivist in differentiating it from collectivistic. Collectivist is used to emphasize the 
collectivist-oriented society, relationships, or selfhood that are harmful to the development of personality 
concerned by social psychologists. Collectivistic denotes a general and neutral meaning.  
33 See also Shenkar and Ronen (1987:574), Lockett (1988:486–90), and Helen Lee (2006:16, 23). 
34 See also Wang Qian et al. (2007:216), Mullis (2008), and Rhyne (2014:website). 
35 See also Wang Qian et al. (2007:216) and Rhyne (2014:website). 
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The fundamental concerns of Ruism strongly value ‘humanism’, ‘social 
relationships’ and ‘reciprocity’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:374). Undoubtedly, they contribute 
to maintaining ‘a warm human feeling between people’ (ibid.) in what has become a more 
materialized and individualistic modern world (Hang, Lin 2011:443–4).36 Accordingly, 
Ruist ideology, especially the attributes of Ruist ‘collectivism’ and hierarchical society, 
is assumed to be better fitted to ‘the age of mass industrialization’ than ‘western [or 
modern European, more precisely] individualism’ (MacFarquhar 1980:71, eo). 37 
Undoubtedly, such a positive appraisal and praise for Ruism is affirmed by a vast number 
of Chinese people, Chinese and foreign scholars in different fields, and many East Asian 
people and scholars, such as Lin Siqi (1997 in Lin, Siqi et al. 1997:7).38 
2.2 Acquired Relational Self in PTRIC Contexts 
2.2.1 The Characteristics of PTRIC Self 
Nevertheless, the impression that Chinese persons are inscrutable can often be 
experienced by foreigners and even among the Chinese persons themselves (Smith 
1890:265–85);39 and very few Chinese people would disagree that Chinese people are 
very sensitive to being scrutinized by others. In general, Chinese people are especially 
sensitive about being evaluated by their superiors because they desire to be seen as 
performing well, thereby generating a positive impression.40 Although this tendency of 
                                                
36 See also Tu Weiming (1985:12, 58, 67) and Yeh Kuanghui (2003:67–9, 77–9). 
37 It is hypothesized first by Herman Kahn (1979:117–26) that Ruist ethics is a key factor in contributing 
to and explaining the economic miracle of East Asian countries (‘post-Confucian hypothesis’) (Berger 
1988:7). See also Ambrose Y. C. King and Peter J. L. Man (1979), Metzger (1988), Tu Weiming ed. (1996; 
1998c:134–5), Song Youngbae 宋榮培 (2006:237–40), and Levi (2013). 
38 See also Choong Cheepang 鍾志邦 (p. Zhōng Zhìbāng) (1999). 
39 See also Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:511) and Lín Yì 林藝 (n.d.:website). 
40 This kind of behaviour can be also found in non-Chinese contexts (Smith, David W. 1983) and is 
confirmed theoretically by Daniel Goleman (1946-) (1996). Goleman points out that when men are not in 
reality strong enough to meet the high expectations placed on them by their society, the only way for them 
to survive is to hide and deny their weakness, inadequacy, and dark side, even to themselves (ibid.:91-127). 
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pretending to be stronger and better must be common behaviour among women and men 
in all cultures (Tournier 1957:12, 44–5), it is worse among Chinese, Japanese and Korean 
men influenced by the social values and ideology of Ruism.41 We might describe this 
characteristic as a self being repressed, or a self being forced to wear a mask in front of 
others, in order to please them (Zhanglaoshi Yuekan 1987).42 Consequently, in a conflict 
situation, Chinese persons may tend to lack of honesty or be less-than-rigorous honesty 
because they used to hide their true feelings, opinions, and intentions in order to maintain 
the harmony of relationships on the surface, but disclose their true thinking, reactions, 
and even plans to work against another only under the table, in secret.43 
Wm. Theodore de Bary (1919-) (1996:x) remarks in his book, The Trouble with 
Confucianism (1996), on the distrustful fear of the young generations in Singapore and 
South Korea due to the possible advancing authoritarian dominance displayed by Lee 
Kuanyew 李光耀 (p. Lǐ Guāngyào) (1923-2015), the former prime minister of Singapore, 
and by the Korean government, through promoting and reviving Ruism.44 The existence 
of such fear reveals that features of social imposition and authoritarian hierarchy in Ruism 
are still issues for PTRIC persons45 as well as Koreans. Therefore, the argument of this 
thesis is intended neither to deny the positive contribution of the Ru-based cultural 
heritage, including the relational self, to Chinese society, nor to compare its positive and 
negative influences.46 Instead, this thesis will focus on examining whether or not post-
                                                
41 This is perhaps even more prominent among modern Japanese and Koreans than among modern Chinese 
men because they are more deeply affected by Ruism (Tu, Weiming 2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yī, Jùnqīng 
衣俊卿 2009:11). The evidence of this phenomenon among Japanese is briefly described in A-B. 
42 See also Hwang Tsungi 黃宗儀 (p. Huáng Zōngyí) (2017:12f.). 
43 See also Jack (1993), Turner (1999:78–83), and Helen Lee (2006:66-7). 
44 See also Cho Hyunyi (2000:318). 
45 Cf. Doyle (2006:website). See also Ho, David Yaufai 何友暉 (p. Hé Yǒuhuī) (1981:89, 93–4). 
46 For there are always two attributes of the interpersonal relationships in PTRIC relational ethics: the 
‘reciprocal’ one which ‘represents beneficial effects’ and the ‘authoritarian’ one which ‘represents harmful 
ones’ (Yeh, Kuanghui 2003:79). See also Singh et al. (1962:126, 130), David Yaufai Ho and Lee Lingyü 
(1974), Lau Sing and Cheung Pingchung (1987), David Y. F. Ho (1996:165), Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford 
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traditional New Ruism, in the light of Tu Weiming’s account, contributes to the problem 
of the RFS resulting from PTRIC relational selfhood as criticized by those scholars in 
different disciplines. 
2.2.2 PTRIC Relational Selfhood 
The Ruist self is explained ‘as a centre of relationships, by Tu Weiming 杜維明 (1940-) 
(p. Dù Wéimíng),47 a Contemporary New Ruist.48 Such a kind of self is different from the 
individual-oriented or individualistic self. In Jess Fleming’s interpretation (2002:184), 
the self in Ruism invariably subsists ‘in defining relationships with others’. The German 
Sinologist, Wolfgang Bauer (1930-1997), while affirming the individuality of the Ruist 
self, finds unequivocally that such individuality cannot be detached from its neighbouring 
relationships.49 The American Sinologist and historian of China, Derk Bodde (1909-
2003), argues that the individual in Ruism is ‘subordinated’ to society (Bodde 1957:66). 
The Chinese historian, Sun Lungkee 孫隆基 (p. Sūn Lóngjī) (1945-) (1983, reprinted in 
2004:7), also indicates that the meaning of ‘a person’ in Ruism is based on the relationship 
with others or precisely the relationship of ‘two persons’ within the five dyadic 
relationships50 (ibid.), namely ‘wǔlún’ ｢五倫｣according to  (the Mencius 《孟子》 {p. 
Mèngzǐ}, 3A:4): father and son, ruler and subject, husband and wife, elder brother and 
young brother, and friend to friend (to be explained in detail in later chapters). Ruist 
                                                
(2003), Chuang Yaochia (2005), and Angel N.M. Leung et al. (2010). Even the authoritarian attribute of 
the interpersonal relationships in post-traditional Ruist relational ethics is not all dysfunctional or negative. 
It might be positive in ‘reducing parent-child conflict and conveying ‘coordination and order’ in enhancing 
‘interpersonal relationships’ (Yeh, Kuanghui and Bedford 2003:226). See also Leung Kwok et al. (1998), 
Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford (2004:141), Chuang Yaochia (2005), and Jīn Càncàn 金燦燦 et al. (2011). 
47 Tu Weiming (1985:12–14, 125–8). 
48 Tu Weiming is referred to as part of the ‘third generation (1980-)’ of Modern New Ruists all of whom, 
including for example, Liu Shuhsien and Cheng Chungying 成中英 (p. Chéng Zhōngyīng) (1935-), are still 
alive (Bresciani 2001:11–31). Therefore, the phrase Contemporary New Ruists used in this thesis 
specifically distinguishes this third generation from the previous two generations of Modern New Ruists. 
49 Wolfgang Bauer (1990 in Fleming 2002:188 n.18). See also Zhong Weiqiang (2005b). 
50 Or ‘the five cardinal relationships’ (Wong, Melvin W. 2001:2). 
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tradition in its various forms, as manifested above, always plays a dominating role in the 
core development of Chinese people and so this raises the question of the place and extent 
of individual autonomy in Chinese culture (Yú, Déhuì 余德慧 1987b:3).51  
2.3 A Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts  
2.3.1 The RFS-Related Characteristics in PTRIC Contexts 
Melvin W. Wong (2001:2), a Chinese clinical psychologist, distinguishes five main 
factors of Ru-based ‘cultural heritage’ and examines their impact in the developmental 
process of the self and in ‘personality disorders’.52 These factors include wulun, ‘filial 
piety, gender-bias, shame and guilt complexes, and co-dependency’ (ibid.). I will argue 
that in all cases, perhaps except that of gender-bias, these factors are manifestly related 
to the strong ideology of fulfilling filial piety, namely jìnxiàodào/xiàoshùn 盡孝道/孝順. 
For this strong ideology enhances the motivation and obligation of Chinese people to 
pursue achievement in order to please or glorify their parents and seniors in the family as 
well as the ruling elite, and so to engage in unquestioning obedience to them, even to the 
severest degree of giving up their own selves (Liu, Shuhsien 1996a:111).53 Gender-bias 
not only makes men more important than women (to be explained later), but also in Ruism 
makes men bear heavier cultural burdens than women, and so tends towards the 
repression of female creativity and leadership (Yeh, Minghua and Yang, Kuoshu 
1997:210f.). The above two factors, filial piety and gender-bias, consequently contribute 
                                                
51 Although this core is transformable, there are ‘wénhuà yuánxíng’ ｢文化原型｣ (cultural prototypes) 
within it that cannot be erased totally (Yu, Dehui 1987b:3, eo) (ibid.:3, eo). These cultural prototypes form 
the putatively unchangeable ‘xīnlǐ yuánxíng’ ｢心理原型｣ (psychological prototypes) of the Chinese people 
(ibid.). These cultural and psychological prototypes or ‘xīnlǐ jiégòu’ ｢心理結構｣ (psychological structures) 
(Lǐ, Zéhòu 李澤厚 1980:77) are also recognized by some other scholars. 
52  Although he does not specify what context Ru-based cultural heritage denotes, I infer from his 
contemporary Chinese audience that this should be PTRIC contexts. 
53 See also Wilson and Pusey (1982:206), Liào Huīyīng 廖輝英 (1991:7), Yeh Minghua and Yang Kuoshu 
(1997:195), and Harriet Evans (2012:128). 
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to ‘the permanent dominance of parents over children and of men over women’ (Ching, 
Julia 1993b:90). Shame and guilt complexes and co-dependency are the products of the 
first three of these five main factors. Shame and guilt complexes prompt, or even force, 
persons to pretend to be something other than they know themselves to be, or to wear a 
mask in order to appear stronger (than they are in reality) and so hide their weakness (as 
they are in reality) (Zhái, Xuéwěi 翟學偉 2010:181–203).54 Co-dependence is also a way 
of hiding one’s weakness in a relationship (Xie, Yao 2005:13–15).55 
We must recognize first that Ru-based cultural heritage is identified as being a 
complicating factor, but not the only one, related to personality disorders. Taking Melvin 
W. Wong’s aforementioned five chief factors of Ru-based culture as an example, by 
promoting the five cardinal relationships, Ruism not only advocates the practice of filial 
piety, which is the root source of many other unequal hierarchical relationships 
(Evasdottir 2005:31–8),56 but also provides a general justification for gender-bias, as well 
as for co-dependency, which may lead to severe shame and guilt complexes (Slote 
1998:44). As mentioned above, all these five factors also interweave and contribute to 
aspects of relational selfhood. Moreover, these factors more or less prompt, or even force, 
persons into a RFS through wearing a mask in order to hide their weakness, inadequacy, 
and dark side, and appear stronger, nicer, better, and more moral in the presence of the 
                                                
54 See also Lín Lìyún 林麗雲 (1987:6), Yu Dehui (1987b:6), and Schwalbe (2009:149). 
55 The Chinese term Xie Yao (2005:13–15) uses is ‘hù lài’「互賴」which is translated from English as 
‘interdependent’ (Gao, Ge and Ting-Toomey 1998:9–12) instead of co-dependent. These two English terms 
in strict psychological speaking refer to different meanings in explaining interpersonal relationships, 
interdependency denoting the healthy and co-dependency the unhealthy one (Lancer 2013:website). But 
what Xie Yao describes as the interdependent Chinese self in its relations to others and the collective is 
similar to the characteristics of co-dependency pointed out by Melvin W. Wong. I argue that there is an 
overlapping range between interdependency and co-dependency rather than demarcating two opposite 
zones. Concerning the discussion of interdependence in relation to collectivism, see also Sampson (1977), 
Smith (1978:1062), Waterman (1981), Markus and Kitayama (1991b), and Gao Ge and Ting-Toomey 
(1998:9–12). Since the definition and usage of the term interdependency (or interdependent) are not 
consistent among scholars, especially in different disciplines, in order to avoid any confusion, I will use the 
phrase unhealthy interdependency (or unhealthily interdependent) to denote negatively interdependent 
interpersonal relationships, which in fact mean co-dependency in strict psychological sense. 
56 See also Rhyne (2014:website) and Hofstede and Bond (1988:8). 
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people with whom they have any of the wulun relationships except the friend to friend 
relationship. About the feature of masking in PTRIC contexts, Zhai Xuewei (2010:182),57 
a Chinese sociologist (in social psychology), explains:  
 In the relationship between the mask and the self, the face (mask) of Chinese people has a 
bidirectional function: showing off self and defending self bidirectionally, which reflects 
concretely the dialectical relationship between face (mask) (liǎnmiàn 臉面) and the self. But 
in reality, it leads to the alienation of face (mask) (lianmian 臉面) and the self, no matter in 
what kind of direction it functions; and at the same time, it makes its operation increasingly 
difficult without a group. This kind of dependent relationship makes the success or failure of 
the individual face (external prestige) (lianmian 臉面) become its group’s face (external 
prestige) (lianmian 臉面). Chinese persons in this state began to pay attention to situational 
factors, learning how to say and act depending on different occasions, so that they can defend 
or show off their own face (mask) (liǎn 臉) and face (external prestige) (miànzi 面子) while 
giving others face (external prestige) (mianzi 面子).58 
In such a repressed behavioural custom of masking, the expression of ‘hypocrisy 
and false-heartedness’, 59  including so-called ‘false humility’, 60  is the content of 
formalism which is intensified by Ruism (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:344).61 
2.3.2 The Problem of PTRIC Repressed Form of Self  
Studies from various fields disclose this RFS as a very important feature of relational 
selfhood arising from a Ru-based cultural heritage. Such a Ruist RFS is even criticized 
by some psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, and theologians, as a 
significant factor contributing to personality disorders or other psychological and social 
                                                
57 All the three Chinese words liǎnmiàn 臉面, liǎn 臉, and miànzi 面子 are literally translated as face. But 
their meanings might not be the same and vary according to different contexts. For example, mianzi 面子
can be literally translated as face but means external prestige. Therefore, I translate them in this paragraph 
according to the context but not literally. In Zhai Xuewei’s study, one of the meanings of lianmian is very 
close to the English word mask (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:182). Therefore, the concept of masking in the Western 
social psychological studies is closest to the concept of lianmian in Ru-influenced Chinese context 
(ibid.:183-90). About the discussion of nuance of the differences between lianmian, lian, and mianzi, see 
Hu Hsienchin (1944), Cheng Chungying (1986), Zhai Xuewei (2006; 2010), and Wei Xiaohong and Li 
Qingyuan (2013). 
58 See also Hsu Jing (1985:100) and Harter (1997:100). 
59 Wang Minglei (2013:ii). 
60 Helen Lee (2006:62) explains what ‘false humility’ means as that ‘[O]n the opposite end of the spectrum 
from excessive authoritarianism lies another [Ru-]cultural tendency: … displaying what appears to be 
humility in the guise of deference, deflection of compliments or resistance to … speaking out on critical 
issues’. 
61 See also Kuo Chienlin and Kavanagh (1994:555). 
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problems (Wong, Melvin W. 2001:2).62 Therefore, the RFS becomes a significant and 
fundamental research problem in this context. Scholars’ criticisms of this problem will be 
demonstrated in more detail in C2.  
The research of Zhai Xuewei (2010:182) discloses that the RFS leads to alienation 
between the internal self-reflective and emotional experience,63 ‘feelings, intentions, and 
beliefs’ (Gergen 2000:203)64 of the self, and its external social mask(s). In other words, 
the RFS denotes that one is untruthful to both one’s selfhood and one’s sociality, i.e. self-
deception (see C2S1.2). This RFS essentially belongs within a group setting because it is 
closely related to some Ru-influenced Chinese cultural features: familism, hierarchical 
society, Ruist relational ethics and ‘jūnzi réngé’ ｢君子人格｣  (the noble human’s 
personality, namely the noble human’s moral self-cultivation) (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:183–
90). For the purpose of discussing this research problem in this thesis, the problem of the 
RFS will always denote a repressed mental habit, a repressed social behavioural custom, 
and a repressed tendency in PTRIC contexts in which one’s true feelings (including 
emotional experience) and thoughts (including self-reflective intentions and beliefs) are 
to some extent suppressed by repressive social imposition. Besides, the self in its 
repressed form is understood and discussed in the social psychological sense because it 
is shaped by way of response, reaction, and adaptation in its cultural and social contexts. 
                                                
62 See also Winnicott (1965:133), June Ock Yum (1988:386), Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:510), and Zhèng 
Zhèngbó 鄭正博 (1990:172). 
63 Vannini and Franzese (2008:1621). See also Francis L. K. Hsu (1971), Tu Weiming (1985), and Hall 
(1994:217). 
64 In empirical research on ‘true self-concept’ and ‘meaning in life’, true self-concept is defined as ‘those 
characteristics that you possess and would like to express socially, but are not always able to, for whatever 




3. Research Questions 
3.1 Alternatives for Transforming the Repressed Self among PTRIC  
Some non-Ruist scholars also have presented the need for a modification of 
(contemporary) Ruism, 65  especially in its expressions of filial piety, including the 
application of the ‘dual framework of filial piety’ promoted by Yeh Kuanghui 葉光輝 (p. 
Yè Guānghuī) (2003:73),66 and the ‘new principle of filial piety’ presented by Yang 
Kuoshu 楊國樞 (p. Yáng Guóshū) (1986b).67 Some Ruist scholars give different insights 
in their interpretations in Ruism, for example, Leung Insing (1951-) and James Legge. 
However, these modifications of Ruism focus on how to modify the way or degree in 
applying it pragmatically to meet the needs of modernization within Chinese societies.68 
They do not reinterpret Ruist relational selfhood comprehensively in terms of the RFS.  
However, very few Ruist scholars beyond Henry Rosemont, Jr. (2012), Roger T. 
Ames (1947-) (2006:312–41), and David L. Hall (1937–2001) (1998) have ever 
recognized, addressed, or dealt with this question. Most traditional and post-traditional 
Ruists have never discussed these issues to any extent (Zhái, Xuéwěi 翟學偉 2010:204) 
— though a minority (like Tu Weiming and Liu Shuhsien) have discussed it briefly. 
Nevertheless, Tu (1985:13) indicates that the problem of the RFS is not caused by 
orthodox Ruist relational ethics.69 He argues that the relational selfhood criticized by the 
                                                
65 Lily Huang 黃囇莉 (p. Huáng Shàilì) (2013). 
66 Or ‘dual filial piety model’ (Yeh, Kuanghui and Bedford 2003; Yeh, Kuanghui 2009a). 
67 Other scholars who also advocate a modification of Ruist filial piety/Ruism are Ruì Yìfū 芮逸夫 (1983), 
Yu Dehui (1987a), Yú Jìbīn 俞繼斌 (1941-) (1998), and Wáng Dí 王滌 (2004). 
68 This can be also observed in the empirical survey. For example, a survey by Chuang Yaochia (2005) 
finds Ruist positive impact on Chinese ‘family harmony and well-being’ in Taiwan. But the Ruist relational-
model is a modified one for fitting the need of modernization of Chinese society. 
69 At the very end of this research, I found that the New Ruist Liu Shuhsien (1988:263–4, 268–9) identifies 
this problem of the RFS in post-imperial Ruism and describes it as hypocrisy, wearing masks, and ‘yǐn è 
yáng shàn’ 「隱惡揚善」 (concealing the faults of others and praising their good points) in traditional and 
post-traditional Chinese societies. However, I have not yet found his further comprehensive discussions for 
solving this problem.  
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scholars as the cause of the RFS (to be discussed in C2) is the one formed in the small 
folk tradition of Ruism that is not the typical Ruist tradition.70 If what Tu argues is true, 
Tu’s New Ruist (or post-traditional Ruist)71 relational selfhood can be considered first as 
an alternative for solving the problem of the RFS resulting from relational selfhood in 
PTRIC contexts. Besides, what other alternatives are there that should be considered? 
3.1.1 Tu Weiming’s New Ruist Relational Selfhood 
Tu (1985:13) Weiming as a contemporary New Ruist and an internationally famous 
scholar claims to be an orthodox follower of the great tradition of Ruist refined 
intellectual spirit.72 He (2014b:website) is one of the promoters73 who advocates the 
universal value of Ruism. Among contemporary Ruists including all three generations of 
New Ruists, such as Liáng Shùmíng, Mou Tsungsan, Xú Fùguān 徐復觀 (1903-82), Táng 
Jūnyì 唐君毅 (1909-78), Liu Shuhsien, and Cheng Chungying, Tu is probably the only 
one  who explores and delves into the issue of Ruist selfhood at some depth.  
Additionally, Tu is probably the most representative Ruist who is open to other 
religions, including Christianity, while still being an influential promoter of contemporary 
New Ruism in Anglophone circles (Liu, Shuhsien 2000:560). Because of his openness, 
he expects less conflict between other religions and New Ruism, and recently promoted 
in two public lectures74 the historical and cultural realities supporting the presence of both 
Ruified Christians and Ruified Muslims in the contemporary world as some of the major 
                                                
70  The first generation New Ruist Liáng Shùmíng 梁漱溟  (Zhèng, Dàhuá 鄭大華 2007) and the 
contemporary Ruist Zhèng Zhìmíng 鄭志明 (1991) also maintain a similar argument. 
71 In order to avoid confusing readers by the two different phrases with similar appearances: post-traditional 
Ruist relational selfhood and post-traditional Ru-influenced relational selfhood, I will use only the phrase 
New Ruist relational selfhood in place of the phrase post-traditional Ruist relational selfhood in this thesis. 
72 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:xxiv). 
73 Liu Shuhsien is another promoter (1998a; 2002). See also Peter K. H. Lee (1991:69). 
74 One in Beijing at the Fourth World Congress of Sinology, 6 September 2014, and the other in Oxford at 
the Oxford University Jin-Long Philosophy Society, 18 October 2014. 
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expressions of contemporary Ruism. Therefore, as a post-traditional and post-secular 
Ruist scholar, Tu’s interpretation of the relational self in the context of post-traditional 
New Ruism is worth studying in order to explore how a contemporary post-traditional 
New Ruist responds to the challenges raised about the relational self as it is developed 
within his own account of a Ru-based cultural heritage. 
As I will describe in detail in C4, Tu (1985:8) tries to defend an orthodox Ruist 
understanding of relational selfhood in answering those who criticize the problematic 
collectivist Ruist selfhood (Bellah n.d., cited in ibid.:7). From his vantage point, the 
orthodox Ruist tradition is merely a scapegoat for such criticisms. But do his arguments 
succeed in identifying significant differences in the characteristics of relational selfhood 
promoted by Ruist orthodoxy and distinguishing them from those of the small folk 
tradition influenced by Ruism in terms of causing the RFS criticized by those scholars? 
If the answer to these questions is positive, Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood would be 
a suitable alternative and the first priority for solving the problem of the RFS within the 
theoretical context where a PTRIC relational selfhood is applicable.  
3.1.2 Jürgen Moltmann’s Social Trinitarian Relational Selfhood 
As mentioned in the beginning, regarding the Ruification in contemporary Chinese 
societies, both within and without Chinese Christian churches, there are some significant 
and inescapable challenges related to PTRIC contexts that the majority of Chinese 
churches most frequently face, no matter whether in fellowship, evangelism, or justifying 
the Christian faith to Chinese audiences.75 Whether or not there is a Christian relational 
                                                
75 For example: (1) The main reason Chinese people refuse the gospel of Christianity follows from the 
widespread view that all religions are equally good, since all of them exhort people to do good. The 
assumption is that Christianity is Western (Tong, Cheekiong 2007:8) whereas Ruism, Buddhism, and folk 
religion are Chinese. What is the benefit of switching to Christianity at the cost of betraying one’s Chinese 
or family culture and traditions, Ruism, Buddhism, or folk religion? This phenomenon is so common among 
Chinese people and thus a common issue discussed in Chinese missiology (Zhōng, Wěiqiáng 鍾偉強
2005a:14). (2) When Chinese people are interested in or have gone further and believed in Jesus Christ, the 
main barrier hindering them from being converted or baptized is the objection of their parents, family, and 
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selfhood that can transform this kind of RFS in PTRIC contexts is a very fundamental 
and significant question to be explored. 
Among the possible alternatives, including the concept of Tu’s New Ruist relational 
selfhood, another account of relational selfhood from the Christian ‘social trinitarian 
anthropology’ is presented in Jürgen Moltmann’s writings, mainly in his works The 
Trinity and the Kingdom of God (1981) and God in Creation (1985). Moltmann 
(1992b:256), through his social trinitarian anthropology, not only presents the possibility 
of a relational self76 (although he has not used this term) without losing its distinctiveness, 
but also maintains its necessity for expounding such a relationality between human 
beings.77 Moltmann and Pannenberg are contemporary pioneers in the Anglo-European 
Church tradition (including Protestant and Catholic Churches) who ‘inaugurate’ the step 
to argue for the social trinitarian doctrine and extend it to develop there interpretations of 
relational selfhood (Grenz 2001:16). According to Moltmann (1981:189), this concept of 
social Trinity can be trace back to ‘the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity’. There are other 
                                                
culture, involving the fear of being accused of being búxiào 不孝 (unfilial) or bèizǔ 背祖 (betraying 
ancestors) (Tong, Cheekiong 2007:10f.). This is also another phenomenon so common among Chinese 
people and thus a common issue discussed in Chinese missiology (Zhōng, Wěiqiáng 鍾偉強 2005a:14). 
This resistance from family is a factor used to explain the phenomena of the stagnant growth in the 
Taiwanese church during 1964-1979 (Zhào, Xīngguāng 趙星光 2014:106) and an extremely high 
proportion of those who have become Christians overseas gave up their faith on return to their home 
country. This phenomenon might also have contributed to the fast growth of churches in Taiwan in the prior 
period 1945-1965 after many Mainland Chinese left their families and moved to Taiwan at the end of the 
civil war of China (Zhao, Xingguang 2014:105) and the significant success of evangelism among overseas 
Chinese (see also Doyle 2005:website). (3) The repressed form of self resulting from Ru-influenced 
relational selfhood is also one of the reasons why Ruified Chinese Christians, especially men, find it harder 
to be connected intimately, mentored in spirituality and trained in discipleship (Lu, Kun 2010). See also Hu 
Zhiwei (2006:website) and Xi Wan (2009:website), and Prayer Team (2011:website). 
76 The doctrine of the imago Dei in Christian social trinitarian anthropology establishes ‘human persons 
being and becoming in relationship’ on the basis of ‘the unique trinitarian Persons in relationship’ and 
produces an understanding of ‘the human being as [a] reciprocating self’ (Balswick et al. 2005:30). Stanley 
J. Grenz (2001:302, 312) also affirms that ‘the new humanity in communion with the triune God’ in social 
trinitarian theological anthropology is a relational self, a ‘person in relationship’ as well as the ‘ecclesial 
self’ (namely the ‘social self’ in theology). This relational self is not only in relationship with God, but also 
with human others (Shults 2003:1–2). 
77 Joy Ann McDougall (2003:197) summarizes Moltmann’s argument as ‘[A] person neither appropriates 
nor possesses another, nor do the two become subject to one another. Rather each creates the space for the 
other person’s freedom to emerge’. 
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contemporary theologians who pay attention to the social model of the Trinity, but vary 
considerably in their interpretations.78 However, few of them, like Moltmann, develop a 
comprehensive social trinitarian anthropology (human selfhood) through the doctrine of 
the imago Dei based on social trinitarian theology. For example, Zizioulas’ (2004:141) 
discussions of his social trinitarian theology and anthropology are more based on an 
‘ontology of communion’ and Lacugna (1991:209-418) focuses more on the 
soteriological perspective of social trinitarianism. Moltmann (1981) is one of the few who 
presents the social Trinity from both historical79 and eschatological perspectives and 
shows its relevance to both the whole of theology and politics (Gresham 1993:326). His 
eschatological perspective of the social Trinity is very important in the becoming aspect 
of human selfhood in his interpretation of social trinitarian anthropology. Besides, 
Moltmann is probably the only social trinitarian theologian who is not only interested in 
understanding Chinese culture but also engages himself in dialoguing with Ruism and 
Daoism in his works (1989:87-101; 1998a; 2008b) and with Chinese theologians, Chinese 
philosophers, and scholars in other disciplines in person. It is notable that he has made at 
least eight academic visits to Taiwan and China, including a dialogue with Tu Weiming 
in China in 2011 (Lin, Honghsin 2002; Hóng, Liàng 洪亮 2011).  
The important feature of this concept is a relational selfhood embedded within a 
dynamic diversity in unity as well as a unity in diversity, namely maintaining relational 
                                                
78 British Anglican theologians (for example, W. Richmond, J. R. Illingworth, Charles F. D'Arcy, R. C. 
Moberly, C. C. J. Webb, Lionel Thornton, Leonard Hodgson, and Charles Lowery) in early twentieth 
century (Gresham 1993:326), Joseph A. Bracken (1974b; 1985:24–5; 2002; 1991:123–39), Millard J. 
Erickson (1984:341), Catherine M. LaCugna (1985; 1991), Kallistos Ware (1986), Thomas F. Torrance 
(1988), Leonardo Boff (1988; 2000:41–2), Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. (1988; 1989), David Brown (1989), Ted 
Peters (1993:144–5), Colin E. Gunton (1993; 1999; 2003), Richard Swinburne (1994), Stanley J. Grenz 
(1994; 2001), Alan J. Torrance (1996), Shults (1997; 2003), Miroslav Volf (1998a; 1998b), Thomas Morris 
(2001:210–18), Pamela Cooper-White (2007:67–94), John Heywood Thomas (1995), Declan Marmion 
(2004), Wolfhart Pannenberg (2004:262), Balswick, King, and Reimer (2005), Tim Chester (2005), Dwight 
J. Zscheile (2007), David H. McIlroy (2008), Theodor Damian (2011:61, 71–2), and Ronald J. Sider 
(2012:34–40, 57–9). See also Bracken and Suchoki (1997). 
79 Moltmann’s historical perspective of the Trinity is not about the history of dogma or historical theology. 
It denotes a notion of the triune God who engages in history and indeed possesses a history of His own. 
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unity without sacrificing personal diversity and allowing for personal diversity without 
sacrificing the dynamics of its basis in relational unity (see C6). Therefore, Moltmann 
presents and argues that this concept of relational selfhood shaped by social trinitarian 
anthropology provides a healthier selfhood, namely balanced relationships between the 
individual self and the group, compared to the problematic modern individualist 80 
selfhood. Can this social trinitarian relational selfhood interpreted and presented by 
Moltmann be argued or justified to be another suitable alternative for solving the problem 
of the RFS within the theoretical context of a PTRIC relational selfhood? Could it be a 
beneficial resource for modifying the form and expression of PTRIC relational selfhood? 
3.1.3 Possibilities of Tu Weiming in Conjunction with Jürgen Moltmann 
There exist many differences between the main traditions within Ruism and Christianity, 
for example, their ontologies, their concepts about human nature, and their solutions for 
human suffering. Although comparisons could and can still be made through dialogues 
in different forms (Pfister 2000:69–79), it is not easy to find intersections to have an 
essential dialogue between them (Liú, Qīngpíng 劉清平 2012:5f.). Could ethics and the 
transformation of humans be such an intersection? 81 Lǐ Yúnquè 李雲雀 (2002:60–66) in 
her study of the uniqueness of Christian ethics points out that ethics is a core value in 
Ruist context, and so can serve as a common ground for dialogue between the main 
                                                
80  Moltmann, as some other scholars, tends to generalize and homogenize accounts about the actual 
pluralities existing within Western civilization, and characterizes individualist selfhood as if all Westerners 
think and act in the same way. From an empirical point of view, this is blatantly false, for example, 
individualism. Modern individualism is related to European humanist forms of Christianity (or even to 
ancient Christianity and Roman Philosophers, such as Cicero, that provided its elements) (Hayek 1944:14), 
but not to the West as a whole. It is notable that from Moltmann’s (1981:199) viewpoint, the development 
of ‘[European] individualism’ started since ‘the social doctrine of the Trinity’ disappeared. 
81 See also Preece (2004:2). 
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traditions in Ruist and Christian contexts.82 Zhōu Cuìshān 周翠珊 (2006:website) argues 
that, besides ethics as an intersection, the dialogue is more feasible between main 
traditions of Christianity and the small folk tradition than other ancient forms of Ruism. 
In my own case, after I found that the concept of selfhood in Christian social trinitarian 
anthropology is also relational and transformational, this dialogue became much more 
feasible and meaningful.83 
When no common ground for a dialogue between Christian theology and non-
Christian disciplines appears, the theologian Langdon Gilkey argues that secular 
experience, for example human nature, provides a common ground for starting a 
dialogue. 84  The ultimate concern 85  about common secular experience makes such a 
dialogue possible. Furthermore, any critical dialogue cannot ‘do full justice to’ both 
Ruism and Christianity without involving ultimate concern.86 I agree with Gilkey. The 
RFS is exactly a common secular experience among PTRIC societies. Behind PTRIC 
relational selfhood and relational ethics by which the RFS is shaped, any ultimate concern 
about the RFS involves the worldview related to religiousness, ontology and cosmology, 
                                                
82 See also Fàn Bìhuì 范皕誨 (1925:435–6), Lew T. T. 劉廷芳 (p. Liú Tíngfāng) (1931:13–15), Julia Ching 
(1981), Liu Shuhsien (2001), Leung Kalun 梁家麟 (p.Liáng Jiālín) (2003:193–5), and Sūn Xiǎopíng 孫小
平 (2010). 
83 Two years later, I found support from other scholars. For example, both Zhōu Wěichí 周偉馳 (1999:75), 
a researcher in Christianity, and Edwin C. Hui 許志偉 (p. Xǔ Zhìwěi) (1998), a theologian, have asserted 
that the essential dialogue between Christianity with its trinitarian doctrine and Ruism with its promotion 
of cultivated humaneness becomes possible by means of the common ground found between the relation-
based and love-based social doctrine of the Trinity. Besides, Lauren Pfister (2001:348) also points out that 
both Ruism and Christian traditions are highly interested in the transformation of individual person towards 
sagehood or sanctification. See also Edwin C. Hui and Chen Rongyi 陳榮毅 (p. Chén Róngyì) (1998), 
Edwin C. Hui (2000:65), Tang, Andres S. K. (2000), Joseph Hongzhang Bai (2013:203f.), and Simon Chan 
(2014:42–3). 
84 Gilkey (1969, cited in Huáng, Lùpíng 黃路蘋 2016). See also Gilkey (1978). 
85 Gilkey (1978:489) proves through his own experience living in a Japanese ‘internment-camp’ in China 
that there is always an ultimate and transcendental dimension, the ‘original sin’ of humankind in his case, 
in common secular experience which secularism cannot understand, explain, or escape from. The 
sociologist Peter Berger (1929-2017) (1999:13) also highlights such a ‘religious impulse’ in pursuing 
transcendental meanings of life within the secularized world from an ‘anthropological’ aspect. 
86 Peter K. H. Lee and Lai, Panchiu (2000:111). 
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according to Gilkey.87 Therefore, the problem of the RFS provides a common ground for 
a dialogue between the main traditions of Ruism and Christianity, especially between Tu 
Weiming and Moltmann, who both articulate their concern about this issue (to be 
discussed in C3). 
Moreover, Tu (1990a:179–80) stresses that Ruist relational selfhood not only stays 
away from the problems of ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’, but also prevents 
itself from developing into ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’.88 In Moltmann’s trinitarian 
theological anthropology, the relational selfhood is not the separate and autonomous self 
developed in ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’, nor the soluble-in-relation self 
developed in ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ (see C6). Tu and Moltmann both claim 
their projects of the relational self constitute a synthesis of the dialectic ‘[modern Anglo-
European] individualism’ (as the thesis) and ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ (as the 
antithesis). Both of them also recognize that neither the collectivist selfhood nor 
individualist selfhood develops balanced relationships between the individual self and the 
group, namely a relationship of keeping one side intact without sacrificing the other side. 
Besides relational selfhood, these two international thinkers aver similar concerns in other 
various ways, for example, individual transformation (or ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ in 
Moltmann’s language),89 protecting human rights, criticizing ‘[modern Anglo-European] 
individualism’, and valuing dialogue between differences. But do both of these accounts 
of the relational self amount to the same thing? Whose account of the relational self 
successfully produces a synthesis of ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ and ‘[modern 
                                                
87 Gilkey (1969, cited in Huáng, Lùpíng 黃路蘋 2016). 
88 Tu Weiming tends to generalize and homogenize accounts about the actual pluralities existing within 
individualism and collectivism, too. See F78 above. Further explanation will be given in C4S4.5.1 and 
C8S2.2. Regarding different types of individualism and collectivism, consult Appendix 3. However, 
according to the individualists Tu (1990a:78) mentions in this work, it is modern Anglo-European 
individualism.  
89 Moltmann (1981:216f.). 
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Anglo-European] individualism’? Thus, it is meaningful and valuable to study these two 
accounts of the relational self, precisely because they are possible solutions for the 
predicament of relational selfhood in the contexts of PTRIC drawn from resources in 
different cultures and traditions. 
3.2 Research Questions and Framework 
3.2.1 Research Questions 
In researching for a solution to the problem of the RFS within the theoretical context of a 
PTRIC relational selfhood, the following main research question will guide our 
discussions: 
To what extent do Tu Weiming’s and Jürgen Moltmann’s conceptualizations of 
relational selfhood provide a suitable alternative or modified modern resource for 
solving the problem of the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the post-
traditional Ru-influenced Chinese relational selfhood? 
In order to explore and examine this research questions, two primary subsidiary 
questions will be explored and examined. They can be expressed as follows (while 
relevant secondary subsidiary questions will be pursued in following chapters): 
(1) To what extent is the conceptualization of the New Ruist Chinese relational selfhood 
presented by Tu Weiming a suitable alternative or modified modern resource for 
solving the problem of the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the 
post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese relational selfhood? 
(2) To what extent is the conceptualization of the social trinitarian relational selfhood 
presented by Jürgen Moltmann a suitable alternative or modified modern resource for 
solving the problem of the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the 
post-traditional Ru-influenced Chinese relational selfhood? 
Based on these main research question and two primary subsidiary questions, through 
comparing the doctrines and presuppositions of relational selfhood both in Tu Weiming’s 
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New Ruism and in Jürgen Moltmann’s social trinitarian theological anthropology in 
modern European and North American Christianity, this study may help to liberate 
Chinese Christians and non-Christians from the RFS. 
3.2.2 Research Framework 
In order to study the research problem and these main and primary subsidiary research 
questions, the main themes and framework of this research are divided into four topics 
according to their logical sequence as follows (with relevant chapter numbers indicated 
in parentheses at the end of each topic) and illustrated in Diagram 1.1:  
(1) the research problem of the repressed form of self shaped by PTRIC relational 
selfhood (C1 to C3); 
(2) Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood in responding to the research problem 
(C4 and C5); 
(3) Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood in responding to the research 
problem (C6 and C7); 






Diagram 1.1 The Framework of the Research  
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Chapter Two 
Understanding the Criticism of the Repressed Form of Self 
in Contexts of PTRIC Relational Selfhood 
1. Clarification of Terminology 
In order to avoid ambiguity in the use of the concepts of individual, self, and person, it is 
necessary from this point on to clarify them. In additions, descriptors of the real self and 
its repressed form will also be introduced and discussed. 
1.1 The Concepts of Individual, Self, and Person 
The meanings of individual, self, and person are distinct in the social sciences, while most 
other scholars often appear to use them interchangeably (Hwang, Kwangkuo 1999:164). 
Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish their nuanced differences in this thesis. I adopt 
Hwang Kwangkuo’s and Grace G. Harris’ definitions that are synopsized in Chart 2.1. 
 Mode of Concept Definition 
Individual Biological As a Single Member of Humankind 
Self Psychological 
As Locus of Experience: A Subject Making One distinct 
from Others to Acquire Self-Identity and Making One Self-
Aware as an Object in Differentiating Oneself from Others 
that also Acquire Personal Identity 
Person Sociological 
As Agent-in-Society: Having a Certain Position in a Social 
Order and Conducting Actions Purposively towards 
Personal Goals 
 
Chart 2.1 Brief Definitions of Individual, Self, and Person (Based on Harris, Grace Gredys 1989:599–
604; Hwang, Kwangkuo 1999:164)1 
 
There is a different dominant ‘ontology of self’ in each separate culture, including 
such notions as birth, aging, illness, and death, as well as ‘the relationship[s] between self 
                                                
1 In terms of being as agent, the self should be identical with the person in the argument of John MacMurray 
(1891-1976) (1953, reprinted in 1993:100–102) that ‘the self is subject in and for the self as agent’.  
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and morality, and … between self and others’ (Hwang, Kwangkuo 1999:164). 
Accordingly, the self is an integrative ‘locus of experience’ is ‘a cultural carrier’ 
whenever the individual and its social world meet, and so the self functions within an 
‘individuated interpretive framework’ (ibid.). Markus and Kitayama (1994:93 n.3) 
explain: 
The nature and course of social behaviour (which includes the emotional experience and its 
instrumental consequences) will be pervasively influenced by whether good feelings are 
experienced … as realizing one’s own … ideas, motives, [and ]goals[,] or as fulfilling the 
expectations of significant others. The nature of the mediating self is thus significant. It is the 
self that is one of the personalized carriers of the social context … [t]he meanings and 
practices accorded to the self by a given cultural group are among the important features of 
the social context that can be localized, specified, and assessed.  
This individuated framework interprets the ideas and practices about which persons are 
good or bad, and the values reinforced by socio-cultural contexts to mould ‘one’s 
thinking, action, motivation, and emotional reactions’ (Hwang, Kwangkuo 1999:164). 
Therefore, the understanding of self as a cultural carrier in the context of social 
psychology is the basic domain for the meaning of self in this thesis. 
1.2 Descriptors of the Real Self and its Repressed Form 
But what self is repressed or masked negatively? The most common expressions in the 
Chinese language (used either implicitly or explicitly) to denote the intact zìwǒ 自我 
(self), wǒ 我 (I), zìjǐ 自己 (myself), and gèrén 個人 (individual person) in contrast to the 
various degrees of affected or suppressed selves (I, myself, and individual person) are 
listed as follows:  
(1) ‘zhēnwǒ’ ｢真我｣  (Tournier 1993)(Li, Lukyan 李耀全  (p, Lǐ Yàoquán) 
2005)(Li, Lukyan 李耀全 (p, Lǐ Yàoquán) 2005);2  
                                                
2 See also Tu Weiming (1996b), Li Lukyan 李耀全 (p, Lǐ Yàoquán) (2005), and Lín Yúlín 林瑜琳 (2011). 
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(2) ‘zhēnshí de zìwǒ’ ｢真實的自我｣ (Yu, Dehui 1987b:4–5, 7, 13);3  
(3) ‘zhēnshí de zìjǐ’ ｢真實的自己｣ (Zhuang, Huiqiu 1987c:196);  
(4) ‘zhēnshí de rén’ ｢真實的人｣ (ibid.);4  
(5) ‘zhēnshí de gèrén’ ｢真實的個人｣ (Shī, Gěwén 施葛文1990:178).  
It has been noted that the Chinese adjectives for describing the intact self are almost 
the same (‘zhēn’ or ‘zhēnshí’, translated as true, real, or authentic in English) or have the 
same meaning, even though there are different terms used to denote the self. The above 
Chinese phrases can be understood in English as:  
(1) the ‘real self’ (Horney 1950);5  
(2) the ‘actual self’’ (Yang, Zhongfang 1991a:24–5, eo); 
(3) the ‘true self’ (Tu 1985); 
(4) the ‘authentic person’ (ibid.:52); 
(5) the ‘authentic self’ (Tu 1979a);6 
(6) the ‘genuine selfhood’ (ibid.:19). 
Certainly some of these phrases carry with different meanings in varying contexts. 
For example, the phrase true self has such different meanings. Nevertheless, it is beyond 
the scope of my research problem that is focused on the social psychological sense of the 
phrase to explore and clarify all of these other passages. A brief attempt at unearthing the 
range of distinctions in the terminology of the true self is made in A-D. 
Besides, both sets of Chinese and English phrases indicate similar meanings, though 
some might possess nuances different from others. For example, the actual self denotes 
                                                
3 See also Lin Liyun (1987:6), Zhuang Huiqiu (1987b:110), Tu Weiming (1992a; 1996b:178), and Kwok, 
Hungbiu (2005). 
4 See also Tu Weiming (1992a). 
5 See also Jourard (1971) and Turner (1999). 
6 See also Jourard (1971:133–5) and Dana Crowley Jack (1993). 
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different meanings in different contexts.7 Therefore, in order to avoid any confusion about 
the meaning of the actual self, this term will not be used in this thesis. Instead, the term 
real self will be used in discussing both the private and public facets of selfhood.  
The descriptors true and authentic generally denote the real self, which accords 
with the empirical fact of the self. These descriptors denote opposite meanings to the 
adjectives pretending, posing, and replicating (Vannini and Williams 2009:2). From the 
examination of secondary literature and also other relevant sources above, the real self, 
the true self, and the authentic self are interchangeable phrases in social psychological 
studies. All of them describe an unveiled self (2 Corinthians 3:17f.), a disclosing self, a 
transparent self (Jourard 1971), or a ‘reveal[ing]’ self (Moltmann 1976:3) as opposed to 
a masked (c.f. 2 Corinthians 11:13f.) or veiled self (c.f. 2 Corinthians 3:17f.), or even a 
‘false self’ 8 (Winnicott 1965).9 In other words, one who lives out one’s real self (or true 
self, authentic self) is the one who fully grasps one’s own essence, affirms one’s self-
                                                
7 Some surveys about self-harmony among Chinese people in Taiwan and Hong Kong compare and analyse 
the difference between the ‘zhēnshí zìwǒ’「真實自我」‘actual self’, the current situation of the self which 
can be also translated or understood literally as the real self, ‘lǐxiǎng zìwǒ’「理想自我」the ‘ideal self’, 
or the desired or favoured situation of the self (Yang, Zhongfang 1991a:24–5, eo). However, 
differentiations between the ‘actual self’ and the ‘ideal self’ are made in the context of discussing the private 
facets of selfhood (Baumeister and Tice 1986:64–8, eo). See also Higgins (1987:319). Such a discussion 
deals with the self-concept without involving others, even though the ideal self might be shaped by social 
values based on others’ expectations and/or ‘the long-range expressive goals of the self’ (ibid.:64). 
Therefore, the actual self in the context of discussing the private facets of selfhood will not be confused 
with the real self, in contrast to the repressed or negatively masked self, especially in the context of 
discussing the social facets of selfhood even when they denote the same present real self in a particular 
context. Still, in empirical research on ‘true self-concept’ and ‘meaning in life’, the ‘actual self-concept’ is 
defined in contrast to a true self-concept as ‘those characteristics that one possesses and is often able to 
express to others in social settings’ (Schlegel et al. 2009:475). In this context, the actual self is best 
understood as ‘a public self’ (ibid.). 
8 ‘False self behaviour’ is defined as acting ‘in ways that are not the real me’ (Harter et al. 1996:306, eo). 
See also Harter et al. (1996), Harter (1997:101), and Li, Lukyan (2005). 
9 In explaining what ‘the false self’ is, Winnicott (1965:133, 148, eo) states, ‘The concept of the false self … 
is not a difficult one. The false self is built up on a basis of compliance. It can have a defensive function, 
which is the protection of the true self’ and ‘the existence of a false self results in a feeling unreal or a sense 
of futility’. See also Ryan (1991:230). 
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existence, and is one’s own master10 and so ‘true to one’s self’ (Vannini and Franzese 
2008:1621).  
The real self (or true self, authentic self) denotes the self open and truthful to oneself 
and others (Spitzmuller and Ilies 2010:306–8).11 In other words, there is no alienation 
between its two facets — ‘the public self’ and ‘the private self’,12 no inconsistency in the 
expressions and acts (or attitude and behaviour, or personality and behaviour) of the self 
(Markus and Kitayama 1991a:41), namely that personal consistency or self-consistency 
in different situations is very high (Yang, Guoshu 2002:88–9).13 Tu Weiming (1979a:19–
22)14 defines an ‘authentic’ person to be ‘truthful’ to ‘one’s genuine selfhood’, or ‘one’s 
inner self’, and to harmonize ‘one’s sociality’ with ‘sincerity’. 15  Jürgen Moltmann 
(1926-) (1974b:93) uses ‘authentic’ to describe the life or forms of living of a person who 
is unmasked or revealing himself. 16  In this perspective, the self is discussed and 
understood in terms of a living and active person who is an embodied being and is 
dynamically changing over time, instead of being static and absolute (Rogers 1961:171–
2).17 Whether the self is real or not is based on the nature of its self-consciousness 
(Tournier 1957): that is, the self-reflective and emotional experience (Vannini and 
                                                
10 Lin Liyun (1987:12). Or similar phrases in other scholars’ language: ‘spontaneous’ self (Winnicott 
1965:148), ‘the autonomous self’ (Van Kamm 1966, cited in Ryan 1991:230), or ‘self-as-impulse’ (Turner 
1999:83). 
11 See also Jourard (1971:133). 
12 Yang Guoshu (2002:102). These two terms are used to explain the concept of Tournier’s person (real 
self) and personage (social mask). 
13 I.e. so-called ‘situational determinism’ (Hsu, Francis L. K. 1963:164-5; Yang, Guoshu 2002:88–9). As 
for the inevitability of wearing one’s social masks, it will be discussed in C3 and C6 and A-E.  
14 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:34–6; 1979a:68, 73–7, 81; 1989a:27). 
15 It is notable that Tu Weiming (1985:52, 68) later changed this definition to being ‘honest with oneself 
and loyal’ or ‘considerate to others’. Did he intend to mean in this new definition that it was not necessary 
to be honest to others? I will explore this issue later. 
16 See also Moltmann (1976:3). 
17 See also Tournier (1957), Jung (1966), Francis L. K. Hsu (1971), Tu Weiming (1985:13, 113–16), Zhan 
Qisheng 詹啟生 and Le Guoan 樂國安 (2002:29–31), and Kwan, Kaiman 關啟文 (p. Guān Qǐwén) (2004). 
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Franzese 2008:1621) 18  involving ‘true feelings, intentions, and beliefs’ (Gergen 
2000:203).19 It is notable that Tu Weiming (1985:19) indicates that knowing the true self 
in traditional and post-traditional Ruism is neither ‘a cognitive grasp of a given structure 
of objective truths’, nor ‘an acquisition of internalized skills’, but ‘basically an 
understanding of one’s mental state and appreciation of one’s inner feelings’. Such a 
definition was reflected in a Chinese informant’s description about her real self in the 
following way in another cultural study: 
My inner self is my real self, my consciousness of awareness of being. It is a self not easily 
revealed to others and guarded [by] myself as a basis of my secured well-being, especially in 
a society where truth is arrived at empirically, not scientifically. (document RCC-CH 689 
Informant 45F pp. 169, 171 in Mead and Métraux 2000:169–74) 
Finally, having no self and other similar phrases are metaphorical expressions of 
the severest degree of either self-deception or the ‘persona trap’ (Winnicott 1965:133).20 
Self-deception means that one is untruthful to both one’s selfhood and one’s sociality 
when the civil but false self ‘gets itself mistaken for real’ (ibid.).21 The persona trap occurs 
when one’s masks cannot be removed (Schwalbe 2009:151). 
2. Measuring the Repressed Form of Self 
Due to the limitation of space, the theoretical bases for discussing the issue of the RFS 
mainly in the light of social psychology will not be presented here, but provided in A-E. 
The RFS is a psychological, ethical, and relational issue open to influences from theology, 
religions, or worldviews. But can it be measured? In their empirical researches about the 
                                                
18 See also Francis L. K. Hsu (1971), Tu Weiming (1985), and Hall (1994:217). 
19 In an empirical study of the ‘true self-concept’ and ‘meaning in life’, the former is defined as ‘those 
characteristics that you possess and would like to express socially, but are not always able to, for whatever 
reason . . . those traits you are able to express around those people you are closest to’ (Schlegel et al. 
2009:475). 
20 See also Dana Crowley Jack (1993:29–54). 
21 In Turner’s theory of ‘self-concept anchorage’, one might anchor one’s true self in institutions (society), 
so that one’s true self might be revealed through conforming to institutional (social) norms or core values 
(Turner 1976; Sloan 2007:307). 
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‘real self’ and ‘inauthenticity’ in the workplace, Rebecca J. Erickson and Christian Ritter 
(2001) as well as Melissa M. Sloan (2007, eo) use several statements to measure 
responders’ inauthenticity in relation to emotional experiences. 22  According to such 
statements, we can find that the states of inauthenticity they describe are all about a RFS. 
Since they were originally drawn from research in the workplace, I modified them for a 
more general social environment. These statements can help to embody the meaning of 
the RFS discussed in this research. These following eight statements are modified for the 
sake of this new research purpose: 
(1)  To get through my social life, I feel like I must conform to others or to general social 
expectations; 
(2)  When I am among others or in society, I become unsure of what my real feelings are;  
(3)  I worry that social life is making me hide my true feelings and emotions; 
(4)  I do not feel I can be myself among others or in society; 
(5)  I have to fake how I really feel when I am among others or in society; 
(6)  I basically have to become a different person when I am among others or in society; 
(7)  The way I act among others or in society is very different from the way I act privately;  
(8)  I feel that I cannot express my true self when I am among others or in society. 
It is worth noting that the RFS is generally not caused by only one factor. Besides 
social impositions, one’s personality as well as the dynamics and tensions of interpersonal 
relationships should also be considered. Another tool needs to be identified in order to 
measure all these factors, something to be anticipated in the future from scholars in the 
social sciences. Since many scholars criticize Ruist relational selfhood as the cause of this 
research problem, this thesis only involves factors that are originally external to the self, 
such as cultural heritage and relationships. 
                                                
22 These forms are found in Erickson and Ritter (2001:152) and Sloan (2007:309). Four statements in the 
latter research were replicated from claims found in the former study). 
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To sum up, the phrase the repressed form of self in this research is used to convey 
the sense that one’s real self is restrained in the presence of others at every moment of its 
existence;23 in other words, one hardly lives as a real self, rarely discloses oneself, or 
allows the expression of one’s real self to be realized. 
3. Complications with the Repressed Form of Self 
3.1 Psychological and Interpersonal Problems 
Longing for sincerity and genuineness is essential to personal relationships 
(Tournier 1957:23–4); acceptance of the reality of ‘our existence’ maintains the ‘inner 
harmony’ which strengthens our ‘physical and moral health’ (ibid.:55). 24  Ellul 
(1973:151–2) warns that to suppress the need to express one’s ‘passions and desires’ to 
some extent might be dangerous. Tournier (1957:82–3) points out that any RFS25 arouses 
‘uneasiness’.26 Such uneasiness is exemplified by Tournier and other scholars as follows:  
(1) ‘agony … disappointment, dissatisfaction, sadness’ (Higgins 1987:319), and 
‘hopelessness’ (Jack, Dana Crowley 1993:168);27  
(2) ‘prolonged indecision’ and fence-sitting (Tournier 1957:201) (to be discussed 
more in A-ES4);  
(3) ‘tension’ (Ellul 1973:152);28  
                                                
23 Carl Rogers’ (1961:172, eo) ‘to be all of oneself in each moment’. 
24 See also Schlegel et al. (2009). 
25 Or in Tournier’s (1957:82) own language: any alienation and inconsistency between the true self and its 
mask. It appears as an RFS is built out of ‘discrepancies between the actual/own self-state (i.e., the self-
concept) and ideal self-states … [or] between the actual/own self-state and ought self-states’ in E. Tory 
Higgins’s (1987:319) ‘self-discrepancy theory’. ‘Ideal self-states’ denote ‘representations of an individual’s 
beliefs about his or her own or a significant other’s hopes, wishes, or aspirations for the individual’ (ibid.). 
‘Ought self-states’ refer to ‘representations of an individual’s beliefs about his or her own or a significant 
other’s beliefs about the individual’s duties, responsibilities, or obligations’ (ibid.). 
26 See also Bai Chongliang (2007:116). 
27 See also Tournier (1957:29). 
28 See also Tournier (1957:29, 83, 201, 224). 
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(4) fear,29 ‘threat, [and] restlessness’ (Higgins 1987:319);  
(5) resentment30 and rage;31  
(6) ‘feelings of insecurity or bombastic defensiveness’ (Rogers 1961:175);32  
(7) ‘feelings of guilt or self-depreciation’ (Rogers 1961:175);33  
(8) feeling of alienation (Wáng, Yòulíng 王幼玲 1987:62);  
(9) ‘silencing the self’ (Jack and Ali 2010),34 or even ‘denial of the self’, including 
denial of one’s own emotional and physical reactions or ‘needs, and memories’ (Miller, 
Alice 1997:40–52 and back cover).  
Although the RFS might not necessarily cause any significant psychological, 
physical, or social problems in the present moment, the accumulation of these varieties 
of uneasiness listed above might make one feel ‘despair’ or even be in ‘torment’ 
(Kierkegaard 1941:17f.). It might also result in psychological symptoms such as 
‘anxiety … [and] obsessions’ (Tournier 1957:82), 35  other psychological problems, 
personality disorders, or even physical problems. An RFS can display: 
(1) ‘a passive, uncritical, and uncreative orientation’, ‘cognitive conservatism’,36 and the 
burial of original creativity;37 
(2) ‘neglect, even inhibition of expressing of opinions (self-assertion), of independence, 
and of self-mastery’38 and controlling of emotions and desires for the sake of keeping 
                                                
29 Zhuang Huiqiu (1987c:171). 
30 Yu Dehui (1987b:9). 
31 Rogers (1961:169) and Dana Crowley Jack (1993:168). 
32 These attendant feelings appear when one is ‘trying to be more than’ one is (Rogers 1961:175). 
33 These attendant feelings emerge when one is ‘trying to be less than’ one is (ibid.). 
34 See also Thompson (1995) and Flett et al. (2007). 
35 See also Tournier (1957:28–9, 38) and Alice Miller (1997:27–68). 
36 David Yaufai Ho 何友暉 (p. Hé Yǒuhuī) (1994:361–3). 
37 David Yaufai Ho (1981:89). See also Arthur H. Smith (1890:151–9), Dana Crowley Jack (1993:158–68), 
Shi Yuányuán 施媛媛 (2013:352), and the evidence from the survey by Goncalo and Staw (2006). 
38 David Yaufai Ho (1996:161). 
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relational harmony 39  or preventing ‘social stigma and shame’ (Kramer et al. 
2002:228);40 this may lead to the difficulties in discovering, diagnosing, and treating 
psychological problems (ibid.); 
(3) ‘negative personality orientation’, ‘some harmful effects on personal growth and 
interpersonal relationships’, 41  such as divorce, 42  and the complexity of 
communication and unnecessary hurts from relationships;43  
(4) the economic ineffectiveness of social operation 44  mainly due to indirect 
communication;45 
(5) ‘addiction’ and abuse-related individual, familial, and social problems (Wong, 
Melvin 2001:16, 36, 43);46  
(6) ‘psychological distress’, such as depression,47 and the difficulties in psychotherapy 
(Hsu, Jing 1985:107);48  
                                                
39 David Y. H. Wu and Tseng Wenshing (1985:10). 
40 This is because Ruist socialization of personal development is underlaid by filial piety ‘characterized by 
authoritarian moralism, putting the accent on obedience and indebtedness to parents, not self-fulfilment, on 
impulse control, not self-expression, and on moral correctness, not psychological sensitivity’ (Ho, David 
YF 1996:161). Kuo Chienlin and Kavanagh (1994:557) point out that Chinese ‘emotions are masked behind 
the forms of propriety’. See also Bodde (1953:69), Solomon (1971:61–2), Tseng Wenshing (1973), Bond 
et al. (1982b:158), Hsu Jing (1985:100, 107), Pye (1988:71), Kuo Chienlin and Kavanagh (1994:555–7), 
and Shi Yuanyuan (2013:359). 
41 Yeh Kuanghui (2003:67, 78). 
42 Wu Fei (2011:213–19). 
43 See also Rohner and Pettengill (1985), Lau Sing and Cheung Pingchung (1987), and Lau Sing et al. 
(1990). 
44 Zheng Zhengbo (1990:172). 
45 See also Arthur H. Smith (1890:91–7), and June Ock Yum (1988:386). 
46 The addiction-related problems are manifested in the ways of ‘risk-taking, gambling, smoking, rage-
episodes (the use of profanity), sex, drugs, alcohol, food seeking, and food preparations’. They are the other 
kinds of negative masking in avoiding or denying one’s shame (Wong, Melvin 2001:43). See also Jones 
and Berglas (1978), Baumeister (1988; 1993), Leary et al. (1994), and Harter (1997:101). 
47 Erickson and Wharton (1997). See also Dana Crowley Jack (1993; 1999), Thompson (1995), Harter 
(1997:101), Flett et al. (2007), Dana Crowley Jack et al. (2010), Sikka et al. (2010), Mauthner (2010), 
Stoppard (2010), Dana Crowley Jack and Ali (2010), and Smolak (2010). 
48 See also Jourard (1971:25–33, 133–5), Sheldon et al. (1997), and Ryan et al. (2005). 
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(7) health problems, such as ‘malnutrition and eating disorders’, cancer, infection, 
‘injuries and accidental death’ (Leary et al. 1994). 
3.2 The Problem of Suicide 
Undoubtedly the worst possible pathological effect of the suppressed self is suicide 
(Wong, Melvin 2001:24).49 Hiding one’s true condition, weakness, or problems might be 
a common self-defence mechanism in order to reduce the anxiety of disclosing them 
(Yang, Zhongfang 1991a:50). 50  Nevertheless, Donald Winnicott (1896-1971) 
(1965:133), a psychoanalytic psychiatrist, indicated that one possible pathological state 
— caused by the false self (resulting from social ‘compliance’) being ‘exploited and 
treated’ as real — is ‘a growing sense in the individual of futility and despair’. In the 
worst case of this abnormality of self-deception, ‘the false self can easily get itself 
mistaken for real’.51 It leads to the ‘annihilation’ of the real self and presents suicide as a 
way to reassert the real self (Li, Minlong and Yang, Kuoshu 1998:54). 
Some recent field research and studies verify that some aspects of PTRIC cultural 
heritage, especially relational selfhood, are significant factors leading to suicide among 
Chinese persons, being more significant than individual factors (Zhang, Jie et al. 
2004:431), especially among young rural females. It has also been noted that female 
suicide rates outnumber the male rates, a situation unique to post-traditional Chinese 
societies internationally according to known suicide data (Zhang, Jie 2014:146). For 
example: 
                                                
49 See also Winnicott (1965:133), Harter (1997:101), Baumeister (1990), and Hewitt and Flett (1991:468). 
50 See also Tournier (1957:30, 148) and Saari (1982:46). 
51 Sidney M Jourard asserts that ‘a person who has not made himself known to another human being … 
[and] in consequence does not know himself. Nor can he be himself’ (Jourard 1971:32–3). 
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(1) Shame cultures (face culture) and Ru-based collectivism52 are major risk factors in 
Chinese suicides, especially among rural females (ibid.:435).53 Hierarchical social 
structure and Ru-based collectivism are the factors for Chinese male suicides (Chen, 
Yingyeh et al. 2012:139). 
(2) Post-traditional Ruist (as well as Daoist and Buddhist) Chinese worldviews that lack 
a single God and afterlife in the Christian sense are risk factors for suicide (ibid.:435-
6). 
(3) Both post-traditional Ruist patriarchy (involving a male gender-bias and obedience to 
superiors) and social conformity based on the ideology of the doctrine of sāngāng 三
綱 (the three bonds) are risk factors for Chinese rural suicide, especially among rural 
married women (Zhang, Jie 2014:151–2).54 
In Durkheim’s (1951:208) claim that domestic social integration counters suicide, 
marriage should be a protective factor against suicide (ibid.:263). Unfortunately, this is 
not the case for rural Chinese married women. Similar evidence was also found in some 
European countries in his studies. In a further analysis, Durkheim found that marriage in 
such social contexts did not favour wives, but only husbands (ibid.:269). Besides, he also 
argued that excess regulations are also a risk factor for suicide (ibid.:276). Durkheim’s 
social theory of suicide and his explanation of different social contexts are helpful in 
explaining findings about the role of PTRIC cultural heritage in Chinese suicides. 
Jacques Ellul’s theory of propaganda can also be adopted to explain some reasons 
why the RFS in collectivist social contexts can be a factor leading to suicide. He (1973:94) 
                                                
52 As explained in A-C, Ru-based collectivism is a familistic collectivism not concerning for a general 
collective body but being bound by the social networks of family or kinship. More discussions of it will be 
in C4S4.5.1. 
53 See also Chen Yingyeh et al. (2012:139). 
54 See also Zhang, Jie et al. (2004:431), Zhang, Jie et al. (2009:187), Zhang Jie (2010:323–4), Zhang, Jie et 
al. (2010:581–4), Wu Fei (2011:213–19), Zhang Jie and Li Ziyao (2012:659–60), Chen Yingyeh et al. 
(2012:139), and Hyeon Jung Lee (2012). 
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points out that when people face strong public opinions and ‘social constraints’ 
(ibid.:151) in mass and collective society (ibid.:152), ‘latent private opinions’ are either 
repressed, diminished, or increasingly eliminated.55  
The above evidence demonstrates the existence and the severity of the problem of 
the RFS in PTRIC contexts. I will now examine scholars’ criticism of the relevance of 
PTRIC relational selfhood to this problem. 
4. The Criticism of the Repressed Self in Contexts of PTRIC Relational Selfhood 
Before examining scholars’ criticism of the RFS resulting from PTRIC relational 
selfhood, I want to first offer a summary of the factors motivating or inducing the RFS, 
or the repressed behavioural custom of wearing social masks in Paul Tournier’s language 
(1957). It has been noted that the social behaviour of wearing social masks might not be 
expressed in a repressed form, because social masks are sometimes not worn under 
coercion.56  But paradoxically, self-repressing and being repressed by external social 
factors can also slip in unwittingly. They might happen due to one’s self-deception or 
intentionally hiding the inner real self behind one’s social masks (ibid.:49-50, 101).57 It 
can also occur because of one’s unhealthy dependence on performance and achievement, 
resulting from ‘over-inflated’ social masks.58 Therefore, I argue that the clear boundary 
between the repressed and unrepressed parts of the self hidden behind social masks might 
not always be perceived and demarcated. Their relationship might be more like a 
                                                
55 For example, Mao Tsetung's ‘propaganda of integration’ (ibid.:74-9, 304-14) is a brainwashing technique 
employing ‘horizontal propaganda’ (ibid.:80-84, 111, 310-13). Under this devastating pressure, many 
intellectuals were finally ‘homogenized’ into the pro-Maoist ‘class’ (Diana Xiaoqing Lin 2016 quoted in 
Pfister forthcoming-b: SIV), such as Féng Yǒulán 馮友蘭 (1895-1990) and Jīn Yuèlín 金岳霖 (1895-1984) 
(Pfister forthcoming-b: SIV). Many others who resisted to be homogenized committed suicide, such as Jiǎn 
Bózàn 翦伯贊 (1898-1968) (ibid.:26). 
56 For example, social roles can be played voluntarily out of one’s own accord, with responsibility and 
sincerity (Goffman 1956). 
57 See also Martin (1999:120) and H. Bruce May (2012:95). 
58 Alister E. McGrath and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:38). See also Zhai, Xuewei (2010:181–203). 
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spectrum with a large overlapping zone. Nevertheless, since the research problem 
involves the RFS, the repressed behavioural custom of wearing social masks mentioned 
and discussed in this thesis refers only to its repressed form. 
The factors motivating or inducing a RFS listed below are mainly found in works 
by Tournier and supported by psychological and sociological studies. I identified them, 
integrating their claims, and then classified them into five main factors. It has been noted 
that these various factors regularly overlap, ‘combining’ and ‘interacting’ with each other, 
instead of being individually and exclusively present (Tournier 1957:28). After taking 
root in a persons’ life, they gradually govern one’s ‘attitudes and [one’s] words’ and then 
mould one’s social masks (ibid.:30f.).59 These five main factors with their primary related 
features in PTRIC contexts include the following main categories: 
(1)  the factor of pursuing one’s own ideal (Tournier 1957:30f., 51) (related to moral self-
cultivation in S4.2 and Ru-based collectivism in S4.3);60  
(2)  the factor of adorning and preserving one’s expected and ‘imaginary self’61 (ibid.:28, 
35-36), such as found in face culture (Yu, Dehui 1987b:4) (related to moral self-
cultivation in S4.2 and Ru-based collectivism in S4.3);62 
(3)  the factor of tensions created when learning how to survive in a society (Tournier 
1957:33–40), especially in settled but unequal relationships (Schwalbe 2009:140)63 
or collectivist societies 64  (Doi 1981:132–41), such as feeling bound to others’ 
                                                
59 These five factors can be also influenced by sub-factors in each category. Due to the limitation of space, 
a summary of these five factors with their sub-factors is provided in A-F for reference. 
60 See also Dong Fangyuan (1995:298). 
61 Pascal (quoted in Tournier 1957:32). 
62 See also Moltmann (1976:3; 2000a:289), Yu Dehui and Gǔ Bìlíng 古碧玲 (1987:67), Alister E. McGrath 
and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:37), and Bai Chongliang (2007:116). 
63 See also Dana Crowley Jack (1993; 1999:190f.), Dana Crowley Jack et al. (2010), Sikka et al. (2010), 
Mauthner (2010), Stoppard (2010), and Dana Crowley Jack and Ali (2010). 
64 This factor is enhanced when rejection of the ‘small self’ for the sake of the ‘larger self’ or ‘great self’ is 
lauded ‘as a virtue’, and the opposite alternative is ‘negated’ or disparaged (Doi 1981:134, eo). See also Tu 
Weiming (1985:14, eo). 
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expectations,65 or being driven by a strong collectivist ideology shaped by ‘the herd-
instinct’ (Tournier 1957:40), ‘group mentality’ (Doyle 2006:website, eo), ‘shùnzhòng 
xīnlǐ’ ｢順眾心理｣  (conformist mentality), 66  or ‘qiútóng xīntài’ ｢求同心態｣ 
(uniformity mindset) (Yang, Zhongfang 1991b:130) (related to Ru-based collectivism 
in S4.3 and hierarchical society in S4.4); 67 
(4)  the factor of hiding inadequacies because of a lack of ‘self-confidence’ (Doi 
1981:152) and the presence of ‘internal doubts’ (Tournier 1957:31–6, 46–50) (related 
to moral self-cultivation in S4.2 and Ru-based collectivism in S4.3); 68  
(5)  the factor of interacting with others effectively (Harter 1999:100) and harmoniously 
(Tournier 1957:34, 46), surviving other’s dominance and constraint (ibid.:137, 212), 
or bowing to the pressure of rénqíng ｢人情｣ (favour)69 or guānxì ｢關係｣ (‘network 
and connections’70) (Lin, Honghsin 2008b:57) (related to Ru-based collectivism in 
S4.3 and hierarchical society in S4.4).71 
These five main factors listed above motivate the formation of a RFS in varying 
degrees and lead to the establishing of what is primarily:  
                                                
65 Zhào Zhìyù 趙志裕 (1991:270–81). 
66 Yu Dehui and Gu Biling (1987:66). 
67 See also Rogers (1961:168–9), Jung (1966:173–4, 304), Cole (1971:19f.), Moltmann (1976:39–41), Doi 
(1981:49), June Ock Yum (1988:374–5), Alister E. McGrath and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:37), Goleman 
(1996:105, 182), Dana Crowley Jack (1999:191–200), Fleming (2002:183), Lin, Honghsin (2008b:57), and 
Yang Jienlong (2012:372). 
68 See also Goffman (1956:135), Rogers (1961:167–8, 181), Moltmann (1976:3; 2000a:273, 275, 277), Doi 
(1981:150–57), Yu Dehui (1987b:5), Yu Dehui and Gu Biling (1987:66–7), Alister E. McGrath and Joanna 
C. McGrath (1992:38), Harter (1997:100), and Payne (2003:18).  
69 Sun Lungkee (1983, reprinted in 2004:22–3). 
70  Tu Weiming (1991:6). The Chinese term guanxi can be literally translated as the English word 
relationship. However, it denotes a nuanced particular concept of relationship in Chinese society that Tu 
Weiming translates as network and connections. In cultural psychology, it is not exactly identical with the 
word relationship (Yáng, Yíyīn 楊宜音 2008:152). Although most of discussions by scholars in this thesis 
do not make such nuanced distinctions in discussing guanxi in the Chinese context, my translation depends 
on its context in the light of my understanding.  
71 See also Tournier (1957:35–8, 50, 63), Rogers (1961:170, 181), Zhuang Huiqiu (1987b:109–19), Jean 
Bond (1993:back cover), Alice Miller (1997), de Vos (1998:337), Li Lukyan and Kwok Hungbiu (2005:19), 
and Schwalbe (2009:140). 
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(1) an imaginary self based on self-expectations;  
(2) an ordinary but restrained self based on others’ expectations;  
(3) a civil but false self which seeks to hide or avoid the circumstances where the 
undesired self would be seen.  
Uneasiness and ‘repression’ are caused by ‘discord’, separation, and even conflict 
between the ‘personage’ (social masks) — namely the imaginary self, the ordinary but 
restrained self and the civil but false self — and the ‘person’ (true self) (Tournier 
1957:76, 82).72 However, this problem of uneasiness is not caused by ‘the mask, [or] the 
personage in itself, but [by] its artificial and deceptive character’ (ibid.:81). I think that 
this is the reason why this kind of uneasiness when experienced in severe degrees might 
be expressed in ‘psychical symptoms such as anxiety, depression, obsessions and 
inhibitions’ (Tournier 1957:81–2). Whenever a person denies the existence of his/er real 
self behind an imposed mask, the root problem will not be faced, so that the situation 
cannot be dealt with and the person healed. In doing so, those psychical symptoms cannot 
be relieved, and the conflicts or even broken relationships with others cannot be 
reconciled and restored. 
4.1 Ru-Affected Chinese Culture and the Repressed Form of Self 
4.1.1 The Shaping of the Traits of the Chinese Self (Character) 
Sun Lungkee 孫隆基 (1983, reprinted in 2004:17) indicates that there is a major problem 
in the character of modern Chinese selfhood that he identifies as the repressed self. He 
criticizes it as a severe concern among modern Chinese people and recognizes its close 
correlation with traditional Ruism. Nevertheless, based on some other scholars’ empirical 
research, the psychologist Yang Kuoshu (1986a) claimed later that the traits of a 
                                                
72 For the definition and discussion of the concepts of personage and person in Tournier’s integrative and 
transformational psychology, see A-E. 
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generalized Chinese self (character) have to some extent a ‘genetic basis’, besides having 
acquired cultural influences from traditional Ruism and other ‘moral and religious 
thoughts’. But he also highlighted another influential factor, that of adapting to one’s 
‘ecological environment’. As shown in Diagram 2.1, he also applied his ‘cultural-
ecological view’ to document and analyse empirically the change within post-traditional 
Chinese selfhood in modernizing Taiwan. Yang Kuoshu’s theory seems more convincing, 
for this cultural-ecological view in comparison with other theories.73 
It has been noted that almost all of the elements that Yang Kuoshu lists in Diagram 
2.1 are related to risk factors for Chinese suicides discussed above. They include all of 
the main features of traditional Chinese social structure, most of the main traditional 
Chinese socialization practices (except multiple parenting), and the whole of a 
generalized Chinese social-oriented character (except for an effeminate disposition). I 
will examine various scholars’ criticisms of these Ru-influenced or Ru-enhanced features 
of this portrayal of relational selfhood below. 
 
                                                
73 Sun Lungkee attributes the cause of both this modern Chinese form of repressed self and the dominance 
of traditional Ruism in post-traditional Chinese culture to a built-in ‘liángzhī xìtǒng’ ｢良知系統｣ (self-
conscious value system) developed through ‘genetic evolution’ (ibid.:7). This theory might be related to 
the co-evolutionism of gene-culture (Sterelny 2006; Fincher et al. 2008; Mesoudi and Danielson 2008; Boyd 
and Richerson 2009; Linquist 2010:xxvii; Shi, Yuanyuan 2013:358), which Boyd and Richerson are 
probably the first ones to present in their book Culture and the Evolutionary Process (1988). Yang 
Kuoshu’s theory seems more convincing, for this cultural-ecological view can explain what Sun Lungkee’s 
theory cannot. According to Sun Lungkee’s theory of genetic evolution, there would be no expectation of 
having any obvious and evident hope to breakthrough this problem of the repressed self, if in fact Chinese 
people are born to be dominated by such a built-in value system. But in the preface to the first edition of 
his work, Sun Lungkee (1983, reprinted in 2004:3) also mentions that a possible solution to this problem 
within the deep structure of post-traditional Chinese culture is through ‘zìjué chóngzǔ’ ｢自覺重組｣ (the 
reorganization of the self-awareness) of the whole person. His solution for the problem of any Chinese’s 
repressed self apparently is questionable, for how can one’s built-in self-conscious value system resulting 
from one’s genetic evolution be adjusted or changed through the reorganization of self-awareness? His 
theory also cannot explain the characteristics of traditional Ruist influences that vary depending on 





Diagram 2.1 Yang Kuoshu’s Interactionistic Cultural-Ecological View in the Shaping of the Traits 
of the Chinese Self (Character) (1986a:162, original in English) 
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Yu Dehui (1951-2012) (1987b:5) demonstrates how post-traditional Chinese 
persons’ harmful habit of negative masking is identified through correlating features of 
face-orientation, repression and dual personalities among Chinese people. Speaking in 
typically generalized ways, Yu Dehui indicates that modern Chinese people tend to 
protect themselves by using their mianzi (face) as armour. In the traditional and post-
traditional systems of self-formation among Chinese people groups, Yu Dehui (1987b:4, 
eo) highlights that modern Chinese persons feel more often that they are ‘bèi rén kàn de’ 
｢被人看的｣ (viewed by others) than being ‘zìjǐ kàn zìjǐ’ ｢自己看自己｣ (viewed by 
oneself). Yu Dehui’s observation resonates with Francis L. K. Hsu’s (ibid.:29, eo) 
insightful rendering of 人 (rén), the Chinese word for ‘[hu]man’ into ‘personage’ rather 
than person, as explained in A-E and A-G. Therefore, the real self of post-traditional 
Chinese persons tends to be obscured (Berling 1985:107). 
In Chinese People’s Character of Masking: Favour and Face (1987),74 the cultural 
factors forming this negatively masking phenomenon among post-traditional Chinese 
persons are listed and analysed as follows:  
(1) Ru-based collectivism;  
(2) familial co-dependent relationships through excessive expressions of filial piety 
(jìnxiàodào 盡孝道); 
(3) face-oriented shame culture; 
(4) the law of returning past favours;75 and  
(5) a boundless ‘yìlùn xìtǒng’ ｢議論系統｣ (commenting system).76  
                                                
74 Zhōngguórén de Miànjù Xìnggé: Rénqíng yǔ miànzi 《中國人的面具性格：人情與面子》(Chinese 
People’s Character of Masking: Favour and Face) prepared by The Editorial Board of Zhānglǎoshī Yuèkān 
(1987). 
75 See also Wang Minglei (2013:7–10, 40) . 
76 Quotation from Yu Dehui and Gu Biling (1987:63–7), emphasized also in David Yaufai Ho (1981). 
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These post-traditional Chinese interpersonal relationships are relation-oriented rather 
than truth-oriented 77  because all these five factors are of ‘the construct relationship 
dominance’ and a typical ‘relationalism’ (David YF Ho 1998:21). Due to the limitation 
of space, further discussion of Ruist relationism is provided in A-K. 
On reflection, one can add that the law of returning past favours is a by-product of 
Ru-based collectivism and face-oriented shame culture. Also, the last factor refers to a 
behavioural custom of criticizing and judging others, especially by means of harsh critical 
statements employed by superiors against subordinates. In this way, superiors highlight 
their social status, often done by emphasizing wealth as a sign of success and their 
reputation linked to a performance-oriented value system. This not only reinforces 
authoritative superiority and obedient inferiority, but also intensifies the suffering of 
PTRC persons from the moral taboos for so long in Chinese society about publicly 
discussing love and sexual behaviour (Yu Dehui and Gu Biling 1987:64–5, 67). 
Consequently, these factors depend on and interact with each other reciprocally. They 
accompanied by such social moral taboos cause various anxieties in many aspects of the 
life of PTRIC persons: love, sex, status, exposure of weakness, and performance 
(ibid.:67). Moreover, almost all of them are obviously derived from post-traditional 
cultural influences of traditional Ruism as demonstrated by Melvin W. Wong in C1, 
although the work Chinese People’s Character of Masking itself does not elaborate this 
claim. 
4.1.2 Ru-Affected ‘Interpersonal Relationships’ and ‘Communication Patterns’ 
June Ock Yum’s (1988:374, 378) study on the Ru-affected ‘interpersonal relationships’ 
and ‘communication patterns’ can also provide us with a clearer picture of the direct or 
                                                
77 The Editorial Board of Zhanglaoshi Yuekan (1987). 
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indirect influences of Ruism on the RFS. She highlights five areas of ‘interpersonal 
relationships’ most influenced by traditional Ruism:  
(1) ‘particularism’;78  
(2) ‘long-term and asymmetrical reciprocity’;  
(3) the ‘sharp distinction between in[-]group and out[-]group members’ (namely Fei 
Xiaotong’s chàxù géjú 差序格局, as described in A-EF77 and A-K);79  
(4) the role of ‘informal intermediaries’; 80  
(5) ‘the overlap of personal and public relationships’.  
All these elements within interpersonal relationships most influenced by traditional 
Ruism demonstrate characteristics of Ru-based collectivism and the hierarchical social 
structures that are risk factors for suicide in modern Chinese societies and also related to 
the RFS mentioned above. 
June Ock Yum (1988:374) also lists four Ru-affected ‘communication patterns’:  
(1) ‘process orientation’;81  
(2) ‘differentiated linguistic codes’;82 
(3) ‘indirect communication emphasis’; 83  
(4) receiver-centred communication’.84  
                                                
78 Particularism denotes that ‘particular rules and interaction patterns are applied depending upon the 
relationship and context’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:378). 
79 See also Ambrose Y. C. King (1982:124, 129), Zhāng Qiáng 張強 (2003), and Xie Yao 謝曜 (2005:13f.). 
80 Informal intermediaries means that ‘personally known intermediaries’ instead of ‘professional 
intermediaries’ are often ‘utilized for diverse relationships’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:378). See very early 
documentation of this feature in traditional Chinese settings in Arthur H. Smith (1890:193–200). 
81 Process orientation means that ‘communication is perceived as a process [with] infinite interpretation[s]’ 
(Yum, June Ock 1988:381). 
82 Differentiated linguistic codes means that ‘different linguistics codes are used depending upon [the] 
persons involved and [their] situations’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:381). 
83 See also Yang Zhongfang (1991b:131) and Hwang Kwangkuo (1998:28–9). 
84 Receiver-centred means that ‘meaning is in the interpretation’ and ‘emphasis is on listening, sensitivity, 
and removal of preconception[s]’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:381). 
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When these Ru-affected communication patterns are combined together and are 
sustained over time, they can obviously tend to lead to a RFS. 
It is worth noting that all of the main PTRIC characteristics mentioned above align 
strongly with tendencies for developing forms of RFS. The features of particularism, the 
overlap of personal and public relationships, differentiated linguistic codes, indirect 
communication emphasis, and receiver-centred communication are all related to Ru-
based collectivism, face-oriented shame culture, and a boundless critical and often 
aggressive commenting system. It emphasizes the importance of others, ‘discreetness 
with others’,85 Ru-based collectivism, and pleasing others more than the importance of 
self, or of European individualism, or of expressing one’s real personal feelings. Joan G. 
Miller’s research (1994:3, 13) also supports the influence of ‘duty-based interpersonal 
moral codes’, which is another PTRIC feature (to be discussed below). Significantly, 
these moral codes suppress the freedom of personal choice, oppose ‘individual 
responsibility’, as well as resisting ‘the true underlying self’, all of which are the signs of 
the RFS.  
4.2 Moral Self-Cultivation and the Repressed Form of Self 
The Chinese senior social worker, Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:510, eo), claims that the 
consequences of Ruist ideology can be summarized into three prominent ‘behavioural 
traits in East Asians’: ‘lack of personality’, ‘lack of principled moral thinking’, and ‘lack 
of assertiveness’.86 The last one partly results from the traditional Ruist preference of 
valuing the fulfilment of social duties more than assertions of ‘individual rights’ 
                                                
85 Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford (2003:224, eo) 
86 Stephen K. K. Cheng’s claims tend to be too reductionist and generalized but not totally groundless and 
invalidated as explained in A-ES6. 
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(ibid.:512). In other words, ‘agreeableness’87 is lacking due to the negative influence of 
‘authoritarian filial piety’.88 To fulfil such social duties and expectations is entirely a 
matter of moral self-cultivation in traditional Ruism.89  
Lin Xiaodong’s study (2010) also affirms traditional Ruist moral self-cultivation 
(xiūshēn 修身) as the cultural factor that most influences masculine Chinese persons, 
even among rural Chinese men who did not receive much education. Philip J. Ivanhoe 
(2000:ix) identifies moral self-cultivation as one of the most often and comprehensively 
discussed topics among philosophers in Chinese ethics. He indicates that Chinese Ruist 
thinkers, unlike Anglo-European philosophers, pay more attention to ‘the problem of how 
to become good’ than to the definition and epistemology of ‘the good’ (ibid.).  
Tu Weiming (1982b) emphasizes the importance of the bodily work of establishing 
the self in order to prevent one’s morals from being merely a vain armchair strategist’s 
talk without the reality of moral cultivation. This might sound like a characteristic of 
virtue ethics, if one simply depends on this statement (Fraser et al. 2011:2–4). However, 
some contemporary Ruist scholars (for example, Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, 
Jr.) insist traditional Ruism is instead a relational ethics or ‘role ethics’ (Ames 2011); it 
is not a virtue ethics because the purpose of moral self-cultivation in traditional Ruism is 
not for oneself, but for fulfilling one’s ‘social roles — especially family roles’ (Fraser et 
al. 2011:3). I will discuss this in detail in C4 and C5 and argue that role ethics enhances 
the influence leading to the RFS. 
Tu Weiming (1985:55) emphasizes moral self-cultivation as ‘a precondition for 
harmonizing human relations’ (to be discussed more in detail in C4). In other words, self-
                                                
87 The technical term ‘agreeableness’ here means the freedom allowed or granted to agree or disagree. This 
is not the normal meaning of the term in contemporary English. It seems to be closer in meaning to a form 
of broad tolerance of diverse opinions. 




cultivation is the only ground for becoming a good person in Tu’s interpretation of Ruism. 
Jess Fleming (2002:183) echoes Tu’s interpretation of the inseparable correlation 
between self-cultivation and selfhood in Ruism, but goes further in pinpointing its 
possible consequence in a ‘loss of identity’. 
Fleming explains his claim in a reductionist and generalizing way, but with insights 
true to some versions of traditional Ruism, that ‘personal identity’ in traditional Ruism is 
based on an individual’s ‘moral quality’, namely ‘a matter of moral commitment’ (ibid.). 
Accordingly, unceasing pursuit of moral cultivation, especially ‘jen’ ｢仁  (p. rén)｣ 
(benevolence), ‘chih’ ｢智 (p. zhì)｣ (wisdom), and ‘te’ ｢德 (p. dé｣ (virtue), builds up one’s 
‘humanity and identity’ and one’s harmonious ‘social nexus’ (ibid.). These qualities are 
the criteria for the ‘success in being somebody’ (zuòrén chénggōng 做人成功) (ibid.). If 
one cannot keep one’s own personal moral equilibrium, one will lose one’s ‘identity’ in 
one’s harmonious social network, and in the ‘consequent moral turmoil’, one will 
eventually lose one’s ‘identity for both the individual in question and his or her society at 
large’ (ibid.).  
Following Fleming’s discussion of this problem of a loss of personal identity, a RFS 
is cultivated by endeavouring to pretend to perform one’s moral equilibrium and gain 
one’s identity. Therefore, I argue that one is vulnerable to developing a RFS if one neither 
wants nor dares to disclose the reality of one’s failing to reach moral equilibrium and/or 
to admit the actuality of lossing one’s identity. This phenomenon is even more distinctive 
amongst Chinese men, due to the existence of a strong Chinese gender-bias. Alister E. 
McGrath and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:38) mentioned that both Carl Jung and Carl 
Rogers have illustrated ‘role performance as a mask’, which hides ‘the real or whole self’. 
According to Jung’s argument, McGraths point out that ‘true personal development’ can 
happen only if a person gives up relying on an ‘omnicompetent persona’, namely the hero 
ideal (ibid.:38, eo). I argue accordingly that this is probably one of the main reasons why 
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many contemporary Chinese men hold secrets which they keep hidden throughout their 
lives — and this could hinder their healthy personal development. 
4.3 Ru-Based Collectivism and the Repressed Form of Self 
In summarizing how traditional Ruism constructs a post-traditional ‘Chinese social 
psychology’, Michael Harris Bond and Hwang Kwangkuo (1986:216) pinpoint three 
fundamental characteristics:  
(1) ‘[hu]man[ity] exists through and is defined by … relationships to others’;90  
(2) ‘these relationships are hierarchically structured’;  
(3) ‘social order is ensured through each party’s honouring … [their duties within those] 
relationships’.  
These three characteristics lead to collectivist ideology.  
They suggest that many features of the social relationships among post-traditional 
Chinese persons are connected to this ‘distillate’ of traditional Ruism (ibid.). In this 
cultural context, one’s self-identity is based on traditional Ruist norms of human 
relationships (Lǐ, Xiángjùn 李祥俊 2005). Admittedly, the motives informing self-
presentation tend to be geared towards fulfilling social norms and others’ expectations, 
but not aimed at realizing one’s own inner expectation or personal characteristics of the 
self (Xie, Yao 2005:13).91 
On the other hand, David Y. H. Wu and Tseng Wenshing (1985:9) point out that 
although the traditional Ruist cultural ideal is ‘seemingly oppressive’, post-traditional 
Ruist ‘conformity to cultural norms’ is merely a ‘superficial conformity’. 92 I find such 
                                                
90 No wonder there is a saying that Chinese persons have no complete selves and will always find their 
meaning of existence only through depending on a group (Zhanglaoshi Yuekan 1987:1). 
91 See also Baumeister and Tice (1986:63–4) and Gao Ge and Ting-Toomey (1998:13). 
92 David Y. H. Wu and Tseng Wenshing (1985:9) articulate that such superficial conformity might be the 
reason why ‘fundamental changes’ do not happen in mainland Chinese society in spite of numerous social 
and political reforming movements.  
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comformity looks like wearing a mask of conformity. Therefore, this kind of conformity 
can be identified as a form of masking, even a repressed form of masking. Besides, I find 
it very significant that this collectivist ideology of traditional Ruism is closely related to 
all of the aforementioned three prominent behavioural traits listed by Stephen K. K. 
Cheng.93 Contemporary Chinese persons’ personality and principled moral thinking are 
products of Ru-based collectivism, but are more directly related to the hierarchical society 
in the context of Ru-based collectivist ideology. Therefore, they are to be discussed in the 
next section, which is concerned with the hierarchical nature of post-traditional Chinese 
society.  
As for the lack of assertiveness, the aforementioned Ru-influenced characteristic of 
the fulfilment of social duties outweighing the assertion of one’s individual character has 
been nurtured within the context of Ru-based collectivist ideology. In this ideology, 
interpersonal harmony is supremely important. Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:512) argues 
that self-assertion, or ‘idiosyncratic individualized self-expression’ (Young 1998:137–8), 
is consequently viewed as showing off a vexatious and disruptive individual’s attitudes 
that resist ‘deferential attitudes’, and so threatening ‘the harmony and the cohesion of the 
group’.94 Consequently, the self is to be repressed.  
In Ellul’s (1973:150–51) theory of propaganda, to satisfy the need of self-assertion 
among diminished individual selves is one of the reasons why propaganda can succeed 
in collective movements, as seen in Mao Tsetung’s propaganda (ibid.:304-314). While 
agreeing with Vandermeersch that ‘family structure’ is one of the three particularities of 
a traditional Ruist ‘legacy’ that distinguish it ‘from Western [or Anglo-European, more 
                                                
93 For an account of the collectivist ideology of traditional Ruism, see also Abbott (1970), Kuo Chienlin 
and Kavanagh (1994:554–5), Cho Hyunyi (2000:310f.), Hong Guiyoung (2004), and Wong Ying and 
Jeanne Tsai (2007:213).  
94 A similar ideology is also seen in post-traditional Ru-influenced Vietnamese (Young 1998:137–8, 142). 
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precisely] individualism’, 95  Hans Küng (1993:96, eo) remarks that traditional Ruist 
family-centred social structure can be understood as ‘communitarian’ i.e. collectivistic. 
As the aforementioned summary indicates, such a strong Ru-based collectivist 
ideology leads to the development of the problem of the RFS. David Yaufai Ho states 
that it entails not ‘autonomy’ and ‘unique individuation’, but (unconditional) ‘[unhealthy] 
interdependence’ 96  and ‘conformism’. 97  The Chinese theologian, Kwok Hungbiu, 
articulates the problem of selfhood as the shrinking-back of the self among contemporary 
Chinese people, and attributes its root to the strong Ru-based collectivism emphasized in 
PTRIC culture, which always belittles European individualism.98  
Ess argues that the self in traditional Ruism is indeed ‘constituted by its diverse 
relationships with others’ (Ess 2009:website) because ‘for Confucius, the human being is 
his or her relationships’ (Ess 2010:111). Henry Rosemont, Jr. (2012:lecture) uses the 
analogy of an ‘onion’ to explain traditional Ruist relational selfhood. Every relationship 
with others — as ‘parent, child, friend, lover, sibling’ (Ess 2010:111), teacher, student, 
classmate, colleague, boss, employee — composes ‘a layer of this onion self’ (Rosemont 
2012:lecture). ‘Such relationships are intrinsic to such a self’ (Ess 2009:website). 
Therefore, the self varies along with the change of ‘any given relationship’ (Ess 
2010:111). If a relationship is lost, the self corresponding with it is consequently lost as 
well. If all relationships are eliminated – peeling away all layers of the onion, so that 
                                                
95 The other two are ‘rites’ and ‘officialdom’ (Küng 1993:96, eo). 
96 In this context, I would suggest co-dependence might be a better term for denoting such a negative feature 
of the strong Ru-based collectivist ideology, according to the explanation in C1F57.  
97 David Yaufai Ho (1989, cited in Ho, David Yaufai 1994:363). See also Theodore T. Y. Hsieh et al. 
(1969), Lau Sing and Cheung Pingchung (1987), Yeh Minghua and Yang Kuoshu (1997:179), and Yeh 
Kuanghui and Bedford (2003:226). 
98 Li Lukyan and Kwok Hungbiu (2005:18f.). See also Ambrose Y. C. King (1982:127–9). 
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nothing is left, then there exists no unique self within or no self99 as given (Rosemont 
2012:lecture).100  
Robert Neville (1939-) does not totally agree with the onion analogy of the 
traditional Ruist self presented by Rosemont, but he (2000:82) indirectly supports the 
vagueness and unimportance of traditional Ruist selves by stating: 
The [traditional] Confucian way of specifying the vague notion of self is neither to claim it 
has a core nor that it is wholly to be negated in terms of relations but that it is a structure of 
poised balancing of orientations to the ten thousand things. 
Even if Rosemont’s analogy is too reductionist and generalized without considering 
the plurality of both Chinese selves and non-Chinese selves, it still can provide clues for 
understanding the causes of some extreme cases of the loss of self that happen within the 
Ru-based collectivist contexts. It is notable that the Chinese scholar, Xie Wenyu (1998), 
understands the formation of selfhood in traditional Ruist ideology in a similar way to 
Rosemont.101 
                                                
99 It is necessary to explain once more that no self or loss of the self in Rosemont’s analogical account does 
not mean that one’s self does not exist, but that one either does not know or does not adequately know what 
‘his real nature’ is (Tournier 1957:46). In this context, then, the meaning of one’s own real self is missing. 
See also Guō, Qīngxiāng 郭清香 (2006:129). 
100 In contrast, Rosemont uses another analogy of a peach to describe the ‘atomistic self’ (ibid.). Like the 
‘peach-pit’, the ‘atomistic self’ underlies an ‘external body’ (ibid.). The ‘atomistic self’ stays unchanged 
all the time even though the external body goes through change, decay or even loss (Ess 2009:website). 
101 As post-traditional Korean and Japanese societies are also Ru-influenced, they share in common with 
PTRIC societies, sometimes in even stronger forms, Ru-influenced features in relational selfhood, situation-
oriented interpersonal relationships, and collectivist and hierarchical social structures (Park, Sangchul 
2016). See also Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi (1988:41–68) and Lee Choong Y. (2012:184–8). According 
to research by Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:11; See also Kim, Heupyoung 金
洽榮 2001:127), South Koreans among all East Asian peoples are influenced most by traditional Ruism. 
Japanese are the second and Chinese, the third (Ching, Julia 1993 in Ching, Julia and Küng 1993:81–2; See 
also Liu, Shuhsien 2002:58–9). Among Chinese people groups, those in Hong Kong are influenced most 
by traditional Ruism, the second are those in Taipei and the third, those in Shanghai. We can also find 
similar evidence of a RFS from studies in contemporary Japanese society. Nevertheless, it seems that there 
are very few selfhood-related studies focused on South Koreans, or at least they do not appear in English 
publications (Levi 2013). After the scandal of the South Korean president, Park Geunhye, broke out near 
the end of 2016, the strong significant correlation between the Ru-influenced South Korean culture heritage 
and political corruption has received attention and been discussed. South Koreans seem to be one of the 
most honest societies in the world, but personal and political dishonesty has become a severe contemporary 
issue in that country (BBC Asia 2016:website). A recent study disclosed that South Koreans are one of the 
top three dishonest peoples among fifteen countries (Hugh-Jones 2016). Professor Kyung Moon Hwang 
(2016:website) of USC pinpoints traditional Ruist values of ‘hierarchy’ or patriarchy and ‘reciprocity’ in 
social relations as the main cause of this issue, because they cultivate a strong ideology that ‘one must repay 
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4.4 Ru-influenced Hierarchical Society and the Repressed Form of Self 
In Ruist classical texts, lǐ (禮) (translated as ‘rites, rituals, rules of propriety, or codes of 
behaviour’102) defines every social role in ‘all interpersonal relationships’ and prescribe 
the codes of ‘interpersonal transaction’ (Cheng, Stephen K. K. 1990:511). Li is equally 
applied to everyone. But Xúnzi 荀子 (298-238 BCE), an ancient Ruist philosopher, 
interpreted its significance in Chapter Ten of his work (10:3),103 the Xúnzǐ《荀子》: 
[Li is] the observance of the differentiation of the ranking between the noble and the lowly, 
of the difference between senior and junior, and of the distinct rules of propriety between the 
rich and the poor as well as between the politically powerful and the powerless. 
Due to a traditional Ruist concept of ‘the moral-political system’ of society, human 
dignity and the recognition of social position are determined by morality (Lo, Pilgrim 
WK 2009:176). Mencius also taught (the Mencius, 4A:7) that social relationships should 
require that ‘people of little virtue should be submissive to those of great virtue, and those 
of little morality should serve those of great morality’.104  
I argue that even if there is a good purpose for maintaining a good social order 
(ibid.:173), such teachings105 undoubtedly lead to the forming of a hierarchical society,106 
including gender-bias and patriarchy as mentioned above, restrictively controlling ‘the 
self-seeking nature of [hu]man[ity]’ (Cheng, Stephen K. K. 1990:511). The origin of li is 
due to the need for controlling people (according to Xunzi) by means of external 
                                                
kind treatment’ (See also GlobalSecurity.org 2016:website). Due to limitations of space, evidence related 
to contemporary Japanese society is documented in A-B. 
102 Lǐ, derived from its original meaning of ‘a religious sacrifice’, has come to denote ‘ceremony, ritual, 
decorum, rules or propriety, good form, and good custom’ in traditional Ruist contexts (Chan, Wingtsit 
1967:367, eo). The main canonical work discussing li is the Lǐjì 《禮記》(the ‘Book of Rites’ or the Record 
of Rites) (ibid.). 
103 Chinese Text Project, Xúnzi, 10:3 Available at: http://ctext.org/xunzi/fu-guo/zh Accessed 13.8.2017 
104 Translated by Pilgrim W. K. Lo (2009:176). 
105 Such teachings were also utilized by Chinese emperors for centuries (Cho, Hyunyi 2000). 
106 Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:510, 513). See also Cho Hyunyi (2000:312, 316–7), Melvin W. Wong 
(2001:16–19), Bedford and Hwang Kwangkuo (2003:132–4, 139), Hong Guiyoung (2004:56–8), Bedford 
(2004:48), Dù Míngdé 杜明德 (2006), Pilgrim W. K. Lo (2009:176), Alexander Chow (2013:23), and 
Wang Minglei (2013:40, 63). 
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impositions and sanctions (Hwang, Kwangkuo 2002:150). The ‘social institution’ of li as 
a socially controlling tool expressed in the rules of propriety stresses and demands 
‘external conformity’ to replace either ‘internal repression’ or inner conflict between 
external oughts and internal intents (Cheng, Stephen K. K. 1990:510f.).107 Its impact 
unavoidably contributes to the lack of one’s personality and the ‘dramaturgical character’, 
because one’s personality is encased ‘within the parameters’ of one’s ‘prescribed roles’ 
(ibid.:511).  
Basing his argument on a definition of personality entailing a ‘separate entity’ 
which is related to one’s own psyche and different from one’s social roles, Francis L. K. 
Hsu (1971:29, eo) argues that the equivalent in English for the Chinese word rén 人 
(translated as ‘[hu]man’) should be ‘personage’ rather than person, because the concept 
of human in Chinese language and culture is rooted in the ‘individual’s transactions with 
his fellow human beings’. No wonder a German theologian, Helmut Thielicke (1908-86), 
found Chinese people to be ‘the most magnificent play-actors in the world’ lacking ‘the 
will to be individual human beings, to be themselves’.108 Although Thielicke’s statement 
tends to be too reductionist and generalized, he is not the only foreigner who has noticed 
this characteristic of Chinese persons. As early as the end of the nineteenth century, 
foreigners such as Arthur H. Smith (1890:15–17), Chester Holcombe, and J. Macgowan, 
began to describe, study, and discuss this phenomenon from the aspect of Chinese face 
culture, for they are closely related to each other (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:26–32). Since then 
there have been many Chinese and foreign scholars engaged in studies of this issue 
(ibid.:26-55). It has been noted that this characteristic of play-actors, like wearing social 
                                                
107 See also Hwang Kwangkuo (2002:150, 159–60). 
108 Helmut Thielicke (1959, cited in Cheng, Stephen KK 1990:511). See also A-EF69. 
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masks, might not all definitely be in a repressed form, but is an important factor leading 
to a RFS.  
There are some other observations which also provide relevant evidence, even 
though they are expressed in a reductionist and generalized way. Chén Jiànyù 陳劍譽 
(2006:blog) asserts straightforwardly that younger generations inevitably lose their 
selfhood because superiors are granted absolute authority in the Ruified modern Chinese 
culture. David Y. F. Ho (1994:361–3) is not the only scholar who calls this Ru-influenced 
feature ‘authoritarian moralism’ or similar phrase, shaped by PTRIC filial piety that 
demands children’s ‘obedience and indebtedness’ to their parents instead of ‘self-
fulfilment’ (ibid.:361).109 Their ‘impulse control’ rather than ‘self-expression’ is trained 
so that their ‘moral correctness’ rather than ‘psychological sensitivity’ is built up (ibid.). 
Therefore, the pattern of socialization of PTRIC is shaped concretely with ‘twin features’: 
‘absolute parental authority and the imperative nature of moral upbringing’ (ibid.). As a 
result, it forms a ‘cognitive conservatism’ bound together with a high level of motivation 
for good performance and achievement (ibid.:361).110 Although the natural ‘inner/outer 
division’ of the self might appear universally, Jon L. Saari (1982:43) also maintains that 
the intensified inner/outer split is salient among modern Chinese people because of these 
strict filial norms and the ‘authoritarian style of kinship and kinship-based institutions’. 
The lack of independent individual ‘principled moral thinking’ is the other 
behavioural trait that Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:511) pinpoints related to hierarchical 
society in the context of post-traditional Ru-based collectivist ideology.111 He links this 
problem to the lack of ‘the capacity to form independent moral judgement apart from a 
                                                
109 See also David Y. F. Ho (1996:156–64), Lin Anwu (1997:71–5), Hwang Kwangkuo (1999:178–9), and 
Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford (2003:226). 
110 See also David Y. H. Wu and Tseng Wenshing (1985:10), David Y. F. Ho (1996), and Yeh Kuanghui 
and Bedford (2003:225). 
111 See also Yeh Kuanghui and Bedford (2003:225). 
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given moral system’, and attributes its causes to wulun and its hierarchical and 
asymmetrical conception of human relationships’ within traditional Ruist ethics (ibid.). 
This ‘widely recognized social phenomenon’ is illustrated by Y.C. King and Michael H. 
Bond (1985:40) in the following example:  
[Modern] Chinese individuals unabashedly show a kind of egocentric behaviour outside their 
family, particularly in a nonkin social context ... When the [modern] Chinese individual is 
not structurally situated in a relation-based social web, [traditional] Confucian values and 
norms cease to be morally binding or ... morally relevant’.  
Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:512) highlights the uniqueness of Ru-based 
collectivism due to the confinement of its ethics to wulun, a system that can hardly be 
applied to ‘the multi-faceted relationships that exist between an individual and the 
community at large’. As a result, such an ‘ethical system’ becomes ‘too family-centred 
and too restricted to the dyadic relationships between individuals’, leading naturally to 
the lack of gōngdé 公德 (public morals) among modern Chinese people (ibid.).112 This 
hierarchical characteristic of traditional Ruist ethics regularly rejects or ‘condemn[s]’ the 
‘universalist, egalitarian principles’ that ‘moral thinking’ is based on (ibid.).113 Not only 
might a RFS often result in a lack of public morals, but a strong ideology of public morals 
might also lead to a RFS when PTRIC persons behave according with public morals due 
to social pressure instead of their own will. Therefore, I found that this characteristic of 
lacking public morals is both a particular product and an enhancer of the RFS resulting 
from PTRIC contexts of Ru-based familial collectivism and hierarchical social structure. 
4.4.1 Fatherlessness and the Repressed Form of Self 
Loss of self (a severe case of RFS) in a father causes him not to express his true feelings 
as a father directly towards his children, making them feel fatherless and underdeveloped 
                                                
112 See also Wei Zhengtong (1990:74–5) and Ambrose Y. C. King (1994). 
113 See also Arthur H. Smith (1890:138–44). 
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in their self-knowledge. However, this particular feature of fatherlessness in Ru-
influenced hyper-hierarchical social structure will not be included in further discussions 
in the thesis, because my primary sources are not engaged with this issue. A-L provides 
a reference for scholarly criticism on the causal links between fatherlessness and the RFS 
in PTRIC contexts.  
4.5 The Absence of God and the Repressed Form of Self 
Takeo Doi (1981:132–41) suggests that the issue of fatherlessness is related to ‘the 
question of the absence of God’, because the absence of God has been progressively taken 
for granted ever since the declaration by Nietzsche that ‘God is dead’ (quoted in 
ibid.:156). According to this context, the God Doi mentioned here should be the 
transcendent personal being who is the Creator in the general Christian sense of that term. 
Bellinger (2010:51) further asserts that humans’ selfhood should be decided and shaped 
by ‘God and God’s Word’. Following Bellinger, I agree that the definition and further 
development of human selfhood should come from a transcendent other, instead of a 
human other at the same level. Likewise, since sinful humans cannot normally mature 
enough ethically by themselves, the starting point for ethics cannot be based merely on 
humans’ selfhood, but should necessarily include ‘God’s will’ (ibid.:88). Bellinger 
(2010:88–9) asserts that to become an ethical self is to ‘become attuned to God and one’s 
created nature’, echoing Karl Barth’s argument that theological ethics is not about ‘the 
Word of God as it is claimed by [hu]man[ity], but the Word of God as it claims 
[hu]man[ity]’ (Barth 1957:546).  
It is reasonable to argue that the healthiness of one’s self-development is to some 
extent based on one’s philosophy of religion, even though it is clear that several 
complicated causes are involved in this problem of the loss of self (or the RFS and 
fatherlessness) in contemporary post-traditional Chinese culture. The Chinese General 
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Liú Yàzhōu, 劉亞洲(2002), even though living in a communist and atheist context, 
expresses this concern boldly: 
Nowadays many problems of China are exposed in the process of her great progress; all of 
them indicate that the system is the root problem. And all the problems of the system point 
to culture as their root; all the problems of culture point to religion as the root of their 
problems. Morality is culture ... Nationality is morality. Religion produces culture; culture, 
the character of the nation; the character of the nation, the destiny of the nation. 
Therefore, in his observation, Liu Yazhou concludes that the problem of a nation 
might be a symptom of its cultural and moral problems, which in turn can be traced back 
to the problem of religion. This observation is similar to Weber’s basic theory in 
explaining the development of capitalism in Europe (Redding 1993:8, 238–9). 
Historically, the evidence of the influences of Christianity, secularism, or atheism in 
Anglo-European and other international settings all confirm Liu Yazhou’s observation 
that cultural and moral problems can be traced back to the problem of religion.114 
4.6 Summary of the Criticism of the Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts 
On the basis of all the secondary literature revealing scholarly criticisms of the RFS 
resulting from PTRIC relational selfhood, the following main relevant points in terms of 
the traditional Ruist doctrines can be underscored: 
First of all, in terms of the traditional Ruist moral self-cultivation and relational 
ethics, the RFS in a culture of moral self-cultivation that emphasizes good performance 
and achievement, especially in terms of moral qualities, is shaped as it pretends to be 
good enough to attain high social norms, ethical standards, and other ideals, especially as 
these ideals cannot be realized in one’s actual life. 
                                                
114 In Anglo-European and many other international settings, some cultural characteristics and behavioural 
customs reveal the impact of long-term influences of Christianity. Nevertheless, it is notable in Anglo-
European contexts in particular that over the past two centuries, the influences of secularism and atheism 
have more and more been rapidly and prevalently shaping these cultural characteristics, or even replacing 
them with new cultural characteristics and behavioural customs. Ironically, some of these secular and 
atheist cultural trends might prove to be too liberal for more conservative East Asian settings – for example, 
the promotion by liberals of same sex marriage. 
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Closely related to this is the traditional Ruist relational ethics where the RFS 
appears whenever one is regularly forced to wear social masks in a Ru-based collectivist 
society, because one can neither express oneself freely nor assume responsibilities for 
one’s real self for various reasons. In addition, within a hyper-hierarchical social structure 
that demands one’s good performances and achievements to satisfy others, especially for 
one’s seniors and superiors, a pressure put on a person to pretend or to mask oneself by a 
hierarchical collectivist and moralizing society is expected. Therefore, this kind of social 
imposition might complicate and extend the problem of the RFS.  
Finally, in terms of the traditional Ruist cosmology, the absence of a belief in God 
as the creator (in the Christian sense of that phrase) has been noted by some scholars as a 
possible factor influencing the appearance of the problem of the RFS. 
The above summary manifests that PTRIC relational selfhood complicated by the 
problem of the RFS is closely related to various main features of traditional Ruist values, 
especially traditional Ruist relational ethics. Although there must be more than one or two 
factors contributing to the formation of the mental habits and behavioural customs related 
to the RFS, Ru-influenced relational ethics undoubtedly are one of the main contributors 
because of its multiple points of influence. Therefore, non-Ruist scholars in particular 
have recognized this range of problems linking relational selfhood to post-traditional 
expressions of a Ru-influenced cultural heritage, and so criticize them as we have seen 
above. 
Even if not all of these tendencies related to the RFS in PTRIC contexts result in 
psychological problems or personality disorders, and even if we take account of a decline 
in traditional Ruist influence, their risk factors in ‘negative psychological 
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consequences … [on] human development’ are still significant (Ho, David YF 1996:165) 
and will be elaborated in C4).115  
According to the above findings, the tendency to form the RFSs is indeed a 
fundamental and common problem of persons in PTRIC contexts. People living in these 
contexts more or less promote, and/or are enculturated into, a socially imposed relational 
selfhood that is a performance-oriented. In addition, they are indoctrinated with the value 
of moral self-cultivation within the context of a hierarchical social structure that has been 
promoted regularly by traditional Ruist ideologies emphasizing relational ethics. Such a 
tendency is a fact accepted with both explicit and tacit consent among modern Chinese 
persons, and so has become a mental habit and behavioural custom possessed by many 
modern Chinese people. Although it can be found more or less in any people group in the 
world, because it is a general feature of social behaviour (as manifested in S3), it is 
enhanced in a Ru-affected society (Saari 1982:43). 116  This fundamental social 
behavioural custom prevents many modern Chinese persons from experiencing a true and 
liberated inner transformation of character and virtue, even while they are striving by 
means of outer performance to achieve the moral cultivation upheld by traditional Ruism. 
5. Indicator for the Research Problem 
In this thesis, the research problem of the RFS is generally not described or discussed 
under the same rubric within the relevant literature. In order to decide if the tendency of 
the RFS exists, a (collectivist) repressive social imposition existing in a society or within 
relationships that the self belongs to might be adopted as its indicator.117 For the issue of 
a (collectivist) repressive social imposition, especially in a Ru-based cultural heritage, 
                                                
115 See also Li Minlong and Yang Kuoshu (1998:11, 51).  
116 Jess Fleming (2002:184), not a Ruist, argues that ‘Confucius would seem to agree … that one’s personal 
identity is largely an artificial social construct (a mere matter of convention)’. 
117  Or ‘external, artificial constraints and superimpositions that bridle manifestations of the real self’ 
(Turner 1999:79). See also (Mullis 2008:182, 191). 
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can be summed up as a core concern from which this research problem arises. Is there a 
dynamic factor of collectivist repressive social impositions existing in relational ethics 
found in PTRIC cultural contexts? Zhái Xuéwěi 翟學偉 (2010:109–203) explains such a 
repressive social imposition as an influence or dynamic factor formed by the values or 
ideologies of first of all, ‘jiāzú zhǔyì’「家族主義」(familism) (ibid.: 253) that devalues 
the individual self, 118  and then also of asymmetrical hierarchical social structure or 
relationships, as well as of moral cultivation that emphasizes external behaviour, 
achievement, and performance. Tu Weiming (1985:22) identifies this indicator as ‘a 
coercive imposition of well-established social norms upon the individual’, so that one has 
no freedom to choose, but has only the obligation to conform to ‘the all-powerful 
society’.119 Repressive social ‘imposition[s]’ is also what Zhuāngzi 莊子, according to 
Judith Berling (1985:104–7, 112f.), criticizes as the repression of the ‘real (inner) self’ in 
Ruism through ‘socialization’, ‘a hierarchical society’, and ‘self-cultivation’. Therefore, 
repressive social imposition is appropriately adopted to be the indicator of the research 
problem of the RFS in this thesis.  
6. Conclusion 
I end this chapter by summarizing my research problem as it relates to criticisms of the 
RFS within PTRIC relational selfhood. 
                                                
118 Geert Hofstede and Michael Harris Bond point out that in Ruist teaching a ‘person is not primarily an 
individual … but a member of a family. Children should learn to restrain themselves, to overcome their 
individuality so as to maintain the harmony in the family (if only on the surface)’ (Hofstede and Bond 
1988:8). 
119 Or ‘set[ting] in motion a process of moral transformation in society … [by] imposing … coercive 
measures upon the people’ (Tu, Weiming 1976a:139; 1989a:90). 
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6.1 Description, Complications, and Indicator of the Research Problem  
The concepts of the individual, self, and person adopted in this thesis have first of all been 
clarified and differentiated. The descriptors of the real self and its repressed form 
described and criticized by scholars have been explained, especially in Chinese language 
studies. The RFS has been subsequently characterized as a common problem in PTRIC 
cultural contexts. Complications related to the problem of the RFS have been disclosed, 
especially in its significant relationship to a high suicide rate in contemporary Chinese 
societies. As interpretations of relational selfhood in the source materials might not 
always refer directly to the problem of the RFS, repressive social imposition serves as an 
indicator of that problem within this thesis. 
6.2 The Criticism of Relational Selfhood in PTRIC Contexts 
A summary of relevant literature produced by non-Ruist scholars discloses that 
relational selfhood in PTRIC contexts that may result in the presence of RFS is Ru-
influenced, and is closely related to traditional Ruist relational ethics. Its expressions are 
shaped by core values within Ru-based collectivism and traditional Ruist familism, and 
strengthened by the promotion of a hierarchical social structure and moral self-
cultivation. The tendency of the RFS might not have resulted directly from traditional 
Ruist teachings, but the end-product reflects the impact of the cultural heritage of Ruist 
core values. As some non-Christian scholars or observers point out (for example, Sun 
Lungkee, Doi, and Liu Yazhou), the issues relevant to the tendency of the RFS may also 
be related to the absence of a belief in God the creator in the general Christian sense of 
that phrase, an aspect which is also related to traditional Ruist cosmology, and so will be 
discussed in C4 and C5. But do New Ruists such as Tu Weiming recognize this problem 
as being related to an orthodox Ruist account of relational selfhood? This issue will be 
discussed in detail in C4.
67 
Chapter Three 
Research Sources and Methodology 
 
As discussed already in C1 and C2, there are groups of the scholars, especially those in 
fields of the social sciences, who criticize PTRIC relational selfhood, leading to the 
problem of the RFS and its influences in psychological problems, personality disorders, 
making interpersonal relationships all the more complex and difficult, even to the point 
of suicide. Accordingly, a solution for this problem is imperative, even if not Ru-
influenced. Following the research questions asked in C1, this research will examine the 
solutions provided by Tu Weiming and Jürgen Moltmann respectively in responding to 
the research problem of the RFS and the criticisms of PTRIC relational selfhood. This 
chapter will introduce my research sources and methodology. 
1. Research Sources 
As C1S3.1 indicates, it is meaningful and valuable to study Tu Weiming’s account of 
New Ruist relational selfhood and Jürgen Moltmann’s version of relational selfhood 
shaped by Christian social trinitarian anthropology. In this section, I will introduce their 
works, focusing on their concerns about selfhood. 
1.1 Tu Weiming and His Concerns about Selfhood  
1.1.1 Who Is Tu Weiming?  
Tu Weiming has been recognized as one of the most prominent contemporary scholars 
and thinkers in interpreting Ruism. Born in 1940, he was Professor of Chinese History 
and Philosophy and Religious Studies at Harvard University from 1981 to 2009 (Tu 
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2015a:website).1 Tu Weiming is a Contemporary New Ruist, an adherent of the Mencian 
孟子 (p. Mèngzi) (372-289 BCE) line and Wang Yangming (1472-1529 CE) school (Tu 
1985:13), and one of the founders of Boston Ruism. He works within a post-traditional 
Ruist context and was known in the 1980s as the ‘foremost exponent’ of Ruism in the 
U.S.A. (Barrett 1986:319). Later, he was described as ‘a kind of missionary’ for 
advocating (at least potentially) Ruism as a contemporary world religion in the Western 
world (Berger 2012:blog). He never views Ruism as a ‘historical relic’, but understands 
it as a comprehensive ‘spiritual humanistic’ heritage and philosophy providing a creative 
transforming force for modern life (Tucker 2013:622). Furthermore, he acknowledges 
that Ruism is not a complete and perfect system and so needs a modern transformation2 
to develop and extend the positive parts and to review and correct the negative parts.3 
During the last twenty years, he also accepted that contemporary Ruism and Chinese 
culture should learn from Protestant Christianity, following the precedents set by another 
contemporary Ruist, Liu Shuhsien.4 He (2008a:445) often claims that he benefited from 
‘monotheistic philosophizing’ and the styles and strategy of Christian theologizing are 
more congenial to his way of doing philosophy than that of treating it ‘as an analytical 
and objective professional discipline’.5 
Tu Weiming was born in Mainland China, but moved to Taiwan with his family 
when he was nine years old. His interest in traditional Ruism arose during his high school 
years, so that he later become a disciple of Mou Tsungsan, Xu Fuguan, and Tang Junyi, 
all of whom are representative figures of the second generation of Modern New Ruists 
                                                
1 See also Tucker (2013:622–3). 
2 Tu Weiming (1995 in Tu, Weiming and Liáng, Yànchéng 梁燕城 1995). See also Bresciani (2001:416). 
3 Tu Weiming (1999 in Li, Minghua 李明華 p. Lǐ Mínghuá 1999:31). 
4 Tu Weiming (1995 in Tu, Weiming and Leung, Insing 1995:8–10). See also (Bresciani 2001:416). 
5 The Boston Ruists he has led are probably best known as ‘Protestant successors to Matteo Ricci’ (Berger 
2012:blog). 
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(Tu, Weiming 2014a:website).6 During his academic career, he has devoted himself to 
the following seven main discourses (Tu 2015b:website): 
(1) ecological consciousness;  
(2) dialogue among civilizations; 
(3) cultural Chinese; 
(4) reflection on the Enlightenment; 
(5) global ethics; 
(6) Ruist creativity;  
(7) the humanist spirit.  
According to the analysis of Guō Qíyǒng 郭齊勇 (2002:114–15), up to this point 
in time, Tu’s scholarship can be generally divided into three periods.  
In the first period (1966-1978), his focus was on the interpretation of Ruist tradition, 
especially Wang Yangming, whom Tu considered to be a faithful transmitter of 
traditional Ruist philosophy systematized by Confucius and Mencius (Tucker 2013:622). 
He also endeavoured to advance a collective and critical post-traditional Ruist self-
consciousness. The main works he wrote during this period were Centrality and 
Commonality (1976a) and Neo-Confucian Thought in Action: Wang Yangming’s Youth 
(1472-1509) (1976b) (Tu 2013:website). It is worth noting that the themes of self-
cultivation, sagehood, and traditional Ruist religiosity are stressed by Tu from the very 
beginning and restated frequently in most of his later writings (Tucker 2013:622).  
In his second period (1978-1989), the elucidation of what he counted to be intrinsic 
experiences of Ruist tradition and the promotion of the modern vitality of Ruism in post-
traditional cultural settings were his main concerns. Therefore, he expanded his 
discussions into a number of new discursive contexts including tradition and modernity, 
                                                
6 See also Xī Liúqín 奚劉琴 (2011:4, 14) and (2012:12–15). 
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Ruist creativity, and East Asian core values. His main works in this period were Humanity 
and Self-Cultivation (1979) and Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative 
Transformation (1985).7  
After 1990, during his third period, Tu broadened his studies to pay more attention 
to the dialogue among civilizations, the nature of cultural Chinese, the justification of 
global ethics, the humanist spirit in Ruist cultural contexts, and reflections on the 
European Enlightenment. In facing the challenges of the twenty-first century, Tu has 
applied traditional Ruist ideas to address questions in pluralistic cultures, including 
environmental problem and ecological ethics, as well as political values, and human 
rights. In this period, unlike his previous efforts, his main works have been mostly written 
in Chinese. They include Rújiā Zìwǒ Yìshí de Fǎnsī 《儒家自我意識的反思》
[Reflections on Ruist Self-Consciousness] (1990b); Rújiā Chuántǒng de Xiàndài 
Zhuǎnhuà 《儒家傳統的現代轉化》 [The Modern Transformation of Confucian 
Tradition] (1992b), and Duìhuà yǔ Chuàngxīn《對話與創新》[Dialogue and Creativity] 
(2005).8  
It has been noted that Tu’s interpretations and discussions of traditional Ruism is 
developed in order to identify and advocate its universal value (Tu, Weiming 
2014b:website) by creatively expounding the intrinsic spirit and modern meaning of basic 
traditional Ruist concepts. The universal values in traditional Ruism Tu has identified as 
worthy of consideration include human’s self-transformation, different themes and 
approaches in morality and ethics, and the principle of being human.9 Generally speaking, 
                                                
7 His other two main works in this period are Confucian Ethics Today (1984) and Way, Learning and 
Politics (1989, re-published in 1993c). 
8 His other two main works published in this period were A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights 
(1996a) and Wénhuà Zhōngguó de Rènzhī yǔ Guānhuái 《文化中國的認知與關懷》[Cultural China: 
Issues and concerns] (1999). 
9 Tu Weiming (1985:13, 19–34, 126, 145; 2001b:7; 2006:12f., 90f., 238, 246-7; 1999 in Lǐ, Mínghuá 李明
華 1999:31, 33). 
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Tu’s post-traditional Ruism promotes a new kind of philosophical anthropology and 
ethics rather than expounding metaphysical themes.  
Tu’s research and published writings about New Ruism are very comprehensive. 
For the purpose of dealing with the tendency of the RFS addressed in this study, the 
following four perspectives are parts of what, Tu argues, New Ruism can contribute 
directly to the issue of the RFS,10 especially as addressed within this democratic and 
scientific modern era. In the following section, I explore how Tu’s concerns are relevant 
to the tendency of the RFS in the lives of PTRIC. 
1.1.2 The Authentic Self as a Goal 
Tu Weiming (1985:20) emphasizes that in East Asian thought11 ‘how to cultivate oneself’ 
is important in revealing ‘who and what the true self is’. Being an authentic, genuine, 
sincere, real, or true self (or person or human) in Tu’s eyes (ibid.:150-53), as well as being 
one’s own self, is a central goal and therefore a core value for New Ruist self-cultivation, 
what he also refers to as ‘[learning to] become a sage’ (ibid.:151).12 He (1979a:73, 86) 
argues that an ‘authentic and genuine, and sincere’ person — his modern way of 
describing a sage — should be truthful to one’s ‘inner self’ and ‘one’s sociality’ (ibid.:22). 
Being ‘zhìchéng’ 「至誠」 (‘absolute sincerity’)13 is pinpointed by him (1976a:117) to 
be one of the indicators that human nature is ‘perfectible’ (Tu 1985:27); this is another 
way of describing sagehood.14  In his account, then, a sage is not only ‘honest with 
                                                
10 Tu Weiming (2001 in Dīng, Guǒ 丁果 2001:66). 
11 Namely the so-called Three Teachings of Ruism, Daoism, and Buddhism. 
12 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:91–2, 116–21, 139–40; 1979a:72; 1989a:62, 77–9, 90; 1990a:135, 160, 
179) and Zhāng Lìwěi 張立偉(2015). 
13 As promoted in the 22nd Chapter of the Zhōngyōng《中庸》(The Doctrine of the Mean). This book title 
is also translated as Centrality and Commonality by Tu Weming (1976a). 
14 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77). 
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oneself’ but ‘loyal to others’ (ibid. 52).15 This will be discussed in much greater detail in 
C4. In order to pursue one’s authentic self, one cannot hide inconsistencies with one’s 
self (as discussed in C2S1.2). For Tu Weiming (1976a:33–5, eo), the concept and 
‘spiritual discipline’ of ‘self-watchfulness when alone (shen-tu)’ or ‘vigilant solitariness’ 
(1989a:108, eo) (慎獨 p. shèndú) in traditional Ruism is one of the key approaches to 
reaching sagehood; it is accomplished by means of examining ‘one’s inner self’, that part 
of one’s inner life that is not disclosed to others. 16  He also argues (1985:12) that 
traditional and post-traditional Ruism value individual ‘dignity, independence, and 
autonomy’ as integral parts of the authentic self.17 Yet in this regard, it is important to 
note that Tu (1979a:38) emphasizes the virtues of self-transformation rather than the 
moral concerns linked to ‘obligation’. He also opposes insincere and superficial harmony 
and relationships, criticizing people like this as ‘hollow and unreal personality’ (ibid.).18 
For example, Tu argues that ‘the hyper[-]honest villager (hsiang-yüan)’ (鄉愿  p. 
xiāngyuàn)19 whom Confucius criticizes, is in fact ‘the … thief … of virtue’ (dé zhī zéi 德
之賊) (ibid., eo). In this way, Tu seems to be concerned about the tendency of the RFS, 
especially when it is identified by critics as being one of the by-products of Ru-based 
cultural heritage by certain scholars. Therefore, he reacts against this claims arguing that 
                                                
15 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:91–2, 116–21; 1979a:19ff., 81; 1985:68; 1989a:62, 78–9). 
16 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:26–7, eo). 
17 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:77–9; 1985:78, 138; 1982 in Tu, Weiming 1982b:460f.; 1989a:54; 2001 in 
Ding, Guo 2001:66). 
18 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:77–9; 1985:55–6; 1989a:54; 1989 in Tu, Weiming 1989b:52–3). 
19 For the classical texts mentioning and interpreting xiangyuan 鄉愿, see Analects 17:13 and Mencius, 
7B:37. Tu Weiming (1979a:38) adopts the rendering of Lau D. C. (1970:203) to explain the term as the 
‘village honest man’ or ‘village worthy’ (1970, revised in 2004:166) believing that ‘being in this world, 
one must behave in a manner pleasing to this world’. It is worth noting that Confucius not only criticizes 
hypocrisy and duplicity (Analects 7:26; 17:12f.) but also admits it is not easy to find a person without 
hypocrisy and duplicity (ibid. 7:26). 
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the RFS is contrary to absolute sincerity, the core value and sagely goal of traditional 
Ruist self-cultivation (ibid.:20-22).20  
1.1.3 Criticism of Hegemony and Sāngāng 三綱 
Tu (1976a:87–97) reacts against authoritarianism (Tu 2006:226–8) and any form of 
hegemony (‘pa’ 「霸｣ p. bà),21 even including the traditional Ruist teachings of ‘san-
kang’ ｢三綱｣ (p. sāngāng) (the ‘Three Bonds’) (Tu 1985:139):22 the ruler are to be the 
standards of the ruled, the father the standards of the sons, and the husband the standards 
of the wives (according to the interpretation in Chan, Wingtsit 1969:272). Accordingly, 
he (1979a:20–23) is concerned with the issues and criticisms of the impositions of social 
values with Ru-influenced cultural contexts. He (1976a:48, 53, 77) implies the existence 
of ‘coercive rules’, ‘the dominance of outside influences [or authorities]’, and ‘social 
coercion’ in traditional and post-traditional Ruist contexts while defending his 
interpretation of the ideal Ruist relational selfhood.23 Nevertheless, he denies they come 
as the result of traditional and post-traditional Ruist teachings (ibid.).24 In his mid-career 
publications, he (1985:58–62) claimed that the uniqueness of every person in traditional 
Ruism should be equally maintained and cherished, so that the self should not be reduced 
to ‘its social roles’. He (1976a:53) also recognized possibilities of the growth of unhealthy 
personalities and struggles for self-identity caused by problems related to sangang.25 
                                                
20 See also Tu Weiming (1982 in Tu 1982b:460f.). 
21 See also Tu Weiming (1982 in Tu, Weiming 1982c; 1985:144–5; 1989a:60–65; 2003 in Xǔ, Jìlín 許紀
霖 et al. 2003:135; 2006:61–2; 2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yī, Jùnqīng 衣俊卿 2009:8–9). 
22 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:112–13; 1998c:122–4; 2006:227–8; 2001 in Ding, Guo 2001:66; 2003 in 
Tu, Weiming and Yáng, Xuégōng 楊學功 2003:9; 2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fàn, Céng 范曾 2010b:55–
6). It is worth noting that Tu’s viewpoint about sangang has been adjusting and changing through four 
decades. It will be shown later in C4S4.4. 
23 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:35, 40, 54). 
24 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:20, 22–23). 
25 Tu Weiming (1989a:40; 2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:55–6). 
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Nevertheless, he did not think that ‘self and society’ or ‘one’s individuality’ and 
‘sociality’ are irreconcilable (ibid.:52-4).26 Accordingly, he devoted himself to defending 
his account of New Ruism and its understanding of a relational self as a synthesis of the 
advantages of ‘[European] individualism’ and ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’, but 
without their disadvantages27 (Tu 1985:10, 77–8).28  Is his account a synthesis as he 
claims? How does his New Ruism deal with the teachings of sangang? How does he 
reconcile ‘one’s individuality’ and ‘sociality’? I will explore the answer to these questions 
in C4 and C5. 
1.1.4 Heaven, Earth, and Humanity (Tiāndìrén 天地人) 
Following specific Ruist traditions, Tu (1985:45–6, 60–63) repeatedly emphasizes three 
interrelated visions of human flourishing: tiānrén héyī 天人合一 (‘the complete unity 
between humanity and Heaven’), tiāndìrén sānhéyī 天地人三合一 (a ‘trinity’29 among 
Heaven, Earth and ‘humanity’),30 and humanity ‘forming one body with the universe’ 
metaphorically as the highest transcendent goal and the full realization of the self.31 In his 
account of the second vision (ibid.:60), a ‘trinity’ among Heaven, Earth and ‘humanity’ 
is the reification of the ontologically ‘highest transcendence [of humanity] within its own 
                                                
26 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:39–40). 
27 The disadvantages he finds within those two alternative positions are mainly ‘egoism’ within ‘[European] 
individualism’ and unwanted repressively social imposition found within ‘collectivism in a general sense]’. 
Other related disadvantages within ‘[European] individualism’ recognized earlier on by Tu (1976a:52–4) 
are self-centredness, isolation, exclusiveness, enclosedness, loss of relatedness, and ignoring ‘social 
responsibilities’. Other related disadvantages within ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ recognized earlier 
on by Tu (1976a:52–4) are social-roles-assigned self, loss of individual subjectivity and autonomy, 
‘dominance’, and ‘coercion’. 
28 See also Tu Weiming (1990a:179–80; 2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:23; 2010a:11). 
29 It is worth noting that the term trinity used here by Tu (1985:46) means something completely different 
from Christian trinitarian theology. In fact, ‘humanity’, Heaven, and Earth in Ruist context do not form a 
real triangular relationship but take on more of a dyadic relation between humans and their cosmic parents, 
Heaven-Earth. 
30 Tu Weiming (1989a:106). 
31 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:118f.; 1979a:73, 75; 1989a:78, 99. 101, 106f.; 1990a:126, 137, 153, 180). 
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reality’. Tu denies that Heaven (tiān 天) can be conceived as a ‘creator’ understood to be 
an external being (ibid.:45, 73) 32 but still insists constantly that human nature’s goodness 
is bestowed by Heaven (ibid.:14, 23-4).33 What does Heaven and Earth really mean in 
these visionary contexts? Do human beings have the ability to reach such a transcendent 
goal by their own abilities and capabilities? What roles do these claims play in the 
formation of Tu Weiming’s New Ruist selfhood? These questions will be discussed in 
greater detail in C4.  
1.1.5 Humanity in the World 
Based on his conception of ‘Chinese cosmology’ or ‘Chinese cosmogony’,34  and so 
extending his claims to embrace the notion of forming an unity of Heaven, Earth and 
‘humanity’, Tu underlined that human beings also form one body with the universe 
(ibid.:35, 40).35 He argued that ‘all things are the companions’ of human beings because 
all ‘share the same consanguinity’ (ibid.:45). But even so, human beings must cultivate 
themselves well enough to become deserving such a status and its inherent relationships 
(ibid.:47). The sociality of human beings predicated on the same basic notion of Chinese 
cosmology is highlighted by Tu (1979a:20–22, 90). For the purpose of self-cultivation, 
namely authenticating oneself, the self must ‘harmonize [its] relationship[s] with others’ 
(ibid.:20). Yet for the purpose of becoming worthy of those relationships with others, 
self-cultivation is a necessary prerequisite (Tu 1985:55). Do not the claims related to self-
                                                
32 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:9; 1985:63, 132, 137). 
33 See also Tu Weiming (1985:30, 71–4, 125–37, 160–70; 1990a:171–7). 
34 Precisely speaking, what Tu refers to is a Chinese traditional Ruist cosmology or cosmogony. He tends 
to generalize it as ‘Chinese cosmology’ or ‘cosmogony’. About different (mainly Ruist, Daoist, and 
Buddhist) forms of Chinese cosmology and their distinction, consult Hé Guānghù 何光滬 and Edwin C. 
Hui eds. (1998:297–366) and Dù Bǎoruì 杜保瑞 and Chén Rónghuá 陳榮華 (2008:223–8). See also more 
explanations in C5F95. 
35 Tu Weiming (1985:8–9, 35–50, 132–3; 2007b). 
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cultivation and proper relationships with others appear to be locked into a form of circular 
reasoning? This problem will be discussed in detail in C4. 
1.2 Jürgen Moltmann and His Concerns about Selfhood 
1.2.1 Who Is Jürgen Moltmann?  
Jürgen Moltmann has been recognized as one of the most influential theologians 
stemming from the contemporary German Protestant Reformed tradition. He was born in 
1926, and was Professor of Systematic Theology at Tübingen University from 1967 until 
his retirement in 1994. His influence is not only in Anglo-European contexts, but also in 
some non-Anglo-European circles. He underwent a profound transforming experience 
while he was a prisoner of war (POW) during the period from 1945 to 1948 in Belgium, 
Scotland and lastly England (Moltmann 2007a:6–18).36  The events in a POW camp 
totally changed Moltmann’s life as he (2009a:12, 19–35, eo) describes in his 
autobiography, A Broad Place: 
The sciences I took so seriously did not at that time make a realist of me … Each of us tried 
to conceal his bleeding heart behind an armour of untouchability and indifference. That was 
the inward imprisonment of the soul which was added to the outward captivity … [When] 
one was exposed without any defence to what one had experienced and suffered, and had to 
come to terms with it … [it is indeed a] mental and spiritual torment … Depression over the 
wartime destruction and a captivity with no end in sight was compounded by a feeling of 
profound shame at having to share in shouldering the disgrace of one’s own people … Psalm 
39[:2, 5b, 12] caught my attention particularly [because] that was an echo from my own soul, 
and it called that soul to God … When I heard Jesus’ death cry [in Mark’s Gospel 15:34], I 
felt growing within me the conviction: this is someone who understands you completely, who 
is with you in your cry to God and has felt the same forsakenness you are living in now … I 
summoned up the courage to live again, and I was slowly but surely seized by a great hope 
for the resurrection into God’s wide space where there is no more cramping … I am certain 
that then, in 1945, and there, in the Scottish [POW] camp, in the dark pit of my soul, Jesus 
sought me and found me … Jesus’ Godforsakenness on the cross showed me where God is 
present — where he was in my experiences of death, and where he is going to be in whatever 
comes. Whenever I read the Bible again with the searching eyes of the Godforsaken prisoner 
I was, I am always assured of its divine truth … I was still searching, but I sensed that God 
was drawing me and that I should not be seeking him unless he had already found me … The 
question of how long the captivity was going to last no longer bothered me … I had 
experienced something that was to determine my whole life. For that reason this time is for 
me so important that I would not have missed a day of it … [because] I experienced th[e] 
turn from the hidden face of God to his shining countenance in the nearness of Jesus, the 
brother in need and the leader of resurrection into true life. 
                                                
36 See also Moltmann (2002b:2; 2009a). 
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Therefore, he (2000a:3) claims that his theology is ‘existential theology’, developed 
originally for his ‘particular existential situation’ and his own need and then further 
enriched by the existential dimension of theology (‘shénxué de shícún céngmiàn’ 「神學
的實存層面」) (Moltmann 2002b:2–4) and the collectively, not merely individually, 
experienced ‘social situation’ (Moltmann 1992a:166).37 For example, because of personal 
experiences of ‘the collective suffering and guilt’ of his country, Germany, he (2000a:4) 
started his earlier works from his need to understand hope and suffering. It is notably that 
his (2009a:147–85) later theological engagements have involved many public and 
political issues.38 Although he has tried to initiate dialogues between Christian theology 
and some other disciplines and religions, he (2002b:2–3) has never tried to present 
Christian theology in the light of religious studies or cultural studies. However, he does 
not confine his theological research and written works to the area of Protestant theology. 
As indicated in the summary of his journey of theology in Experiences in Theology 
(2000a), Moltmann is open not only to engaging age-old theologies from both Roman 
Catholic and Eastern Orthodox traditions, but is also willing to address questions from a 
wide variety of contemporary theologies, including liberation theology, charismatic 
theology, and public theology.39  
Moltmann’s Theology of Hope (1967, German original 1964) expresses his long 
struggle to formulate a description of God ‘ “with future as his essential nature” (as Ernst 
                                                
37 See also Moltmann (1988, excerpted and trans. in 1994a:61–72; 1996:13ff., 44-6; 1997:2; 2000a:4) and 
Neal (2009:368–9). Moltmann (2000a:139–45, eo) promotes the integration of ‘the hermeneutics from 
above and the hermeneutics from below’. The former is his ‘trinitarian hermeneutics’, emphasizing the 
aspect of God’s revealing of God- self within the Bible, perceiving the function of the Bible ‘in the 
trinitarian history of God’ (ibid.:144, eo). The later, emphasizing the aspect of human beings’ expressing 
their faith based upon claims in the Bible, is ‘existential[-]historical, socio-historical and psycho-
sociological’ (ibid.:142). See also Kwok Hungbiu (2007:18f.). 
38 See also Bauckham (2005:147). 
39 See also Moltmann (2009a). It is notable that he has made at least seven academic visits to Taiwan and 
China and has had a number of encounters and dialogues with Chinese theologians, Chinese philosophers, 
and scholars in other disciplines (Lin, Honghsin 2002; Hóng, Liàng 洪亮 2011). 
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Bloch puts it)’ (ibid.:16, 30).40 The Crucified God (1974b, German original 1972) is his 
second major influential work, dealing with issues of suffering and the impassibility of 
God. In this book, he (ibid.:247-9) interpreted the event of the cross as a trinitarian event, 
and so presents God there as a Trinity open to the world. Following this initial trinitarian 
emphasis, Moltmann stressed the role of the Holy Spirit in a more systematic 
pneumatology expressed in his The Church in the Power of the Spirit (1977, German 
original 1975).41 Still later, he developed a social view of the Trinity in The Trinity and 
the Kingdom of God (1981, German original 1980), responding to the dispute on the issue 
of ‘filioque’ (ibid.:xv) 42 and overcoming the dialectic of accounts of God as the supreme 
substance and God as the absolute subject (see C6S3 and C6S4). Such a relational 
trinitarian theology turns out to be the overarching theological framework of Moltmann’s 
writings from that point of time in the early 1980s. It is worth noting that this work is also 
a turning point for a ‘paradigm shift’ in Moltmann’s theological journey ‘from the order 
of domination and obedience (Karl Barth and Ernst Kasemann) to the new and democratic 
order of community, freedom, and friendship’ (Moltmann 2008a:369). 43  It is also a 
                                                
40 Moltmann expanded this notion of God in an account of God and creation through a new focus on the 
Holy Spirit in God in Creation published in 1985. 
41  The third one of his trilogy, the first and second are Theology of Hope and The Crucified God 
respectively. 
42 This term filioque, deriving from Latin, literally means ‘and from the Son’ (Bromiley 1984, eo). This 
phrase was seemingly first added into the Nicene Creed (325) at the local Council of Toledo in 589 by the 
churches in the Latin West to highlight that ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son’ (Dulles 
1995:31–2). In order to defend themselves against Arians, this insertion served to stress ‘the perfect equality 
between the Son and the Father’ (ibid.), namely the full deity of the Son and His consubstantiality and co-
eternity with the Father (Edgar & Oliphint 2009:16). But this was not the content agreed upon within the 
confessions at Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381), when a statement based on John 15:26 was cited, 
where Jesus Christ promises: ‘When the Advocate comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the 
Spirit of truth who comes from the Father, he will testify on my behalf’. At that time it simply was affirmed 
that ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father’ (Dulles 1995:31–2). Therefore, this insertion was rejected 
by the churches in the Greek East (Bromiley 1984) in order to stress the full deity of the Holy Spirit 
(Moltmann 1981:181), even though they also opposed Arianism (Blaising 1984). Nevertheless, based on 
the same verse, the Latin Western churches asserted that from both the Father and the Son the Spirit 
proceeds (ibid.). This main doctrinal bifurcation led to the great schism in 1054, when the Eastern Orthodox 
Church and the Western Roman Catholic Church spilt apart. This dispute has never been resolved since 
then (Moltmann 1981:178–80; Pless 2005:116f.; Siecienski 2010). See also Walter F. Hook (1887:352), 
Gerald Bray (1983), and Joannes Metaxas-Mariatos (1988). 
43 See also Moltmann (2000a:303–333). 
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journey for him from ‘the God of Hope to the Inhabitable God’ (ibid.) or from a ‘theology of 
time’ to a ‘theology of space’ (ibid.:371). Besides, starting from this work, he began to 
write the ‘theme-orientated series’ that he entitled ‘systematic contributions to theology’ 
(Moltmann 2000a:xvii, eo).44 The other volumes in this series include God in Creation 
(1985), where he expressed his concerns about the ecological crisis, The Way of Jesus 
Christ (1990, German original 1989) focusing on Christology, The Spirit of Life (1992, 
German original 1991), presenting his advanced pneumatology, The Coming of God 
(1996, German original 1995), his eschatology merging universal salvation and divine 
indwelling together, and Experiences in Theology (2000), that has served as both an 
introduction to and afterword of his approach to Christian theology. For understanding 
his development of trinitarian thought beyond The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, his 
set of essays published as History and the Triune God (1992, German original 1991) is 
particularly helpful. Additionally, God for a Secular Society (1999, German original 
1997) makes a significant contribution to his development of public theology. 
In the following sections, I will concentrate on Moltmann’s concerns about 
relational selfhood. Some of the issues with which Moltmann is concerned are relevant 
to the tendency of the RFS in PTRIC contexts.45 
1.2.2 The Inevitability of Masking 
In his book, Man: Christian Anthropology in the Conflicts of the Present, Moltmann 
(1976:2–3) indicated the inevitability of negatively masking one’s identity among human 
beings, tracing the root of this behaviour to an embarrassed and naturally shameful ‘self-
encounter’. ‘Naked honesty’ to the self is itself agonizing, because human beings incline 
                                                
44 See also Moltmann (2009a:286). 
45 It is important to observe that even when Moltmann mentions Ruism directly in his writings, he never 
specifies which epoch or school of Ruism he is talking about, let alone its specific teachings. This is not to 
say that what he understands about Ruism is wrong. Rather he shares the general concept about traditional 
Ruism that prevails among many scholars and other people outside the professional circles of sinology. 
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to repress the ‘consciousness of the ambiguity’ of their self-awareness, namely to 
intentionally evade facing their true selves (ibid.:3). It is because losing ‘their secret’, in 
Moltmann’s account, is equivalent to giving up ‘their future’ (ibid.). Furthermore, human 
beings also tend to make themselves ‘recognizable’ to others, gaining value, confidence, 
or security from others’ affirmations (ibid.:2). But how can who one really is be better 
than what one appears to be? Accordingly, Moltmann argues that everyone requires a 
mask as long as they find it hard to accept being ‘identical with’ one’s inner real self 
(ibid.:3). Precisely in this context, Moltmann realizes that a dilemma arises: on the one 
hand, one is neither able to ‘completely identify [oneself] with [one’s] mask’, and so one 
is unable to accept the ‘appearance’ shown to others; on the other hand, one cannot easily 
‘get right down’ to oneself even if one desires to expose oneself unreservedly (ibid.). 
Although Moltmann pinpoints humans’ limitations in living authentically, at this point, 
he does not explain the basic reason for these phenomena from the perspective of 
Christian anthropology. Nevertheless, although Moltmann does not make much use of 
this language, I suggest that the doctrine of original sin in Christian anthropology explains 
the root cause of such a RFS (or hiding one’s real self). That is a common reason why 
one hides one’s real self from oneself first and then from others in any cultural contexts.46 
According to the account in Genesis, the first thing the first man and woman did after the 
Fall was to hide their naked selves because of ‘shame’ (Genesis 3:7) (Henry 1706:56). 
From whom did they hide? Besides from their own eyes or ‘consciences’, the second 
thing they did was to hide from each other’s eyes because at that time, of course, 
according to the narrative, there were no other human persons alive than those two (ibid.). 
The third thing they did was to hide from the Lord God (Genesis 3:8). The example of 
this experienceable reality of fallen human beings in this way can be found through the 
                                                
46 This independent suggestion of mine is supported by the similar arguments of Thomas Merton (1961:34–
5, 43, 280f.) found after I completed the first draft of this thesis. 
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whole Bible. For example, the Apostle Paul precisely and vividly depicts such conscious 
struggling in Romans 7: 18b-19: ‘I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not 
do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do.’ 
Moltmann (1976:3) refers to this imposed mask presented to others as ‘the external 
face’ that is given by both traditional and contemporary ‘culture[s]’. He thinks that one 
cannot be satisfied with a mask acquired externally; in the long run, one will eventually 
become stagnated or alienated by it (ibid.). For one’s ‘real self’ cannot be involved in a 
mere ostensible conformity to unsought ‘social compulsions’ outside (ibid.:39, 41). 
Undoubtedly, the repressed behaviour of masking can develop into a form of ‘inward 
emigration’ to some extent or other; through that masking one seeks to preserve and hide 
one’s ‘true inward nature’, expressing what appears to be only a passive conformity in 
order to evade relational conflicts and stresses (ibid.:39-40). Inward emigration seeks 
only for ‘freedom in privacy’, ‘self-protection from social pressures’ or the ‘inward 
cultivation of the beautiful soul’ (ibid.:41). I find that this inward emigration is exactly a 
RFS. Accordingly, Moltmann calls this passive ‘attitude of resistance’ a ‘tragedy’, 
because Christians holding such a passive ‘attitude of resistance’ will not address their 
‘inhuman circumstances’ (ibid.). Moltmann’s concern for and criticism of inward 
emigration originates from the context of European industrial society (ibid.:22-45) and 
the ‘Third Reich’, that is, Nazi Germany (ibid.:16). But the phenomenon of inward 
emigration can be also evidently applied to describe the tendency of the RFS in PTRIC 
contexts. This application is explored in C2 and C4, as well as in A-E. 
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1.2.3 Criticism of Patriarchy 
Moltmann (2008b:4) demonstrates that he is concerned about and advocates ‘human 
rights’, 47  ‘freedom’ and justice for the oppressed, criticizing ‘jíquán’ ｢ 極 權 ｣ 
(totalitarianism) in its many aspects.48 From his viewpoint (2000a:332), the enlightened 
understanding that flows from the trinitarian concept of God makes possible ‘the 
equilibrium between personal freedom and a just society’. He has not yet discussed or 
mentioned directly the problem of the RFS in these contexts, but has been concerned with 
the results of self-contempt and the insurmountable hindrances to self-liberation due to 
the imposition of mainstream value systems, especially patriarchy. For him (1981:214), 
the passive side of freedom is at least to be liberated from ‘compulsion and necessity’. 
The active side of it is to strive ‘for the realization of the Good’ 49 (ibid.). Consequently, 
he has proposed a way to find one’s self through finding the Kingdom of God and 
experiencing reconciliation with God in Christ (Moltmann 1994b:8–19, 29, 135). These 
initiatives are in fact closely related to the problem of RFS in PTRIC contexts. The main 
question he has focused on in feminist theology 50  is nothing but to challenge the 
fundamental age-old masculine rule in societies dominated by patriarchy and 
androcentrism (Moltmann 2000a:272). This heritage influences and predominates every 
                                                
47 Moltmann (1974, trans. and published in Chinese 1990b). 
48 See also Moltmann (1969, trans. in 1991; 1977, in Moltmann 2007b:8 of the Preface; 1981:xii; 1984, in 
Moltmann-Wendel and Moltmann 1984:112–5; 1985d; 1985c:99; 1988, excerpted and trans. in 1994a:67–
9; 1990a:255; 1992b:251–4, 239–41; 1994b:8–19, 26–9; 1998b; 1999:46–70; 2000a:263–92; 2000b; 
2000c:156; 2008b:3–16; 2009a:286). 
49 Moltmann (1981:213f.) denotes ‘the realm of the Good’ as the domain from where the ‘purposes and 
values’ of morality shine into freedom’s domain, so that ‘freedom may be used properly … for life’s 
preservation and not for its destruction’. 
50 Influenced by his late wife, Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, a feminist theologian who published in this 
realm from 1972, his attention has been focused on the issue of patriarchy as it relates to the ‘deformation’ 
of females (Moltmann 1985d:57) and the construction of a feminist theology for males (Moltmann 
2000a:268–92). See also Moltmann (1988, excerpted and trans. in 1994a:68–9; 1992a:xiiif., 1-25). 
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aspect of life, including concepts of religion, the image of humankind, and the familial 
framework and its functions (ibid.).51  
Although Moltmann discusses the above issues without reference to any 
contemporary or past Chinese cultural contexts, such phenomena can also be seen among 
many Chinese men (Tang, Catherine Sokum et al. 2010:538).52 He argued these matters 
on the basis of common experiences documented within his own generation, including 
the expectations in a patriarchal society that usually require a male person ‘to be a man’, 
and found notably among those who brought him up (Moltmann 2000a:289, eo). While 
Moltmann admitted that it is impossible for men to reach this idealized vision of being a 
man, in the process of trying to live up to those external demands, they have to not only 
repress some of their ‘feelings’, ‘senses[,] and inner needs’, but also rule over some of 
their instinctive drives, and play other roles in order to ‘make something of [themselves]’: 
such as being a victor, master, superior, succeeder, owner, conqueror, controller, and 
leader (ibid.:275, 289, eo).53 The constant fear of ‘not being anything’ can split a male 
person into two parts. One is to ‘identify himself’ with an false image of being a ‘subject 
of understanding and will’; the other is to escape from becoming a true ‘object of heart, 
feeling and needs’ (Moltmann 2000a:289). 
                                                
51 Moltmann (2000a:274) identifies two essential elements in ‘patriarchy’: ‘an institutionalized system of 
sexual hierarchy and a psychological mechanism for its justification’ in both ‘family and society’. In such 
a patriarchal society, the mastery of the man over the woman is acquired by birth (ibid.). Accordingly, the 
father assumes the responsibility as the ‘family priest’ in the familial ancestral worship and passes it down 
to the eldest son of every generation (ibid.:275). The external ‘forms and appearances’ of the gender-biased 
hierarchy in patriarchy have been transmitted through thousands of years in the vast majority of cultures 
(ibid.). Moltmann argued that male ‘supremacy’ over females has remained alive and visible in three aspects 
of male persons’ self-perceptions and roles: ‘sexually active roles’, ‘supposed potency’, and ‘life-long 
narcissism’ (ibid.). 
52 See also Sun Lungkee (1983, reprinted in 2004:113) and Fanny M. C. Cheung et al. (2010:302) . 
53 For Ru-influenced Chinese people, the goal to be a human can be usually summarized with idioms such 
as ‘chūrén tóudì’ ｢出人頭地｣ (to become honoured and distinguished among others)53 and ‘guāngzōng 
yàozǔ’ ｢光宗耀祖｣ (glorifying and illuminating the ancestors)53 (Hé, Yǒuhuī 何友暉 2006:18). See also 
Hu Hsienchin (1944:45, 64), Shenkar and Ronen (1987:573–4), Jin Shenghua et al. (2009:1004, 1008–
1011), and Zhào Fúlóu 趙福樓 (2012:blog). 
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Moltmann notices especially the ‘depreciation’ of females in traditional Ruism, a 
set of phenomena dating back to ancient times in China (ibid.:273). These phenomena are 
highlighted precisely when men’s actual achievements are not strong enough to meet the 
culture’s high expectation. So, in order to be accepted by their own Chinese society 
(especially when it is influenced by traditional Ruism), men manage to survive only 
through hiding and denying their weaknesses to everyone, including hiding them from 
themselves (ibid.:273-5).54 Consequently, by maintaining this split ‘conscious self’, the 
male is hunting endlessly for ‘security’ to relieve his internal ‘anxieties’ through 
dominating and repressing female persons (ibid.:277).55 Moltmann’s observations and 
explanations are consistent with evidence found among contemporary Chinese, Japanese, 
and Korean societies as mentioned in C1 and C2 and developed further in A-E and A-F. 
According to Moltmann’s analysis of patriarchy, I can see that there is a strong 
tendency to develop a problem related to the RFS, though he did not use this phrase, in 
these kinds of patriarchal cultural settings. What a paradoxical relation and tension exists 
between the putatively strong and external appearance of the dominant male and the 
hidden, weak, and oppressed internal reality males can experience! I share the concern 
with Moltmann that a patriarchal rule develops regularly by the same logic of ‘male 
sexism’ (Moltmann 2000a:275), so that it supports a hierarchical society, racism, and 
nationalism. As he documents in this same context, it is even more difficult for male rulers 
to give power away when it has been acquired through kinship, even though there may 
be other factors including ethnicity. Consequently, the RFS may well become much 
                                                
54 So it seems precisely when a man’s identity and self-value are based on his masculinity that he views 
femininity as being only ‘weakness’, and does not allow himself to ‘get soft’ (Moltmann 2000a:277, eo). 
55 Moltmann is concerned not only with masculine problems of the self as described above, but also notices 
some feminine problems of the self developed in these contexts. As females are ‘culturally conditioned’ to 
be relation-oriented in a patriarchal society, they tend to despairingly flee from ‘solitariness’ and being 
themselves (Moltmann 1992b:253). Evidently, such a problem is also a by-product of patriarchy, under 
which the meaning of ‘being a human’ for females is disrespected (ibid.:254). 
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stronger within male dominant cultural contexts in order to hide and suppress its 
contrasting weaker internal reality. This can turn into a vicious cycle: employing a status 
of being the ‘master in the house’ (ibid.:289, eo) with all its power may also become a 
way to suppress one’s weakness.56 
Although Moltmann’s discussion of patriarchy does not always address the general 
cultural contexts of either traditional Ruism, post-traditional Ruism or of modern Chinese 
people, he addressed this in other places. 57  In his eyes (Moltmann 1989:87–101), 
however, PTRIC society is a typically patriarchal one. This is so, he recognized, even if 
he does not use the same terms to describe post-traditional Ruist contexts as he did in 
other discussions of patriarchal societies, to highlight the features of modern Chinese 
patriarchy. Moltmann does point out, however, that a patriarchal sex hierarchy is the basic 
type or archetype within a traditional and post-traditional Ruist hierarchical society 
(ibid.:91). Patriarchal society demands that men live out their identity in such a way that 
they are perceived as being strong, exercising full control of their inner feelings, and 
supressing any weaknesses. This demand can come from women just as much as from 
men, due to their sharing an overwhelming collectivist ideology that makes ‘the 
individual consciousness’ embedded in and taken hold of by ‘the collective 
consciousness’ (Moltmann 1998a:28). Although Moltmann addresses his observation and 
understanding in a general ‘Asiatic’ context (ibid., eo), they can be validly extended to 
explain that the strong ideology in Ru-based collectivism demands the relational self to 
excel in moral self-cultivation (as discussed in C2S4). Moltmann (2000a:292; 1981:165) 
concludes his discussion of patriarchy by stating that the theology of ‘the tri-une God … 
                                                
56 Certainly the level of oppression may become worse in contexts of political power, since the act of 
exposing one’s own weaknesses as a ruler may counter the preferred image of a strong leader, causing 
tensions with others’ expectations or demands regarding the ruler. Consequently, it is necessary to suppress 
one’s real self all the more diligently. 
57 It is worth noting that he has felt personally more distant from traditional Ruism than traditional Daoism 
(Moltmann 2008b:ix). For example, he (1998a:23, eo) views Singapore as a representative of traditional-
Ruist ‘educational dictatorships’. 
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in sociality’ within the trinitarian doctrine can overcome or avoid the problem of 
patriarchal monotheism, with its earthly patriarchy and problematic sexism. How can this 
doctrine effect a change? This will be discussed in C6 and C7. 
1.2.4 God and Human Selfhood 
Moltmann is concerned with the issue of selfhood. He (1967:91, 285) indicates that the 
predominant questions in biblical anthropology — ‘Who or what is man? Who am I?’ — 
are not based on comparing humans with the other myriad things in the world, but on the 
‘revelation of God’.58 This does not mean, however, that Moltmann (1967:89–91) denies 
the reality of the existing problem about who I am. Instead, he sees ‘the revelation of 
God … in the promised future of Christ’ as the light illuminating the reality of human 
beings, as well as who I am, and the hope of who I will be (ibid.:91). Through ‘the 
revelation of God in promise’, I come to myself ‘in spe’ (in hope), but find ‘disharmony’ 
with myself ‘in re’ (in reality) (ibid.). For Moltmann (ibid.:285), the quest for the real self 
is based not simply on being ‘coram Deo’ (in the presence of God), but rather on facing 
and taking up a transcendent ‘mission, charge and appointment’ from God. Precisely in 
this light, Moltmann does not agree with existentialist understandings of human selfhood, 
which are merely based on ‘self-endorsement’ (ibid.). The knowledge of oneself develops 
in the process that one understands an ‘emptying’ of oneself in confronting with ‘the 
other’ (Moltmann 1990a:245). One comes to know oneself only through knowing the 
‘otherness’ of others (ibid.).59 Moltmann emphasizes that it is only from God that we can 
demonstrate the reality and existence of humanity and the world, not the other way round. 
                                                
58 Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014) (1970:10–13) also agrees with this point. 
59 Moltmann (1990a:246, eo) points out that ‘the most profound and most primal form of knowledge of the 
other – namely the Wholly Other’ – is through perceiving ‘the dead Christ in the eternal livingness of God’ 
because of the greatest ‘antithesis … between absolute death and eternal life’. Accordingly, he (1967:58–
69, 84–94) repudiates the ‘theology of the transcendental subjectivity of [hu]man[s]’ presented by Rudolf 
Bultmann (1884-1976), a proof of the existence of God based on the affirmations determined by the 
authentic existence of humans. See also Moltmann (1999:83). 
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Most importantly, to understand human beings after the Fall through the revelation of 
God for Moltmann (2007b:63) can be only done through an indirect or ‘mediated’ 
approach to this issue. The only way comes to be known recognizing that the ‘crucified 
Christ’ is ‘the mirror of God and the mirror of oursel[f]’ (Calvin, John n.d., cited in 
Moltmann 1976:18). The imago Dei is the key to Moltmann’s understanding of this close 
relationship between God and human selfhood. This will be discussed in greater detail in 
C6 and C7. 
Significantly, Moltmann has never directly applied his discussions about the 
revelation of God and the real self to the sphere of my research problem. In other words, 
his discussions are not addressed directly to the issue of the RFS as it appears in the 
context of and in dialogue with post-traditional Ruism. However, they are logically 
meaningful and relevant to it, as will be shown in C6 and C7. 
1.2.5 Humanity in the World 
Based on the theological approach of demonstrating the reality and nature of human 
beings and the world from the existence of God, Moltmann (1967:65) doubts that solitary 
self-reflection without any recognition of the existence of the world would be an effective 
path to ‘self-understanding’. For Moltmann, one can only find the ‘authenticity’ of one’s 
self in God (ibid.:67, 89–94). Nevertheless, one still needs the external social, material 
and historical worlds and one’s relation to the natural world at large as a mediating 
reference to objectify, experience, understand, and express the authenticity of one’s self 
and one’s relation to God (ibid.:65). When one can come to one’s real self only in the 
promised future of Christ, namely, in the new creation found in Christ, one not only 
restores one’s real self but also reunites with others and the world.  
However, unlike the concept in Ruism that ‘[hu]man[s] and heaven and earth are 
one thing’ (Chan, Wingtsit 1969, cited in Tu 1985:46), the world in Moltmann’s eyes is 
not on the same plane as the selves of humans or of God, whether in understanding them 
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distinctly or in their relationships with each other.60 Moltmann (1998a:28–31, eo) makes 
a distinction between the biblical understanding of the human individual ‘as a person’ and 
the general Asiatic cosmological understanding of the human individual ‘as part of 
nature’ (ibid.:28).61 In the latter concept of human beings, the individual person is merely 
a member throughout many ‘generations’, and so the private self, its life, and its death are 
not at all significant (ibid.). In the former concept of human beings, every person should 
be regarded ‘as a subject’, and none of them should be taken to be merely ‘as an object’, 
because God creates every human to be ‘free and equal’ (ibid.:29, eo). Based on being 
created in the imago Dei, a person is ‘in the resonant field of the relationships of I-you-
we, I-myself, I-it’. In these relationships, the person turns out to be the subject of his/er 
actions and behaviours and cannot be reduced ‘to slaves, to mere labour, or to 
merchandise … [for example, as a] prostitute’ (ibid.:29). Accordingly, the life of the 
person on earth is ‘singular and incapable of repetition’ in front of God (ibid.:30). Humans 
are lifted above other living creatures with ‘relative freedom’, and are bestowed a special 
mandate by the creator God who is transcendent, but they also are burdened ‘with special 
responsibility for other living creatures’ (ibid.). They not only dominate ‘over nature’, but 
also are alienated ‘from nature’, because they are creatures and followers of the promising 
God. In this sense, nature cannot be their ‘mother’ (ibid.:31, eo).  
Therefore, in Moltmann’s Christian perspective human beings are entirely 
distinguishable from the world, and every individual person is unique because their 
personal history is distinguished from one another. 62  On the contrary, according to 
                                                
60 For example, in explaining how we should view and experience the world from the aspect of ‘Christian 
eschatology’, he (1967:69) remarks that (Christian) ‘faith cannot suffer the world to become a picture of 
God, nor a picture of [hu]man[s]’. 
61  In the concept of human beings as part of nature, people call the earth ‘mother’ and the moon 
‘grandmother’, and believe that ‘their lives are floating in the great family of all living beings in the cycles 
and rhythms of the sun, moon, and earth’ and that all living beings reincarnate (Moltmann 1998a:28–9, eo). 
62 Moltmann’s concept of history is based on ‘Hegel's philosophy of history’ (Moltmann 2000a:119; Kwok 
Hungbiu 2007:22–6). In discussing and emphasizing Christianity as a religion of history, along with 
Judaism and Islam, Moltmann (1990a:237) differentiates it from the general Asiatic religions that do not 
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Moltmann, human beings and their individual selves as seen in the Asiatic religions are 
identical with nature and society. This will be discussed in detail in the latter portion of 
this thesis, from C4 to C8. 
2. Methodology 
This research is text-based and will make textual analysis through the employment of 
logical dialectics. As this is also a cross-cultural and interdisciplinary study, I include 
here discussions about the methods and approaches used by Tu Weiming as well as those 
adopted by Christian theologians. 
2.1 Clarification of the Application of Contextual Theology 
As mentioned in C1S3.1.2, quite a few Chinese people think that every road leads to 
Rome and all religions are good. Furthermore, they might easily be inclined to reject 
Christianity as a foreign religion, because Ruism, Buddhism, Daoism, or Chinese folk 
religious practices are inveterately accepted as Chinese religious traditions and more or 
less a major part of what is generally considered to be Chinese culture. Therefore, a 
dilemma appears. On the one hand, avoiding unnecessary cultural conflicts is a challenge 
for sharing the Christian gospel and theology effectively and fruitfully especially in the 
context of post-traditional Ruified Chinese culture. On the other hand, the distinctions 
between the Christian gospel and theology and other religions are especially crucial in 
the approaches to Christian evangelism and its related apologetics in Asian cultural 
contexts. In other words, this dilemma is how the Christian gospel and its related theology 
                                                
focus on history or historicity but prefer to seek an equilibrium between internality and externality. He 
further points out specifically that the equilibrium Daoism focuses on is ‘in nature’, Ruism ‘in society’, and 
Buddhism ‘in one’s own soul’ (ibid.). Yet he argues that it is what we experience and remember in the past 
and what we expect and hope in the future that determine what we perceive in ‘historical time’ (ibid.:236) 
(Moltmann 1990a:237). In Moltmann’s understanding, history happens between God as the Lord of history 
and human beings who are the mortal experiencers of history (ibid.:245). So too, then, being an individual 
self is ‘personhood in a history’ (ibid.:267). 
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can be communicated and understood in other cultural contexts without distorting, 
missing, or replacing their content and meaning. 
This kind of dilemma is studied and debated in the realm of contextual theology, 
including indigenous theology, especially in the post-traditional Chinese cultural contexts 
(Kwan, Kaiman 2010).63 It is because of this dilemma that contextual theology may be 
confused with indigenous theology (ibid.). But if we carefully rethink and study this 
cross-cultural dilemma by means of two distinctive aspects, including their differing 
functions and purposes, a prudent examination of these issues may reveal that the two 
concerns in that dilemma mentioned above might not be contradictory, but instead 
actually complement each other. In order to avoid any ambiguity of the contextual 
theological terminology in use currently, I coin two phrases to name and clarify these two 
distinct aspects. One aspect of this approach, then, is the issue of theology-
contextualizing, dealing with addressing Christian theological content in non-Christian 
cultural contexts (also involving questions of language). For example, although moral 
cultivation, the transcendental self, filial piety, and lunli (倫理) (the Chinese translation 
for ethics) are not in the English vocabulary of Christianity and Christian theology, they 
can still be adopted to discuss and compare issues within Christianity and Ruism (Ames 
2011). Through explaining some of the etymological definitions of key theological 
concepts by means of non-Christian cultural contexts and languages, 64  Christian 
                                                
63 See also Yáng Sēnfù 楊森富 (1984:203–224), Chang Litsen 章力生 (p. Zhāng Lìshēng) (1904–1996) 
(1984), Jerry Solomon (1992), Song Choanseng 宋泉盛 (p. Sòng Quánshèng) (1996), Carver T. Yu (1998), 
Tsai Leechen (2001:211–20), Lín Ruìlóng 林瑞隆 (2003), Wáng Chóngyáo 王崇堯 (2003), Kāng Láichāng 
康來昌 (2004:27–33), Sebastian C. H. Kim ed. (2008), and Craig Ott (2015). It is worth noting that non-
Christians, such as the nationalist Gū Hóngmíng 辜鴻銘 (1912, reprinted in 1994:29) and the New Ruist 
Mou Tsungsan (1995:54), might not appreciate indigenous theology developed in Christianity because it 
makes Christianity impure. 
64 For example, the understanding of the word ‘lunli (倫理) ‘ (ethics) in Chinese means mainly the order of 
basic human relationships, and so it involves some differences in use from the normal understanding of the 
word ethics in English, when it is taken to mean the study of or ‘a set of beliefs about what is morally right 
and wrong’ (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
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theological content can be addressed more easily and without distortion in PTRIC 
contexts. This is what is involved in the aspect of theology-contextualizing. 
However, the other aspect of this approach is the issue of content-theologizing,65 
understanding and addressing the non-Christian cultural content by means of a Christian 
theological methodology. For example, this could involve the exploration of theological 
meanings of issues occurring in PTRIC contexts. In other words, theological analysis of 
particular themes related to PTRIC contexts engages in examining cultural questions 
through theological concepts and methods, leading to some critical insights that might 
suggest ways to modify or correct certain ways of life, if and when needed (Abraham & 
Rufaedah 2014:519). This is why Sino-Christian theology66 has developed and has been 
given more and more attention by scholars studying Christianity in Chinese contexts. 
Only in the context of Sino-Christian theological studies (Ames 2011)67 can questions 
raised in this thesis be dealt with more faithfully, relevantly, and profoundly.  
Therefore, from the perspective of contextual theology, this research is engaged in 
a Sino-Christian theological study. I will apply Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian 
theology to pursue content-theologizing, and then focus on the issue of the RFS in PTRIC 
contexts as it is addressed in Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood in order to 
create a theology-contextualized bridge or dialogue between PTRIC and Protestant 
                                                
65 This phrase content-theologizing is coined by the inspiration of the discussion of ‘theologization of 
psychology … regarding how theology should address psychology’ presented by Abraham and Rufaedah 
(2014:516). 
66 Chin Kenpa 曾慶豹 (p. Céng Qìngbào) (2006:126, eo) differentiates Sino-(Christian) theology from 
Chinese theology. In his distinction, ‘Sino-theology … takes the existential hermeneutics of the individual’ 
as its domain. In this domain, its purpose is to understand what occurs for the sake of personal 
comprehension; its theme is focused on the ‘fundamental issues of faith’. It emphasizes the ‘effects of 
differences’. But the main impetus of Chinese theology is based on the ‘national prosperity or discourse of 
nationalism’; accordingly, theology becomes substitutively ‘a tool of nationalism’ rather than ‘being the 
faith’ demanded for the crisis of the existence in humankind. Therefore, on the contrary, ‘Sino-theology no 
longer takes the [nationalistic] identification with Chinese culture … as its object of thought; [but] … it 
takes on a more radical meaning of existence’ so that ‘the identification with the God’ who is completely 
different can be strengthened. 
67 See also Lai Panchiu and Jason T. S. Lam (2010). 
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theological perspectives relying on Moltmann’s studies. The content-theologizing 
method intends to discern the nature of the problem of RFS and its accompanying 
theological and spiritual concerns within the PTRIC cultural contexts. The approach of 
theology-contextualizing will seek to explain how Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian 
theology might address this problem in PTRIC cultural contexts. For example, although 
moral cultivation is not part of the normal vocabulary employed in Protestant theology, 
it can be adopted and modified so that it can be employed within theological language, 
resulting in our creation of gracious moral cultivation. By this means a more robust 
comparison between Moltmann’s Protestant theology and Tu Weiming’s Ruist 
philosophy can be pursued as the problem of RFS in PTRIC cultural contexts is 
elaborated. 
2.2 Pragmatic Arguments Approach 
Klaus Nielsen (n.d.) states, ‘[Traditional Ruism] is a set of pragmatic rules and 
lessons in practical ethics for daily life … [but] not a religion’. Similarly, in 
psychological studies, the self within socially oriented psychological constructs is 
categorized as a ‘pragmatic self’, and put in contrast to a ‘principled self’ embedded 
within intrapersonally oriented psychological constructs, as shown in Chart E.1 in A-E 
(Greenwald 1982:128). Significantly, traditional Ruism or post-traditional Ru-influenced 
culture is recognized as being pragmatic in nature (to be discussed in C4)68 because of 
the ‘situational determinism’ that generally shapes many aspects of its teachings and 
values (Yang, Kuoshu 2002:88–9),69 as mentioned in C2 and will be explored in more 
                                                
68 Yáng Zhēndé 楊貞德(2007). See also Lucian Pye (1988:75–108), Ames (2006:113–64), and Simon Chan 
(2014:59–60). It is notable that Cheng Chungying sees, in a simplistic sense, both ‘Ruism’ and 
‘Christianity’ as pragmatism but of different kinds: the former one is of personality cultivation and the latter 
one of utilitarianism (Cheng, Chungying n.d., cited in Fāng, Kèlì 方克立 and Zhèng, Jiādòng 鄭家棟
1995:378–9). 
69 This term and concept of ‘situational determinism’, adopted by Yang Kuoshu, was presented by Francis 
L. K. Hsu in 1963. He (1963:164-5) explains it as ‘to think of multiple (not double) standards of conduct; 
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detail in C4, A-D, and A-E. Tu Weiming (1998c:128) himself stresses that Ruists are 
‘pragmatists and realists’. Admittedly, the use of pragmatic arguments is obviously the 
major approach adopted by Tu Weiming in his New Ruist dialectical interpretation of 
relational selfhood, especially when he is defending his version of Ruism against 
scholars’ criticisms that both traditional and post-traditional Ruism lead to RFS (Bellah 
1985:4). In fact, the appearance of the RFS in PTRIC societies is an outcome of their 
social or relational ethics, and so associates closely with PTRIC persons’ psychological 
health and the formation of healthy interpersonal relationships among them. Accordingly, 
the issues of this research relate significantly to the benefits of PTRIC individuals and 
their societies, precisely because there is a need to identify a solution for the problem of 
the RFS resulting from PTRIC relational selfhood. Therefore, this research also adopts a 
pragmatic argument approach, especially when analysing Tu Weiming’s and Jürgen 
Moltmann’s interpretations of relational selfhood. 
Generally speaking, a method relying on pragmatic arguments transfers ‘the value 
of consequences’ to their ‘antecedents’ or what causes them (Perelman 1959:18f.). 
Therefore, this approach is obviously more practical-oriented or ‘benefit-directed’ than 
‘truth-directed’. 70  In other words, a pragmatic argument purports to argue for ‘the 
formation and maintenance of a certain belief’ based on the ‘beneficial consequences’ it 
brings about (Jordan 1999). 71  Although pragmatic arguments are often adopted in 
justifying ‘theistic belief’,72 they are also naturally ‘accepted by common sense’ without 
                                                
the differing standards prevail according to the differing varieties of human grouping in which particular 
events occur’. 
70 ‘[O]ntological, cosmological, or teleological arguments … are … primarily … truth-directed’ (Jordan 
1999). However, there are two kinds of pragmatic arguments: ‘truth-dependent’ one and ‘truth-
independent’ one. The definition and distinction between them can be grasped in detail in Jordan’s two 
references (1999; 2010:425–6, eo). 
71 See also Jordan (2010:425). 
72 ‘Theistic pragmatic arguments are not arguments for the proposition that God exists …[but] arguments 
that believing that God exists is rational.’ (Jordan 2009) 
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‘any justification’ so that their use is also employed in many other fields (Perelman 
1959:18f.). It is worth noting that it is particularly effective within contexts where moral 
arguments are of distinctively importance (Jordan 2009). In this light, it is important to 
underscore the practical character of Tu Weiming’s writings. Although Tu denies that any 
external personal creator exists in traditional Ruism, he bases his interpretations of New 
Ruism on his faith or belief in a specific form of the ‘Chinese cosmology’. Sometimes he 
takes this cosmology to be self-evident in its nature, especially in its conception of Heaven 
(to be explored in greater detail in C4). He not only justifies his interpretation of New 
Ruist relational selfhood mainly through pragmatic arguments, but also defends his belief 
in his preferred ‘Chinese cosmology’ by means of pragmatic arguments. Consequently, 
in order to evaluate any possible alternative solutions for the problem of the RFS found 
in PTRIC contexts of the relational selfhood, pragmatic arguments can be applied to 
analyse not only Tu’s account of relational selfhood in New Ruism, but also to assess 
parallel concepts raised in Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian anthropology. 
2.3 Presuppositional Analytical Method 
In terms of comparing the conceptualizations of relational selfhood in New Ruism 
presented by Tu Weiming within that in modern Protestant Christianity by Moltmann, 
this research is a religious ethics study (Little and Twiss 1978) and/or a comparative 
theological study (Neville 1991) in the Sino-Christian theological context. However, 
David L. Hall asserts that ‘any coherent concept of self presupposes some coherent sense 
of culture’ (Hall 1994:214). So it is important to add here that, in agreement with Hall’s 
claim, I find that both the New Ruist relational selfhood interpreted by Tu Weiming and 
the Protestant account of relational selfhood offered by Jürgen Moltmann both are based 
on some explicitly stated cultural presuppositions. Therefore, this research applies 
specifically a presuppositional analytical method in Christian theology to the comparative 
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study of Tu Weiming’s and Jürgen Moltmann’s accounts of relational selfhood in order 
to analyse the similarities and differences of their presuppositions. 
Presuppositional analytical method, also known as ‘presuppositional apologetics’ 
or ‘presuppositional argument’ (Boa & Bowman 2005:26), was adopted originally by 
modern Reformed theologians, initiated by Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) (1898:56–
227)73 and then subsequently integrated and revitalized into apologetics by van Til (1895-
1987) (1976). 74  It is based on the insight that ‘the given presuppositions’ of any 
theological, religious, and philosophical standpoint, view, or argument ‘predetermine[d] 
and govern[ed] much of its later outworkings’ (White, William 1979:74).75 John Frame 
(1987:45) explains that ‘a presupposition is a belief that takes precedence over another 
and therefore serves as a criterion for another.’ When there is no other presupposition 
taking precedence, we describe this presupposition as being an ‘ultimate’ one. Therefore, 
van Til (1976:61–2) defines the presuppositional analytical method as indicating ‘what 
are the epistemological and metaphysical principles that underlie and control one’s 
method’, namely ‘the final reference-point’. Compared to the directness of evidential 
argument, this method is indirect (ibid.:62. 65. 68). When a situation has gone beyond the 
limitation of evidential proof, or there is no common ground that can be agreed upon in a 
dialogue or debate between two completely different concepts or positions or evidential 
arguments, the presuppositional analytical method is probably the best way to deepen the 
dialogue or debate. Instead of focusing on the two parallel arguments without moving 
forwards to any interaction, the presuppositional analytical method seeks to further 
discuss and compare their different presuppositions. 
                                                
73 See also Kuyper (1898:380–97; 1905, trans. 2011:48–61). 
74 See also Timothy I. McConnel (1999) and Greg L. Bahnsen (2008). 
75 See also Boa and Bowman (2005:26), Edgar and Oliphint (2009:4, 36), and Glynn (2011). 
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When the RFS is found as a common experience among PTRIC societies, the 
ultimate concern about it must involve particular cultural presuppositions as well as 
ultimate presupposition(s) undergirding PTRIC relational selfhood and relational ethics 
by which it is shaped.76 Therefore, it is particularly helpful to compare and analyse the 
similarities and differences between Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s accounts by means 
of a presuppositional analytical method. 
2.4 Measurement Reference for Transforming the Repressed Form of Self  
Transforming the RFS into a liberated or unmasked real or true self promises to lead 
towards a development of healthier personalities and ‘healing[s] of the dissociated 
identity’ of human beings who have become wounded individuals living in problematic 
interpersonal relationships (Tam, Ekmon PC 1998:72). Through accumulating 
knowledge and experience from his integrative psychotherapeutic practice based on his 
own account of transformational psychology, Tournier suggests a positive direction for 
dealing with the problem of the RFS. This direction is adopted for the purpose of 
measurement in this thesis. As explained in A-E, Paul Tournier (1898-1986) is one of 
very few persons who offers a comprehensive discussion of the problem of repressed 
behavioural customs of social masking. Moreover, he is also among the few persons who 
devoted himself in integrative psychotherapy and transformational psychology in the 
twentieth century. Since this research is an attempt to deal with this social psychological 
problem of the RFS from a Christian theological approach, Tournier’s account affords a 
theoretical measurement reference to this research. 
                                                
76 As mentioned in C1S3.1.3, Gilkey (1969, cited in Huáng, Lùpíng 黃路蘋 2016) proved and asserted that 
the ultimate concern about common secular experience makes a dialogue possible between Christian 
theology and non-Christian disciplines. For example, in the cases of this thesis, besides being based on 
some other assumed cultural presuppositions, Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood is also 
based upon an atheistic conception of ‘Chinese cosmology’. Similarly, Moltmann’s interpretation of social 
trinitarian relational selfhood is based upon a more general account of Christian theism. 
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What the standard of measurement adopted will accomplish is to examine whether 
or not the conceptions of relational selfhood studied in this research are following a path 
described by Tournier as moving towards transforming the personage into the person or 
reversing that process. As Rogers (1961:171–2) observes and suggests by quoting 
Kierkegaard’s words, ‘to be that self which one truly is’ (Kierkegaard 1941:18) or moving 
away from the contexts where a RFS is found necessarily involved ‘a process, a fluidity, 
a changing’. This process is inherently dynamic and so is one that is not ‘consistent’ or 
unchanging all the time.  
Tournier (1957:213) maintains that human beings must rediscover their ‘natural 
spontaneity’ in order to disclose ‘the true colour’ of the self behind the varnish of the 
personage. Still, however, it is not enough to merely rediscover one’s natural spontaneity. 
He continues by asserting that the ‘natural self’, driven by natural spontaneity, is different 
from the real self (ibid.). One’s natural spontaneity can make anyone ‘a person’ that is 
seen to be only different from ‘an animal’ (ibid.). Instead, the real self appears when one 
‘make[s] a personal choice’ voluntarily and independently about the code of behaviour 
one will observe and the ways to exert one’s freedom, namely when in some respects ‘the 
instincts of one’s natural self’ are conquered (ibid.).  
But how can this real self conquer natural instincts? In contrast to any naturalistic 
solution, Tournier claims that the only way to discover a full resolution to the problem is 
by reference to the transformative supernatural power that is in the person and is granted 
to us by God (ibid.): 
It is here that I part company with my agnostic colleagues who have only a purely naturalistic 
conception of the evolution of the person … For me the person is more than one’s nature; it 
is a supernatural power in us which rules our nature according to the choice it makes. What 
matters, what makes [any hu]man a person, is the sincerity of that choice, even if it means … 
that [one] must adopt a line of conduct very different from [one’s] natural reactions. 
Through this assertive statement Tournier discloses his Reformed Christian 
doctrine of anthropology: any human being’s will power is totally depraved in salvation 
or in overcoming sinful nature, a position also claimed and justified by Martin Luther in 
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his monumental masterpiece, The Bondage of the Will (1525, trans. in 1972). 
Accordingly, for Tournier, ‘reason’, or any ‘[moralistic] system of abstract principles’, or 
‘the sincerest of resolves’ cannot liberate the real self (Tournier 1957:215). The solution 
can only be discovered ‘in living fellowship with God: the experience of forgiveness’ 
(ibid.). He explained that in this fellowship with God: 
Choice is made not of principles but of a person, of the living God, of Christ. It does indeed 
bring with it all the moral principles that can be discovered by reason. But it makes us 
something more than mere machines applying principles: it makes us persons. It brings us 
much more than a code of ethics. It brings us a personal relationship, a current of life 
springing from the very source of all life, and true liberty. (ibid.:215f.) 
Therefore, does this mean that completely stripping off the personage is the one and 
only way to transform the RFS? Tournier’s answer is no.77 Tournier (1957:81) quotes 
Pindar’s (n.d.) adage — ‘Become what you are’ — to suggest a totally innovative 
direction for harmonizing the personage with the person, and so to transform it in 
accordance with the person’s ‘sincerest convictions’. I find that what Tournier refers to 
can be understood in biblical terms as expressing truth in love or living out the truth in 
love (Ephesians 4:15). It is a transformative process rather than a radical surgery that 
would seek to cut off the personage once and for all. Instead, Tournier’s goal is that the 
personage will gradually ‘express and show forth’ more and more of the person genuinely 
(ibid.). In fact, the reality is that our personage also ‘moulds our person’, so that the 
external social roles we adopt affect us constantly, exerting their influences ‘even on the 
deepest and most intimate recesses of the person’ (ibid.:80). I have found that when the 
value of the real self conflicts with expectations from within and without, one 
subsequently feels unable or fearful to express one’s real self. In those kinds of contexts, 
not only is the real self repressed, but also its inherent value is harmed. Under this 
repression that can be described as negatively masking, the real self is not empty, nor is it 
                                                
77 Neither does Doi (1986:77–8) by quoting the similar opinion of the critic, Hideo Kobayashi (1902-1983). 
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absent or non-existent, but it suffers from the immaturity of the person. It is at least 
underdeveloped, or perhaps even left undeveloped, and so has not grown into its real self. 
Therefore, when one encounters the problems of the RFS as expressed in the personage, 
the way one approaches a solution — the restoration of the real self — is through 
committing the personage to act according to the values of the real self, instead of merely 
negatively removing the personage from an active engagement with others.  
As mentioned above, the problem of the RFS results from a natural reflex involving 
self-protection of our inner fears, anxieties, and insecurities. Its remedy will never be 
merely to evade others outside and concentrate on our own selves inside ‘where the true 
nature of the person always eludes us’ (ibid.:81). The path for the personage to genuinely 
express and show forth the person must be to take courage to form a personage for the 
person, namely, to ‘look outwards, towards the world, towards our neighbour, [and] 
towards God’ (ibid.). 
For Tournier, the true solution for the problems caused by the hindrances within the 
personage is the ‘grace’ and the transforming power granted by God the creator and 
redeemer, rather than ‘the pseudo-solution[s] of pathological reactions’78 (ibid.:220). A 
gracious fellowship will be surely supportive for those following the path transforming 
from the personage to the person. Only when ‘being loved and understood’ is assured in 
a genuine fellowship, can fragile persons dare boldly to express their negative feelings 
towards the strong (ibid.:29–30, 159). Confession reaches the zenith when one gives up 
one’s ‘most intimate secrets’. Tournier defines this fellowship specifically as ‘personal 
fellowship with God and with our neighbour’, and explains how it works in leading one 
                                                
78 For Tournier (1957:223), these pseudo-solutions of pathological reactions suggested by psychologists all 
rely on humankind’s own individual capability, such as ‘will-power … good resolutions … the impulsions 
of instinct and the determinism of powerful psychological complexes’. 
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further on the path towards becoming a real and vital person (ibid.:224). He elaborates 
this by explaining that in this fellowship (ibid.): 
Life is renewed and the person is revealed … we become conscious of our deepest problems, 
and … the breath of the Spirit comes to sweep away like dust the automatisms we had thought 
to be a part of our person, when they were in reality only a deposit from the past. 
How does this happen? Tournier points out that this only springs ‘spontaneously 
from within’ and any attempt to make it happen will be in vain (ibid.). Therefore, what 
one can do is to devote one’s entire effort to seeking such a fellowship. But he also argues 
that there is not any real dialogue between human beings ‘unless it is … doubled by an 
inner dialogue with God’ (ibid.:160). The personal encounter with God can produce an 
overpowering force inside us, which obliges us to be honest and sincere even though it 
may be painful, ‘to throw off the mask of the personage and uncover the person’ 
(ibid.:159).79 This throwing off the mask is different from the stripping off the personage 
mentioned above. The former is done by a transforming force within given by God’s 
grace, but the latter is accomplished by human beings’ own power. God’s grace is granted 
‘drop by drop’ to awaken and liberate the person to a flourishing and forgiven lifestyle. 
It comes about through an inner dialogue with the trinitarian God: Jesus Christ’s 
atonement and redemption to restore and re-establish the dialogue, the Holy Spirit’s 
renewal in raising the quality of the dialogue, and the calling of God the Father to instill 
a loving and wise purpose for life within us for the sake of our present and future 
fellowship and service (ibid.:169-76). 
Chart 3.1 summarizes Tournier’s two ‘diametrically opposite paths’ to the person 
(including his practical path to the person through the revealing personage) (ibid.:81) and 
to the personage in seeking freedom (ibid.:224). In order to contrast the path to the 
                                                
79  The perfect example Tournier employs here is the precedent for such an encounter seen in the 
transformative encounter of the Samaritan woman during her dialogue with Jesus at Jacob’s well in John 
4:3-29, 39. 
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personage with the practically transforming path of the revealing personage to the person, 
I call the path to the personage the path to the contrastive personage. In considering these 
claims of Tournier, I have realized that the behavioural customs among post-traditional 
Ru-affected Chinese people reflect much more the characteristics of the path to the 
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Modern Psychology  
Acknowledging the True 
Solution of Grace  
Relying on Any Self-
Generated System  
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Chart 3.1 Summary of Tournier’s Paths to the Person and the Personage (Tournier 1957:81, 224) 
 
Although Tournier insists that the person cannot be reached without being renewed 
by the salvation and grace of God (ibid.:76), he does not engage more deeply in discussing 
the transforming process of the reborn person in terms of an already-and-not-yet process 
of present realization as well as the eschatological realization of the true self. As can be 
seen from this perspective, the dynamics of the person and its eschatologically promised 
futurity in this process (as emphasized by Moltmann) are very important dimensions that 
should not be overlooked in dealing with the problem of the RFS. This will be discussed 
in much greater detail in C6 to C8. 
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Tournier believes that modern psychology has recognized the futility and even the 
harm of depending on ‘our own efforts’ in moving towards the path of the discovery of 
the person within us (ibid.:223). But all schools of modern psychology, he argues, involve 
‘only mechanisms of the mind’ which are not within the dimension of the person, but 
within the dimension of the personage, following precedents in the studies of ‘all the 
physiological mechanisms of the body’ (ibid.:23).80 While Tournier’s approach engages 
in the personage’s showing forth the person genuinely through God’s grace, the solutions 
Jung and Rogers present are still merely by way of processes of self-transformation, from 
different psychological perspectives.81 Therefore, due to the limitation of space, Jung’s 
(1966) ‘individuation’ and Rogers’ (1961) self-transformation of ‘becoming a person’ 
will not be included in further discussions of this thesis, but only introduced in A-I. 
2.5 The Dimensions of Transformation within the Repressed Form of Self 
As previous studies in secondary literature disclose, the issue of the RFS is mainly about 
the social facet of self, namely the transformations between negatively masked selves and 
real selves. In terms of time, the person who tends to be repressed or negatively masked 
is as s/he is at every moment and so the transformation of the RFS is in the present 
dimension (i.e. the horizontal arrows shown in Diagram 3.1). However, ‘transformation’ 
of the self, in Tu Weiming’s language (1985), or ‘becoming’ of the self, in Moltmann’s 
                                                
80 For dealing with the compatibility between Christian faith and psychology (psychoanalysis), Tournier 
(1968) wrote another book entitled, A Place for You: Psychology and Religion. At the last stage of this 
research, I found David. G. Benner (2012), a Christian psychologist, who applies his expertise in 
psychoanalysis to offer a path (or ‘journey’) towards ‘unfolding self’ (unmasking self) based on Christian 
faith, especially through the perspectives of ‘Christian mystics’. He (2012:55–88) also stresses that the 
complete transformation into an authentic self cannot only happen by means of what Tournier called the 
mechanisms of the body and mind. 
81 Besides Tournier, both Rogers and Jung are also concerned about the problem of the RFS, and so suggest 
directions to deal with it. However, in terms of ‘the discovery of the person’ for Tournier, all the schools 
of psychotherapy take the path of ’trusting relaxation of tension’ towards ‘abdication of self-constraint’ 
(ibid.:224). Of course, these schools are not exactly the same. But how does one overcome the difficulties 
and barriers internally and externally appearing in their processes of self-transformation? Jung and Rogers 
seem not to engage in these related issues. In terms of self-transformation, Jung’s and Rogers’ directions 
for dealing with the problem of the RFS look like an Anglo-European form of traditional and post-
traditional Ruist moral self-cultivation (as explained in C4 and C5). 
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language (1985a:227), cannot be overlooked in facing the problem of the RFS in terms 
of Tournier’s paths moving from the personage to the person or vice versa  (as 
demonstrated by the arrows of the social facets in two-directions shown in Diagram 3.1). 
In addition, I will argue here that the self also has a future dimension especially in solving 
the problem of the RFS (or the personage), because the self is in a state of dynamic change 
and so is neither static nor absolute in character. In the future dimension of the self, its 
private facets (the transformations from the negatively masked self towards full loss of 
self in the personage on the one hand, and from the real self towards the ideal self in the 
person on the other hand) are also involved in its social facets (as shown in the vertical 
and diagonal arrows shown in Diagram 3.1 ). Therefore, the two possible transforming 
paths presented by Tournier actually involve two dimensions, as they apply to the 
transformation of the private facets of the self at the same time. Diagram 3.1 integrates 
and illustrates the two-dimensioned framework of the concept of transformation of those 
two facets of self discussed in terms of the RFS (the negatively masked self).82 
 
Diagram 3.1 Tournier’s Two Possible Paths Involved in Two Facets of the Self in Two Dimensions  
 
                                                
82 It has been noted that the transformation paths symbolize the general direction of change instead of the 
detailed movements of these changes. The movements of change are absolutely not as simplistic as a linear 




2.6 Additional Explanations 
Some additional explanations about the use of the terminology collectivism and 
individualism in this thesis and the scope of the research are provided here below. 
2.6.1 The Terminology of Collectivism and Individualism 
As mentioned, both Tu Weiming and Moltmann are concerned about the issues of 
collectivism and individualism. Still it is the case that both of them do not specify what 
kind of collectivism and individualism they are talking about. In other words, they, as 
well as many other scholars tend to generalize individualism as being Western and 
collectivism as being Eastern. On the contrary, however, Western or Eastern behaviours 
are not uniform in terms of collectivism or individualism. One should also add that the 
reasons shaping any variety of collectivism or individualism are also not the same. 
Besides, there is more than one type of collectivism and individualism and so there are 
and should be more than one single categorization for each general topic. However, the 
definitions and types of collectivism and individualism found in secondary literature are 
not the main focus of this research and so in order to address this problem, a discussion 
of this matter is placed in A-C for reference. Whenever it is necessary, I will specify the 
type of collectivism and individualism intended in discussions that refer to them in order 
to avoid simplistic such generalizations or even reductionism, especially in terms of 
certain local ‘cultural patterns’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:375).83 
2.6.2 The Scope of the Research 
The goals of this research will be confined to the scope described in the following seven 
propositional claims: 
                                                
83 It is notable that ‘holism’ is another term denoting ‘collectivism’. There is no general consensus about 
the scope of individualistic and collectivistic (or holist) explanations or the standards related to their usage 
and definition (Zahle and Collin 2014a:6, 11).  
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First, this research is to some extent pursued in the form of a dialogue between Tu 
Weiming and Moltmann. Therefore, in terms of the forms of dialogue in a ‘multifaith 
society’, this research is what Moltmann (2000a:18–22, eo) calls an ‘indirect dialogue’ 
instead of a ‘direct’ one. The purpose of a ‘direct’ dialogue is for exchanging different 
‘religious ideas’ [even in a simplistically and culturally relativistic form], but the purpose 
of an ‘indirect’ dialogue is for searching for a common solution for any social question 
that is being discussed and might be globally significant (ibid. 21). This kind of dialogue 
is ‘indirect’ because its focus is not on ‘ourselves or each other … [but on] a third factor 
— something outside ourselves’ (ibid.). It would seem that Tu Weiming would also agree 
that the approach of this thesis involves an indirect dialogue; for in his book, Confucian 
Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (1985), Tu claims that it is not meant to 
be ‘a mere exchange of information’, but is intended to respond to ‘perennial human 
concerns’ or ‘a living encounter’ (Tu 1985:7). Although the research problem is 
contextualized in this thesis partly because of the limitation of space, the complications 
related to the problem of the RFS is and will be globally significant across ethnicities and 
cultures, especially when New Ruism becomes a global value that New Ruists pursue and 
promote. Particularly in this light, then, Protestant Christianity should not be limited to 
or over-generalized as being only Western, nor should Ruism be taken merely to be 
Chinese or East Asian, just as Thomas A. Metzger (2001:566) challenges New Ruists.84 
With regard to what kind of attitudes are appropriate to adopt whenever one faith engages 
in discussions with another faith in a ‘multifaith society’ (such as exclusivist,85 inclusivist, 
pluralistic,86 or some other approaches), these questions are part of ongoing debates (Hick 
                                                
84 Metzger (2001:566, eo) challenges New Ruists by saying: ‘The “Dao” (「道」) is a human way, but not 
a Western or Chinese way; the Confucian orthodoxy should go towards globalization, but not towards 
Sinicization, let alone Westernization. Is this not [New] Ruists’ own perspective?’  
85 Or ‘particularist’ in McGrath’s (1997:158–9) language. 
86 It is worth noting that over the years, Tu (2007a:4–15) has been devoting himself to various dialogues 
among civilizations in contemporary contexts of cultural pluralities. He contends that any alternative 
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2001).87 However, this is not the place to go into an extended and detailed discussion of 
these debates due to the limitation of space. 
Secondly, Arthur Wright (1964:v) pointed out that there are basic problems 
produced by ‘false antitheses’, ‘monolithic comparisons’, and ‘cliché generalization[s]’ 
or overstatements inherent in cross-cultural comparative studies, especially in 
comparative studies of the so-called ‘East’ and ‘West’.88 These problematic ways of 
comparison tend to either cover up the diversity within each generalized side by 
highlighting differences between each (Johnson 1985:91f.), 89  or elude ‘cultural 
critic[ism]’ by means of a form of ‘simple cultural relativism’ (Kasulis 1994:85). Most 
criticisms of post-traditional Ruism as a major cause for this RFS research problem are 
argued in reductionist and generalizing manners. They tend to over-generalize regardless 
of the historical facts that document the plurality of varying schools of Ruism that exist 
currently as well as throughout appropriate cultural histories. However, it is not the scope 
of this research to comprehensively examine these problems of reductionism and 
generalization, because neither Tu Weiming nor Moltmann defend their accounts against 
these kinds of problems. The task of this research is to examine how Tu Weiming and 
                                                
cultural model that serves as a unitary standard will have to be aware of and respond to the possibility of 
becoming an assimilating power for Western dominance in modern cultures. Even if he does not claim 
himself to be a philosophical pluralist, he (2003 in Tu, Weiming and Yang, Xuegong 2003:12) discloses 
his pluralistic tendencies and proudly presents ‘shūtú tóngguī’ ｢殊途同歸｣ (different roads leading to the 
same goal) as a traditional Ruist proposition. See also Tu Weiming (2007a:4–16). 
87 There are numerous works about such debates in different cultural dialogical contexts (or in the field of 
indigenous theology mentioned above in S21 and F68), such as H. Richard Niebuhr (1951 reprinted in 
2001), Alan Race (1983), Oxtoby (1983), D'Costa (1986; 1996), Huáng Yǒng 黃勇 (1996), Robert N. 
Bellah (1996), McGrath (1997:154–61), Quinn and Meeker ed. (2000), Zhuō Xīnpíng 卓新平 (2000; 
2007:55–92), Wáng Zhōngxīn 王忠欣 (2004), Zhou Weichi (2004), Wáng Zhìchéng 王志成 (2006), and 
Liu Shuhsien (2006), including in the context of Chinese society, such as Berthrong (1994), Hé Guānghù 
何光滬 and Edwin C. Hui (1998), Zheng Zongyi 鄭宗義 (p. Zhèng Zōngyì) (2001), Ying Fooktsang 邢福
增 (p. Xíng Fúzēng) (2003), Lai Panchiu 賴品超 (p. Lài Pǐnchāo) (2005), Wáng Xiǎocháo 王曉朝 (2010), 
Sūn Xiǎopíng 孫小平 (2010), Zhōu Jǐngxūn 周景勛 (2010), Chin Kenpa (2011:502–542), He Guanghu 
(2013), and Wright Doyle (2014). A Resource Book for Programmes of Interfaith Dialogue (2007) by the 
Ecumenical and Multifaith Unit provides a valuable bibliography. 
88 See also Amartya Sen (1997:31) and Angle (2002:20–22). 
89 See also C1F6, C1F79 and C1F86. 
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Moltmann defend their accounts of relational selfhood against criticisms of PTRIC 
relational selfhood as a source of RFS and so, in response to the research problem, to 
suggest an alternative solution. In Moltmann’s case, this is rarely done in any direct 
manner, but is pursued in dialogues with some of his Chinese contemporaries in ways 
that suggest relevant criticism. However, in order to achieve this task, the problems will 
be disclosed whenever it is deemed necessary to do so, in order to avoid any over-
generalization and distortion of the evidence referred to or criticisms that are raised by 
other scholars. 
Thirdly, this research explores the different conceptualizations of relational 
selfhood related to the issue of the real self (or unveiled self) instead of merely the issue 
of identity, although they are related to each other and possess overlapping meanings 
(Lawler 2008:7). In other words, my identity denotes mainly who I am, but my real self, 
while involving about who I am, denotes about what I think and how I feel in the following 
discussions about the problem of the RFS. 
Fourthly, the influences of different cultures, beliefs, and thoughts on people in the 
modern world are ‘manifold’ in both conscious and unconscious ways (Nakamura 
1964:37). Therefore, there must be many factors interactively contributing to the problem 
of the RFS. Due to the limitation of space, however, this research focuses only on the 
social behavioural factors related to RFS as resulting from PTRIC cultural phenomena 
addressing relational selfhood that are criticized by scholars. 
Fifthly, this text-based research is not a comprehensive comparative study between 
Ruism and Christianity in general but an attempt to identify and analyse alternative 
theoretical solution(s) for the fundamental problem of the RFS existing in PTRIC 
societies. Evidence supporting the existence of this problem in PTRIC cultural contexts 
is provided by scholars in both empirical and theoretical studies. The alternative 
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solution(s) suggested at the end of this thesis still need(s) to be further verified by 
advanced empirical and additional theoretical studies. 
Sixthly, the explorations of Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood and 
Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood are mainly based on their 
works. In order to analyse, compare, and criticize these concepts as discussed within their 
works, other relevant writings by other scholars, Ruists, theologians, and philosophers 
will also be discussed. 
Finally, it should be noted that immoral or illegal behaviour that is conditioned by 
society or coerced by the state (Sider 2012:55) is excluded from this research.90 
                                                
90 In answering the common question — ‘Does this imply being evil?’ — asked in the context of being or 
living out one’s real self as it is, Rogers (1961:177) relieves such worries by explaining that when one ‘lives 
closely and acceptingly with’ the complexity of one’s true feelings, one’s true feelings ‘operate in a 
constructive harmony rather than sweeping [oneself] into some uncontrollably evil path’. 
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Chapter Four 
Tu Weiming’s Understanding of Self 
1. Introduction 
Challenged by Robert Bellah (1927-2013), an American sociologist of religion, Tu 
Weiming (1985:12–4) included nine essays in his book, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as 
Creative Transformation, to answer the question, ‘What is the Confucian self?’.1 He also 
discusses the issues of selfhood in his other works. Among Contemporary New Ruists, 
Tu Weiming is probably the one who is most engaged in these related discussions. 
Although the conceptualization of relational selfhood in PTRIC contexts is recognized by 
many scholars as Ru-influenced or Ru-based, Tu does not usually view it as an orthodox 
Ruist account but disputes their criticisms as misunderstandings of Ruism. As C2 has 
already clarified, a solution for the problem of the RFS resulting from PTRIC relational 
selfhood is imperative, even if it is not Ru-influenced. Therefore, in this chapter, I will 
explore Tu Weiming’s responses to the research problem (the RFS) and its indicator 
(repressive social imposition) through his conceptualizations of New Ruist relational 
selfhood. 
                                                
1 Bellah worried about the possibilities that the radical trend of individualism would sabotage the social 
structure of ‘American civil religion’ (Bellah 1980, cited in Tu 1985:8). About the definition of ‘American 
civil religion’ and its related discussion, see Bellah (1970:168; 2005:54). However, he did not consider Ru-
based collectivism as an alternative solution for individualism (Bellah 1982, cited in Tu, Weiming 1985:8; 
2005:54). He (1970:95) was also worried by issues caused by the collectivist repressive imposition found 
in the context of Ruism and ‘the centrality of self-cultivation’ (xiūshēn 修身 ) in Tu Weiming’s 
‘characterization of the Mencian line’ of Ruism (Bellah n.d., cited in Tu 1985:7–8, eo). Bellah is just one 
of many scholars who are concerned about Ruist relational selfhood as mentioned in C2, precisely because 
it tends to lead to the RFS. Robert Neville and John Berthrong, as founders of Boston Ruism, claim the 
issue of selfhood is one of the three important issues New Ruism should deal with (Cài, Déguì 蔡德貴
2004:80). The key issue is whether the self is an isolated entity or a centre of a relational nexus. It is obvious 
that selfhood is a big issue drawing the attention of contemporary Ruists, based on their interest in the study 
of selfhood in Neo-Ruism, mainly of Chu Hsi 朱熹 (p. Zhū Xī) (1130-1200) and Wáng Yángmíng 王陽明 
(1472-1529 CE) (Hé, Zhìqīng 何志青 et al. 2007:87). 
110 
 
2. Tu’s Interpretation of Relational Selfhood in Responding to the Research 
Problem2 
In interpreting Ruist selfhood, Tu (1985:8) intends to look into ‘the authentic possibility 
of a new vision of the self’. Evidently, his interpretation of the Ruist self is not merely 
limited to disclosing the traditional Ruist concept of selfhood. He does not dispute the 
fact that to generalize about Ruist doctrines is a near impossible task because of the 
‘elasticity’ of Ruism and its ‘vicissitudes’ over decades and centuries (ibid.:113). 
Furthermore, he does not believe there is either a ‘trans-temporal coherent’ understanding 
of Ruism or a consensual concept of it that, once revealed, would not change essentially 
any more (ibid.:13). However, he still tries to explain the Ruist self through his Mencian 
definition of Ruist sagehood as an ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’3 that 
attains the highest excellence of morality in community (ibid.:113). In his understanding, 
Ruist sagehood is the embodiment of a complete self-realization (ibid.:10, 15). For him, 
this definition of Ruist sagehood (selfhood) is based on two main basic ‘interrelated 
assumptions’ (ibid.:113):  
(1) the Relational Assumption (A1): ‘the self as a centre of relationships’, instead of an 
‘isolable individuality’;4  
(2) the Self-Cultivation Assumption (A2): ‘the self as a dynamic process of spiritual 
development’.5 
Since the self is a centre of relationships and the so-called ultimate self-
transformation is a communal act, the Ruist self in Tu’s understanding is basically a 
relational self and, therefore, viewed by Tu as an ‘open system’ (ibid.:8, 127). This means 
                                                
2 The Chinese brief version of S2 to S4 in this chapter was created and will be published in 2018 (Hwang, 
Tsungi {forthcoming}2018:S2), but this English one was the original text. 
3 About Tu’s definition of ultimate self-transformation as a communal act, see also Tu Weiming (1979b). 
4 See also Tu Weiming (1986:176; 2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:20). 
5 See also Tu Weiming (1990a:172, 176). 
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that the manifestation of the ultimate self-transformation can be seen through the 
‘existence’ of the self as a centre of relationships (ibid.:127). Such a self is opposite to 
the ‘privatized ego’ (ibid.:57, 95). But Tu insists (1976a:52–4) that this kind of self is 
never collectivist.6 I find that, according to Tu’s definition, Ruist selfhood seems more 
functional than ontological.7 Therefore, does sociality not conflict with individuality in 
New Ruist selfhood? Will this highly-emphasized sociality lead to a RFS? These will be 
the main problems addressed in this chapter. 
In order to answer the first primary subsidiary research question –To what extent is 
the conceptualization of the New Ruist Chinese relational selfhood presented by Tu 
Weiming a suitable alternative or modified modern resource for solving the problem of 
the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the post-traditional Ru-
influenced Chinese relational selfhood? – several relevant secondary subsidiary questions 
will need to be investigated: 
(1) What are the meanings of Heaven, ‘the complete unity between Heaven and 
humanity’, and self-cultivation as disclosed in Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational 
selfhood, especially in relation to their involvement with repressive social 
impositions? 
(2) What are the ‘fiduciary community’8 and ‘open system’ in Tu Weiming’s New Ruist 
relational selfhood in terms of the problems of repressive social imposition, and what 
are their implications for the unmasking of the real self? 
(3) What is Tu Weiming’s New Ruist ‘cultural design’9 in terms of a repressed form of 
self? 
                                                
6 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:39–40). 
7 This observation of mine was found later to be supported by Robert Neville (2000:168). 
8 Tu Weiming (1976a:52–99; 1989a:39–66). 
9 Social scientific observations, by Zhèng Zhèngbó 鄭正博 (1990:169–70) and Zhuāng Huìqiū 莊慧秋 
(1991:156–8), indicate that the traditional values of Ru-based collectivism and its concomitant RFS are 
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(4) What are the presuppositions for Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood? 
In order to understand Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist selfhood in a more profound 
way, I will start by examining the aforementioned two interrelated assumptions, 
beginning with the second because the first depends more on the second than the other 
way around. 
3. Self-Cultivation Assumption (A2): The Self as a Dynamic Process of Spiritual 
Development 
For Tu Weiming (1985:9–10), the character of the self is a dynamic process of spiritual 
development. Then, what does ultimate self-transformation mean and what is this 
process? This process is what Confucius in Analects 14:24 defined as ‘wéijǐ zhī xué’ 「為
己之學」 (‘learning for the sake of the self’) (ibid.:52). The goal of this learning process 
is ‘to be human’ (zuòrén 做人) (ibid.).  
Tu (ibid.:8, 15) emphasizes continually that everybody is equipped with 
ontologically ‘inherent’ self-sufficient ‘internal resources’, so that everyone is able to 
‘become a sage’ through learning by means of their own effort.10 In this way, Tu views a 
Ruist ‘sage’ (shèngrén 聖人) to be a synonym for a Buddhist buddha (fó 佛) and a Taoist 
‘true person’ (zhēnrén 真人) (ibid.:8).11 He explains Ruist sagehood as ‘the complete 
realization of the self’, the ‘full actualization’ of a perfect human nature, ‘the most 
genuine and authentic manifestation of humanity’, or, in Neo-Ruist terminology, ‘truly 
understand[ing] my human nature and … know[ing] Heaven’ (ibid.:10, 15). These 
abstract terms can be embodied by the saying found in Dàxué Wèn 《大學問》 (Inquiry 
                                                
parts of the ‘wénhuà shèjì’ ｢文化設計｣ (cultural design) of a post-traditional Ru-based cultural heritage. 
This was also been identified as ‘wénhuà yuánxíng’ ｢文化原型｣  (cultural prototypes) by Yu Dehui 
(1987b:3, eo), another concept already mentioned in C1S2.2. The discussion of this cultural design in detail 
is presented in A-N. 
10 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:20). 
11 See also Bodde (1953:63–7). 
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on the Great Learning) by Wang Yangming, ‘forming one body with Heaven and Earth 
and the myriad things’ .12 Tu (ibid.:46) names this saying as a ‘trinity’13 of Heaven, Earth, 
and ‘humanity’14 and subsequently describes it as ‘self-transcendence’ (ibid.:10). In order 
to understand ultimate self-transformation and its assumed processes, the Self-Cultivation 
Assumption (A2) alone is insufficient. Other interrelated subsidiary assumptions are 
required. 
3.1 First Self-Cultivation Sub-Assumption (A2.1): Human Nature Is Perfectible 
through Self-Cultivation 
Tu Weiming is one of the Ruists who engaged most in arguing for Ruism as a religion 
(Weber 2007:94). Therefore, he (1985:58) asserts that self-cultivation is a form of 
spiritual development and ‘ethico[-]religious growth’ and tends to adopt religious 
terminology in his argument. Tu (1990a:173) shares the same ‘faith’ with Mencius and 
other Ruists in the ‘transformability and perfectibility’ of both human nature and its 
condition.15 This means that human nature’s perfection can be attained through learning 
and ‘self-effort’ or self-cultivation, because the ‘ultimate reason’ for its perfection is 
human’s own internal strength (ibid.:27). 16  This is Tu’s first self-cultivation sub-
assumption (A2.1): human nature is ‘perfectible’ through self-cultivation (ibid.).17  
By quoting from the Zhongyong 22, Tu (1976a:116f.) emphasizes that only when 
one is ‘absolutely sincere’ (namely the ultimate expression of self-cultivation), can one 
not only ‘fully develop’ one’s nature, but also one can fully develop others’ natures, and 
                                                
12 English Translation by Chan Wingtsit (1969:659). 
13 See C3F29. 
14 See also Tu Weiming (1985:10, 63, 137, 153; 1990a:180). This use of ‘humanity’, ‘humankind’, or 
‘[hu]man’ in Tu’s other similar expressions, is very awkward in this phrasing. One would normally need a 
definite article, the, in front of it, or need to make the term plural as humans. Here he is stretching English, 
as if making ‘humanity’ or ‘[hu]man’ into a Platonic form or eidos. 
15 See also Tu Weiming (1985:15; 1990a:173). 
16 See also Tu Weiming (1985:74, 82, 117, 135; 1990a:174–8). 
17 See also Kuiper (2011:63). 
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the ‘nature of things’ and then help in ‘the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven 
and Earth’ and form a trinity with them.18 
This perfection of self-transformation is stressed by Tu (1985:19, 22) repeatedly as 
‘a ceaseless process’, 19  or ‘an unceasing process’, 20  one that ‘never ends’ (Tu 
1989a:95).21 On the one hand, Tu emphasizes that everybody can become a sage, but, on 
the other hand, he recognizes the fact that in terms of the full development of personality, 
it is very difficult to become a ‘noble[hu]man or profound person’22 (‘jūnzi’ ｢君子｣), let 
alone to become a sage.23 In order to resolve this obvious conflict, he argues that a 
‘minimum requirement’ for personality can work as the standard, while the full 
development of it should not serve as this standard but ‘maximum fulfilment’ or 
realization (ibid.:90).24 Does Tu mean by this argument that there are at least two levels 
of sages — one that is unreachably perfect, and the other that is reachable as the minimum 
required for perfection? Can this reachable minimum standard required to become a 
perfect sage still mean perfect? Tu (1979a:142) introduces Wang Yangming’s notion and 
states unequivocally that the ‘potentiality’ to be a sage is inherent in everyone as a reality 
that ‘can never be fully realized’. Tu (1985:24–5) admits that it as an ‘ontological 
postulate’ cannot be ‘empirically’ proven or experienced in the existent world.25  He 
(1976a:31–2) also recognizes that neither Yán Huí 顏回 (521-481 BCE),26 Confucius’ 
                                                
18 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77). 
19 See also Tu Weiming (1985:31, 39, 52, 63, 67, 74, 94, 113, 131; 1990a:177). 
20 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:xxi, 28, 68, 86, 89, 141, 143). 
21 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:90). 
22 Tu Weiming (1990a:177). 
23 Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:10). 
24 See also Tu Weiming (2008a:438). 
25 See also Tu Weiming (2014b:website). 
26 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:25). 
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best disciple, nor even Confucius himself can ‘claim to be a sage’ (Tu 1985:25).27 He 
(1976a:44) 28 claims that this is simply an ideal29 nobody can reach in the future as well 
as in the past. 30  Nevertheless, Tu (1985:24–5, eo) still justifies his faith in the 
perfectibility of human nature by two arguments:  
(1) A logical pre-condition for his ‘ontological postulate’: human perfectibility is the 
‘rational’ assumption about human beings. He (ibid.:24) states: 
[c]ommon to all Three Teachings is the further claim that inherent in human nature is the 
moral and spiritual propensity for self-development … It is in this connection that Mencius 
insists upon the goodness of human nature as the real basis for self-realization.31  
This assumption leads to what he calls the ‘Moral Universal’, which assumes that 
‘[H]uman beings are moral … [and] self-perfectible beings’ (ibid.:27, eo).32 
(2) An ‘experiential assertion about the concrete path [of self-cultivation] (ibid. 24). He 
(ibid. 25, eo) states: 
[t]he human condition here and now, rather than either the original position in the past or a[n] 
utopian projection into the future, is the central concern. It is in this sense that the ontological 
postulate of human perfectibility must be supplemented by an experiential assertion about 
the concrete path by which one's own germinations and seeds can eventually be brought to 
fruition.  
Nevertheless, this experiential assertion is not what Tu and any other Ruist, 
including Confucius, can ever experience if this fruition means perfection. Based on this 
                                                
27 Analects 7:34a; 14:28a and Zhongyong 13d. See also Tu Weiming (1979a:7; 2014b:website). 
28 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:32). 
29 About sagehood, see Analects 7:26. 
30 Some other modern or New Ruists apparently share the same attitude. For example, the other third 
generation New Ruist, Liu Shuhsien (1987:229), does not think such an ideal world can ever exist on the 
earth, even the world of King Shùn (舜) and King Yáo (堯) that Confucius dreams of cannot be called an 
ideal one, let alone for Confucius himself. Or as Wéi Zhèngtōng 韋政通 (1927-) (1990:26–7), a Chinese 
historian, points out, the legendary personalities of King Shun and King Yao are an idealization of ancient 
kings in the ‘past time orientation’ (‘Chónggǔ de Jiàzhí Qǔxiàng’「崇古的價值取向」) of Chinese culture 
promoted by Ruism.  
31 Tu (1985:19, 26) asserts a common assumption shared by all of them that ‘moral and spiritual self-
development involves not only a convergence of stages to be perfected but also a multiplicity of ways to be 
pursued’. This assertion can be understood simply through a popular saying, ‘all roads lead to Rome’.  
32 From the doctrines of the Three Teachings, their unobjectionable conclusions on their selfhood all mean 
the human perfectibility in their respective context: everyone can become a sage in Ruism, everyone can 




belief, Tu extends the ‘transformative potential’ of this perfectibility of the self to ‘the 
family, the state, and the world’ (ibid.:135). Surprisingly, in another place where he 
interprets ‘the profound person’ as discussed in the Zhongyong, Tu (1976a:30–33) not 
only accepts the problem that such a contradiction between reality and his claim of the 
perfectibility of human nature creates, but also suggests that persons need to bear this in 
mind as ‘the apparent incompatibility’, viewing it as ‘the assumptive reasoning’ within 
the Zhongyong.33 This means that, in order to insist upon this sub-assumption (A2.1), 
another assumption must be added to his argument as its basis. 
3.2 Second Self-Cultivation Sub-Assumption (A2.2): The Intrinsic Goodness of 
Human Nature 
As is well-known, the core value of the Mencian line of Ruism is that human nature is 
good. In Tu’s (1985:24) interpretation, this assumed and asserted the Ruist doctrine of 
the ‘intrinsic goodness’ (ibid.:126) of human nature, as his second self-cultivation sub-
assumption (A2.2), becomes the source of any human’s ‘inner worth’ (ibid.:77). I find 
that it is also the basis for all other related discussions about self-cultivation.  
In order to strengthen this doctrine, Tu (ibid.:24-5) argues on the basis of Mencius’ 
famous thesis, xìngshànshuō 性善說 as an ‘idealism’ (Tu 2014b:website).34 This theory 
claims the ‘intrinsic goodness’ of human nature is manifest in ‘the four germinations 
[sìduān 四端] of the four basic human feelings’35 that are themselves ‘inherent’ in every 
human’s ‘hsin [心 p. xīn]’ (heart-and-mind) (Tu 1985:23–5).36 On the one hand, Tu 
                                                
33 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:24–5). 
34 Confucius himself never discussed the issue of human nature, whereas his followers separated into two 
major wings: the ‘idealist and rationalist’. The former is based on the Mencian (孟子) thesis, xìngshànshuō 
性善說 (the goodness of human nature), and the latter on Xunzi’s (荀子) thesis, xìngèshuō 性惡說 (the 
badness of human nature) (Tan, Jonathan Y. 2003a:96–7). 
35 Siduan is later translated as ‘the Four Sprouts’ by Tu (2008a:438). 
36 Although some might still debate its meaning, Mencius’ thesis xìngshànshuō 性善說 should be precisely 
understood and translated as ‘the goodness’ of human nature (Pfister 2014b:20–26). Tu Weiming’s 
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(ibid.:24-32, 128) recognizes the corruptibility, fallibility, and immorality of human 
beings, to the point that he (1979b:238, eo) even uses the Christian terms ‘prelapsarian’37 
and ‘postlapsarian’ to indicate that the ‘transcendence’ of human beings before the Fall 
is ‘alien’ and not ‘experienceable’ after the Fall.38  
Yet, on the other hand, he (1985:24, 128) imputes the causes of these failures in 
human nature to be completely determined by other ‘internal and external’ factors and so 
rejects the concept of original sin in his New Ruist account. He (1979a:8) also rejects 
‘God’s grace’ as the ‘ultimate source’ of moral cultivation. However, he (2014b:website) 
recently argues that the intrinsic goodness of human nature can never be deprived of by 
any external force.39 In fact, Tu (1985:24) himself also uses the term ‘propensity’ to 
describe his own account of the goodness of human nature.40 Why, then, is self-realization 
needed if human nature is intrinsically good according to Tu’s interpretation? Tu 
(1985:126) explains it further: 
The intrinsic goodness in our nature is often in a latent state: only through long and strenuous 
effort can it be realized as an experienced reality. In a deeper sense, however, a distinction 
between [the] ontological assertion and [the] existential realization must be made. Self-
realization is an existential idea, specifying a way of bringing into existence the ontological 
assertion that human nature is good. Precisely because human nature is good, the ultimate 
                                                
(2014b:website) understanding and translation as the ‘intrinsic goodness’ of human nature is actually 
‘xìngběnshàn’ 「性本善」interpreted and supported primarily by Chu Hsi (Liu, Chengwei 劉振維 p. Liú 
Zhènwéi 2005).  
37 Tu Weiming (1985:128). 
38 See also Tu Weiming (1986:175–6). However, Tu (1985:158) also denies the post-lapsarian state of 
human beings  in another place by asserting that ‘it appears that there is no post-lapsarian state to encounter 
and that alienation as a deep-rooted feeling of estrangement from one’s primordial origin is nonexistent’. 
39 It is notable that not every Ruist and research scholar in Ruism agrees with this Mencian thesis, but some 
of them understand this theory of the ‘intrinsic goodness of human nature’ to be merely a ‘tendency of [it] 
to good’ (Pfister 2013b:107). James Behuniak Jr. (2002:105) demonstrates his similar interpretation based 
on modern archaeological findings, mainly on a document from the unearthed Guōdiàn Zhújiǎn 郭店竹簡: 
Xìng zì Mìng Chū 《性自命出》(Dispositions Arise from Conditions). He argues that the notions of human 
nature in the Mencian four germinations should be most appropriately realized as ‘a dynamic disposition’, 
a ‘process’ of becoming human, or ‘a product of experience’ formed by external socio-environmental and 
temporal ‘conditions’, instead of ‘an essential attribute’ or an intrinsic biological shared nature found in all 
human beings at all times (ibid.:v, 97-132). See also Legge (1875 reprinted in 2011b:17–70, 178). 
40  It is worth noting that Tu (1976a:9; 1979a:18; 1985:10) uses the term ‘self-actualization’ as an 
interchangeable synonym of self-realization, self-cultivation, and self-effort to explain the perfectibility of 
human nature, but it does not mean the same thing as in Aristotelian philosophy. Tu’s actualization or 
existential realization is merely a tendency to cultivate one’s self without ‘a predetermined telos’ that 
‘Aristotelian actualization’ has in the ‘potentiality’ of any being (Weber 2007:87, eo). 
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basis for self-realization and the actual process of initiating self-cultivation are both located 
in the structure of the self … There is an implicit circularity in this conception of the self: 
human nature is good so that there is an authentic possibility for dynamic spiritual 
development and vice versa. If we accept that the … distinction of ontological assertion and 
existential realization also involves a dialectic relat ionship, the circularity is no longer a 
vicious one. 
Although he recognizes the circular argument implied by this explanation, Tu argues that 
this circular reasoning can be accepted as long as the differentiation between the 
ontological assertion and the existential realization can be viewed as ‘a dialectic 
relationship’ (ibid.). However, in his earlier explanation (1979b:238, eo) that a 
transcendence of self other than the ‘experienceable’ one can be justified for 
‘postlapsarian … human nature’, we must continue to ask, does this argument suggest 
that either the ontological assertion cannot stand, or the existential realization cannot be 
experienced after the Fall of human beings? Tu obviously wavers between his positions 
about the experienceability of the intrinsic goodness of human nature.41  
It has been noted that Tu (1976a:115–21) uses a similar argument to bridge the gap 
between the need to ‘learn to be sincere’ and the ‘reality of … [the] heavenly endowed 
nature’ of sincerity.42 In fact, regarding the issue of human nature’s sincerity, he also 
contradicts his other statements when he affirms the ‘incompleteness’ of sincerity in 
human nature in one context, 43  while denying it in another context (ibid.:115, eo; 
1989a:77, eo): 
                                                
41 However, another New Ruist, Liu Shuhsien (1989:267–8), stresses that the goodness of human nature 
cannot be understood on the level of experience because it is not established by arguing from the 
experiential evidence. 
42 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77–9). Based on the account of Chou Tuni 周敦頤 (p. Zhōu Dūnyí) (1017-
73), Tu (1985:151–2, eo) further stresses an ontological understanding of Cheng (誠), instead of an ethical 
and psychological concept of it, and renders it also as ‘truth or reality’. He consider it denoting ‘honest 
genuineness’ which should ground ‘a heartfelt feeling’ on ‘realities’ rather than ‘semblances’. See also Tu 
Weiming (1976a:104–106; 1989a:70). But, based on his studies on the Daxue 6 and the Zhongyong 20 and 
25, Plaks (2003:107, eo) disagrees the common rendering of Cheng by most traditional and post-traditional 
Chinese and Western commentators and scholars: ‘truthfulness or sincerity’. He renders it as ‘integral 
wholeness’ because in those contexts Cheng denotes the ‘authenticity’, ‘completion’, or ‘integrity of the 
inner self’ instead of ‘the self’s faithful representation to others’.  
43 Tu (1976a:35) states, ‘Unless one has already come to terms with one’s inner self, that which is hidden 
and subtle to others but visible and manifest to oneself, modelling one’s life upon an established pattern of 
behaviour will be a limited and limiting experience.’ See also Tu Weiming (1989a:27). 
119 
Underlying this assertion is the premise that the human way is, in an ultimate sense, identified 
with the Way of Heaven because they share the same ontological reality. To be sure, Heaven 
is by nature sincere and human beings must learn to be sincere. Yet the reason human beings 
can learn to be sincere is not because of Heaven’s grace but because their nature is originally 
so endowed. The reason that human beings must learn to be sincere is not because of any 
incompleteness in their ontological reality but because their existential situations make it 
necessary. 
Nevertheless, Tu asserts that Ruists do not agree with the ‘existentialist belief’44 
related to human nature (1976a:95, eo). The issue of whether both Tu’s ontological and 
existential notions in this context mean the same as essentialism and teleology might not 
be directly relevant to this research45 because it does not matter what he really means in 
his argument. The more relevant question comes about due to Tu’s argument for 
defending his own circular reasoning. This I will discuss later. However, he also bases 
this assumption (A2.2) on another assumption: a human’s original and inherent nature is 
bestowed by Heaven (ibid.:24-5, 126). 
3.3 Third Self-Cultivation Sub-Assumption (A2.3): Human Nature Is Endowed by 
Heaven 
Based on Chan Wingtsit’s indirect interpretation of the Zhongyong46 and the ‘postulate’ 
of Chang Tsai 張載 (p. Zhāng Zǎi) (1020-77), Tu (ibid.:14, 23-4) believes that any 
human’s original nature is ‘endowed by Heaven’.47 Put in other words, Heaven is the 
‘source’ of ultimate self-transformation (Tu 2002c:36). What the term Heaven means in 
Tu’s interpretation will be explored in the next section. This ‘Heaven-endowed’ human 
                                                
44 Namely that ‘since our existence precedes our essence we can shape our nature according to our own 
independent action through conscious living’ (ibid.:95).  
45 Tu tries to apply an essentialist concept and terminology to Ruist context of self-cultivation, namely to 
explain Ruist self-cultivation with a solid start and an expected goal. But Ralph Weber (2007:86–7, eo) 
criticizes his ontological assertion and existential realization as just a ‘processual and contextual’, instead 
of an essentialist ontological and ‘teleological’, notion of self-cultivation. He points out that in Tu’s 
interpretation of Ruist self-cultivation, both the solid ‘ground’, namely ‘is’ (Tu 1979a:142), and the 
expected goal or more rather the ‘concrete process’, namely ‘ought to be’ (ibid.), are susceptible to ‘change 
and circumstantiality’. For Tu emphasizes further ‘[one]’s being what [one] is must be sought in [one’s] 
becoming what [one] ought to be, and vice versa’ (ibid.:143, eo). 
46 Based on Cheng Hsüan 鄭玄 (p. Zhèng Xuán) (127-200), the Zhōngyōng Zhù 《中庸注》(Commentary 
on the Doctrine of the Mean) (Chan, Wingtsit 1969:98). 
47 See also Tu Weiming (1985:30, 71–4, 125–37, 160–70; 1990a:171–3). 
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nature is defined, explained, and described by Tu (1985:127) in the following terms or 
phrases:  
(1) ‘conscience’ (ibid.);  
(2) ‘the reality known as the principle [(lǐ 理)] ’ (ibid.:131-2, eo);  
(3) the original inner ability and wisdom to ‘know and experience ultimate reality in its 
all-embracing fullness’ (ibid.:161);  
(4) the assumed ‘ability of intellectual intuition (chih te chih-chüeh) [智的直覺 p. zhì de 
zhíjué]’48 as the ‘Chinese mode of thinking’ (ibid.:163, eo);  
(5) ‘the germinations of morality or seeds of enlightenment’ (ibid.:23, eo);  
(6) the Mencian moral ‘sensibility of the hsin [心 (p. xīn)]’ (ibid.:24);  
(7) ‘the humanity of the heart’ for self-realization (ibid.:30, 32, eo);  
(8) ‘the irreducibility of the vital energy and raw stuff for personal growth’ (1990a:172).49  
Tu Weiming (1985:12) does not think that either he himself or Mencius is 
promoting a ‘romantic advocacy’ or ‘optimism’ (2014b:website) of the perfectibility of 
humankind. He (1979a:30) himself had earlier acknowledged that Ruist sagehood is ‘the 
personality ideal’ that even Confucius himself could not attain. Therefore, Tu explains 
that the ‘theory’ of Heaven-endowed human nature is for directing us to appeal to ‘our 
internal resources for spiritual growth’ (ibid.). Since Tu believes that human nature is 
endowed by Heaven, why is that same nature also identified with our internal resources? 
Does he mean by this theory that all of the resources human beings need to attain an 
ultimate and perfect spiritual transformation are endowed by Heaven, and so it simply is 
assumed to be realizable for this purpose?  
                                                
48 A position asserted by Tu’s teacher Mou Tsungsan (1909-95) (1959 in 2003a:111–126). 
49 See also Tu Weiming (1985:30, 74, 127). 
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In several places, Tu (1976a:35; 1989a:27) stresses human nature as a ‘self-
generating source of strength’. For example, he (ibid.) says, ‘What [Zhōngyōng] envisions 
seems to be a creative process of self-realization, fostered by a self-generating source of 
strength’.  He (1985:126) also says in the context of explaining ‘Heaven-endowed’ human 
nature: 
[w]e can well see that inherent in the structure of the self is a powerful longing for the 
transcendent, not for an external supreme being but for the Heaven that has bestowed on us 
our original nature. This longing for the transcendent, in a deeper sense, is also an urge for 
self-transcendence, to go beyond what the self existentially is so that it can become what it 
ought to be. Although we are, in ontological terms, never deficient in our internally-generated 
capacity for spiritual development, we must constantly open ourselves up to the symbolic 
resources available to us for pursuing the concrete paths of self-realization. The participation 
of the other is not only desirable but absolutely necessary. 
His assertion here sounds confusing. What does ‘Heaven-endowed’ mean while he 
also stresses the ‘internally-generated capacity’ in human beings which is never deficient 
ontologically? What does ‘the symbolic resources’, indicating the other, which is 
‘absolutely necessary’ mean while ‘[one is] … ontologically … never deficient in one’s 
internally-generated capacity for spiritual development? Tu does not go futher to clarify 
it. 
3.4 Fourth Self-Cultivation Sub-Assumption (A2.4): Reaching Heaven Is Precisely 
Full Self-Realization 
3.4.1 The Meaning of Heaven 
Tu Weiming clearly assumes that Heaven is a central concept for self-cultivation in the 
context of Ruist spirituality. Yet for him, this concept of Heaven appears to be self-
evident in the context of East Asia, so that he does not need to define it and explain it. 
Only in two places, Tu (1985:73) denotes Heaven as ‘the ultimate reality’ and equates it 
with the Way as ‘the ultimacy’ (ibid.:125). Nevertheless he hesitates to recognize it as ‘a 
transcendent reality’ (ibid.:27, 73). Even if he calls Heaven ‘the transcendent’, he still 
denies that it is ‘an external supreme being’ (ibid.:126). In his eyes, the profound purpose 
of the self’s longing for Heaven is for ‘self-transcendence’, so that the self would no 
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longer be as it is ‘existentially’, but it can ‘become what it ought to be’ (ibid.:126, 136-
7), or what he (1989a:98) calls the ‘godlike sage’. It is worth noting here that, as 
mentioned in C2S4.4 and A-ES3 to A-ES6, the strong sense of pursuing oughts, 
especially being imposed externally, is related directly to the RFS.  
It is also notable that Tu seems not to make any conceptual distinction between the 
two terms: transcendent and transcendental (cf. Tu 1985:126 and 132). 50  In his 
interpretation (1976a:7–9, 102–104), Heaven is transcendent but ‘immanent’, absolutely 
not an external and personal Creator-God. 51 Since Heaven is not a personal being and 
human nature is not created by Heaven, would that Heaven imparted human nature be a 
merely metaphorical way to describe the innateness of human nature? He seems never to 
clarify it. 
Therefore, in Tu’s account the self’s hsin 心 appears to be ontologically equivalent 
to Heaven52 as long as the self decides with a strong will to pursue self-transcendence. In 
the context of the legendary Sage-King Shun (Shèng-Wáng Shùn 聖王舜) (ca. 2294-2184 
BCE) as exemplifying the case of ‘reaching Heaven’, Tu (1985:127) assumes one sense 
of reaching Heaven as ‘fully realizing [one’s] selfhood precisely’. He (1976a:128–9) 
                                                
50 This independent finding of mine is verified later by Li Minghui’s (2001a:132) finding in the similar 
undifferentiated usages of these two terms by Tu Weiming’s teacher, Mou Tsungsan. The term 
‘transcendental’ is a particular technical word in Kantian epistemological vocabulary. It refers to ‘a priori 
cognition … by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) 
are applied entirely a priori, or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition or its use a priori)’. In this 
sense, it always is part of human experience and cannot be associated with an ontologically transcendent 
reality (Kant 1781, trans. in 1998:196). 
51 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:9, 69, 116; 2008a:445). It has been noted that only in one place within his 
works Heaven appears to Tu (1990a:180) looking like a personal being who is ‘omnipresent and may be 
omniscient’ but ‘is certainly not omnipotent’ and ‘do[es] not speak’. See also Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, 
Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:11f.). Tu (1985:132) unequivocally differentiates the Ruist Heaven 
(including similar concepts in Daoism and Buddhism) from ‘a transcendent personal God’ (ibid.), ‘an 
external supreme being’ (ibid.:126) as a ‘source of authority’ (ibid.:125), ‘a wholly other’ (ibid.:132, eo), a 
higher ‘external intelligence’ (ibid.:36), or ‘an almighty creator’ (ibid.:38). Tu Weiming’s concept about 
the Ruist Heaven is not unusual. In differentiating the Ruist ‘Lord-on-High and Heaven’ from the Creator 
God (Yahweh) in Christianity, Julia Ching (1934-2001) (1977:143) states that the Ruist Heaven lacks ‘a 
theory of creation ex nihilo’, ‘inherently a notion of personality’, and ‘any clear historicity’. 
52 Tu’s interpretation of Heaven obviously follows the interpretation of Neo-Ruists because for them 
‘Heaven, the Way of Heaven, principle, nature, and the heart/mind are regarded as being essentially the 
same’ (Yao, Xinzhong 2000:148–9). 
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explained earlier the ontological reality of human as the ontological reality of Heaven in 
this way:53 
Since the ontological reality of [hu]man is none other than the ontological reality of Heaven, 
and since the ch’eng [誠 (sincerity)] of the sage is the same as the ch’eng of Heaven, they 
can be fully united … not [as] an antinomic bi-unity but [as] an indivisibly single oneness. 
The sage as the most authentic manifestation of humanity does not coexist with Heaven … 
[but forms] a coincidence with Heaven … not the unity of opposites but a continuous, lasting 
and homogeneous whole … an unbreakable organismic continuum.  
Apparently (on the basis of his argument) because the self (or ‘Humanity’) ought to be 
so, therefore, it does not merely long for Heaven, but also can be recognized as being 
ontologically indistinct, ‘indivisib[le]’ and ‘inseparab[le]’ from Heaven (Tu 1976a:129; 
1989a:84).54 
According to this assumption, assigned as the fourth self-cultivation sub-
assumption (A2.4): reaching Heaven is precisely full self-realization, Heaven itself must 
be based on the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) (human nature is perfectible) 
and his definition of Ruist sagehood as an ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal 
act’. 
Tu recognizes in the Three Teachings the promotion of a kind of atheism in a 
religious sense55 and so argues as well that there is no after-life within Heaven or an 
                                                
53 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:84). 
54 Tu Weiming (1976a; 1989a) denies that Heaven in Ruism is an external supreme being or personal God 
but still emphasizes the religiousness of Ruism. There are quite a few discussions and different explanations 
on this issue and what Heaven in Ruism denotes for proving the religiousness of Ruism (Eitel 1879:390; 
Legge 1880; Weber 1951; Mou, Tsungsan, 1983 revised in 2005:60; Yu, Yingshi 1986:43–50, 61–4, 112–
25; Zhèng, Zhìmíng 鄭志明 1986:183–6; Eno 1990; Ching, Julia 1993a; Berthrong 1994:69–132, 165–
208; Fáng, Zhìróng 房志榮 1995; Tu, Weiming and Zhou, Qin 1996; Zheng, Jiadong 1998; Huang, 
Chunchieh 黃俊傑 1999; Rèn, Jìyù 任繼愈 2000; Tu, Weiming 2000; 2008a; Neville 2000:147–66; Yao, 
Xinzhong 2000:139–52; Wēn Wěiyào 溫偉耀 2001:147–62, 192–5; Lǐ, Tiāngāng 李天綱 2002; Plaks 
2003:111f.; Sun, Lungkee 2005; Zhāng, Qìngxióng 張慶熊 2006:171–81; Miller 2006; 2006:105–98, 251–
313; Ames 2006:593–617; Adler 2006; 2014; Rèn, Lìxīn 任麗新 2006; Lǐ, Jiàn 李健 2007; Lǐ, Mínghuī 李
明輝 2007; Boot 2007; Roetz 2008:368–70; Billioud and Thoraval 2008; Pfister 2009; forthcoming-a; Yao, 
Xinzhong and Zhao, Yanxia 2010; Chin Kenpa 2011:544–91; Chen, Weigang 2012; Berger 2012; Rèn, 
Zhòng 任重 and Liú, Míng 劉明 2012; Fan, Lizhu and Chen, Na 2015; Davies 2015). See also F50 above. 
Due to the limitation of space, the comprehensive discussions about this issue in Ruism are not included in 
this thesis. 
55 See also Tu Weiming (1979b:238; 1985:22, 27, 61, 116, 136; 1988:45; 2002c:36; 2009 in Tu, Weiming 
and Yi, Junqing 2009:10). 
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eternity in Ruism.56 When discussing the concept of creation, he (1979a:86) stresses that 
‘the very nature of [hu]man … is imparted, but not created, by Heaven’. However, in the 
same work, he (ibid.:20, eo) also says: 
[Hum]an has the inner strength to actualize the full potential of his[/her] being, and his[/her]  
creativity is inherent in his[/her] humanness. [Hum]an, therefore, is not a creature but a 
creative agent who gives meaning to Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things. 
How can human nature be imparted by Heaven which humans give meaning to? 
Tu (ibid.:159) follows in the footsteps of his teacher, Mou Tsungsan (1962 in 
2003b:22–3), a second generation New Ruist, by viewing Heaven from the functional 
aspect instead of the ontological perspective based on a personal God as an ‘entity’. Tu 
(1976a:104–106, 116–18) argues that human beings partake ‘their nature from Heaven’ 
and so share an identical ‘essence’ with Heaven due to their Heaven-endowment (ibid.).57  
Even he himself admits that ‘the likelihood of one’s becoming completely identified with 
heaven and earth is extremely limited’ (1989a:118f.).58  Nevertheless, he argues this 
because it appears to him as a self-evident truth. He (1985:158) asserts:  
For we are all potentially guardians and indeed co-creators of the universe. In this holistic 
vision of man, an ontological gap between Creator and creature would seem to be almost 
inconceivable. It appears that there is no post-lapsarian state to encounter and that alienation 
as a deep-rooted feeling of estrangement from one’s primordial origin is nonexistent. 
Not only does Tu (ibid.) deny that there is any ‘ontological’ difference between 
‘Creator and creature’, but he also promotes human beings to the level of being ‘co-
creators of the universe’, namely ‘godlike sage’ (1989a:98), making humans’ efforts 
necessary in fulfilling Heaven’s infinite creative power.59  
If Heaven in this account is by no means a transcendent personal God or an external 
supreme being, what sense does it make to say that Heaven is omnipresent and omniscient 
                                                
56 Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:10). 
57 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:70, 77). 
58 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:78). 
59 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:104–106, 129–30; 1989a:70, 84, 98, 102, 106; 2002c:37; 2010 in Tu, 
Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:10f.). 
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but not omnipotent? Tu (1989a:120f.) does state that the heart-and-mind is ‘omnipresent 
but not omnipotent’. Would it then be possible to summarize this position by stating that 
Heaven is in fact the perfect ideal heart-and-mind of human beings? In order to stress the 
value of humanity, would Heaven’s authority and will be replaced by the ultimate 
realization of benevolence and righteousness in human’s heart-and-mind as Zheng 
Zhiming (1986:183) points out? Since there is no creator and no creature in terms of 
creation, where does the concept of the fully realized human as co-creator come from? 
With whom do human beings co-create? Who are the creatures that are being created? Or 
is it the universe that is being extended or created? What then constitutes this universe? 
Tu (1989a:106) seems to call human beings co-creators in order to promote them to the 
same level of Heaven and Earth in this Ruist trinity.60 
3.4.2 The Transcendence of Heaven 
In discussing ‘the transcendence of Heaven’, Tu (1985:125) recognizes a significant 
difference with ‘the transcendence of God’. Based on his Mencian thesis, he defines ‘the 
transcendence of Heaven’ as the ‘understanding of Heaven’, appreciating the value of 
‘the subtle meanings of the Mandate of Heaven’ (ibid.). This transcendence can be 
reached only after ‘a full realization of our minds’ and then ‘a comprehension of our 
nature’ (ibid.). Therefore, the ‘transcendent dimension’ of Ruist selfhood is that ‘Heaven 
resides in it, works through it and … is also revealed by it’ and ‘selfhood so conceived 
maintains a tacit communication’ with Heaven (ibid.:125-6), or a ‘dialogical response to 
the transcendent’ (Tu 1989a:x, 94). He explains more recently this communication or 
dialogical response in Chinese by means of a literary idiom, ‘xiānghù gǎn tōng’ 「相互
感通」(reciprocal perceiving and connecting),61 however, he (2008a:440) also admits 
                                                
60 I consider that Tu derives this concept from the Zhongyong 22. 
61 Tu Weiming (2008a:440; 2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:21). 
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that ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act and as a faithful dialogical response 
to the transcendent … does not entirely sound Confucian’, as criticized by Roetz 
(2008:370). In terms of this admission, can he still claim the orthodoxy of his New Ruist 
interpretation (C1S3.1.1)? 
Tu insists that the full realization of the self can be embodied ‘within its own reality’ 
without any help from external non-human others (Tu 1985:45–6, 60–63). In his 
understanding (ibid.:60), the full realization of the self, namely ‘absolute sincerity’ (Tu 
1976a:116f.), is to attain the ‘highest transcendence’, namely ‘the complete unity between 
humanity and Heaven’ or a ‘trinity’ among Heaven, Earth and ‘humanity’.62 Tu goes to 
great lengths to emphasize the importance of this highest transcendence and tries to 
interpret and discuss these concepts in most of his works.63 Although Tu denies that 
Heaven is a creator or any other external being, he emphasizes that, in an ultimate sense, 
Heaven and humans form a relationship of ‘mutual fidelity’ and that humans ‘serve 
Heaven’64 (Tu 1985:73, 132, 163). He also defines the ‘religiosity’ of Neo-Ruism by the 
‘mut[u]ality of Heaven and [hu]man’ (ibid.:132).65 In this sense, he unusually states that 
‘the gap between Creator and creature is bridgeable’ based on Confucius’ words quoted 
                                                
62 See also Tu Weiming (1985:126, 137, 153; 1989a:77; 1990a:180). 
63 It is notable that he (2002a:429–30) points out that there has not been any systematic works, either in the 
field of Ruism or of Chinese philosophy, probing into them seriously until now, even though they have 
been recognized as an essential characteristic of Chinese thought by some influential Ruists and Chinese 
philosophers (see also Cheng, Chungying and Leung, Insing 2004; Lǐ, Míng 李明 2009). Why? He does 
not explain this claim any further. Might this claim imply that ‘the complete unity between humanity and 
Heaven’ is merely a not-well-understood speculation, and that real transcendence is unfathomable for 
human beings without revelation from that transcendent external one? Ruist schools have no consistent 
understanding and interpretation of the complete unity between humanity and Heaven. (Guō, Qīngxiāng 郭
清香 2006:66) For example, the Ruist school of philosophy of the Song dynasty (960-1279) and after asserts 
that there is no difference between Heaven and humanity and, therefore, there is not any need for them to 
form into one body (Zhōu, Xiǎoān 周小安 2001:78, 83; Li, Ming 2009:27). This assertion is quite different 
from the one before the Song dynasty.   
64 I consider that Tu’s concept of serving Heaven is based on claims from Mencius, 7A:1, where the phrase 
‘shìtiān’「事天」appears. 
65 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:9; 1985:63, 137). 
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in the Zhuāngzǐ 《莊子》that refer to ‘Zàowùzhě’「造物者」(the Creator) (ibid.:93).66 
By means of this interpretation, he (Tu 1985:93, 109 n.4) tries to soften the strong 
statements made both by himself more than once67 and by Frederick W. Mote (1922-
2005):  
The Chinese [people] … are apparently unique in having no creation myth; that is, they have 
regarded the world and [hu]man as uncreated, as constituting the central features of a 
spontaneously self-generating cosmos having no creator, god, ultimate cause or will external 
to itself. (Mote 1971, revised in 1993:13) 68  
Tu Weiming (1976a:104–106, 116–18) early on actually deni ed ‘any ontological gap 
between human nature and Heaven’ but argues that the ways of human and Heaven ‘share 
the same ontological reality’, 69  namely ‘ontological identity’ in Chin Kenpa’s 
interpretation (2011:563). 
Tu (1985:47) mentions ‘the spirit of Heaven and Earth’ in discussing the 
relationship between humanity and nature. How can the meanings of the technical terms 
‘mutual fidelity’, ‘communication’, reciprocal perceiving and connecting, and 
                                                
66 Zhuangzi 《莊子》, 6: 「彼方且與造物者為人，而遊乎天地之一氣。」([The other two men], 
moreover, make [hu]man to be the fellow of the Creator, and seek their enjoyment in the formless condition 
of heaven and earth) (trans. by James Legge in 1891:251–2).  
67 ‘The lack of a creation myth is not only a prominent feature of Confucian symbolism but also a defining 
characteristic of Chinese cosmology’ (Tu 1976a:103; 1989a:69). 
68 In fact, there is a Maker or ‘Creator’ found in this special chapter of the Zhuangzi, but Mote seemed to 
have never seen it before. It should be read as an early Daoist claim, however, and is not repeated in any 
early Ruist canonical texts. Like Mote, Walter H. Medhurst (1796–1857) (1838:181–219), E. J. Eitel 
(1838–1908) (1879:390), J. Edkins (1823-1905) (1885), Derk Bodde (1953:68; 1961:405), Joseph 
Needham (1900-1995) (1956:581), Chang Kwangchih 張光直 (p. Zhāng Guāngzhí) (1959), Angus C. 
Graham (1919-1991) (1989:12), David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames (1995:184), and Geoffrey 
MacCormack (2001), Robert Cummings Neville (2007), also unanimously aver, despite their different 
arguments, that there is not any myth of cosmogony in traditional Chinese culture. But J. Chalmers (1825–
1899) (1885), Berthold Laufer (1874-1934) (1912:146–7), Eduard Erkes (1891-1958) (1931), N. J. 
Girardot (1976), David C. Yu (1981; 1986), Michael J. Puett (2001:12–20), Andrew H. Plaks (2005), Paul 
R. Goldin (2008), and Erica F. Brindley (2013) disagree on such a consensus. It is notable that Paul R. 
Goldin (2008:3, eo) does not consider that Bodde, Mote, Graham, and Hall and Ames who deny the 
existence of creation myths in ancient China are mistaken. He suggests they based their arguments on a 
presupposition that China ‘cannot have creation myths’. Besides, Laufer (1912:146–7) also asserts that 
the insistence of the absence of Creation myths in Chinese traditions is only ‘a one-sided and biased 
version of their religion abridged and curtailed after an eclectic method stamping out everything that did 
not fit the Confucian system’. Due to the limitation of space, the comprehensive discussions about this 
issue in Chinese traditions are not included in this thesis. 
69 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:70, 77). 
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‘mutuality’ make sense if Heaven is not a being? He seems to personalize Heaven and 
Earth at some places. Since he repeatedly stresses the impersonality and internality of 
Heaven, why does he personalize Heaven and Earth or nature in these other contexts? 
Does he intend to interpret these claims only in a metaphorical way?  
On the one hand, he emphasizes that human nature is endowed by Heaven, yet on 
the other hand, he explains that Heaven is revealed by selfhood. At other points he claims 
that the ‘whole universe’ can be embodied by human beings and that fully realizing and 
understanding selfhood are the preconditions for knowing Heaven (ibid.:15, 46).70 Since 
he (1979a:67) believes that ‘the mind as the defining characteristic of human nature is 
itself the ultimate basis’ for reaching full self-realization through moral self-cultivation, 
is Heaven defined by selfhood? Is the term Heaven borrowed only to indicate 
metaphorically the transcendence of selfhood in moral excellence in the human 
community?  
Tu does not clarify these ambiguities. But in one place, he (2008a:440) shows his 
agreement with Roetz’s (2008:369) explanation that traditional Ruism ‘did not inherit the 
religion of “Heaven” as such but only its normative content—the primacy of morals—
and that it advocated a basically a-religious ethics of self-cultivation based on individual 
self-respect’. However, Tu does quote the saying of Ch’eng Hao 程灝 (p. Chéng Hào) 
(1032-85) ‘[Hu]man[s] and Heaven and Earth are one thing’ to underscore the trinity of 
the unity between Heaven, Earth and humanity by ‘forming one body with the myriad 
things’ (yǔ wànwù wéiyītǐ 與萬物為一體) (ibid.:46).71 By means of this interpretation, 
Tu obviously denies ‘the subject-object dichotomy’ of the relationship between humanity 
and nature (that is, Heaven and Earth) (ibid.). From his interpretation of the Zhongyong, 
                                                
70 See also Tu Weiming (1985:9, 61–3, 72–3, 125–6). 
71 Cheng Hao (n.d., cited in Tu 1985:46). 
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Tu also emphasizes that humans cannot be ‘alienated from Heaven in any essential way’ 
(ibid.:73).72 Following the Mencian tradition, Tu insists that ‘Heaven sees as the people 
see and Heaven hears as the people hear’ (tiānshì zì wǒmín shì, tiāntīng zì wǒmín tīng 天
視自我民視，天聽自我民聽) (ibid.:132).73 Do these claims sound like metaphorical 
expressions? If humans, Heaven, and Earth are one thing, or if Heaven depends on 
humanity, does the Heaven-endowment simply metaphorically mean an inborn 
inherence? Since the terms ‘transcendence’ or ‘the transcendent’ are regularly used by Tu 
to describe and explain his self-cultivation assumptions, it is necessary to understand fully 
his definition of transcendence. 
3.5 Tu’s Definition of Transcendence74 
Undoubtedly, Tu’s self-transcendence never refers to a metaphysical meaning beyond the 
plane of human beings75 because he (1976a:116f.) emphasizes the ‘actualization’ of self-
transcendence ‘is not to transcend humanity but to work through it’.76 He (1979b:238, eo) 
also does not think a transcendence other than ‘the experienceable human self’ can be 
justified for ‘postlapsarian … human nature’. But he (1989a:97–8) still insists that in 
Ruist religiosity ‘faith in the perfectibility of human nature through self-effort is, strictly 
speaking, a faith in self-transcendence’. He (1979b:13) explains that ‘radical otherness’ 
cannot be conceptualized as transcendence in Ruism (1985:136) and the ‘ultimate 
meaning’ of human life can only be found in the ordinary existence of daily life (ibid.:13). 
                                                
72 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:9). 
73 James Legge’s translation from Mencius, 5A:5 (Tu 1985:146 n.11). 
74 Transcendence in Western philosophical context usually denotes ‘a deity existing beyond or above 
created things, distinct from an immanent divine’ (Levenson & Aldwin 2013:583). 
75 This independent argument is later found to be supported by Wen Weiyao’s (2001:192–5) analysis of the 
meaning of Heaven in traditional and post-traditional Ruism.  
76 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77). 
130 
 
Besides the significant difference between the transcendence of Heaven and the 
transcendence of God recognized by Tu (ibid.:125-6), most of the time, it seems to Tu 
that transcendence and Heaven (including Earth, the nature, and the universe) are self-
evident terms used interchangeably to describe the ultimacy expressed when anyone 
recognizes that humans, Heaven, and Earth are one thing.77 He generally tends to define 
one by the other and vice versa.  
However, Tu does seek to explain the meaning of transcendence in a few places. In 
terms of human-relatedness, self-cultivation in Ruism involves the establishment and 
enlargement of an ‘ever-expanding circle’ of relationships, developing from ‘the 
structures of the self’ towards ‘the family, the country, and the world’ (ibid.:14). 
Therefore, in this sense, Tu (1990a:10) emphasizes that ultimate self-transformation as a 
communal act must transcend beyond ‘culturalism’ (ibid.:10), ‘egoism, regulation of the 
family … racism’ (ibid.:137), ‘nepotism, parochialism, ethnocentrism … chauvinistic 
nationalism … and ‘anthropocentrism’ (ibid.:179-80). 78  Under these conditions, 
transcendence appears to mean simply mere self-transcendence (Tu 1985:10, 126). 
Tu acknowledges that Heaven or the Way is not ‘a transcendent reference point 
(such as God)’ and asserts Ruist selfhood itself is a transcendent reference point 
(ibid.:125). 79  He underscores this assertion when discussing the self-cultivation 
assumptions and argues that selfhood is ‘divine in its all-embracing fullness’, being ‘both 
immanent and transcendent’ because selfhood is ‘intrinsic’ to us and ‘belongs to Heaven’ 
                                                
77 Tu’s concept of Heaven is close to the one interpreted in the Ruist school of philosophy of the Song and 
Ming dynasties. In this school, as Zhāng Dàinián 張岱年 (1993:154–5) points out, Heaven represents the 
nature, the whole universe, and the fundamental basis rather than implication of a dominator with will-
power in Mencius’ interpretation.  
78 See also Tu Weiming (1986:190). 
79 See also Tu Weiming (2002c:37; 2008a:446). Guo Qingxiang (2006:67–8) points out that the starting 
point and focus in discussing the relation of Heaven and humankind in the traditional Ruism is humankind 
and their nature and their doing goodness instead of the former. Therefore, she concludes that Ruist 
dialectics is from humankind to humankind and its argumentation on the relation of Heaven and humankind 
is in reality about the relation of humankind and their nature (ibid.:80–82, 114).  
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at the same time (ibid.). It is notable that Tu emphasizes self-realization as ‘a process 
transcending the anthropological realm’ because human nature is bestowed by Heaven 
(ibid.:74). But he also states that the actualization of the reality underlying human nature 
and the myriad things is not about ‘transcend[ing] humanity’ but about ‘work[ing] 
through it’ (ibid.). His explanation is based on a Ruist belief that Heaven endows human 
nature, so that ‘the original ability and the original wisdom to realize the ultimate meaning 
of Heaven’ exist ‘ontologically’ in all ordinary human beings (ibid., eo). 
In spite of the significant difference between the meanings of transcendence for the 
Ruist Heaven and the Christian God, Tu parallels a Ruist account of the ‘original human 
nature’ to ‘God’s image in [hu]man[s]’ in the ‘Christian idea of humanity as divinity 
circumscribed’ (ibid.:125). Does the term divine in this Ruist context mean the same thing 
as it does in the Christian context?  
When Tu explains the moral metaphysical ontology of the sage, he quotes Mencius 
(ibid.:152, eo): 
The desirable is called good. To have it in oneself is called true. To possess it fully in oneself 
is called beautiful, but to shine forth with this full possession is called great. To be great and 
be transformed by this greatness is called sage[ly]; to be sage[ly] and to transcend the 
understanding is called divine [spiritual].80  
The term ‘divine’ here, which actually refers to the spiritual (shén 神) in a more general 
way, is defined by Mencius as being sagely and transcending the understanding of other 
humans. Furthermore, following the interpretation of Chu Hsi, Tu denies any possibility 
of ‘a spiritual being (shen-jen) [神人 p. shénrén] … above the sage’, as indicated here by 
the term ‘divine’ or spiritual (ibid.). It means that the sage’s transforming power is 
beyond what ordinary humans can comprehend. In other places, he asserts that the 
‘perfected self’ in East Asian thinking does not absolutely assume ‘a superhuman quality’ 
                                                
80 Tu adopts its English translation by Lau D. C. (1921-2010) (1970, revised in 2004:162) from Mencius, 
7B:25 (Tu 1985:166 n.14) 
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(ibid.:27). In another book, Tu (1993c:29) states that the sage is a person with ‘a godlike 
stature in the pantheon of the virtuous’ and one who is widely exalted among both ancient 
and modern Chinese persons. In still another context, where he (Tu 1989a:119f.) is talking 
about the ‘profound person ([the] ideal personality)’ (ibid.:40),81 Tu explains the status 
of such a perfected self or sage as ‘not only as an empirical entity but also, in the 
ontological sense, as an absolute, transcendental reality’ (ibid.:120). It happens when 
one’s ‘heart-and-mind’ (hsin [心]) or self’s resolution decides to establish the will. Still 
Tu denies unequivocally that this expression of absolute reality is just ‘another version of 
God talk’ or thinking ‘theologically about Confucian religiousness’, but is instead an 
attempt to grasp religiously Ruist humanism (ibid.:120, eo). 
4. The Relational Assumption (A1): The Self as a Centre of Relationships 
Tu Weiming (1985:54) argues that the self, being a centre of relationships, possesses ‘a 
communal property which was never conceived of as an isolated or isolable entity’ in the 
orthodox Ruist context. He further emphasizes that the meaning of the self constituted by 
this communal property in Ruism is completely distinct from the meaning of the self in a 
modern Western82 context (ibid.). Undoubtedly, this Ruist account of the ‘ultimate self-
transformation as a communal act’ is based upon a relational assumption (A1): the self as 
a centre of relationships. In one place, Tu states that self-transformation ‘assumes the 
form of mastering the self’ that includes realizing one’s ‘original nature’ and transforming 
one’s self-centredness and so it requires a ceaseless struggle to remove ‘selfish and 
                                                
81 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:54). 
82  The phrase modern Western context in Tu Weiming’s context refers to modern individualism. 
Undoubtedly, this is a reductionist expression. Scholars, including Tu Weiming, usually tend to generalize 
and homogenize accounts about the actual pluralities existing within Western civilization. Precisely 
speaking, modern individualism is related to European post-Enlightenment forms of Christianity, see also 
C6F2. Besides, there is not only one Western or even modern Western concept of the self, see also A-D. It 
is worth noting that Tu (1982:6) claims his Ruist position of anti-reductionism and often pinpoints others’ 
‘deceptively simple’ questions, interpretations, statements, or arguments (Tu 1985:7, 25, 29, 54, 95, 153). 
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egoistic desires’ (ibid.:137). In what follows I will examine some related aspects of the 
conception of the relational self in Tu’s New Ruist context. 
4.1 First Relational Sub-Assumption (A1.1): All Things Are My Companions 
Besides ‘human-relatedness’ within ordinary daily existence, the other characteristic 
related to this account of a New Ruist version of ultimate spiritual transformation is the 
‘continuity of being’ in the context of a modern conception of traditional ‘Chinese 
cosmology’ or ‘Chinese cosmogony’ (Tu 1985:35–50). This cosmology is based on the 
notion of ‘all modalities of being … made of ch’i [氣 (p. qì) (energy)]’ (ibid.:8-15, 43, 
eo).83 Tu believes, as do many other modern Chinese scholars, that the continuity of being 
appears to be a self-evident truth (ibid.:36-40).84 Based on his account of a traditional 
‘Chinese cosmology’, Tu claims that the cosmos is viewed as a continuous 
‘spontaneously self-generating life process’ without beginning and end, in which ‘inner 
connectedness and interdependence’ are inherent (ibid.:9, eo). Although there is still 
differentiation in it, ‘all modalities of being are organically connected’ as ‘integral parts’ 
that is called by Tu an ‘organismic unity’, and so is conceived as one aspect of a ‘cosmic 
transformation’ process (ibid.:39-44, 138). It is in this ‘metaphysical sense’ (ibid.:44) that 
Zhang Zai expresses his ‘ontological’ account of human beings85 that he has faith in, as 
quoted by Tu several times (ibid.:42): 
Heaven is my father and earth is my mother, and even such a small being as I finds an intimate 
place in their midst. Therefore, that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that 
                                                
83 About Tu’s discussion in detail on ‘Chinese cosmology’ and ‘Chinese cosmogony’ and qì 氣, see Tu 
Weiming (1985:35–50; 2007b). For Tu’s tendency to refer only to a singular generalized ‘Chinese 
cosmology’, see C3F34 and C5F95. 
84 For Tu Weming (1976a:103; 1989a:69), ‘Chinese cosmology’ is also self-evident because of its defining 
characteristic he claims. However, he (1985:38) also acknowledges that there is a puzzle regarding whether 
the conception of a continuity of being is informed by traditional ‘Chinese cosmology’ (ontology) or vice 
versa.  
85 In fact, such an ontology of human beings is based on a cosmology that lacks ‘any ontological claims, 




which directs the universe I regard as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and 
all things are my companions.86 (Zhang Zai n.d., cited in Tu 1985:42–3, 137, 157) 
Since the ‘sense of cosmic togetherness’ (ibid.:33) or ‘all things cosmologically 
share the same consanguinity with us’ (ibid.:45), is the core claim of his New Ruist 
relational self in its cosmological expression of the continuity of being, I assign it as his 
first relational sub-assumption (A1.1) (‘all things are my companions’)87 for the purpose 
of discussion. 
Tu explains this in ‘anthropocosmic’ terms, arguing that a complete self-realization 
entails both ‘the full actualization of humanity’ and a unity or ‘trinity’ among Heaven, 
Earth, and ‘humanity’ or ‘humankind’ (Tu 1985:10).88 In this sense, the first relational 
sub-assumption (A1.1) is also the premise for the fourth self-cultivation sub-assumption 
(A2.4) (reaching Heaven is precisely full self-realization).  
Based on this sub-assumption (A1.1), the dichotomous differences between self and 
society, creator and creature, as well as body and mind, are no longer important. What 
matters in this traditional form of this Ruist cosmology for Tu Weiming is its emphasis 
on the ‘part/whole, inner/outer, surface/depth, root/branches, substance/function, and 
Heaven/man’ correlative pairs (ibid.:9). Accordingly, discussions about the nature of the 
wholeness-related and dynamism-related issues 89  involving the ‘subtle relationships, 
                                                
86 Quoted from the Western Inscription《西銘》(Xīmíng). Its English translation is by Chan Wingtsit 
(1969:497). 
87 It is worth noting that there is a difference between a continuity of being and an extension of intimate 
relationships. The first two sentences in this quotation from the Western Inscription allude to that 
contradictory of being, whereas the third sentence deals only with relationship. Therefore, in terms of the 
ontological sense of human beings, the sub-assumption provided by this account would be ‘that which fills 
the universe I regard as my body’ or ‘what fills Heaven and Earth constitutes our concrete presence’ in 
Pfister’s (2014a:638; 2015c in 2018 (forthcoming):216) rendering, that is not a relational one. However, 
Tu emphasizes (1985:45) through this account of continuity of being that ‘all things cosmologically share 
the same consanguinity with us’ and that is an onto-relational one. Consequently, ‘all things are my 
companions’ is a proper account for his relational sub-assumption. 
88 See also Tu Weiming (1990a:180f.). 
89 ‘Continuity, wholeness, and dynamism’ are ‘three motifs’ in ‘Chinese cosmology’ (Tu 1985:38–40). 
Chin Kenpa (2011:560, eo) points out that this kind of characterization of Chinese cosmology (culture) 
adopted by New Ruist in contrast to Anglo-European culture is a parlance of ‘Zhōngguó zhéxué yōuyuèlùn’ 
「中國哲學優越論」(theory of superiority of Chinese philosophy). 
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internal resonance, dialogical interplay, and mutual influence’ of those correlative pairs, 
instead of the issues involving merely ‘static, mechanistic, [or] analytical distinctions’, 
are relevant for an understanding of this traditional ‘Chinese cosmology’ (ibid.:8-9, 38).90 
On the one hand, Tu (ibid.:15) follows the Mencian suggestion that ‘ultimate self-
transformation is a communal act’, rather than ‘a lonely quest for one’s inner 
spirituality’;91 on the other hand, he (ibid.) argues: 
To take one’s situatedness in a particular network of dyadic relationships as the given is not 
total submission to the prescribed social roles but a recognition of the most immediate and 
fruitful way of initiating and completing one’s task of learning to be human. After all, in the 
Confucian view, the ultimate meaning of life is never found in a radical otherness, but it is 
inseparable from our ordinary daily existence. 
Here, Tu (ibid.) still denies that ‘total submission to the prescribed social roles’, 
defined by relationships instead of achievement, would be a corollary for taking the given 
‘situatedness’ in any account of Ruist wulun, as pinpointed by Richard H. Solomon 
(1971:105–6). However, he (1985:15) asserts that this involves a recognition of the best 
and most effective way to initiate and complete one’s mandate of ‘learning to be human’ 
because, as mentioned above, the ultimacy of life is tied to human’s ordinary daily 
existence instead of a radical otherness.  
According to the above modes of modern and traditional forms of Ruist thinking, it 
is understandable how, in Tu’s view, moral self-cultivation is emphasized as:  
(1) ‘a precondition for harmonizing human relations’ so that the relations are not 
superficial only (ibid.:55);  
(2) ‘the aesthetic experience of mutuality and immediacy with nature’ (ibid.:47); 
                                                
90 Huang Junjie 黃俊傑 (2002:37–8) stresses that such a monist cosmology leads to the traditional Chinese 
ideology of ‘the self being absorbed into the collective’ and individuality obeying sociality’. 
91 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:54; 1989a:40). 
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(3) the realization of the ‘ultimacy’ of human beings in forming a trinity with Heaven and 
Earth (ibid.:137) and so to have transformed and further realized the processes 
involved in the universe (ibid.:74).92  
Therefore, in order to predicate the first relational sub-assumption (A1.1) (‘all 
things are my companions’), the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) (human 
nature is perfectible) and the definition of Ruist sagehood (i.e. ‘ultimate self-
transformation as a communal act’) must be its premises. Here again, the first relational 
sub-assumption (A1.1) as well as all four self-cultivation sub-assumptions assume and 
define each other in a closed system. 
In the light of this closed system, it is not surprising to find that Tu summarizes the 
features of the transformed self ‘as the manifestation of the great self [(dàwǒ 大我)] and 
the concom[m]itant dissolution of the small self [(xiǎowǒ 小我)]’ (ibd:14, eo).93 His 
notions of honouring the great self and devaluing the small self are linked by Tu to the 
Mencian honouring the great body (dàtǐ 大體) and devaluing the small body (xiǎotǐ 小
體),94 even as both Mencius and Wang Yangming did honour the great person (dàrén 大
人) and devalued the small person (xiǎorén 小人).95 
                                                
92 Tu’s argument here is based on Zhōngyōng 22 (1976a:116–18; Tu 1985:74, 80, 152–3; 1989a:77). See 
F59 above and also Chan Wingtsit’s (1969:107f.) translation. See also Tu’s argument (1985:63–4) based 
on the Zhongyong 31 and Chan Wingtsit’s (1969:112) translation. 
93 It is worth noting that some scholars consider that the ethical claims by Zhang Zai in the quoted passage 
from the Western Inscription are ‘egalitarian benevolence’ (Lee, Junghwan 2010) and ‘broad love (bó'ài 
博愛)’ both of which might even destroy the Ru-based familism, ‘a more restrictive form of hierarchical 
ethical values’ (Pfister 2015c in 2018 (forthcoming):199, 202, eo). Since Tu goes to great lengths to stress 
very much that moral self-cultivation must be ‘a precondition for harmonizing human relations’, Tu seems 
not to accept Zhang Zai’s more radical egalitarian vision of human relationships and ‘broad love’. 
94 Mencius, 6A:15. See also Yeh Kuanghui (2002:239–40). 
95 The Inquiry on the Great Learning. It is notable that the meaning of small person could be very negative, 
especially in classical Chinese language. In one place where Confucius defined the meaning of small person 
as the antonym of the great or superior person, James Legge (1869 reprinted in 2011a:170) translates it as 
‘the mean [person]’ in the Zhongyong 2. 
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4.2 The Precondition for the Self as a Centre of Relationships 
In Tu’s definition of Ruist selfhood, it seems that human relatedness is valued more than 
one’s inner spirituality, and the great self more than the small self because he (ibid.:15) 
stresses that ‘ultimate self-transformation, instead of a lonely quest for one’s inner 
spirituality, is a communal act. Human-relatedness is thus an integral part of one's quest 
for spiritual fulfillment’. We can see that one’s ‘own inner transformation’ is still stressed 
very much by him, not only because of inherent problems in Ruist ‘learning for the sake 
of the self’, as already explained above, but also because of quandaries related to the 
whole concept of ultimate self-transformation. Tu (1985:52) insists that the self is ‘an end 
in itself’ in the process of learning, instead of being ‘a means’ to that goal: 
It may also mean substantively that the person in ordinary daily existence is the basis for the 
full realization of humanity. The Confucian insistence that learning is for the sake of the self, 
an end in itself rather than a means to an end, speaks directly to this. Learning, for the 
Confucian, is to learn to be human. 
Accordingly, Tu asserts that one should not superficially learn how to be human in 
response to the repressive impositions of others, because that will lead to indulging in 
‘xūtuō wàizài’ ｢虛脫外在｣ (prostration inside with hypocrisy outside) and ‘sīyù héngliú’ 
｢私慾橫流｣ (cross-flowing lusts).96 Willingness for self-transformation is highlighted by 
Tu’s (ibid.:141) counsel, ‘Voluntary change of attitude is preferred; an arbitrary 
imposition of an external standard, despite its possible heuristic value for self-discipline, 
can never bring about genuine self-transformation.’97 But preparing oneself to become 
‘worthy of a relationship’ is always the precondition for the self in order for it to realize 
itself as a centre of relationships in Tu’s account (ibid.: 9, 47). Therefore, again, this 
precondition must be based on the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1), that 
human nature is perfectible through self-cultivation. It is notable that this precondition of 
                                                
96 Tu Weiming (1982 in Tu 1982b). See also Tu Weiming (1979a:20–23). 




self-worthiness of a relationship not only makes relationships with other human beings 
feasible, but also supports Tu’s New Ruist ideal reinterpreted for post-traditional Chinese 
and international audiences as a ‘trinity’ among Heaven, Earth and ‘humanity’ (ibid.:9, 
47).  
From a practical perspective, we should also ask, how does one evaluate one’s 
worthiness of a relationship? Tu responds that it is according to ‘socially recognized 
forms’ (ibid.:22). Moreover, Tu emphasizes that ‘character formation’ is primarily 
realized in self-cultivation, and is ‘defined in ethical terms’ (ibid.:52). Even if he asserts 
self-realization as ‘a precondition for harmonizing human relations’, the former is 
evaluated by actual achievement in the latter (ibid.:55). 
Since ethics are constituted by principles guiding relationships and Tu’s New Ruist 
ethics emphasize social or relational ethics, the vision of an ultimate self-transformation 
in his account is inevitably defined by social relationships. Tu (1979a:20) asserts that in 
the traditional Ruist approach of ‘li [禮] as process of humanization’, sociality is ‘a 
defining characteristic’ of the ultimate self-realization as well as ‘a desirable trait’. In 
other words, the precondition for a self to serve as a centre of relationships is to win social 
recognition. Besides ‘social approval’, Tu (1985:89) also indicates that ‘personal 
integrity’ is an even more important concern than social approval for one’s maturity, 
namely, one’s worthiness for entering relationships. However, the problem of a relational 
self being shaped by external social recognition is still there. Where does the standard for 
defining personal integrity come from? When conflicts between standards within society 
prevail, how would one determine which standard should be followed? On the one hand, 
in order to deny the reality of the problem of ‘the imposition of external values upon the 
self’, as noted critically and very early on by the ancient Daoist intellectual, Zhuangzi, Tu 
highlights ‘the mutual nourishment of inner morality and social norms’ in the Mencian 
tradition (ibid.:25, eo). On the other hand, he especially emphasizes that ‘morality or 
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spirituality is not internalized by but expressed through learning’ (ibid.:25). Accordingly, 
it appears that the outward appearance and expression of morality in the context of 
gaining social recognition is inevitably far more important than the internalized morality 
achieved by self-transformation in the light of Tu’s interpretation. 
4.3 A Sense of Community for Moral and Spiritual Self-Development 
Tu (1985:26) emphasizes that preventing repressive social imposition on others involves 
a basic respect for their personal integrity. He argues this way because no one can fully 
understand the other and so no socially imposed form of life could ever adequately nurture 
the complete range of traits involved in full self-realization. However, he never ceases in 
stressing the absolutely essential ‘sense of community’ for self-development in morality 
and spirituality, because other people are always ‘an integral part of one’s own quest’. He 
even uses a very strong term, ‘symbiosis’, to highlight the necessity of others’ 
‘participation’ in this Ruist conception of selfhood (ibid.:113). It means that this account 
of the Ruist self cannot exist without being intimately bound up with other selves. Based 
on his interpretation of the Zhongyong, Tu (1976a:52–99) presents a New Ruist model 
for human-relatedness and sociality, the ‘fiduciary community’.98 He pictures it as a 
community of reciprocal trust, one without coercive ‘pressure groups’, a vision on which 
Confucius based his ideal state (ibid.:67).99 In facing the challenge of a pluralistic post-
modern era, Tu (2007a) presents this community as a framework that offers enough 
shareable commonality for converging divergences and seeking unity in diversity 
(‘qiútóng cúnyì’ ｢求同存異｣), instead of promoting a more restrictive conformity.100 But 
                                                
98 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:39–66). It is worth noting that Tu’s fiduciary community which is ethical 
differs from John Locke’s ‘fiduciary trust’ (Locke 1988:115) which is juridical (Chan, Joseph 2013:43). 
99 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:48).  
100 See also Tu Weiming (1989 in Tu 1989b:16). 
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how can this ‘fiduciary community’ in contemporary societies be established and built 
up?  
In a passage where he discusses the ‘rhetorical situation’ of the Analects《論語》, 
he (1985:82) highlights that human beings are created ‘into existence through symbolic 
interchange’ (namely ‘sharing intentions, values, meanings’) and a ‘rational atomic’ 
human is ‘value-free’. By quoting Wayne C. Booth’s argument,101 Tu (1985:82) argues 
for ‘the malleability of human nature … [and] the perfectibility of undivided selves 
through group sharing and mutual exhortation’. Such kinds of ‘psychic’ and ‘social ethos’ 
are described and conceptualized by Tu as ‘fiduciary community’. In such a community, 
Tu argues, by the above quotation from Booth and Fingarette’s (1972:72–3) argument 
referred to in his Footnote (Tu 1985:91 n.10), that the boundary between ‘individual and 
society’ should disappear, and even the usage of first person pronouns as well as the word 
‘self’ should be ‘reconsidered’ (ibid.:82, eo).102 
In defending the proper meaning of ‘self-watchfulness when alone’, mentioned in 
C3, Tu (1976a:33–6) argues that its purpose is to attain the actuality underlying ‘common 
humanity’, not for pursuing ‘the idiosyncrasy of an atomized individual’ and the proper 
behaviour of self in public as well as in private (1989a:108).103 He insists that ‘self-
watchfulness when alone’ is not at all for ‘the intrinsic value of being alone’ but for the 
total integration of solitariness ‘into the structure of social relations’ (ibid.). Does Tu 
                                                
101 Booth (1974:134) argues that human beings are ‘in fact more like each other than different, more 
valuable in our commonality than in our idiosyncrasies: not, in fact, anything at all when considered 
separately from our relations’. He even stresses that ‘every usage of words like I, my, mine, self, must be 
reconsidered, because the borderlines between the self and the other have either disappeared or shifted 
sharply’ (ibid., eo). 
102 I consider that Tu’s arguments, including Booth assertion, must be overstated. Is an individual without 
any relationship with others nothing or non-existent? Can an individual disappear in fact into a society? Is 
this a notion of extreme collectivism? Even so, is such an anti-realistic and radical notion of selfhood more 
close to a Buddhist (see A-DS2.2.), Daoist (see A-DS2.4.), or postmodern one (see A-DS3) rather than a 
usually common Ruist one? About postmodern selfhood see also David L. Hall (1994:223–5) and Paul C. 
Vitz (2006:xii–xviii). 
103 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:26–7). 
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assume that one cannot pursue ‘self-watchfulness when alone’ when alone? Tu’s 
interpretation of ‘self-watchfulness when alone’ might not be agreed by other Ruist 
scholars such as Andrew Plaks (2003:112).104 
Accordingly, this Ruist self as a centre of relationships, viewed by Tu (1985:26) as 
‘a sharable commonality’, is open to others and so never becomes ‘an isolated and 
enclosed individual’. He asserts that personal differences beyond mere ‘sameness’ are 
assumed in such a commonality. Precisely in this case, Tu claims that the commonly 
shared concept of all roads leading to Rome in East Asian thought implies that 
exclusivism is rejected (ibid.). However, he does not deny the fact that it is only Ruism, 
among the Three Teachings in East Asia, unequivocally asserting ‘society’ is both a 
necessary and intrinsic value required for ultimate self-transformation (ibid.).105 Major 
interpretive themes among them all show how they stand against ‘the falsehood of self-
centredness’ (Ruism), egoism (Ch’an) (p. Chán), and an assertive self by means of self-
forgetfulness (Daoism) (ibid.). Tu, therefore, insists that ‘eradicat[ing] the alleged fallacy 
of individualism’ is a shared commitment found within all the Three Teachings (ibid.:27). 
Moreover, Tu feels strongly that ‘the necessity of participating in ‘a shared vision’ 
which is ‘beyond the private’ is not just because of the relatedness of human beings 
(ibid.). It is also because his New Ruist ‘collective judgment’ involves ‘the survival and 
continuation of their civilization … not [as] a given reality but a communal attainment’ 
                                                
104 Based on his studies on the Daxue 6 and the Zhongyong 1 and their contexts and related interpretations 
by scholars, Plaks (2003:112, eo) renders the Chinese term shendu (慎獨) as ‘to pay great heed to the core 
of one’s own individuality’ instead of merely ‘watch over your behaviour when you are alone’. He as well 
as other scholars consider the Chinese word du (獨) pointedly referring to ‘one’s singularity … the 
uniqueness of one’s individual self … which lies at the very centre of one’s selfhood’ but not simply one’s 
solitariness (ibid.). Tu (1989a:108f.) might not deny such a rendering of shendu but he insists on shifting 
its centre and purpose from the ‘singularity, uniqueness, and innermost core’ of the self to ‘human-
relatedness’. In Tu’s interpretation of traditional and post-traditional Ruism, a sage ‘is never self-centred … 
defines his[/her] existence in terms of human-relatedness’ (ibid.:35). 
105  Since the lived world must be always accounted for in all the Three Teachings, Tu’s (1985:26) 
differentiation among them in this sense seems to indicate that human-relatedness (rén 仁) is primary for 
ultimate self-transformation in Ruism, but only secondary in Buddhism and Daoism. 
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(Tu 1990a:173). Tu (1976a:60-70, 87-91) points out that such an attainment is by means 
of ‘moral persuasion’ and moral or ‘ethical education’, including rites and ceremonies 
which constitute New Ruist methods to advance human beings’ ‘virtue’.106 Tu explains 
that such a judgment comes from ‘a fundamental faith’ in the condition of human beings 
that can be transformed and perfected by ‘communal self-effort’ (ibid.). According to 
Tu’s interpretation, self-cultivation in New Ruism is obviously a communal business and 
so will also be judged by society. Since there is no external supreme being as a source of 
authority, it is understandable that collective judgment based on ‘a strong sense of 
shareability and commonality’ (Tu 1985:23) is the only and ultimate source of authority 
in New Ruism. For if one of the New Ruist core values is to eradicate the alleged fallacy 
of individualism, New Ruism, as Tu emphasizes, does not want to support or ‘give any 
particular individual privileged access to truth’ (ibid.), namely, there is no ‘individuality’ 
in terms of this, even for the sage.  
Tu pragmatically argues that without the communal dimension in moral cultivation, 
an individual self is incapable of attaining spiritual self-transformation (ibid.:128). While 
arguing for the indispensability of this communal dimension, he not only admits human 
beings’ ‘propensity for self-destruction’ and vulnerability to fall into immoral situations, 
but also acknowledges ‘the tremendous difficulty’ inherent in his account of New Ruist 
self-cultivation (ibid.). He even uses the term ‘salvation’ to indicate how much human 
beings require this communal dimension (ibid.). It is precisely because of these 
difficulties in individual self-cultivation that Ruists are prompted to ‘define personal 
spiritual development as a communal act’ (ibid.). In terms of solving the pragmatic 
predicament they face in self-cultivation, the logic justifying the need for a communal act 
of self-transformation is understandable. However, Tu’s denial of the possibility of 
                                                
106 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:45–9, 60f.). 
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individual self-cultivation in order to assert the necessity of relying on communal acts 
seems to negate almost all the previous assumptions at the same time, especially the first 
three self-cultivation sub-assumptions, unless he conditions them only in a communal 
context. It is notable that, as mentioned above, Tu asserts unequivocally more than once 
that the full realization of the self can be attained without any help from non-human 
others. Since one individual person alone is not able to attain one’s own goal of perfection 
for Ruist self-cultivation by means of overcoming its tremendous difficulties, must two 
or more incapable persons help each other to attain one’s individual own goal? Or must 
they aim at attaining their common goal, promoting a standard that is much lower than 
the individual’s one?  
In the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) (human nature is perfectible), the 
perfection of self-cultivation is assumed to be attained by one’s own inner strength or 
self-effort without any external help. Yet here the assumption is that the transformability 
and perfectibility of the human condition can only be processed through communal self-
effort. According to Tu’s more Buddhist and post-modern notion of ‘undivided selves’ 
(ibid.:82) in society as mentioned above, it follows that the communal self-effort actually 
equates with self-effort in the integrated concept of Tu’s assumptions because he takes 
off the boundary between ‘individual and society’ by quoting Fingarette’s words 
(ibid.:82, eo).107  Therefore, it can be inferred from this that there is no personal or 
individual self allowed in terms of this New Ruist ‘ultimate self-transformation as a 
communal act’, especially in one’s dignity. For the convenience of discussion, I have, 
therefore, modified the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) to become human 
nature is perfectible through mutually edifying communal effort. It has been noted that in 
                                                
107 This argument must assume first that the modified first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) does not 
conflict with the original one, or with all the other assumptions. 
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order to sustain this modified first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1), the relational 
assumption (A1) (‘the self as a centre of relationship’) must be its premise. 
In discussing human-relatedness, the formative powers within hierarchical societies 
in particular must not be overlooked. 
4.4 The New Ruist Relational Self in a Hierarchical Structure of Social Roles 
4.4.1 The Independence and Autonomy of the Ruist Self 
As mentioned above in C3S1.1.2 and C4S3, through emphasizing the centrality of self-
cultivation, Tu (1985:55–8) asserts the independence and autonomy of the Ruist self.108 
But how does he deal with the self’s independence and autonomy in a traditional or even 
post-traditional Ruist hierarchical society?109 Tu recognizes a hierarchical structure of 
society, a tendency of familism (a strong emphasis or overemphasis on familial or 
consanguineous relationships within society) and ‘authoritarianism’ as products of 
traditional Ruism, especially as undergirded by wulun (ibid.:12).110 Moreover, in the 
context he discusses the ‘principles of government’, he (1976a:77–9, 98–9) ascribes the 
hierarchical feudal social complex system to the highly elaborated development of dyadic 
relationships.111 He (1985:139) never denies that despotism, gerontocracy, and ‘male-
oriented society’ are the politically ideological products of Neo-Ruism in pre-modern 
                                                
108 See also Tu Weiming (1993a:16). 
109 Zhāng Dōngsūn 張東蓀 (1886-1973) (1974:57–8), a well-known Chinese philosopher, indicated that 
Chinese society based on the Ruist teaching of wulun is ‘a hierarchical system of families’ － a big family 
with multi-layered and seemingly countless numbers of small families inside. Therefore, the independence 
of individuals was never acknowledged in traditional Chinese thought, because an individual was always 
recognized to be a ‘dependent being’ born to fulfil particular duties and roles towards others. Precisely in 
this sense, individuals do not exist for themselves, but for others (ibid.). Liáng Shùmíng 梁漱溟 (1893-
1988) (1949 reprinted in 2005:81), a founder of early twentieth century New Ruism, also shared this same 
viewpoint with Zhang Dongsun. Although their claims tended to be overstated, too generalized and 
reductionist, what they understood and observed about Ruist teachings and PTRIC societies coincide with 
those other scholars’ criticisms. 
110 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:55–6, 98–9; 1985:113, 139–45; 1989a:41, 66; 2003 in Xu, Jilin et al. 
2003:138; 2003 in Tu, Weiming and Yang, Xuegong 2003:9). 
111 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:54, 66). 
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Chinese history. But in his earlier academic stages, he usually imputed all of them to be 
results of a sangang system, as a highly politicized, distorted, ‘outmoded’, and alienated 
application of (Mencian line) Ruist teachings in the Han dynasty (ibid.:139, 145).112 
However, his attitudes towards sangang are not consistent all the time. Let me now 
explore more deeply how Tu deals with problems and criticisms of one of the core ethical 
values in Ruist moral education — sangang.113  
4.4.2 Tu’s Denial of Sangang’s Orthodox Ruist Origin 
In his first two academic stages, Tu Weiming almost does not recognize sangang as a 
main value within the Ruist classics because its origin is from the Legalistic classic ‘Han 
Fei Tzu’ (p. Hánfēizi) 《韓非子》, although it is also briefly mentioned in the Xunzi.114 
Accordingly, sangang should be ‘thrown out’, but not wulun.115 For him (1998c:122–31), 
familism and ‘authoritarianism’ are absolutely not based on (Mencian line) Ruist 
teachings but arise in cultural and political contexts a long time before the modern era.116 
In his eyes, although the teachings of sangang involve ‘authoritarianism’, their ‘functional 
utility’ (ibid.:122) became a political tool using Ruist values to sustain ‘social order’ and 
stability (ibid.:122-3, 129-30).  
However, in order to correct some common misunderstandings of forms of Ruism 
that he disputes, Tu (1985:12, 138) clarified that traditional Ruism values individual 
                                                
112 See also Tu Weiming (1998c:122–4; 2003 in Tu, Weiming and Yang, Xuegong 2003:9; 2010 in Tu, 
Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:55; 2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:10). However, it is also 
notable that Tu (2010 in Hong, Gu 2010) recently identifies Ruist feudal inveteracy and dregs bound with 
autarchy and authoritarianism as the biggest obstacle to China’s modern civilization. 
113 Zhāng Ǎizhū 張靄珠 (1991:8–9) points out that sangang as well as wulun are prevalently identified as 
the most basic values of traditional Ruist relational ethics. It is also, as Chan Wingtsit (1969:277) asserts, 
recognized as a fortifier of the asymmetry inherent in the four dyadic relationships. See also June Ock Yum 
(1988:378–9). 
114 Tu Weiming (1992 in Tu et al. 1992:55–6). See also Tu Weiming (1998c:122–3). 
115 Tu Weiming (1992 in Tu et al. 1992:56). 
116 See also Tu Weiming (2003 in Xu, Jilin et al. 2003:138). 
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‘dignity, independence, and autonomy’ because it supports the aforementioned Ruist 
‘learning for the sake of the self’. He (1979a:71) highlights that the real focus is not ‘the 
corresponding society’, but ‘the perfecting self’. Furthermore, he argues that the ‘father-
son dyad’ should not be assumed ‘as a model’ for others because each dyadic relationship 
is unique and will never be ‘subsumed’ under the other. 117  Yet in some places, he 
(1985:140) also acknowledges the occurrence of an ‘obvious asymmetry’ in dyadic 
relationships, and notes the ‘hierarchic’ and ‘absolutely binding’ relationship of the 
father-son dyad.118 Still, in another place, he (1985:139) disputes the ‘asymmetry’ or 
‘one-dimensional dependency’ of the inferior on the superior in four of the dyads 
(ibid.:139).119 Tu (1985:139–42, eo) argues for ‘reciprocity (pao)’ (報 p. bào)120 (or ‘the 
principle of reciprocity’) and ‘the principle of mutuality’121 rather than dependency as the 
underlying value. Will this argument of Ruist reciprocity prevent Ruist social structure 
from being hierarchical? I will discuss and evaluate it in C5S7. 
4.4.3 Tu’s Positive Attitude towards Sangang 
In his second academic stage, Tu (1985:147–8 n.30) adopted a translation of this value as 
‘the minister [is bound] with the ruler, the son with the father and the wife with the 
husband’. He attributed the thought of one-dimensional dependency to ‘a highly 
politicized interpretation of the whole matter’ (ibid.). Tu even emphasized the equality of 
the genders in traditional Ruist moral ethics and attributes it to Chinese ‘functional’ non-
anthropomorphic cosmology (ibid.:144). For ‘Chinese cosmology’ results naturally in no 
                                                
117 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:48–9; 1989a:35). 
118 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:55–6; 1989a:41). 
119 Lin Honghsin (2008a:79) highlights asymmetry in four of the dyads as a feature of persons living within 
any traditional Ru-based cultural heritage. 
120 About the concept of bao, Tu refers to Yang Liensheng’s (1957, eo) ‘The Concept of Pao as a Basis for 
Social Relations in China’. 
121 Tu Weiming (1998c:124–7). 
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‘theological justification for the creation of an exclusively male spiritual leadership’ in 
traditional Ruism.122 However, Tu later explains sangang as ‘three types of domination’ 
(Tu 1992 in Tu et al. 1992:55).  
In the first ten years of his third academic stage, based on the argument for ‘the 
[Ruist] principle of reciprocity’ as mentioned in the previous section, he (1998c:128–33) 
later goes so far as to justify Ruist hierarchical society as a necessary social stabilizer. 
(ibid.:128-9) He asserts: 
Undoubtedly, in the Confucian order of things, virtue takes precedence over rank and age. 
However, as pragmatists and realists, the Confucians arc acutely aware of the necessity of 
hierarchy in establishing stability and harmony in society …Suffice it to say that the 
Confucians are aware of the ambiguity and paradox involved in assigning great value to 
generation and age in harmonizing interpersonally relationships at home. 
Tu (1998c:129–33) also argues for and justifies unequivocally traditional and post-
traditional Ruist hierarchical society in an article written in English as a ‘particular pattern 
of authority’ informed by the complex interaction between sangang’s authoritarianism 
and wulun’s reciprocal ‘benevolence’ (rén 仁). As the family is the most vital ‘political 
unit’ in traditional Ruist thought, the particular pattern of authoritarianism in hierarchy, 
age, and gender informed by sangang is significantly important in traditional and post-
traditional Ruist family ethics (ibid.:130f.). However, Tu argues that wulun should not be 
misinterpreted as the social consequence of sangang but rather serves ‘as an ideological 
background’ for it (ibid.:130, 133). However, in reality, Mencian ideals for wulun that 
keep equality within the particular pattern of authority have been rarely realized 
                                                
122  The renowned Chinese scholar in Chinese philosophy and religion, Chan Wingtsit (1901-1994) 
(1969:277–8), whose book A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (1969) is one of Tu’s important 
references, emphasizes that sangang means not only ‘a relationship’, but also ‘a standard’. Even if the basic 
meaning of wulun is about ‘mutual moral obligation’, the ruler in traditional Ruist ethics has been the 
standard of the minister, the father the standard of the son, and the husband the standard of the wife since 
the Han dynasty. This superiority of the ruler to the minister, and so forth, had been according to Chan 
Wingtsit ‘inherent’ in the traditional Ruist system (Chan, Wingtsit 1969:277). He also argues this kind of 
‘double standard’ for superior and inferior is ‘natural’ because ‘yang [(陽 p. yang)] is superior to yin [(陰 




throughout history (ibid.:133). It is notable that Tu (1998c:134–5) 123 only addressed this 
alternative argument, for the particular pattern of authoritarianism informed by sangang, 
during a period when positive roles of PTRIC society were linked to ‘the economic 
development and social stability’ in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons (Taiwan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea).124  
Nevertheless, fifteen years earlier he (1983:514), and other scholars such as 
Ambrose Y. C. King (1983:55)125 were not certain whether or not post-traditional Ruism 
had made any direct contribution to economic development. 126 In the meantime, Tu 
(1998c:130) emphasized the traditional Ruist tendency of adjusting to the world.127 This 
                                                
123 See also Tu Weiming (1993a:8, 18; 1993c:141–60; 1997b:327–72). 
124 Herman Kahn (1979:118, 122) is the first one who tried to attribute the industrialization and economic 
miracle in East Asia to Ruism, overthrowing Max Weber’s theory (1930; 1951) that Christian ethics avails 
to capitalism unlike Ruist ethics. Since then, a debate about this issue started (Jochim 1992:137–8). Weber’s 
theory is followed by other scholars, for example, Talcott Parsons (a sociologist), John K. Fairbank (a well-
known China expert) (Zurndorfer 2004:1), and Yu Yingshi (a Chinese historian) (1986; 1987b; 1987a). 
Kahn’s proposition is supported by Xia, Guang’s (1997) PhD thesis, the empirical study of Yang Kuoshu 
and Cheng Poshyun 鄭伯壎 (p. Zhèng Bóxūn) (1988), and other scholars, for example, Fan Ruiping 
(2010:xix) in China’s case, Michio Morishima (1984:86–7) in Japan’s case, Jones and Il Sakong (1980:48, 
256–7, 291–303) and Park Sangchul (2016) in Korea’s case, and Hicks and Redding (1982:214), Redding 
(1993:238–40), and (Crawford 2000) in overseas Chinese’s cases. See also Ambrose Y. C. King and Peter 
J. L. Man (1979), Berger (1988:7–8), Tu Weiming (1988), Julia Ching (1993 in Ching, Julia and Küng 
1993:82–6), Ambrose Y. C. King (1996), and Liu Shuhsien (1998a). However, through empirical studies 
in Taiwan over ten years, Hwang Kwangkuo (1991:189) concludes that there is not enough evidence to 
disprove Weber’s theory or prove Kahn’s opposite one. Some other scholars also do not see any evidence 
that Ruist ethics contribute directly to the successful economic development in East Asia (Lǐ Shùqīng 李樹
青 1985:176; Wan, Hsienfa 萬先法 p. Wàn Xiānfǎ 1986:36; Lǐ Guódǐng 李國鼎 n.d., cited in Wan, Hsienfa 
1986:34; Xiāo, Xīnyì 蕭欣義 1989; Sūn, Zhōngxìng 孫中興 1989; Yáng, Jūnshí 楊君實 1989; Dǒng, 
Xiǎochuān 董小川 1999:295; Yè, Rénchāng 葉仁昌 2003) let alone overthrow Max Weber’s theory by the 
economic success of the Asian four-dragons (Sun, Zhongxing 1989; Yang, Junshi 1989). In Geert Hofstede 
and Michael Harris Bond’s (1988:16) analysis of two studies, one study shows positive evidence, the other 
no evidence. These related debates was rekindled after the outbreak of economic crises in Asia and the 
Ruist positive role in contributing East Asian economic success is questioned again (Li, Minghui 
2001b:125). Harriet T. Zurndorfer (2004) argues that both views of two opposite sides tend to be 
reductionist.  
125 See also Ambrose Y. C. King (1992:152–69). 
126 The first Prime Minister, Lee Kuanyew, in Singapore, attributes the success of the East Asian economy 
to Ruist collectivism and authoritarianism as Asian values (Li, Minghui 2001b). Ambrose Y. C. King and 
Peter J. L. Man (1979:54), Roderick MacFarquhar (1980:71), and S. Gordon Redding (1993:239) also 
attribute it to Ruist ‘paternalism’ and other features of hierarchical and collectivistic society. But other New 
Ruists fight against such an interpretation of Ruism and attribute its success to the seed of democracy in 
Ruism and Ruist capitalism (Li, Minghui 2001b). 
127 This is exactly one of the traits of Ruism that Max Weber (1951:235) points out for his evidence on 
Ruism as a factor hindering China’s modernization.  
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meant that instead of transforming societies, traditional Ruism consented to and endorsed 
the differentiation of human society by means of ‘hierarchy [or status authority], age, and 
gender [(sangang)] as an irreducible reality’.128 He argued this was to distinguish the 
‘secularity’ of Ruist ethics from those found in Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, and 
Christianity (ibid.). It is notable that in an article published ten years earlier, Tu (1988:45) 
argued to the contrary that ‘transforming society from within’ by values of traditional 
Ruism was strongly preferred to adjusting to it, so that a sense of social ‘mutuality and 
harmony’ was strong in traditional Chinese societies (ibid.:45).129 In another dialogue 
with a Chinese scholar twenty years later, he once again presents this same claim.130 
4.4.4 Tu’s Negative Attitude towards Sangang (and Sometimes Wulun) 
Surprisingly, just one year before that article in English, Tu, in 1997 within a dialogue 
with Chinese scholars, admitted that ‘lǐjiào’ ｢禮教｣ (education by li, Ruist code of ethics 
or Ruist ethical morals)131 brought about by sangang and wulun as one of the ‘zuìè’ 「罪
                                                
128 See also Tu Weiming (1992 in Tu et al. 1992:55). Herman Kahn (1979:121–2) attributes the harmony 
of human-relationships in Ru-influenced society partly to ‘a sense of hierarchy’ and asserts that such a 
society with ‘enough hierarchy, discipline, control, or motivation’ works out better than the society that 
restrains ‘excessive tendencies to egalitarianism, anarchy, [and] self-indulgence’ which leads to 
‘disunity, … confrontation, and … excessive compensation or repression’.  
129 See also Tu Weiming (1990a:176–7; 1994a:181–2). 
130 Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:15). 
131 It is worth noting that the function of such an education by li is morally-cultivating Chinese people to 
conform to Ruist code of ethics, which as listed in the Ruist classics the Lǐjì《禮記》and the Zhōulǐ《周
禮》includes comprehensive details related to every aspect of daily lives, mainly by moral persuasion or 
ethical education (Chang, Wenchang 張文昌 {p. Zhāng Wénchāng} 2008:22). See also Fan Ruiping 
(2010:165–88) and Gù Tāo 顧濤 (2014:120f.). According to Fan Ruiping’s (2010:171) explanation, two 
types of Ruist code of ethics are divided in the Liji (the ‘Records of li): ‘yílǐ (儀禮), ceremonial rituals, and 
qūlǐ (曲禮), minute rituals’. This minute rituals (quli) refer to the ‘partially-exhibited ceremonial rituals … 
employed in a small degree in ordinary human interactions and behaviours’ (ibid.). One of the criticisms of 
the Ruist li by modern Chinese intellectuals such as Hu Shih 胡適 (p. Hú Shì) is not about the total 
inappropriateness of its contents but about the externally-imposing way of its education that results in 
hypocrisy and repression due to disregard to one’s liberty of conscience (Zhōu, Chānglóng 周昌龍
1999:111) . However, the purpose and way of li is not for expressing direct feeling, according to Lǐjì《禮
記》, 2B:43 and 8:22 (ibid.). 
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惡」 (evils) in traditional and post-traditional Ruist culture.132 This tends to weaken the 
importance of Ruist moral education he promotes because as mentioned above, in Tu’s 
eyes moral persuasion or ethical education is the New Ruist method to establish the ideal 
fiduciary community. Since traditional Ruist ethics is constructed around moral virtues 
and relational ethics, what exactly makes this dimension of traditional and post-traditional 
lijiao evil? Could it become evil partly or mainly because it is imposed on individuals 
repressively by the superiors in the asymmetrical dyadic relationships? Is it involved also 
in justifying and imposing those asymmetrical dyadic relationships on traditional and 
post-traditional Chinese society?133 Do the evils of a traditional Ruist code of ethics that 
Tu identifies reveal remnants of a traditional ideology passed down and still existing in 
PTRIC societies? Tu did not explore this possibility and does not provide the conceptual 
framework to decipher the differences these Ruist forms of life would give. 
Around the turn of the twenty-first century, educated Chinese people became Tu’s 
main audience. In facing the challenges inherent in contemporary concerns about gender 
equality, scientific complexities and democratic trends in valuing the dignity of human 
persons, he admitted that the aforementioned problems criticized by modern Chinese 
scholars to be the ‘dark side’ of traditional Ruism, starting from criticism raised in the 
May Fourth New Cultural Movement.134 Poignantly, at this time, he (1998c:123) actively 
                                                
132 Tu Weiming (1997 in Lín, Sīqí 林思齊 et al. 1997:14). 
133 Significantly, Zhao Zhiyu (1991:271–3) argues that maintaining the traditional hierarchical dyadic 
interpersonal relationships, the stability of kingship, and the feudal system became the ultimate ideal of the 
rules of propriety and yì (義, rightness). This occurred especially after traditional Ruist concepts and 
practices based on the rules of propriety and its related concept of rightness shaped the spirit of the law in 
imperial China. See also Zhāng Jìnfān 張晉藩 (1930-) (1984:252–6) and Lú Jiànróng 盧建榮 (1991:165–
73). Zhang Jinfan (1984:252–6), a Chinese juridical scholar, even pointed out that traditional Ruism 
because a deceptive ideological tool in the traditional system of imperial law and punishment after the Han 
Dynasty. Under a mask of morality and holiness, imperial age Ruism was even more powerful than the law 
itself for justifying the brutality of its systems of laws and punishments, thereby suppressing the people. 
See also la Barre (1946b:382). Although the criticisms by Zhao Zhiyu and Zhang Jinfan tend to be over-
generalized, they seem to pinpoint the same thing as Tu. 
134 Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:10). 
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pinpointed the ‘coercive nature’ of sangang. Tu (2006:227–8) publicly began to assert 
that the anachronous sangang must be discarded, ‘chèdǐ xiāochú’ ｢ 徹 底 消 除 ｣ 
(completely eliminated), and transformed.135 He justified these major changes because 
sangang could never answer modern needs in PTRIC societies, especially with the 
development of ‘réngé zūnyán’ ｢人格尊嚴｣ (dignity of human personality) as a key 
element in Post-Mao and post-secular educational contexts.136 He also admitted at this 
time that PTRIC Ruist society has tremendous difficulties in dealing with the related 
issues of gender equality (ibid.:61-2). According to his latest views in 2010, Tu 
unequivocally urges a return to the true spirit of wulun by means of either discarding 
sangang completely or reconceiving it according to a mutually respectful style of 
wulun.137  If in fact sangang is so alienated from wulun, how can it be restored or 
reconceived on the basis of wulun? Once again, Tu offers no further details. Furthermore, 
even if sangang is discarded, can he deny that a double standard still resides within the 
dyadic relations in wulun based on the superiority of yang to yin as promoted in the Yì 
Jīng 《易經》(Book of Changes)?138 For the Yì Jīng is not only one of the most important 
of the nine Ruist classics,139 but also ‘the source of the Five Classics’ (Chan, Wingtsit 
1969:477).  
Therefore, it seems that Tu (1985:139–40) may in fact have tried to correct the 
imbalance within those relationships by strengthening the reciprocity of all the other four 
dyadic relationships based on the friend-friend dyad as the model of his ideal ‘fiduciary 
community’. Intending to defend New Ruism from any criticism based on the imbalanced 
                                                
135 See also Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:55–6). 
136 Tu Weiming (2003 in Tu, Weiming and Yang, Xuegong 2003:9). See also Tu Weiming (2001 in Ding, 
Guo 2001:66). 
137 Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:55–6). 
138 See F131 above. 
139 Namely Sìshū Wǔjīng 四書五經 (The Four Books and Five Classics). 
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relationships within the first four of wulun, Tu, in an interview, relies on such a criticism  
originally raised by Kāng Yǒuwéi 康有為140 (1858-1927).141 Accordingly, it is surprising 
to find that Tu simply attributes this notorious imbalance to a mere ‘assumption’ on which 
critics rely, when the very same phenomenon of relational imbalance in Ruism had been 
disclosed and criticized by many scholars (ibid.:13). The phenomenon they challenged 
was that the post-traditional Ruist self is still ‘inevitably submerged in the group’ (ibid.) 
in order to fulfil its ‘multivalent’ 142 roles within those imbalanced hierarchically loaded 
dyadic relationships.143 Did Tu at this time indicate that all of the studies disclosing such 
problems, relying on their wrong assumption, mistakenly impute them either to traditional 
or post-traditional Ruism? Or did he recognize the need to modify the teachings of 
human-relatedness in traditional Ruism in order to present his corrected interpretations of 
a post-traditional Ruism which is more thorough and honest? Or did he simply present 
his new vision, without any further critical awareness, offering his own New Ruist 
account of an ideal Ruist selfhood without explicitly pointing out the problem in 
traditional Ruism?  
Tu (2002b:641–2) tried to present and justify the concept of (fiduciary) community 
(‘shèqún’ 「社群」) as a New Ruist synthesis to escape the different problems caused 
by both individualism and collectivism as mentioned in C3S1.1.3;144 but he did so without 
qualifying his ideas as post-traditional, and so leaving the impression that he was 
somehow representing all forms of Ruism. His basic ‘thesis’ (1985:27) was summarized 
in a single phrase: ‘equality without uniformity’. Tu (1976a:53–4) focused on the key to 
                                                
140 Kang Youwei was a famous Ruist reformer in the Qing Dynasty who devoted himself to reform Ruism 
to adapt to the modernization of China. 
141 Tu Weiming (2004 in Kuǎi, Lèhào 蒯樂昊 2012:181). 
142 Hall and Ames (1998:25). 
143 See also Power (2007:151). 
144 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:20–23; 1985:10, 78; 1990a:179–80). 
153 
the problem of repressive social imposition or ‘coercion’. 145  However, where does 
equality in post-traditional Ruism come from? According to Tu’s understanding 
(1985:77), it ultimately comes from a person’s ‘inner worth’, namely ‘the inherent ability 
to attain moral excellence’. In other words, one’s ‘inner worth’ is tied to one’s functional 
ability. Does this inner worth affirm simultaneously the perfectibility (A2.1) and the 
‘intrinsic goodness’ (A2.2) of human nature? Does every person have the same inherent 
ability? Tu might say yes but he does not explain his claim any further. Whatever he 
meant at that time, both assumptions are not an experienced reality as we learned 
previously from his work. Therefore, how can the ‘inner worth’ of persons be prevented 
from collapsing due to humanity’s inability to realize it in reality? How then can equality 
within these key dyadic relationships be sustained in post-traditional Ruist relational 
selfhood? Before I move on to the evaluation chapter, I need to address an issue of the 
possibility of a transformative cultural design within New Ruist settings. 
4.5 The Privatized Self Is Devalued for the Sake of the Great Self 
4.5.1 Post-Traditional Chinese Ru-based Familistic Collectivism 
Tu Weiming (1990a:175–6) emphasizes that the ‘closed private ego’ should be self-
transformed into the ‘open communicating self’, ‘an encompassing self’. He (1976a:48) 
also reacts against any repressive imposition of social values or ‘coercive rules’ employed 
to restrain and distort the self.146 However, can we find such a transformative cultural 
design of New Ruist relational self in Tu’s interpretation? Although Tu does not directly 
use these terms, he unfortunately manifests a tendency to promote a RFS as found in 
                                                
145 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:28; 1979a:20–23; 1989a:21, 40, 114–16, 134, 145). 
146 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:35). 
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coercive cultural designs supported by traditional imperial Ruism as expressed in the 
Dàxué 《大學》(The Highest Order of Cultivation).147 He (1985:57) states:  
It is not at all surprising then that, despite the centrality of self-cultivation in Confucian 
learning, autobiographic literature exhibiting secret thoughts, private feelings, and innermost 
desires and drives is extremely rare in the Confucian tradition. Obviously, the cultivated self 
is not private property that we carefully guard against intrusion from outside. The ego that 
has to be protected against submersion in the waves of social demand is what the Confucians 
refer to as ssu [(私 p. sī)] (the privatized self, the small self, the self that is a closed system). 
The true self, on the contrary, is public-spirited, and the great self is the self that is an open 
system. As an open system, the self in the genuine sense of the word is expansive and always 
receptive to the world at large. Self-cultivation can very well be understood as the broadening 
of the self to embody an ever-expanding circle of human relatedness. 
Not only does Tu emphasize social harmony as a precondition for individual dignity,148 
but here he (2002c:32) also goes further later to suggest that our private feelings, secret 
thoughts, and ‘innermost desires’ should not be considered to be acceptable aspects of 
our private selves but that each of us should become ‘receptive to the world at large’ and 
so be able to broaden ourselves to become sharable public-spirted agencies with others. 
He (1990a:177) also directly stresses giving up one’s self as the goal to become a 
‘noble[hu]man’ by quoting Fingarette’s argument. 149  For both Tu Weiming and 
Fingarette, ‘self’ seems to be equivalent to ‘ego’. As pointed out in F79, in Tu’s 
(1976a:48) interpretation of traditional and post-traditional Ruism, a sage should ‘define[s 
his/her] existence in terms of human-relatedness’. 150  Otherwise, s/he is unqualified 
because of self-centredness.151 
                                                
147 Dàxué 大學 can be literally translated as the great learning. But in considering the theme of this classic, 
‘the highest order of cultivation’ is a more pertinent translation (Plaks 2003). 
148 Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:9). 
149 Fingarette (1972:79) concludes that ‘the noble [hu]man is the [hu]man who most perfectly having given 
up self, ego, obstinacy, and personal pride follows not profit but the Way. Such a [hu]man has come to 
fruition as a person; he is the consummate [Hu]man’. 
150 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:35). 
151 Such a conception accords exactly with what the Chinese psychologist Yu Dehui’s (1987b:5, eo) 
criticizes as a post-traditional Ru-based collectivist selfhood: ‘zìsī’ ｢自私｣ (selfishness) is a taboo in such 
a post-traditional Ru-based collectivism, so that selfishness and ‘zìwǒ’ ｢自我｣ (self) become synonyms for 
an unacceptable character in its collectivist psychological account. This indeed resonates deeply with 
observations made by another contemporary Chinese psychologist, Yáng Zhōngfāng 楊中芳, as discussed 
in A-E. She asserts that there is no a meaningful distinction between self (‘zìwǒ’「自我」) and ego 
(‘yīwǒ’「一我」) in the psychological studies of Chinese selfhood as there is in the psychological studies 
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It is notable, as seen above in Tu’s quotation, that the ‘great self’ always has priority 
over the ‘small self’ in imperial traditional Ruist accounts, so that the primary social 
groups or relationships always have greater value than the secondary groups. In this 
imperial traditional setting it seems that the private dimensions of any self are declared to 
be expressions of an immoral selfishness or egocentrism.152 In PTRIC contexts, it is still 
normally the case that the primary group where the ‘great self’ is manifest is identified 
with the family in the framework of Ru-based familistic collectivism as explained in A-
C. In this modern Chinese cultural setting, another distortion occurs that Tu’s account 
does not anticipate: even the society and the nation are demoted to the level of a secondary 
group. I find that this subtle and dynamic relationships between the great self and the 
small self in their connection to what are considered to be the primary and secondary 
groups coincides with what Tu (2006:215f.) calls ‘chàděng de ài’ 「差等的愛」 (the 
private-to-public priority of loves) 153  in the teachings of traditional and New Ruist 
relational ethics. This is a typical feature of Ru-based familistic collectivism. 
4.5.2 Post-Traditional Chinese ‘Shame-Based Culture’ 
It is worthwhile here to discuss briefly some dynamics in post-traditional Chinese ‘shame-
based culture’ recognized by most culture-related scholars and researchers, including Tu 
Weiming (1988:45).154 Shame-based culture is mainly established by traditional Ruist 
                                                
of Western selfhood since the self and ego in the Chinese language is usually devalued to be self-serving, 
self-caring, and selfish (Yang, Zhongfang 1991a:18, eo). Therefore, showing off one’s self is discouraged 
in the behavioural code of PTRIC societies (ibid.:66). In a much earlier study, Singh and Sophia Chang 
Huang (1962:128) concluded in their empirical research that ‘self-centredness is socially disapproved in 
the Chinese culture’. This conclusion resonates Tu’s (1985:137) assertion, as mentioned above in S4, that 
transforming one’s self-centredness requires a ceaseless struggle to remove ‘selfish and egoistic desires’. 
152 Ambrose Y. C. King and Bond (1985:40). See also Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:512) and Fei Xiaotong 
(1992:67). 
153 This rendering is according to Tu’s definition of ‘chàděng de ài’ which is commonly translated as 
differentiated loves. 
154 See also David Yaufai Ho (1981:81, 88–92), Melvin Wong (2001:42), Helen Lee (2006:65-6), and Delia 
Q. Lin (2012). 
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teachings based on the Ruist classic Liji.155 Tu and some other New Ruists revised this 
phrase by referring instead to the ‘shame and guilt complex’ 156  (Tu 1988:45). 157 
Therefore, a ‘shame and guilt complex’ is another Ruist cultural design in Tu’s account. 
Leaving aside the differences between shame and guilt and their nuanced relationships in 
different cultural contexts (see F156) due to the limitation of space, the more pertinent 
issue relevant to the research problem is whether there is any correlation between 
repressive social impositions and the shame-and-guilt complex. In explaining the 
contribution of post-traditional Ruist ethics and values, especially in Ruist familism as 
found in East Asian industrialization and modernization, Tu (1988:45) states that ‘the 
psychology of guilt and shame is often mightier than brute force’. It is mainly by means 
of such a psychology that ‘ideological pressure’158 formed by ‘social consensus’ can often 
deter ‘deviant behaviour’ (ibid.).159 These functions of ideological pressure and social 
                                                
155 Melvin Wong (2001:38–42). See also Ambrose Y. C. King (1986:56–74), Zhū Cénlóu 朱岑樓 (1988), 
and Cho Hyunyi (2000:307–12). 
156 According to scholarly research, shame is basically associated with judgments made by others against 
oneself that are felt externally, while guilt deals with responses to (objective) standards taken on as one’s 
own values internally. Wong Ying and Jeanne Tsai (2007:210f.). See also Fingarette (1972:20–30), Li Jin 
et al. (2004:793), and Tennent (2007:94). The definitions of shame and guilt and their related details have 
been discussed, studied, and debated for years, including a number of nuanced meanings and accounts of 
the mutual interactions of shame and guilt, especially in different cultural contexts. See more details in 
works by Ausubel (1955), Eberhard (1967), Ambrose Y. C. King (1986), Cho Hyunyi (2000), Bedford and 
Hwang Kwangkuo (2003), Hong Guiyoung (2004), Li Jin et al. (2004), and Wong Ying and Jeanne Tsai 
(2007:210f.). Therefore, I do not think New Ruist expressions of guilt mean exactly the same as 
Christianity-based guilt culture, because New Ruist standards ultimately come from traditional Chinese 
society, whereas the Christian standards comes from biblical teachings associated with the revelation from 
the Creator God. Moreover, as discussed above (especially in S4.2), preparing oneself to become ‘worthy 
of a relationship’ is always the precondition for the self as a centre of relationships, especially mainly driven 
by a ‘coercive and narcissistic’ shame (Lin, Delia Q. 2012:170–76). As a result, traditional forms of Ruist 
culture is definitely experienced more as a shame-based rather than as a guilt-based culture (Wong, Ying 
& Tsai, Jeanne 2007:213). See also Cho Hyunyi (2000:307–9) and Bedford and Hwang Kwangkuo 
(2003:141). Arthur Wright (1962:8f.), an American sinologist, summarizes thirteen ‘approved attitudes and 
behaviour patterns’ taught in the Analects. On examining them carefully, it is not difficult to find that all of 
these taught behavioural norms are driven by shame-based motivations. All the figures discussed in his 
book illustrated facets of shame-based motivated personalities. 
157 See also la Barre (1946b:381) and Melvin Wong (2001:42). 
158 Such a recognition of the power of social ideological pressure is also confirmed by another New Ruist, 
Cheng Chungying (1986:341). About the mechanism of social control by way of shame functioning better 
than the impersonal and ‘[F]ormal law’ and rules in Ruist ‘traditional Chinese society’, see Cho Hyunyi’s 
(2000:307) discussion and references. 
159 See also Yang Zhongfang (1991b:115f.) and Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 
2009:12). 
157 
consensus arise through a thick guanxi (‘connections and networks’) ‘informed by 
familial, communal, and national sentiments’ (ibid.). This ‘mechanism of control’ or the 
‘patterns of symbolic control’ are also based on the assumption that one has the ‘ability 
to transform one’s primordial ties into vehicles of self-expression and self-realization’ 
(ibid.:38, 45). 
To summarize, we are left here with an unresolved set of contrary claims in Tu’s 
early works, portraying his account of New Ruist selfhood as both autonomous and yet 
one that cannot refuse social expectations and demands. I now move on to evaluate in the 
next chapter Tu Weiming’s interpretation of New Ruist selfhood and how well he 








Evaluations of Tu Weiming’s Views on Selfhood and Their Implication 
for the Repressed Form of Self 
1. Introduction 
After examining Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood in terms of the 
tendency of a RFS, I will evaluate the validity of Tu’s account in responding directly and 
indirectly to modern scholars’ criticism of Ruism as the main cause of repressed form of 
selves in PTRIC societies. In terms of this research problem, is Tu’s account of New Ruist 
relational selfhood significantly different from PTRIC relational selfhood? To what 
extent is Tu’s account of New Ruist relational selfhood a suitable alternative or 
modification for solving this problem within the cultural and theoretical context of PTRIC 
relational selfhood? 
As discussed in C4, Tu (1985:78; 1990a:179–80) recognizes the different problems 
caused by individualism and collectivism and so has tried to present New Ruist selfhood 
as a dialectic synthesis of individualism and collectivism through his complicated 
interpretations and arguments. Undoubtedly, he pictures an ideal blueprint for a healthy 
transformation project of selves and communities. Can his account successfully relieve 
modern scholars’ worries about the tendency of the RFS? His (ibid.:27) main basic 
‘thesis’ is that properly aligned selves in PTRIC contexts should embody ‘equality 
without uniformity’. Tu focuses on this as the key to solving the problems of repressive 




2. The Differentiation of Tu’s Responses to Criticisms: the Resistant Tu and the 
Responsive Tu 
As displayed in the previous chapter, Tu’s defensive arguments are not always consistent, 
especially in relation to problems associated with sangang (and sometimes wulun). In 
some contexts, he shows his extreme opposition against sangang. For example, he  
recognizes ‘lǐjiào’ ｢禮教｣ brought about by sangang and wulun as one of the ‘zuìè’ 「罪
惡」 (evils) in traditional and post-traditional Ruist culture.1 Tu (2006:227–8) publicly 
began to assert that the anachronous sangang must be discarded, ‘chèdǐ xiāochú’｢徹底消
除｣ (completely eliminated), and transformed. He justified these major changes because 
sangang could never answer modern needs in PTRIC societies. These are his soft, more 
responsive and flexible responses to overcoming the repressed form of self in PTRIC 
societies, as disclosed in C4S4.4.4. His responses admit that problems exist and so 
support to some extent modern scholars’ concerns. 
But still in some other contexts, his responses are either denying the existence of 
the problem in orthodox Ruist relational selfhood, as shown in C4S4.4.2, or justifying 
them as positive aspect of traditional Ruism, as disclosed in C4S4.4.3. These are his hard, 
strict, resistant, and less flexible responses to overcoming the problem in PTRIC societies.  
In his ‘Probing the Three Bonds and Five Relationships in Confucian Humanism’ 
(1998c, eo), an important work on this issue, Tu’s attitude toward sangang and 
hierarchical society is significantly much more positive than his extremely negative 
attitude shown in other works although Tu never supports the politicized application of 
extreme authoritarianism in Three Bonds (i.e. sangang). Especially, he affirms ‘the need 
to reassess the Confucian role in East Asian modernity’ after mentioning the iconoclastic 
attacks on Ruist familism after the May Fourth and stresses the change of the rhetorical 
                                                
1 Tu Weiming (1997 in Lín, Sīqí 林思齊 et al. 1997:14). 
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situation as the rise of the Four Dragons (ibid.:133-4). Suffice it to say that in this article 
Tu (ibid. 127-8) affirms the necessity of social hierarchy for the social stability and 
harmony and supports ‘a particular pattern of authority’ informed by sangang (ibid.:129-
33). According to his understanding of this article, Pfister (2018, eo) concludes that ‘Tu 
continues to deny-and-affirm at key points within the text, and so this sets up the 
[problematic] … ambiguity that he creates by seeking a middle way between two 
alternatives, even though they may not be always strictly opposites’, especially in pp. 
130, 133, 134-5 (Tu 1998c). Such a denying-and-affirming attitude makes the analysis of 
Tu’s arguments more difficult. For example: 
In order to affirm ‘a particular pattern of [hierarchical] authority’ informed by 
sangang, Tu asserts that ‘Confucians accept the concrete living human being 
differentiated by hierarchy, age and gender as an irreducible reality’ (ibid.:130). Why 
does he refer to only ‘the concrete living human being’ in the singular, as if it is a 
collective term, when it can never be actually such a simple depiction?  There are human 
beings concretely, in intergenerational contexts that are highly patriarchal in orientation, 
and so an unqualified affirmation of ‘hierarchy’ here leaves one with many puzzles.2 I 
would have many more questions to ask about these matters here, as they are expressed 
by Tu, but I leave that ‘irreducible reality’ problem at least as an indication of the non-
stated, semi-supportive, and non-critical affirmation of situations that could easily tend 
toward authoritarian structures in societies that support such an ‘irreducible reality’. 
                                                
2 Does he mean by this that only power-senior-males have authority? Or can there also be unempowered-
senior-females with suitable authority? Or would it only allow for power-not/so/senior-males to have 
authority, but very seldom for any female, even though senior, to have that authority? These ambiguities 
open a door for suggesting that his post-traditional Ruist-influenced version of wulun still cannot really 
handle the concrete living conditions of many post-traditional Chinese, Korean, Japanese and other Ruist-
informed contexts in East Asian settings that tend toward a patriarchal authoritarianism. 
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This is most strongly underscored in his admissions related to Max Weber’s 
analysis of Ruism within his The Sociology of Religion. Tu (ibid., eo) admits on the same 
page: 
[t]hough this does not mean that the Confucians uncritically accept the existing power 
relatiohnsihps, [nevertheless, they are] prone to adjustment to rather than transformation of 
the world … Confucian ethics is more likely than, for example, Protestant ethics to be 
politicized. 
What does ‘politicized’ point to?  Not to becoming involved in lobbying tactics, but on 
the contrary, to submit to the current ruling authority, or even authoritarianism, without 
a critical awareness or the political courage to challenge that authority. It is precisely here, 
then, that his middle way discourse appears to breakdown into an inarticulate submission 
even to questionable forms of governance and so would tend to adapt to authoritarianism, 
because that is the concrete living reality for many East Asian peoples even within post-
traditional Ruist-inspired/-informed/-influenced societies.   
Based on the long history of the prevalence of sangang, I find that Tu seems to be 
more concerned pragmatically with the social consequences of sangang, instead of the 
core teachings of sangang.3 This provides further `evidence that the post-traditional Ruist 
self is more pragmatic than principled, as predicted in C3 (Greenwald 1982:128).4 
Ultimately, we need to ask Tu what specific kind of Ruism actually transforms the world, 
because it would be questionable to argue that it does so precisely by conforming to what 
it adjusts to.  
                                                
3 As mentioned in C3S2.2, Tu Weiming (1998c:128) himself stresses that Ruists are ‘pragmatists and 
realists’. Some contemporary scholars, such as Kennedy et al. (2016), also support similar situation-
determinist justification for the hierarchical authoritarian social structure in post-traditional Ruist 
‘communitarian perspective’ as long as ‘low-ranking individuals’ dignity’ can be protected through 
ensuring ‘their good life or well-being’. It is worth noting that the New Ruists in Mainland China have been 
obviously parting ways with the ones in Taiwan and Hong Kong since 2014 (Gé, Zhàoguāng 葛兆光
2017:241–2). They are now engaged in the promotion of Ruifying China and establishing a contemporary 
Ruist political status by endorsing the legitimacy of the current Chinese Communists regime by means of 
values in their own post-traditional Ruist writings. 
4 See also Ames (2006:87–93). 
163 
Tu (1998c:133) presents a position opposing sangang but admits that in spite of 
them being ‘at most a mixed blessing, if not outright negative’, his version of an 
alternative wulun drawn from the Mengzi ‘have been realized only on rare occasions 
throughout Chinese history’. In addition, on the same page, he admits that ‘the 
authoritarianism of the Three Bonds’ have been topics of disdain in novels written by 
Chinese authors such as Bā Jīn (巴金) and Lǔ Xùn (魯迅). So, in the end, is the responsive 
Tu’s idealized situation so far from the concrete living context of post-traditional Ruist-
influenced Chinese families that it is useless in the face of critical rejection of the 
authoritarianism that others recognize is so prevalent?  
While believing a positive side to Ruist ‘psychocultural dynamics’ or family 
dyanmics is manifest in the Four Dragons, Tu concludes that ‘the role of the Confucian 
family in making a positive contribution to the economic development and social stability 
of these dynamic areas in the Pacific Rim has gradually been recognized’ (ibid.:134-5). 
He (ibid.:135) not only acknowledges ‘the perennial issues engendered by the 
authoritarianism of the Three Bonds and the benevolence of the Five Relationships are 
still readily visible in East Asia’ but also admits: 
Both the corporate spirit of industrial East Asia and the feudal ghost of communist East Asia 
is infused with a strong dose of Confucian familism. The East Asian strength in maintaining 
social stability and the East Asian weakness in developing a full-fledged democracy are both 
intimately intertwined with Confucian ethics. The great subtlety in honoring age, and the 
blatant insensitivity in deprecating gender, equally reflect on East Asian mentality with deep 
Confucian roots. 
If these factors that include a ‘blatant insensitivity’ in speaking down and against women 
and children are ‘equally’ reflecting what is actually occurring within social settings as 
well as within the minds of those who have been nurtured in those contexts, does this not 
sound like it is conceding to certain forms of patriarchalism, if not also authoritarianism, 
that are morally questionable? 
To sum up, as shown above and also in C4S4.4, these two distinct voices within 
Tu’s discursive texts are intertwined. He speaks differently to audiences in English than 
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to those he addresses in Chinese. In different historical moments, for example, before and 
after the rise of the Four Dragons, as well as the places, for example, in Western countries 
and in China, where his works are stated/published, these two voices appear in varying 
contexts, as well as within the same document such as the article mentioned above. Based 
on his different attitudes towards sangang (and sometimes wulun), his other standpoints 
in responding the scholars’ criticisms in terms of the RFS, its problematic cultural and 
theoretical context, and of relational selfhood in PTRIC societies are also not always 
consistent. Therefore, for the convenience of discussing, analysing, and evaluating Tu’s 
interpretation of New Ruist selfhood, it is wise to differentiate between Tu Weimng’s two 
different attitudes towards sangang and scholars’ criticisms of it and the RFS in Ruist 
selfhood. I call his soft, more responsive and flexible attitude the responsive Tu, that 
supports to some extent modern scholars’s concerns about Ruist problems of sangang, 
wulun, and the RFS. I call his hard, strict, resistant, and less flexible attitude the resistant 
Tu, that either denies the existence of the problems in orthodox Ruist relational selfhood 
or justifies them as positive aspects of traditional Ruism.  
3. General Responses to the Criticisms 
3.1 The Resistant Tu 
In some contexts, as shown in C4S4.4.3, the resistant Tu argues for and justifies 
unequivocally that the particular pattern of authoritarianism promoted by sangang in its 
hierarchy, age, and gender is significantly important in traditional and post-traditional 
Ruist family ethics (to be discussed later in S7.1). However, more often the resistant Tu 
(1985:13) inclines to ascribe all of these criticisms to a misunderstanding of orthodox 
Ruism (i.e. related to the issue of what orthodox Ruism is), arguing they are based on 
misleading assumptions related to the orthodoxy of PTRIC cultural heritage  (i.e. related 
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to the issue of whether PTRIC cultural heritage can represent orthodox Ruism).5 Even if 
Tu discusses the related issues mentioned in psychological and cultural studies, he 
generally avoids social scientific studies of these matters. Chinese psychologists Albert 
H. Yee (2000:277–8) and David Y. F. Ho (1996:156) point out that many modern Ruists 
and sinologists, including Tu Weiming, simply pay less attention to studies in the social 
sciences that ‘elucidat[e] the families of societies’6 inspired by traditional Ruism. This is 
exactly how Tu is criticized by David Y. F. Ho (1996:162). As early as in 1967, Tu 
(1967:77–8) had warned by pointing out the misinterpretations of some famous scholars, 
such as Max Weber, Arthur Waley, and Lucian Pye, that not all the social scientific 
methodology adopted to study Ruism might be valid unless it is based on the proper 
understanding and interpretation of Ruism. This is not the place to go into a 
comprehensive evaluation of the validity of Ruist interpretation by Tu and social 
scientific scholars. This thesis is neither to evaluate Tu’s interpretation by social scientific 
scholars’ interpretations as a standard nor the reverse. It is to verify the validity of social 
scientific scholars’ criticisms of post-traditional and traditional Ruism by Tu’s own 
interpretation. 
According to the characteristics of PTRIC context explained in C1S1.4, we might 
not be able to ascertain what parts and how much of traditional or post-traditional Ruism 
are distorted in this context. In this situation, orthodox Ruism of whatever sort might just 
be a scapegoat. However, the critical issue for discerning observers is whose commentary 
or which Ruist school has the perceived authority to standardize the orthodox Ruist 
interpretation. 
The resistant Tu tends to assume the Ruist school he belongs to is the orthodox and 
authentic Ruism. What he is saying is that if one follows his interpretation of Ruism 
                                                
5 See also Tu Weiming (1985:114–6, 134, 141).  
6 Albert H. Yee (2000:277–8). 
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(which is orthodox) and not be distracted by other unorthodox interpretation, then one 
will not encounter the RFS problem. However, he easily generalizes without 
differentiating and excludes others’ interpretations as inauthentic Ruism. This is how 
Fāng Kèlì 方克立 (1991:40) criticizes New Ruists; apart from Tu’s wavering attitude 
towards sangang, are the ones promoting sangang in the Han dynasty not authentic 
Ruists? The answer to this question for some is still debatable.7 However, this debatable 
issue will not be elaborated here because it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
3.2 The Responsive Tu 
However, we have seen in C4S4.4 that some of Tu’s views, especially in his third 
academic stage, are obviously distant from the resistant Tu’s views in his second stage, 
especially about sangang. The responsive Tu seems to have given up defending sangang 
and was even willing to drop it from his original stand. He also stopped defending the 
perfectibility of humanity and the non-existence of God as a living reality, but still, in 
spite of all these, he did not change his commitment to his original stand related to these 
two major features of his worldview. In that vein, however, the responsive Tu recognizes 
that the problems stemming from repressive social impositions have already existed in 
pre-modern Chinese history and so he imputes them to and criticizes some teachings and 
applications of some Neo-Ruists who rely on social impositions. He clearly senses and 
                                                
7 The first generation New Ruist, Liang Shuming, points out that ethics and politics are the same scholarship 
in Ruist concept (Liang Shuming 19?? in Cáo, Yàomíng 曹耀明 and Liú, Xiǎochén 劉曉辰 1995:53). 
Contemporary traditionalist Ruists, Fan Ruiping (2010) and Jiǎng Qìng 蔣慶 (2011:17–19, eo), and a 
contemporary Chinese historian, Zhāng Fēntián 張分田 (2016:website), argue for a form of ‘political’ 
Ruism with sangang at its core as the orthodox expression and do not recognize New Ruism (what Jiang 
Qing calls ‘Mind’ Ruism), specifically Tu Weiming (Fan, Ruiping 2010:166), as authentic. Jiang Qing 
(2011:18–19, heading eo) criticizes three main problems of New Ruism as follows: ‘The Extreme Tendency 
of Individualizing Confucianism’, ‘Over-emphasis of Abstract Metaphysics’, and ‘The Extreme Tendency 
of lnternalization’. In Fan Ruiping’s (2010:xii) viewpoint, the orthodox Ruism is not of European 
individualism emphasizing ‘individual rights, equality, autonomy, and social justice’. In Fang Keli’s view 
(1991:38), the feudal ideology (based on paternalistic bureaucracy and a familist vision of society) and 
traditional Ruism cannot be separated, because the origin and development of Ruism is a self-conscious 
reflection upon it. Therefore, there exists ‘a plurality of interpretive positions within Ruist traditions’ 
(Pfister 2015b:7). See also Pfister (1995:9) and Billioud and Thoraval (2008).  
167 
understands the challenges and worries raised by contemporary scholars about the 
tendency of a RFS in Ru-based cultural heritages in post-traditional times. Although it is 
hard to identify a decisive change in his two standpoints even in this third stage of his 
academic career, there are some hints that changes were at least being considered as 
mentioned in the previous chapter.8 According to his latest attitude towards sangang, the 
responsive Tu has obviously recognized its involvement with repressive social 
impositions, which lead to a RFS. 
4. Tu’s Disputation about a Ruist Repressed Form of Self  
It is notable that Tu tends to argue his case only theoretically.  
4.1 The Resistant Tu 
4.1.1 Tu’s Defence by Extreme Cases 
The argument of the resistant Tu focuses on that there will not be the tendency to have an 
illegitimate or repressed form of self if one follows orthodox Ruism because the orthodox 
Ruist teachings do not lead to such a tendency. Besides clarifying the proper interpretation 
of Ruist selfhood, Tu always uses good/bad dichotomous terms such as open/enclosed, 
open/isolated, shared/private, shared/self-centred, inclusiveness/exclusiveness, 
relatedness/individualism, and relatedness/egoism, all for the sake of disputing the 
tendency of a RFS in Ruist relational selfhood. On the one hand, the resistant Tu 
(1985:12, 22) repeatedly clarifies and justifies Ruist relatedness in order to prevent it from 
being mistaken for the bad extreme case characterized by the problem of repressive social 
impositions. To bolster his case, he argues that the problems caused by repressive social 
impositions are bad extreme cases and that traditional Ruist relatedness is never so 
                                                
8 Is it that he became aware of these matters because he was addressing a Chinese audience at that time or 
because he began promoting some parts of New Ruism as an advocate of global ethics during his third 
academic stage? The answer is not easily discerned. 
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extreme.9 On the other hand, Tu justifies his New Ruist claim by setting it against the bad 
extreme cases of egoism, absolute self-centredness, and a type of so-called self-contained 
individualism (see A-C). In other places, he (1976a:53) asserted that a total alienation 
from sociality and its values can only take place under the influence of ‘an extreme 
display of individualism’. 10  Here the approach adopted by the resistant Tu is too 
simplistic, because the options are not only determined by an either/or absolutist 
assessment. Besides, these issues related to the tendency of repressive social impositions 
are most of the time not extreme on either side.  
There is evidence of its existence even when individuality and autonomy are not 
totally repressed. For example, Marc L. Moskowitz (2007) in describing Chinese 
women’s struggles to achieve independence from their abusive husbands coined the 
phrase ‘quiet individualism’ to characterize those women.11 He found that these husbands 
justified their putative superiority in these cases based on a tradition-bound Ru-based 
‘male oriented’ cultural heritage.12 Erika Evasdottir (2005) coined another oxymoronic 
phrase, ‘obedient autonomy’, 13  to describe the special phenomenon of PTRIC 
                                                
9 See also Tu Weiming (Tu, Weiming 1985:114–6, 134–7, 145). Hall and Ames (1998:24) adopt the same 
strategy as Tu’s to defend traditional Ruist selfhood. 
10 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:40). 
11  In contrast to the more overt Western European individualism, ‘quiet individualism’ denotes that 
‘individuals attempt to protect their own interests while maintaining an ideological commitment to 
Confucian precepts that familial concerns outweigh individual interests’ (Moskowitz 2007:157). Some of 
the women in the accounts studied by Moskowitz ‘still maneuver to fulfil their own wants and needs to the 
degree that it is possible’ even though they suffer ‘familial abuse’ (ibid.). 
12 Or the similar phrases ‘covert rebellion’ adopted by Dana Crowley Jack (1993:49–52) and passive 
resistance expressed by Chinese idiom ‘yángfèng yīnwéi’ 「陽奉陰違」 (outwardly obeying but secretly 
ignoring) adopted by the New Ruist Liu Shuhsien (1991:54–5) to denote one of the post-traditional Ru-
cultivated Chinese persons’ popular attitudes towards their superiors. 
13 In contrast to ‘uncompromising autonomy’ typical in Anglo-European thought (Evasdottir 2005:xi-xii), 
the term ‘obedient autonomy’ a kind of strategy that ‘achieve[s] and maintain[s] [social or organizational] 
order, while still intervening in the process of [individual] judgment’ (ibid.:22). Such a strategy ‘obey[s] 
because they maintain and even strengthen order’ (ibid., eo). It leads to ‘autonomy because, once [social or 
organizational] order is established, [individual] intervention, manipulation, and the management of 
reputation, and therefore of identity, may begin’ (ibid., eo). Another study by Ronald P. Rohner and Sandra 
M. Pettengill (1985) revealed similar evidence that Korean adolescents raised within a strong Ruist 
ideology respond positively to their parents’ authoritarian control with unflinching obedience. 
169 
hierarchical relationships mainly between teachers and students in her case studies of 
Chinese intellectual archaeologists. All the above examples are evidence of certain 
features of a Ru-influenced ‘wénhuà—xīnlǐ jiégòu’ ｢文化—心理結構｣14  (cultural-
psychological structure). From the Shāng 商 and Zhōu 周 dynasties onwards, Chinese 
persons exposed to such a cultural-psychological structure justified by rényì dàodé (仁義
道德) (a morality of benevolence and righteousness) and the rules of propriety learned to 
accept and even could not help choosing to conform themselves to social impositions 
from this major pre-imperial Ruist tradition. 
4.1.2 Tu’s Defence by Anti-Egoism 
Moreover, as mentioned in C4, Tu (1985:14, eo) summarizes the main feature of the 
traditional Ruist self as dissolving the small self in order to manifest the great self. In 
C4S4.3, he stresses that the ‘commonality’ of human beings is more valuable than their 
‘idiosyncrasies’, and agrees with Booth that human beings become nothing when 
separated from their relations with others (ibid.:82). Furthermore, the distinction between 
‘individual and society’ should disappear, and the first person pronouns as well as the 
word ‘self’ should be ‘reconsidered’ how to be used (ibid.:82, eo). 15 Tu’s arguments also 
provide evidence for the aforementioned imperial traditional Ruist cultural design.16 
                                                
14 Hwang Kwangkuo (1995:247). He explains further that after external rules of propriety with their 
impositions and sanctions were developed in the Shāng 商 and Zhōu 周 dynasties, Confucius provided the 
teachings that internalized them into this cultural-psychological structure (ibid.). 
15 The social psychologist Yang Zhongfang (1991a:77) identifies these features in traditional and post-
traditional Chinese society. 
16 As the Chinese psychologist Yu Dehui (1991a:109–11, eo) points out, to take care of one’s own self 
would seem ironically to imply ‘selfishness’ in traditional Chinese cultural settings, because of its stress on 
filial piety, collectivism, harmony, and shame culture. Zhuang Huiqiu (1991:156–7) also confirms Yu 
Dehui’s viewpoint that the privatized self or the small self is devalued as ‘selfishness’. 
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Besides, Tu tended to conflate ‘[European] individualism’ with ‘egoism’, 
criticizing them as immoral, even though they17 do not mean the same thing (Li, Shuqing 
1941b:24). 18  Tu has identified ‘[European] individualism’ with ‘selfishness’ and 
‘parochialism’.19 Fei Xiaotong (1910-2005) (1992:67), a notable Chinese anthropologist, 
indicated that ‘[European] individualism’ pursues a particular ‘balance’ between 
individuals and their whole group. Accordingly, ‘[European] individualism’ yields two 
political outcomes: equality: no individual is allowed to ‘encroach on’ others, and 
constitutionality: the whole society is not allowed to negate the rights of any individual 
except ‘the partial rights’ handed over by them willingly (ibid.).20 Therefore, does Tu 
misexplain the term ‘[European] individualism’ or does he always criticize it in its 
‘extreme display’, or ‘egotistical individualism’,21 as mentioned above? In Lucian Pye’s 
(1988:59–60) analysis, it is a natural thing in Ru-based collectivism22 to view ‘[European] 
individualism’ ‘in a negative light’ because the strong ideology of the great self in Ru-
based collectivism ‘debases the value of [European] individualism’ and sees it as ‘the 
source of corruption and selfishness’. 
                                                
17  Private and self-centred, or private and isolated, or individualism and exclusiveness, may not be 
synonyms. However, Tu also tends to conflate these pairs of terms. 
18 See also Hayek (1944:14) and Leung Insing (2004 in Cheng, Chungying and Leung, Insing 2004:8). 
19 Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:20, 23, 103f.). 
20 Hayek (1944:14) points out that ‘[European] individualism’ was notorious to-day because the term has 
been always linked to ‘ego[i]sm and selfishness’. He argues that when we use this term ‘in contrast to 
socialism and all other forms of collectivism’ is not necessarily linked to these (ibid.). In his view, 
‘[European] individualism’ is based on an attitude of ‘tolerance to other opinions’ (ibid.:170). According 
to Hayek’s (1944:14) context, I consider what he denotes here is egoism instead of ‘egotism’. According 
to Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford Dictionaries 2016b, eo), these two words are often adopted as 
‘interchangeable’, but it is worth noting their distinctions. The more common term Egotism denotes ‘the 
fact of being excessively conceited or absorbed in oneself’. In a strict sense, the term egoism is adopted in 
Ethics to denote ‘a theory that treats self-interest as the foundation of moral behaviour’. This meaning is 
less dominant nowadays. In the Oxford English Corpus, most of ‘the citations for egoism’ actually mean 
‘excessive conceit’. See also Li Shuqing (1941b:24). 
21 This term is coined by Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi (1988:54) to portray ‘the core values of the Hong 
Kong Chinese’. 
22 Although Tu claims that his New Ruist account is a synthesis of individualism and collectivism, his 
interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood is still a Ru-based collectivist form. This will be 
demonstrated later in S7 and S8.  
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Moreover, while Tu tries to argue for New Ruist relational selfhood as an ideally 
anti-egoistic form, he might ignore the ‘egocentric behaviour’ (even though which might 
appears more or less in any cultural contexts) in Ru-based familial collectivism 
pinpointed by scholars mentioned in C2S4.4. Such an ‘egocentric behaviour’ is evidently 
manifest in making the delimitations of primary groups and secondary groups by the small 
self in a situational-determinist way.23 Besides, Lucian Pye (1988:58–61) also pinpoints 
that both ‘self-sacrifice’ and ‘self-aggrandizement’ are characteristics of the Ruist self 
although they look like opposite and mutually exclusive. I think that the latter is also 
cultivated by the collective value and so a particular form of self-sacrifice to fulfil others’ 
expectation and achieve a degree of worthiness to strengthen a relationship. Besides, self-
sacrifice might be a way of survival or self-protection in a ‘co-dependen[t]’ relationship 
cultivated in Ru-based collectivism which has been mentioned in C1 and so might be also 
an ‘egocentric behaviour’ although it literally seems to be opposite to egocentrism. No 
wonder Pye highlights that the egos in such a collectivist ‘egotism’ are paradoxically 
fragile (ibid.:71). In terms of both the differential mode of association (Fei, Xiaotong 
1992:60) (see A-EF75 in and A-K) and within the dynamics of the relationships of 
collective selves (Yeh, Kuanghui 2002:230f.), such a egocentric behavioural feature24 in 
the Chinese Ru-based collectivist ideology is verified by Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi’s 
(1988:41–68) and Xie Yao’s (2005) field research.  
                                                
23  Under Ru-based collectivism (utilitarian familism), the interests of a primary group (family) have 
unexceptionally priority over the interests of a secondary group (society) (Lau, Siukai & Kuan, Hsinchi 
1988:54). That is to say, this ‘egocentric behaviour’ acts outside one’s primary group and views one’s 
secondary group as ‘potentially dangerous foes’ (ibid.:59), or treats two groups in a double-faced manner 
which will be discussed later in S8.1. 
24 This is what Henri Tajfel (1919-1982) and John Turner (1979:38–42) refer to as ‘in-group favouritism’. 
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A Chinese historian, Guō Hóngjì 郭洪紀 (1948-2013) (1997:70), coined ‘shēnfèn 
lúnlǐ’「身分倫理」 (role ethics) 25  to characterize the feature of ‘the operation of 
situational morality’ in traditional Ruist ethics.26 He argues that traditional Ruist role 
ethics in the context of PTRIC societies is maintained within an imbalance of oppressing 
mode with two polarized extremes: one extreme demands ethical obligations in human 
relationships, but simultaneously the other extreme provides no protection for personal 
rights.27 Therefore, it follows that this post-traditional expression of Ruist role ethics will 
not help resolve the problem of the RFS: it seems that this form of role ethics can only 
offer verbal comfort to suffering souls, because they are the very ones who are being 
oppressed within their inferior positions by this same hierarchically loaded role ethics.  
In this sense of Ruist role ethics, individualism, which values the individuality of 
any individual self, is opposite to egoism or ‘egocentrism’, which devalues the 
individuality of any individual self who does not conform to the social demands of the 
dyadic relationships. Individuality in traditional Ruist selfhood tended to mean 
‘unique[ness]’ rather than autonomy (Hall and Ames 1998:25, eo). 28  However, the 
majority of the Chinese individuals lacked any uniqueness in terms of its meaning in Ruist 
context because only very few could reach superiority and excellence, or ‘churen toudi’ 
｢出人頭地｣ (to become honoured and distinguished among others) as mentioned in 
C3F53,  so as to be unique.29 Because of such strong motivation of ‘churen toudi’, there 
                                                
25 Literally, ‘shenfen lunli’ is to be translated as identity ethics or status ethics. However, Guo Hongji (1997) 
coins this term to feature ‘the operation of situational morality’ in Ruist ethics. Therefore, ‘role ethics’ 
coined by Roger Ames (2011) (to be discussed later) is a more appropriate rendering. 
26 Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi (1988:48). 
27 See also Madsen (1986:54–5), Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi (1988:50f.), and Fan Ruiping (2010:xii–
xiv). 
28 See also Ames (2006:63–5). 
29 It is notable that Zizioulas (1995:57–8) differentiates the meaning of the person from the individual by 
the uniqueness, unrepeatability, and ‘particularity’ of the person. However, the characteristics of the person 
he points out are acquired in creation in the sense of ontology (See also Moltmann 1981:188–90). The 
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exists an ideology of competition and utilitarianism among Chinese individuals and 
families which cultivate egoism or ‘egocentrism’ instead of the opposite. Lin Honghsin 
(2008a:79) claims that a strongly competitive and utilitarian mentality driven by 
traditional Ruist values associated with self-cultivation has nurtured Chinese people’s 
attitudes for thousands of years.30 Such a utilitarian mentality in post-traditional Ru-based 
collectivism is named by Lau Siukai (1947-) (1978) as ‘utilitarianistic familism’, which 
he claims is the foundation of ‘political stability’ in Hong Kong in the twentieth century 
but may no longer be guided by more humane values within traditional Ruist ethics. 
In terms of the above understanding of individual in post-traditional Ruist role 
ethics, ‘equality can only mean parity’ (Hall and Ames 1998:25). For if only a Chinese 
individual in a PTRIC cultural context is valued, recognized, and distinguished by how 
well or how much one achieves within one’s roles, this still must be expressed within 
‘multivalent relationships’ through ‘communal deference’ to the requirements of different 
roles demanded by post-traditional Ruist social ethics (ibid.). As already mentioned 
before, Tu (1985:27) supposes that the eradication of the fallacy of individualism is a 
shared goal among the Three Teachings, and that post-traditional Ruism in particular 
stands against ‘the falsehood of self-centredness’ in this context. Then, in terms of Fei 
Xiaotong’s (and Hayek’s, in F13) understanding of individualism as mentioned above, 
does Tu mean to eradicate the fruit of equality in individualism? Does Tu recognize that 
egocentrism can also appear in the post-traditional Ru-influenced forms of relationships? 
Unfortunately, Tu offers no further clarification of these matters.  
In terms of a Ruist RFS, we can see that the attitude of the responsive Tu shows his 
willingness to review and correct the negative parts of traditional Ruism as indicated in 
                                                
uniqueness in Ruist selfhood is acquired by moral self-cultivation and other achievement in the sense of 
functionality. 
30 See also Zheng Zhiming 鄭志明 (1986:337–41) Wen Chongyi (1988:25–9). 
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the previous section. However, the resistant Tu tries to dispute this criticized problem by 
categorizing it to the extreme case which does not exist. I find that the resistant Tu does 
not argue against the criticism but evades it. 
5. Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of Self-Cultivation 
In Tu’s interpretation, absolute sincerity serves as both an ultimate goal and core value of 
self-cultivation as well as an indicator of the perfectibility of human nature. He also 
assumes that every Ruist follower theoretically should pursue becoming a sage. 
5.1 The Resistant Tu 
Orthodox Ruism, the resistant Tu argues, never teaches people to be insincere or to make 
others insincere.31 He emphasizes repeatedly that Ruist selfhood is about a ceaseless 
process of self-cultivation and nobody, even Confucius himself, has ever attained or will 
attain sagehood (C4S3.1). Besides, in arguing that an individual self is incapable of 
attaining spiritual self-transformation without a communal act with others, Tu indirectly 
admits the imperfectibility of individual human nature, 32  unless the reason of the 
incapability of Confucius himself to attain sagehood is that he was alone without a 
communal act with any other. 
5.2 The Responsive Tu 
In facing the challenges from modern ideologies, such as humanism, democracy, and 
human rights, the responsive Tu makes a great effort to show the importance of 
individuality in Ruist self-cultivation, 33  even in which ‘sociality’ must be grounded 
                                                
31 C3S1.1.2. and C4S3.1. 
32 This independent argument is later found to be supported by other scholars. Both Wm. Theodore de Bary 
(1996:37) and Ralph Weber (2007:88–9) argue that the ‘unattainability’ of the perfectibility of human 
nature and the unending process of learning to be humane ‘belie’ his first self-cultivation sub-assumption 
(A2.1): human nature is perfectible through self-cultivation. 
33 C3S1.1.2. and C4S4.4. 
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(2008a:444). The responsive Tu insists that the end of self-cultivation is the self itself.34 
While emphasizing self-cultivation, the responsive Tu asserts: that Ruism does not 
devalue the self and its duties, a position shared with Hsieh Yuwei (1968:280–83). In 
terms of these assertions, the responsive Tu is more responsive to scholarly criticism and 
shows the same concern with them about the RFS in PTRIC contexts. 
But in both the resistant Tu’s and the responsive Tu’s account, as long as perfection 
has not yet been reached in reality, his theoretical arguments cannot be sustained because 
absolute sincerity has never yet existed. Under those conditions, the existence of a RFS 
as documented by social scientists of various sorts is much harder to deny. Scholars do 
not criticize insincerity as coming directly from traditional Ruism teachings. Instead, they 
criticize repressive social impositions as coming from traditional and post-traditional 
Ruist emphases on self-cultivation in the context of their various forms of Ru-based 
hierarchical and collectivist societies.  
We shall continue to ask whether the resistant Tu’s theoretical arguments are 
sustainable. For Tu (1985:94), learning to be human means learning to be ‘humane’,35 
because he still insists that ‘humane possibilities’ are ‘inherent’ in human nature. Yet the 
term ‘possibilities’, actually meaning impossibility in reality, appears to deny the intrinsic 
goodness of human nature and even the effort of learning to be humane seems to deny 
the existence of any inherent humane attribute (Weber, Ralph 2007:88). Therefore, 
logically speaking, Tu’s second self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.2) (human nature is 
good intrinsically) becomes questionable in his emphasis on learning to be humane and 
its implications. Besides, Tu’s own argument in defending the second self-cultivation 
sub-assumption (A2.2) is not convincing, because he (1985:137) refers to that nature 
                                                
34 C4S3 and C4S4.4. 
35 See also Tu Weiming (2001a:74). 
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understood as an ‘original nature’, arguing for an ontological postulate undergirding non-
experienceable reality. 
Nevertheless, Tu (1989a:95–6) attempts to explain away this logical doubt by 
differentiating between the ultimate goal of learning to be humane and the intrinsic 
goodness of human nature. He refers to the former as ‘the greatest possible’ or ‘the 
maximum realization of humanity’, while the latter he describes as a natural and 
inescapable nature, ‘the minimum condition’ of ‘the lowest common denominator’. The 
latter is the ‘minimum requirement’, the ground for the qualitative transformation leading 
to former. Yet there is a qualitative difference between them to the point Tu admits that 
human nature cannot be good enough and consequently cannot reach perfection. 
Therefore, learning to be humane as a social norm and requirement tends to cultivate an 
illegitimate or repressed form of self because one is unable to attain its goal and, as a 
result, tends to live by pretending to be humane within the framework of PTRIC roles and 
their social impositions. 
6. Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of Heaven 
In Tu’s interpretation of the framework of New Ruist relational selfhood, the assumed 
concept of Heaven plays an important role. It is the extremely significant premise among 
all the other assumptions. Tu seeks to present a coherent argument based on his 
conception of Heaven. However, there are some weak points in his argument that relate 
to his account of Heaven. 
Diagram 5.1 sums up all the aforementioned assumptions and their interrelated 




Diagram 5.1 Circularity in Tu’s Assumptions and their Relations (A2.1 is a modified assumption. The 
direction of the arrows is from the premise to the predicated. The red circles and polygon display the circular 
relations.)36 
 
The whole concept of Tu’s New Ruist selfhood is based on many interrelated 
assumptions, some of which assume each other in circular reasoning as discussed in C4. 
As long as one of the assumptions is not sustained, the related arguments are falsified. 
For example, perfectibility is negated by the phrase ceaseless self-cultivation. Naturally 
and logically, there would have to be an end to this process if human nature is in fact 
perfectible. Tu (1985:126) admits that in his New Ruist account the goodness of human 
nature and its perfectibility through communal moral self-cultivation involve ‘an implicit 
circularity’.37 However, this circularity he does not see as a ‘vicious one’ (ibid.), as 
                                                
36  The Chinese version of this diagram was created and will be published in 2018 (Hwang, Tsungi 
{forthcoming}2018:S2). 
37 Tu (1985:126) says that ‘human nature is [intrinsic] good so that there is an authentic possibility for 
dynamic spiritual development and vice versa’. 
178 
 
explained above in C4S3.2. Leaving alone his reasons supporting these claims. Tu does 
not even find that these circular statements themselves are falsely argued. For the former 
can only be the premise for the latter but not the other way round and the latter cannot be 
sustained without the former as its premise. Therefore, the latter cannot be the premise 
for the former. In his efforts to deepen the meaning of intrinsic goodness of human nature 
and, at the same time, to deny the repressive imposition of social norms in New Ruism, 
Tu stresses the ‘mutual nourishment of inner morality and social norms’ (ibid.:25, eo). 
This argument appears to indirectly disclose the insufficiency of human’s intrinsic 
goodness, precisely because it requires ‘nourishment’ from outside. Besides, can social 
norms increase human’s intrinsic goodness or grant human power to be a perfect sage? 
Can this term nourishment explain away any repressive imposition of social norms? 
However, this is not the only kind of circular reasoning he employs in his arguments 
supporting the post-traditional concept of New Ruist selfhood (or sagehood).  
As mentioned in C4S3.4, according to his fourth self-cultivation sub-assumption 
(A2.4), reaching Heaven is precisely full self-realization, Heaven itself must be based on 
the first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) (human nature is perfectible) and his 
definition of Ruist sagehood as an ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’. The 
first and fourth self-cultivation sub-assumptions (A2.1 and A2.4) also fall into the same 
form of circular reasoning. 
However, the fatal problem of Tu’s circular arguments is that his own claim of no 
one ever having attained sagehood falsifies all the related arguments. As his New Ruist 
definition of sagehood (i.e. ‘ultimate self-transformation as a communal act’) is the 
premise of both first relational sub-assumption (A1.1) (‘all things are my companions’) 
and fourth self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.4) (Reaching Heaven is precisely full self-
realization) as illustrated in Diagram 5.1, the reality of the non-existence of the sage, 
claimed by himself, makes all his circularity related assumptions crumble. It is exactly 
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the internal tensions and circular reasons among Tu’s interrelated assumptions of New 
Ruist relational selfhood that make Tu’s account ultimately an unrealizable 
perfectionism, which will be discussed in detail in S9 below. 
Although human nature, according to Tu and other contemporary Ruist scholars, is 
endowed by Heaven, everything is defined, or given meaning, by human beings as 
mentioned above in S3.4.1 (Tu 1979a:20), because, according to Tu’s account of the 
traditional Ruist conception of Heaven, Heaven is not an external being or creator and 
human nature, in ontological terms, has ‘self-generating source of strength’ and 
‘internally-generated capacity’ which are never deficient (as mentioned in C4S3.3). 
Therefore, humans can define cosmology, the continuity of being, and they are able to be 
united with Heaven and Earth. 38  Even if transcendence is highly valued, this 
transcendence only means surpassing within the plane of human existence,39 or ‘lǐxìng 
běntǐ’「理性本體」40 (rational being). In reality, there is no higher personal being above 
human beings, even though the universe and some of Heaven’s positions are greater than 
any human person’s life. As mentioned in C4S3.4.1, Tu (1989a:106) seems to call human 
                                                
38 This independent argument of mine is supported by the evidence found later. Chien Yeongshyang 錢永
祥 (p. Qián Yǒngxiáng) (2008:14) argues that Ruists are not concerned whether or not Heaven itself exists, 
but which kind of transcendental source human’s moral practice needs to presuppose. Mou Tsungsan 
(2005:60–63) emphasizes that Ruist metaphysics and cosmology are based on morality, but not the reverse. 
Accordingly, the ‘metaphysics of morals’ in Ruism is ‘moral metaphysics’ but not ‘metaphysical ethics’. 
Chén Lái 陳來 (2009:197, eo) points out that after the Zhou dynasty, ‘tiānmìng’「天命」(the Mandate of 
Heaven) in Ruism denotes Heaven endowed with ethical character, embodied as people’s desire and 
demand. Yu Yingshi (1986:113), a world-known historian, also points out that the Chinese Ruist concept 
of a transcendental Heaven is developed from the fact that human beings have the capacity for a self-
awareness of inner value. Heaven is unknowable, but human beings are knowable. Heaven can be known 
only through ‘jǐnxìng’「盡性」 (the complete realization of [human] nature). Yu Yingshi argues from 
interpretations of the Xunzi and the Dàxué and some other Ruist classics that it was it was meaningless for 
Chinese persons to construct (‘xūgòu’「虛構」) a ‘réngéhuà de shàngdì’「人格化的上帝」 (personalized 
God) to represent the image of Heaven. Liang Shuming, by citing the argument of Japanese Ruist scholar 
Kinzō Gorai 五來欣造 (1875-1944), underscores that Ruism is actually a ‘lǐxìng zhìshàng zhǔyì’「理性
至上主義」(ration supremacism) and argues that Heaven, gods, kings, nations, and the collective, are all 
but a pronoun for reason in Ruism (Liang Shuming 19?? in Cáo, Yàomíng 曹耀明 and Liú, Xiǎochén 劉
曉辰 1995:65). Robert Eno (1990) concludes from the result of his studies that the term Heaven is a Ruist 
creation. 
39 According to Tu’s usage of transcendence in interpreting traditional Ruism, this is what Tu really means. 
40 Li Dàhuá 李大華 (2002:569–70). 
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beings co-creators in order to promote them to the same level of Heaven and Earth in 
forming a trinity. However, if he makes this kind of assertion, this appears to contradict 
his atheistic claim for Ruism. He also argues that human nature must be identical with 
Heaven because it is endowed by Heaven and reaching Heaven is precisely full self-
realization. Whether or not is this argument convincing logically, he actually pulls 
Heaven down to the plane of human exisitence instead of lifting up human beings to the 
plane of Heaven. 
In differentiating the transcendence from the transcendent God in Christianity, 
which some New Ruists refer to as external transcendence (‘wàizài chāoyuè’ ｢外在超越
｣ ) (Liu, Shuhsien 1998b:105–108) and Tu (1989a:121) refers to as ‘radical 
transcendence’, Tu (1989a:102,121) and some other New Ruists highlight the goal of 
post-traditional Ruist self-cultivation as ‘immanent transcendence’ (nèizài chāoyuè 內在
超越 ) (Tu 2008a:445) or ‘immanence with a transcendent dimension’ in Tu’s own 
language. 41  However, just as Xie Wenyu (1997:57–8) has pointed out, immanent 
transcendence does not really transcend what is understood to be physical reality. Within 
this conception of qualified transcendence, the constitutor(s) of the standard of 
transcendence, the evaluator(s) of achievement, and the one who tries to transcend 
(namely the self-cultivator) are all internalized to the same entity, namely a particular 
human being (ibid.).42  I find that, in Tu’s account, whether something or anyone is 
transcendent is determined by the extent of its/one’s self-realization. A Chinese analytic 
                                                
41 The concept of immanent transcendence was coined first by Táng Jūnyì 唐君毅（1909-78）(1951 10th 
ed. in 2005:336). Mou Tsungsan (1909-95) (1962 in 2003b:22), Liu Shuhsien (1972:49), and Tu Weiming 
(1982a; 1989a:93–122) succeed him to elucidate it further. All these three other scholars focus on this 
concept in terms of Heaven. However, Tu (1985:125) extends it to refer to the original nature of humankind 
and the realization of their selfhood, because he highlights ‘humanity’ and Heaven and Earth as one. 
Contrary to Tu, Liu Shuhsien (1972:49) differentiates Heaven as an ‘all-encompassing creative power’ 
from the human as a ‘creature’. It is notable that the phrase immanent transcendence adopted by these New 
Ruists refers to something completely different from what the phrase ‘immanent transcendence’ refers to 
in Moltmann’s account discussed in C6S3. 
42 See also Guo Qingxiang (2006:78–82). 
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philosopher, Fung Yiuming 馮耀明 (p. Féng Yàomíng), started with semantic criticisms 
of ‘immanent transcendence’ presented by New Ruists, including Tu Weiming, in 
1990s.43 Through his research on this issue over ten years, he consequently criticized the 
concept of it or ‘transcendent immanence’ as a fundamental problem for New Ruism in 
his monograph entitled The Myth of ‘Transcendent Immanence’ (《「超越內在」的迷
思》) (2003). As Fung Yiuming points out, one of the main logical problems among 
works by New Ruists is that they either involve logical contradictions or circular 
arguments. Roger Ames (1997:43–57, 60–63) has ultimately suggested that New Ruists 
would be wise not to use the terms ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in their own 
interpretations of Ruism.44 One reason why Ames makes this suggestion is that New 
Ruists do not adopt generally shared meanings in their ‘strict’ sense of these terms, and 
so their interpretations confuse readers (ibid.:43-56).45  In facing these criticisms, Tu 
(2008a:445) rejects following the dichotomous methodology and Christian definition of 
transcendence (1988 in 1997a:309), even if he claims his ‘interpretive strategy’ for the 
idea of ‘immanent transcendence’ is inspired by Christian and Islamic monotheistic 
theology. Then he justifies ‘the fusion of the transcendent and the immanent’ a symbolism 
of a complex mutuality and mutual interaction and responsiveness (ibid.). However, I find 
                                                
43 Fung Yiuming’s semantic criticism of New Ruist ‘immanent transcendence’ and his series of debated on 
this issue with Tu Weiming can be found as follows: Fung Yiuming (1993a; 1993b; 1993c), Tu Weiming 
(1993b), Fung Yiuming (1994a), Tu Weiming (1994b), Fung Yiuming (1994b), and Tu Weiming (1994c). 
44 See also Hall and Ames (1987:13f., 208-216, 232-7). This is a much debated issue, one related directly 
to another controversial issue dealing with the religiousness of Ruism. However, this is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Besides some references in the text and in F34 and F36, see also Liu Shuhsien (1972; 1993; 
1998b), Schwartz (1975a; 1975b), Tu Weiming (1982a), Tang Yijie (1988 in 1997), Berthrong (1994:133–
64), Li Minghui (1994), Pfister (1995), Tu Weiming and Zhōu Qín 周勤 (1996), Hall and Ames (1998:219–
52), Choi Duyol (2000), Kwok Hungbiu (2001), Ames (2002:24–82, 111–47; 2006:18–56), Fung Yiuming 
(2003), Lín Qǐpíng 林啓屛 (2004:265–97), Lǐ Yīnghuá 李英華 (2011), and Sūn Zhōuxìng 孫周興 (2012). 
45 For example, New Ruists use ‘transcendence’ to denote an idealization of reality within a post-traditional 
Ruist monism, instead of following standard meaning set in a dualist metaphysical framework suggested 
by monotheism. See also Schwartz (1975a; 1975b), Gān Yáng 甘陽 (1988 in Tu, Weiming 1997a:308), Li 
Minghui (1994:65–8), and Berthrong (2004:430–33). However, whether or not Ruists need to follow its 
strict meaning in using transcendence is still debatable (Hall & Ames 1987:iii, 13-20; See Li Minghui 1994; 
Zheng, Jiadong 2000). 
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this to be important evidence for explaining why Tu Weiming’s relational selfhood and 
the complete unity between ‘humanity’ and Heaven tends towards idealism or 
perfectionism. Modern Chinese Buddhism criticizes the concept of internal transcendence 
as a self-delusion, according to Xie Wenyu (1997:58).46 Self-delusion or self-deception 
could also be one of the sources for the creation of a false self or a masked real self as 
mentioned in C2S4, but this is not something I will address at any length here. 
As a result, in the sense of New Ruist account of selfhood, the self can only be 
defined either by itself, by another individual self, or by other collective selves. Since the 
former two cases are unacceptable to Tu’s New Ruist ideology, because it seeks to 
eradicate individualism, the New Ruist self can only be defined by the other collective 
selves. Therefore, in Tu’s post-traditional cultural and interpretative context, the tendency 
to create conditions where a RFS emerges is hard to avoid because self-value can only 
arise from social recognition, being something I achieve or based on how I perform.47  
7. Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of Reciprocal Relationships 
Regarding Tu’s (1985:27) basic thesis about New Ruist selfhood that relationships of 
Ruist selves are based upon ‘equality without uniformity’, I agree that uniformity can be 
prevented in these relational contexts because it would appear only in extremely 
collectivist situations. What remains problematical is how equality can be generated in 
the context of Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood. In the light of Tu’s interpretation, I 
argue that equality is not easily obtained or maintained between self and society, or 
between the small self and the great self because of both the traditional and post-
                                                
46 Xie Wenyu (1997:58) also argues that Chinese Buddhists do not appear to provide a better solution for 
this self-delusion except by nullifying all of its three elements: the standard of transcendence, its judge, and 
the self-cultivator. 
47 The value of any self in this context cannot be easily established by and derived from self-contemplation 
(‘zìwǒ guānzhào’ ｢自我觀照)｣) (Yu, Dehui 1991a:110). See also Lucian Pye (1988:71). 
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traditional Ruist cultural design supporting some form of collectivism.48 This will be 
discussed more in S8. I also find that equality might at most refer to an egalitarian 
relationship between two selves, but only if the so-called reciprocity between the dyadic 
relationships can practically and actually take the place of a prioritized asymmetrical 
relational pattern. But do reciprocal relationships normally replace the hierarchical 
asymmetrical relationships stemming from traditional Ruism? Tu’s most incoherent 
standpoints are about these two issues. 
7.1 The Resistant Tu 
As mentioned above in S3.1, the resistant Tu (1985:13), on the one hand, more often 
inclines to ascribe all of these criticisms to a misunderstanding of orthodox Ruism. On 
the other hand, the resistant Tu, in some contexts, justifies unequivocally the significant 
importance of the particular pattern of authoritarianism promoted by sangang in post-
traditional Ruist family ethics. When the positive roles of traditional Ruist values had 
been noticed and discussed as contributing to economic developments and social stability 
in East Asian countries, the resistant Tu emphasized that the traditional Ruist tendency of 
adjusting to the world, and so also to being politicized in consenting or endorsing a 
harsher form of differentiation within human society taught by sangang, was an 
irreducible cultural reality. Therefore, on the basis of the resistant Tu’s claims in this 
regard, not only these justifying claims negates his New Ruist interpretation for an 
orthodox Ruist form of symmetric non-hierarchical societies and interpersonal 
                                                
48 Lau Siukai and Kuan Hsinchi (1988:43–4) identify the influences of traditional Ruist values in shaping 
‘the ethos of [modern] the Hong Kong Chinese’. One of these values is the concept of individual. They 
recognize that the values of ‘individual equality, rights, duties, and freedom’ were definitely addressed in 
Ruism. However, they argue further that Ruism articulated these values in the particular way to make them 
‘compatible with steep status inequalities and the subordination of the individual to society and state’. One 
reason for this is because the individual rights in society in Ruism are possessed by birth but given by 
society (or ruler and superiors) (ibid.: 50f.). The other reason is that a right in Ruist relational ethics is more 
like what Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill (1983:126, eo) call a ‘privilege’ or a reward for being worthy 




relationships, but also the RFS becomes an inescapable corollary to his post-traditional 
New Ruist relational selfhood, precisely because it supports particular patterns of 
authoritarianism in PTRIC societies within a hierarchy and between ages and genders. 
7.2 The Responsive Tu 
On the contrary, critiquing and discarding the teachings of sangang (and even wulun in 
very few contexts) as the products of a highly politicized forms of imperial traditional 
Ruism during long periods of Ru history, the responsive Tu defends a purified New Ruism 
that has not insisted on forms of cultural expression based upon hierarchical relationships 
and collectivism. We cannot deny or ignore completely that New Ruism, as the responsive 
Tu (1985:12) highlights it, respects and emphasizes to some extent the importance of the 
self or individual, including its ‘dignity, independence, and autonomy’.49 However, the 
existence of traditional and post-traditional asymmetrical relationships due to Ruist 
teachings are historical facts, phenomena verified indirectly by Tu’s denial that these 
expressions come from a pure and traditional orthodox Ruism. 
Based on ‘the [Ruist] principle of reciprocity’ as mentioned in C4S4.4.2, Tu indeed 
tries to argue for a non-hierarchical social structure in orthodox Ruism. Instead, I argue 
here that not only are there problems related to the asymmetry and inequality within the 
three dyadic relationships constituting sangang as well as in the first four of five 
relationships in wulun, but also that the priority of the importance of different 
relationships disclosed by the sequential presentation of wulun and sangang indicates 
another dimension of asymmetry and inequality, especially for the status of women 
(especially wives).50 Although the sequence of the dyadic relationships in wulun and 
                                                
49 We can also find that Ruist classics, as Wáng Jué 王珏 (2014:140) has argued, do not always teach an 
‘one-sided submission’ within the relational contexts of filial piety and wulun. 
50 Yuán Xìnài 袁信愛 (2008:69) points out that wives and their relationships with husbands are less 
important than both of the father-son and ruler-subject relationships in wulun and are least important in 
sangang. 
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sangang might look like an order of increasing equality, I do sense that the sequence of 
their presentations indicates their priority rather than the order of equality in the 
traditional Ruist context. As for the Ruist teaching of bao (reciprocity) adopted by Tu for 
defending Ruist relational equality, I argue that equal reciprocity only happens when the 
relationship is equal. When the relationship is unequal, this Ruist reciprocity becomes a 
demanding pressure to the inferior side in the relationship coerced by the superior side in 
the relationship and social imposition. Therefore, equal reciprocity cannot be expressed 
within the relationships guided by filial piety, wulun (except the last one, friend-friend, 
relationship), and sangang. In other words, Ruist reciprocity remains asymmetrical and 
unequal in all those relationships. Besides, Ruist reciprocity, even if equal, in the face and 
shame culture of Ru-based collectivism also leads to the RFS.51 Does this not look like 
another of Tu’s circular arguments in managing the relationships between bao and 
asymmetrical relationships? 
It is notable that Tu’s interpretive Ruist ‘psychology of guilt and shame’ as the 
‘mechanism of control’ in Ruist thick guanxi, as mentioned in C4S4.5.2, is exactly what 
scholars in different fields called ‘social manipulation’52 or ‘social control’53 by way of 
feeling shame. Cho Hyunyi (2000:318) indicates further that ‘filial duty’ is ‘an ideology 
of social and political control’. Undoubtedly, this is related directly to the repressive 
social imposition discussed in this research. We can by no means deny the positive role 
                                                
51 This independent argument is supported by Francis L. K. Hsu’s work which was found after the viva of 
this thesis. Francis L. K. Hsu (1963:165) says that ‘[I]n th[e Ruist] kinship scheme, one’s obligation 
tends … to equal one’s reward’. And then he adds an explanation to this statement in its note: ‘Obligation 
and reward … refer … to tangible goods and services. But the worth of such goods and services is, of 
course, measured by the extent to which they satisfy the social needs of the individuals concerned’.  
52 Melvin Wong (2001:43). It is worth noting that Melvin Wong points out, ‘The social manipulation of the 
feeling of shame is the basic driving force in the control of human behaviours in Chinese culture. 
(“Knowing shame is the beginning of courage!”) [(“zhīchǐ jìnhū yǒng” ｢知恥近乎勇｣from the Zhongyong 
21)]’ (ibid.). For example, ‘When it was shameful for others outside the family to know of the absence of 
filial piety within a family, often the virtue of filial piety was coerced or forced by way of shame and guilt’ 
(ibid.:20). 
53 Cho Hyunyi (2000:307–9). See also Bedford and Hwang Kwangkuo (2003:133–4). 
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of shame culture from the perspectives of social development, stability, harmony, 
industrialization, and modernization. Furthermore, it is also active to some extent from 
the perspectives of individual personal growth, behavioural development, and the 
establishment of relationships. However, we should not also deny its complications in 
shaping distorted personalities and restricting behavioural and relationship developments. 
This is evident especially when human beings cannot attain self-realization as we saw in 
Tu Weiming’s discussions above. Such complications are not only recognized by 
psychologists, but also lead to the behavioural custom of ‘denial’ and ‘pretence’ (Wong, 
Melvin 2001:34, 42).54 
Whether or not that traditional orthodox Ruism teaches these things even while a 
politicized traditional form of Ruism does so, as Tu claims, is still a debated issue among 
modern post-traditional Ruists.55 However, according to the responsive Tu, it is hopefully 
possible that his ideal New Ruist relational selfhood is different from the PTRIC one 
because of its rejection of an asymmetrical hierarchical social structure criticized by other 
scholars. Accordingly, it might provide a solution for the problem of the RFS in PTRIC 
societies. 
8. Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of Fiduciary Community 
As mentioned in C4F9 and explained in A-N, social scientific observation indicates that 
the traditional values of Ru-based collectivism and its concomitant RFS are parts of the 
cultural design of a post-traditional Ru-based cultural heritage. Can we find such a post-
traditional cultural design of Ru-based collectivism and its concomitant expression of a 
RFS in Tu’s New Ruist account of relational selfhood? 
                                                
54 See also Ambrose Y. C. King (1986:60, 72). 
55 For example, Zhāng Lìlì 張麗麗 (2015:website), through her studies of Ruist classics, argues that Ruist 
oppression of women did not start form Dǒng Zhòngshū 董仲舒 in the Han dynasty but from Confucius. 
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8.1 The Resistant Tu 
According to the aforementioned analysis of the resistant Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist 
selfhood, collectivism and a RFS are definitely parts of post-traditional Ruist cultural 
designs. So even if the Chinese person’s self is the end of New Ruist self-cultivation (i.e. 
so-called ‘learning for the sake of the self’ mentioned in C4S3), as the responsive Tu 
insists, the resistant Tu emphasizes so much — as Bodde (1957:66) also pointed out — 
that fulfilling the requirements of social norms and the duties of one’s social roles are 
preconditions for reaching the end of self-cultivation and becoming worthy of any 
particular relationship or community. Although willingness for self-transformation is 
necessary as highlighted by Tu’s (1985:141), can one’s willingness make one attain the 
standard of a dynamic relational self? What if one cannot attain it by one’s willingness as 
Tu (ibid.: 25) admits, as mentioned in C4, that even Confucius himself could not do it? 
Since humans, Heaven, and Earth are united into one as Tu argues by quoting Ch’eng 
Hao’s words as mentioned above in S3.4.2, and human beings are ‘consanguineous with 
nature’, that is, with Heaven and Earth (ibid.), why is there a need for self-cultivation in 
order to become worthy of relating with all of them? Can this precondition of self-
worthiness of a relationship also be assumed as an incentive for appealing to our 
presumably internal vast resources, because there are no external resources that Ruist 
selfhood can rely on? 
Therefore, in Tu’s account (1985:22), one’s worthiness of a relationship is 
evaluated according to ‘socially recognized forms’. Undoubtedly, I find that this is the 
only way through which one can establish what Tu calls ‘the communication necessary 
for self-cultivation’ (ibid.), since there is no external source of authority to be addressed 
or relied upon. Besides, self-realization is evaluated by actual achievement in 
harmonizing human relations (ibid.:55). Therefore, I argue that when this kind of 
performance-based self-cultivation combines with a traditional expression of shame-
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based Chinese culture, the problem of a destructive kind of repressive social imposition 
becomes unavoidable. 56  Moreover, as found in C4S.2, it shows that the outward 
appearance and expression of morality in the context of gaining social recognition is 
inevitably far more important than the internalized morality achieved by self-
transformation in the light of Tu’s interpretation.57 As a result, it inescapably conceives, 
cultivates and fosters the tendency to cultivate a RFS. 
From this perspective, the post-traditional Chinese self is designed to contribute to 
its PTRIC society, and so to be accepted by it and survive it. The collective self or great 
self is always given more value and authority than the individual self or small self in the 
resistant Tu’s account (C4S4.1 and C4S4.5), even if some other scholars, such as Hsieh 
Yuwei (1968:282–3), insist that the importance of the individual is equal to the 
importance of the community. Accordingly, in PTRIC societies, it is still often the case 
that to sacrifice the small self for the good of the great self is highly valued as a virtue. In 
this cultural context, to pursue the good of the small self is devalued as a selfish and 
shameful act. However, the interest or profit of the small self might not disappear from 
PTRIC society so easily. Understandably, these devalued interests tend to remain hidden 
and unexpressed while the harmony and the interests of the great self are being promoted 
publicly and sought for idealistically. 
                                                
56 This kind of understanding of classical Chinese self-cultivation is exactly a ‘performance[-]based’ one, 
as the Chinese clinical psychologist Melvin W. Wong (2001:13, 42) points out. It values a person by the 
‘measurable outcomes’ which are manifested concretely and outwardly (ibid.:42). For example, the 
‘measurable outcomes’ originally include conforming to li 禮 (p. Lǐ: rituals or the rules of propriety) in a 
Ru-influenced society; that includes fulfilling the demands of ancestor reverence (or worship) and 
embodying filial piety in families within that society (Wong, Melvin W 2001:42). Melvin W. Wong 
emphasizes that when a form of filial piety is strictly operating in a family, it can be applied to small matters 
such as the ‘grades’ children receive from school or big matters such as family members’ ‘social status and 
reputation’ (ibid.). Nadeau (2002:115f.) points out that Ruist rules of propriety are sometimes easily 
operated in an ‘oppressive’ way. 
57 This is all the more evident in a ‘fàndàodé zhǔyì de shèhuì’ 「泛道德主義的社會」 (pan-moralistic 
society) (Wen, Chongyi 1988:29–31), like PTRIC cultural contexts. Pan-moralism judges everything by 
morality. Anything measuring up to a moral standard is good. Otherwise, it is bad (Wen, Chongyi 1988:29), 
especially in politics (Tang, Yijie 1996a:60f.). See also Auyang Sunny Y. 歐陽瑩之 (p. Ōuyáng Yíngzhī) 
(2015:1–6). 
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As seen in the resistant Tu’s version of New Ruism, individual interests and rights 
in a community are recognized, but belong to the collective self instead of the individual 
self. Although the responsive Tu asserts that the self and its duties are never devalued in 
New Ruism, this is exactly what Nathan (1986b:138) denies. Nathan points out instead 
that the individual self ‘is born into society’ and ‘depends on the harmony and strength 
of the group’ but ‘cannot prosper alone’ (ibid.).58 Like the resistant Tu and some other 
modern Ruists as reflected in Munro’s (1977) research, selfishness is recognized in 
traditional Ruism as ‘a failure to perceive oneself in terms of a more comprehensive entity 
to which one belongs and a futile attempt to isolate oneself from it’.59 Tu (1985137) 
asserts that self-transformation ‘assumes the form of mastering the self’ that includes 
transforming one’s self-centredness, and so it requires a ceaseless struggle to remove 
‘selfish and egoistic desires’. From this angle, it can be reasonably understood that the 
ultimate self-transformation of a selfish self is an assumption needed to undergird the 
concept of the self as a centre of relationships. Or are they mutually related so that they 
                                                
58 Donald Munro (1977:162) even highlights the lack of the concept of an individual ‘natural rights’ in 
traditional Ruist philosophy as one of the reasons that made the reign of the Chinese Communists and 
Mao’s regime possible. This does not mean that contemporary Ruists do not recognize any personal rights, 
but that they frame personhood always within ‘typical social roles’ accompanied by ‘particular duties’ 
(ibid.). Consequently, it is very hard in the context of such ‘an organicistic conception of society’ to imagine 
that individual existence and rights can be ‘prior to joining society by consent’, let alone that ‘a society … 
has an obligation to protect those rights that existed before it’ (ibid.). Anyone claiming such rights tends to 
be charged as egotistical and so devalued as a ‘selfish’ person (ibid.). Karl Marx (1818-1883) (1845:14) 
argues against individualism by indicating that the individual in reality is ‘the ensemble of the social 
relations’. In the middle of twentieth century, an Austrian and British economist and philosopher, Friedrich 
A. Hayek (1899-1992) (1944; 1949), warned against collectivism as ‘the Road to Serfdom’ 
(totalitarianism), the end of socialism. A first generation New Ruist, Qián Mù 錢穆 (1895-1990) (1974:184) 
identified the direct link from collectivism to communism. Lucian Pye (1988:30–74) argued that the 
significant common deeper psycho-cultural root of a post-traditional Ru-based collectivist selfhood is 
shared by two opposing political cultures in modern China: Maoism and Dengism. See also Edwards 
(1986:44), Shenkar and Ronen (1987:573), Julia Ching (1993 in Ching, Julia and Küng 1993:86–8), Jones 
(2001:164–5), and Sunny Y. Auyang 歐陽瑩之 (p. Ōuyáng Yíngzhī) (2015). 
59 Munro’s argument (1977:162) is supported by his quotation from the words of Chu Hsi in the Zhāngzi 
zhī Shū Yī 《張子之書一》64, ‘selfish intentions separate, causing a polarity between the self and things’ 
(translated by Munro). One of the founders of modern New Ruism, Liang Shuming (1949 reprinted in 
2005:81), emphasized that human relations in traditional Ruism are ethical relations, and so obligatory 
relations. Consequently, he (ibid.:111) highlighted ‘impersonal feeling[s]’, namely unselfishness and 
obligation, instead of ‘common rights’, as the most important in establishing the ‘common values’ within 
a community (Zhang, Lily 2011:829). 
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entail each other? From this perspective, it seems that any self to some extent must be 
consistently suppressed by a communal ideology. This may prove true either directly, or 
indirectly. 
As mentioned in C3S1.1.2, the resistant Tu seemed to adjust his definition for an 
‘authentic’ person from being ‘truthful’ to both one’s inner self and one’s social 
relationships by means of sincerity (1979a:19ff., 68-81) to being ‘honest with oneself’ 
and ‘loyal [or considerate] to others’ (1985:52, 68). But in Tu’s (1979a:20, 22) definition, 
being truthful to one’s social relationships means ‘making sincere attempts to harmonize 
his relationships with others’. Along with his overall thinking and logic and also the 
common understanding of the term ‘harmonize’ in the context of modern Chinese 
language (see also A-EF63), it implies that in Tu’s account being loyal and considerate 
to others is more important than being honest with them because ‘worthy of a 
relationship’ is always the precondition for the self in Ruist self-cultivation as disclosed 
in C4S4.2. 
It is notable that Roger Ames (2011) tries to coin a new English term and concept, 
‘role ethics’,60 in order to differentiate what he (ibid.:88, 153-4) considers to be the 
                                                
60 In 1999, Henry Rosemont, Jr. (1999) had applied the concept of ‘role-bearing persons’ to Ruist relational 
ethics in differentiating it from the modern Western ethics which emphasizes the concept of ‘rights-bearing 
individual’. Literally, ‘shenfen lunli’ is to be translated as identity ethics or status ethics. It has been noted 
that, in as early as 1997, Guo Hongji (1997) had already coined ‘shenfen lunli’ (role ethics) as mentioned 
in F18 in this chapter, and later in 2004, Huáng Yùshēng 黃裕生 (2004:947, 950), a Chinese philosopher, 
had coined ‘juésè lúnlǐ’「角色倫理」(translated directly into English as role ethics), to categorize Ruist 
relational ethics. Tu Weiming (2014b:website) himself identifies it as part of Ruist ethics recently. Ames 
and Rosemont (2011:17) point out that this traditional Ruist role ethics, starting in the ‘pre-Buddhist’ stage 
of early Ruism, was based on two specific visions of human beings and their moral life: (1) human beings 
are ‘relational persons constituted by the roles they live rather than as individual selves’; (2) ‘the entry point 
for developing a consummate moral competence’ is at ‘family feeling’ rather than at individual feelings. 
Robert Neville (2000:168) argues that the problem of the self was not treated profoundly in Chinese cultural 
settings until Buddhism’s influences on later traditional forms of Chinese culture were manifest in the Song 
and Ming dynasties (960-1279 and 368–1644). This observation verifies indirectly that the concern about 
the individual self was not strongly asserted in traditional orthodox Ruism. Robert Neville deems that it is 
because of the Buddhist notion of reincarnation that personal identity in traditional Chinese culture began 
to be ‘less a function of individuated relations with others and the environment’ and ‘more a matter of an 
individual’s own journey through time’ (ibid.). This is because reincarnation is a personal (individual) 
matter, just as salvation is a personal matter in Christianity. 
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‘unique’ system of Chinese moral philosophy from the ‘Western’ or ‘Greek’ one.61 This 
approach supports the similar concept Tu (1985:8–9) presents that the differences 
between self and society are not as important in traditional Chinese or post-traditional 
Ruist thinking.62 As mentioned in C4S4.3, Tu (1985:82, eo) argues that the boundary 
between ‘individual and society’ should disappear, and even the usage of first person 
pronouns as well as the word ‘self’ should be ‘reconsidered’. Hall and Ames (1998:42) 
describe in detail this similar vision of a traditional Ruist cultural design:63 
In the classical Chinese language, there is no distinction between the first person singular, I, 
and the first person plural, we. An I is always a we. Equally significant … is the absence … 
of any explicit and consistent distinction between the subjective I/we and the objective me/us. 
The I/we is embedded in the me/us. 
Even if their assertion can be criticized as being too reductionist and over-
generalized,64 it is still notable as a claim that requires some thoughtful consideration. For 
example, this manifests a form of repressed self. This is exactly one of the reasons Zhai 
Xuewei (2010:204) attributes to why there are very few studies focusing on the Chinese 
self (excluding the ones measuring it with a ‘Western scale’ of self).65 He generalizes that 
‘the Chinese individual self’, in comparison with ‘the Western one’, is not as important 
or emphasized as a Chinese cultural feature, and so is not thought to be worthy of study 
(ibid.).66 
                                                
61 See also Fáng Wěi 房偉 (2014:110). 
62 This is my independent criticism in 2014 which is supported by Huang Yusheng’s article that I found 
later in 2016. In this article, he criticizes Ruist role ethics. 
63 In his other book, Ames (2006:520) states that the Ruist self is not an individualized one. 
64 Angus C. Graham (1989:398) pinpointed their problems of generalization for the other interpretative 
issues in their earlier other book. It is worth noting that Ames, in a section of his work Confucian Role 
Ethics (2011:20–35), stresses the ‘necessity of informed generalizations’ in comparative cultural studies 
and argues that ‘the only thing more dangerous than striving to make responsible cultural generalizations 
is failing to make them’ (ibid.:23 and see also Rosemont & Ames 2010:56–7). Such an argument might not 
be convincing. Some scholars criticize either his interpretative problems of ‘generalization’ (Weber, Ralph 
2012:623) or this ‘methodological problems’ of his (Ihara & Nichols 2012:523–4) emerging in this book. 
65 See also Yang Zhongfang (1991a:48–9; 1991b:95) and Zhèng Jiādòng 鄭家棟 (2003:63). 
66 See also Pong Wenberng 彭文本 (p. Péng Wénběn) (2009:77) and Yang Yiyin (2008:152). 
192 
 
It is worth noting that the post-traditional cultural design of collectivism and its 
reinforced expression of a RFS that Hall and Ames support,67 as shown above, might 
parallel to what the resistant Tu's account supports and this will tend towards another 
cultural design of double-facedness (‘liǎngmiànxìng’ ｢兩面性｣ ) called by Zhuang 
Huiqiu (1991:157).68 In this double-facedness, two games being played out at the same 
time: one game is played out idealistically for the sake of the great self, remaining on the 
surface; and the other for the small self, which lies hidden under the surface (ibid.:157-
8). Therefore, on the one hand, if the perfection has not yet been reached in reality, the 
self tends to be repressed by social demands and so ends up wearing a personally 
unwanted social mask. On the other hand, this post-traditional Ruist cultural design of 
double-facedness makes human nature’s perfectibility impossible, since absolute 
sincerity is one of the prerequisites of its perfectibility. 
8.2 The Responsive Tu 
Based on his interpretation of the Zhongyong, the responsive Tu (1976a:52–99) presents 
the ‘fiduciary community’ as a New Ruist model for human-relatedness and sociality.69 
He depicts it as a community with reciprocal trust, one without coercive ‘pressure groups’ 
(ibid.:67).70 In facing the challenge of a pluralistic postmodern era, he presents it as a 
framework to share enough commonality for converging divergences and seeking unity 
in diversity rather than promoting a more restrictive conformity. Such an account tends 
to relieve the worries of otherwise critical scholars and liberate the RFS in PTRIC 
contexts. 
                                                
67 This view is also supported widely by other scholars, such as Donald J. Munro (1985:40), Randle R. 
Edwards (1986:44), Louis Henkin (1986:39), Andrew J. Nathan (1986b:141–7), and Lucian W. Pye 
(1988:59). 
68 Takeo Doi (1920-2009) (1986:157–63) describes this same cultural design among Japanese as a ‘2-fold 
structure of consciousness’. See also Yang Zhongfang (1991b:125–6). 
69 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:39–66). 
70 Ibid.:48. 
193 
9. Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of What Ought-To-Be 
As aforementioned, the core source causing the problem of the RFS is the suppression of 
the intents of the self by externally imposed oughts.71 David Yaufai Ho (1996:162) points 
out that Tu Weiming, a follower of the idealist Mencian line, deals exclusively with what 
ought to be the case, namely ‘the ethical question of what ought to be’. Nevertheless, Tu 
offers almost nothing that deals with what actually is the case, namely ‘the scientific 
question of what is’ occurring in PTRIC societies. Both moves are made by Tu in order 
to answer scholars’ criticisms of post-traditional vision of Ruist relational selfhood. 
Similarly, Zheng Jiadong (2003:55, eo) criticizes Tu’s approach, claiming that the ought-
to-be interpretation of modern New Ruists confuses the issues because it replaces 
historical research with philosophical interpretation. The intention of these moves by Tu 
and some other New Ruists is problematic because they tend to turn a philosophical 
‘yīngrán’ 「應然」 (ought-to-be) into a historical ‘shírán’ 「實然」 (reality).72 
9.1 The Resistant Tu 
Is the resistant Tu’s argument and defence for his interpretation of a New Ruist relational 
selfhood an unrealistic perfectionism, as I have argued above? This is originally the result 
of my own independent research, but two years later, I found some supporting evidence 
confirming my position in the writings of other scholars. 
As pointed out in C4S4.3, Tu stresses the importance of ‘moral persuasion’ and 
moral or ‘ethical education’ advancing human beings’ ‘virtue’. It implies that Tu affirms 
indirectly that humans are lacking in intrinsic goodness, consequently also the 
perfectibility of human nature.73 It is notable that this tends to support the tendency of 
                                                
71 C2S4.4, A-ES2 to A-ES5, and C4S3.4.1. 
72 This independent observation is supported by Zheng Jiadong’s (2001:2) account I found two years later. 
He pinpoints this tendency generally seen in New Ruists’ accounts. 
73 Logically speaking, promoting moral persuasion and ethical education might imply a lack of intrinsic 
goodness in human nature. However, as mentioned in S2.1.1 and S2.1.2 in this chapter, Tu’s first self-
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relying on repressive social impositions, in spite of Tu’s arguments against scholars’ 
criticisms in this realm. 
Tu puts all his faith in humans, so that he essentially rejects any other possibility. 
Although he more than once denies that his position is a romantic utopia, it is very hard 
not to view it as simply an imagined and unrealizable idealism. Over 140 years ago, James 
Legge had already expressed his doubts about whether the doctrines of the perfectibility 
and intrinsic goodness of human nature in Mencian Ruism can be sustained (Legge 1875 
reprinted in 2011b:47, 54). He further pointed out that it is not an actuality but an ‘ideal’ 
and ‘a brilliant and unsubstantial phantasm of our philosopher’s own imagining’. 74 
However, I argue that when there are no external resources that New Ruist selfhood can 
rely on in his account, Tu’s first self-cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) about human 
perfectibility can be in fact merely a beautiful ideal, serving also as an incentive for 
appealing to our internal resources, the only possible ones, because nobody has ever 
attained this ideal. This independent argument of mine relies on sources mentioned by 
other scholars.  
In his study of traditional and post-traditional Ruist political philosophy for modern 
society, Joseph Chan (2013:193–204) coins the phrase ‘Confucian perfectionism’ to 
denote the idealization of traditional and post-traditional Ruist ideal political concepts 
and framework. However, he only espouses ‘moderate Confucian perfectionism’, 
rejecting ‘extreme Confucian perfectionism’.75 Joseph Chan’s rejection of extreme Ruist 
                                                
cultivation sub-assumption (A2.1) (human nature is perfectible) is based upon his second self-cultivation 
sub-assumption (A2.2) (the intrinsic goodness of human nature). Therefore, a lack of intrinsic goodness 
would tend to the concerns related to the imperfectibility of human nature within the framework of his 
arguments. 
74 This is also what Wei Zhengtong (1990:33–9) criticizes Ruism, including New Ruists specifically. See 
also Zheng Shuchuan 鄭淑娟 (p. Zhèng Shūjuān) (2006:167–8). 
75 Although traditional and post-traditional Ruist political philosophy is totally beyond the scope of this 
thesis, its principles of governance are based on relational ethics rather than jurisprudence as mentioned in 
F44. 
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perfectionism and his espousal of moderate post-traditional Ruist perfectionism not only 
confirms the problems of traditional and post-traditional Ruist idealistic tendencies in 
relational ethics and moralism, but also verifies the contemporary necessity of offering 
substantial modifications and advocating only a partial adoption of traditional and post-
traditional Ruist relational ethics. A Korean sinologist, Song Youngbae 宋榮培 (1944-) 
(2006:255–9), also criticizes New Ruist modernization as a utopia and describes what 
Neo- and New Ruism pursue as moral idealism.76 He quotes the criticisms of Metzger 
(1933-) to pinpoint Neo- and New Ruist ‘optimistic this-worldliness’ 77  and ‘perfect 
justice’ (Metzger 1988:298–348).78 In order to get rid of such a utopian impression of 
traditional Ruism, Tu (1985:25) highlights the central concern shared by all Three 
Teachings about existential human beings: Tu claims that they are all concerned about 
‘the human condition here and now, rather than either the original position in the past or 
a utopian projection into the future’. 79  In a dialogue with Tu Weiming in Beijing, 
Moltmann also emphasized the traditional Ruist this-worldliness.80 But the resistant Tu 
continued to support that the perfection of self-transformation in New Ruism is a 
ceaseless process which never ends, even though human beings are still claimed by him 
to be perfectible. Does not what he promotes look like a utopian and optimistic this-
worldliness?81 
                                                
76 Similar criticisms of Ruified Japanese societies have been observed both by Japanese and foreign scholars 
(Ballhatchet 1988:363). 
77 Max Weber (1864-1920) (1920 translated in 1951:235) names this feature of Ruism as ‘radical world-
optimism’. 
78 See also la Barre (1946b:388) and Latourette (1943:v.1, 215). 
79 Weston la Barre (1946b:388) points out that ‘Confucius … knew that human beings could live and grow 
most happily and fully only in an atmosphere of properly cultivated interpersonal relationships’. His 
observation about the traditional Ruist context discloses not only that one’s individual value and happiness 
depend on one’s relationships with others, but also that this-worldliness is far more important than other-
worldliness. 
80 Moltmann (2010 in Chen, Miaojuan 2010:webite). 
81 Although not only in the post-traditional Ruist context, socially prescribed perfectionism has proved to 
be significantly related to problems of silencing the self, unjust social imposition, diminishing marital 
satisfaction, neuroticism, hopelessness, maladaptation, and even, in extreme cases, the tendencies towards 
196 
 
Mou Tsungsan in his Idealism of Morality (Dàodé de Lǐxiǎng Zhǔyì 《道德的理
想主義》) argues that New Ruism is a cure for the social and human problems of his 
age.82 His Ruist idealism can also be found in a context where he criticizes Christianity.83 
He emphasizes that everyone in principle can become a sage in traditional Ruism (ibid.). 
But he adds that it nevertheless is not so in reality (ibid.). Cai Meili 蔡美麗 (p. Cài Měilì) 
(1987), a philosophy scholar, criticizes traditional and post-traditional Ruist ‘dàtóng 
shìjiè’ 「大同世界」 (the stateless world of the Great Unity) as a utopian idea based on 
traditional and post-traditional Ruist relational ethics and moral self-cultivation.84 Liu 
Shuhsien (1987:228–30) as a New Ruist not only agrees with her,85 but also points out 
that the New Ruist unrealistic and unattainable idealism expressed in moral self-
cultivation — namely what Tu continues to emphasize when he argues that everybody 
can become a sage — results in producing a philosophical vice, hypocrisy.86 
Accordingly, I have also argued at great length in this work that Tu’s interpretation 
and defence of New Ruist relational selfhood itself promotes a post-traditional form of 
repressive imposition in PTRIC contexts. It confirms evidence documented in an 
empirical survey conducted by Lǐ Mǐnlóng 李敏龍 and Yang Kuoshu (1998:51) about 
the endurance of contemporary Chinese people. In their survey, nearly forty percent 
                                                
suicidal attitudes (Baumeister 1990; Hewitt and Flett 1991; Flett et al. 2007; Lucy M. Kim et al. 2011). 
Perfectionism also appears in contexts of the problems of parent-child relationships especially when it is 
contrasted to in the ‘good enough’ parent. (Bettelheim 1988; Winnicott 1992:10, 173–6) In an empirical 
study, excessive alcohol use is linked to a way ‘externaliz[ing] the causation of poor performance’ (Jones 
& Berglas 1978); another particular problem is found in an over-concern with poor performance. Yet these 
attitudes appear to be directly linked to cultivated values in New Ruist perfectionism in Tu’s account. 
82 Mou Tsungsan (1959 in 2003a:7 of Preface). 
83 Mou Tsungsan (1977, cited in The Editorial Board of Éhú Yuèkān《鵝湖月刊》編輯部 1977:3). 
84 See also Wei Zhengtong (1990:217–22). 
85 Liu Shuhsien (1987 in Cai, Meili 1987:262). 
86 It is notable that the original meaning of the Greek word ὑποκριτής, i.e.  a person of hypocrisy in English, 
is ‘play-actor’ (Moulton & Milligan 1929:657, eo) and metaphorically denotes ‘a pretender’ or ‘a 
dissembler’ (Robinson 1852:854; Liddell & Scott 1882:1631; Grimm & Wilke 1889:643). 
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identify the negative influences of the value of endurance (‘rěn’「忍」) in their mental 
health, even though all teachings about endurance in traditional Ruist or non-Ruist 
classics and traditional Chinese proverbs are positive. In facing various psychological 
situations of suppression in the process of moral self-cultivation, Tu’s and some other 
New Ruists’ solutions endow such psychological states of self-suppression with strong 
moral justifications (ibid.:11f.).87 That the boundary between the self and the other should 
be vanished in order to fulfil ‘jen [humanity] as a living metaphor’ is stressed by Tu 
(1985:11, 82) by quoting Fingarette’s (1972:36) argument that ‘in the larger context of 
Confucius’s view of man … the images of the inner man and of his inner conflict are not 
essential to a concept of man as a being’. In other words, the New Ruist solution is to 
suppress or harmonize the inner conflicts between the oughts imposed repressively by an 
external New Ruist moral code of ethics and their self-suppressed intents. Ultimately, 
even these self-confessed inner intents or desires are considered to be unjustified in post-
traditional New Ruist moral self-cultivation (Qian, Mu 1974:198).88 Will the RFS in such 
contexts be liberated? 
10. Tu’s Argument as Seen in His Account of ‘Cheng’ 「誠」(Sincerity) 
This section closes with an examination of whether or not Tu’s account of absolute 
sincerity values the individual self enough so as to liberate the repressed form of self 
which definitely appear in the other facets of the transformative cultural design in his 
account demonstrated above. From another angle of interpretation focusing on a major 
virtue in traditional Ruist self-cultivation, Tu emphasizes repeatedly the importance of 
‘cheng’ 「誠」 (sincerity) as an ultimate goal and core value in self-cultivation 
                                                
87 See also Yeh Minghua and Yang Kuoshu (1997:181, 175). 
88 See also Yuan Xinai (2008:62). 
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(1985:135).89 Absolute sincerity is viewed as both the equivalent of ‘heavenly endowed 
nature’ and an indicator for human nature’s perfection (1976a:116–121).90 As mentioned 
in C4S3.1, by quoting from the Zhongyong 22, Tu (1976a:116f.) emphasizes that only 
when one is ‘absolutely sincere’, can one ‘fully develop’ one’s nature, but also one can 
fully develop others’ natures, and the ‘nature of things’, and then help in ‘the transforming 
and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth’ and form a trinity with them. But since 
absolute sincerity is the full realization of the self, namely the full development of one’s 
nature, how can one reach absolute sincerity without having fully developed one’s nature 
and why does one still need to fully develop one’s nature when one has been absolutely 
sincere? There is an obvious logically circular reasoning in the Zhongyong that Tu does 
not pinpoint, but he regularly relies upon. 
Tu (1985:58, 131) also argues that self-transformation is ‘a deliberate communal 
act’ but ‘not reducible to its social roles’. However, the traditional cultural design for any 
account of a Ruist relational self does not allow it to refuse freely any social expectations 
and demands.91  In another place, Tu even explains through his interpretation of the 
Analects that a ‘[hu]man as an ultimately autonomous being is unthinkable, and the 
manifestation of the authentic self is impossible except in matrices of human converse’ 
(ibid.:83, eo). This is obviously basic to the relational assumption (A1) (‘the self as a 
centre of relationships’). In explaining the deeper meaning of ‘self-watchfulness when 
                                                
89 See also Tu Weiming (1976a:91–2, 139–40; 1989a:62, 90; 1990a:151–3, 160, 179). 
90 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77–9). 
91  In C2S4.4, it was mentioned through Thielicke’s observation (1959, cited in Cheng, Stephen KK 
1990:511) that Chinese people are ‘the most magnificent play-actors in the world’; lacking ‘the will to be 
individual human beings, to be themselves’. Samuel Kidd (1841:205) criticizes the doctrine of sincerity 
taught to Chinese as ‘not only to be set at defiance in practice, but to form the most striking contrast to 
existing manners’. Arthur Henderson Smith (1890:265–7) also wrote a chapter entitled ‘The Absence of 
Sincerity’ in his volume on Chinese Characteristics and points out Chinese native characteristics of 
‘pretensions, falsehood, duplicity, insincerity, and obsequious accommodation to favourable 
circumstances’ by Confucius and Mencius as two of his many evident examples. See also A-EF69, 
C1S2.2.1, C2S4, and more discussion in C8S3.3. 
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alone’, Tu (1989a:108) does not think its main purpose is for behavioural consistency 
both in private (or innermost self) and in public (self-presentation).  
By quoting Fingarette’s observation92, he (1985:82) asserts there should be no 
‘borderlines between the self and the other’. He (1989a:108) argues that ‘self-
watchfulness when alone’ is essentially for recognizing the self’s ‘own face’ and ‘own 
voice’. But what really is the self’s own face and own voice? Tu defines them as a 
‘common’ face and a sympathetically resonant voice with all the others in the community 
and nature (ibid.:108f.). He asserts that the real self, the ‘innermost core’ of the self, is 
shared with all the others in the community (ibid.:109). Since the commonality of the self 
with others is the essential meaning of this post-traditional Ruist understanding of the true 
self, also referred to as the sincerity of the self, these interpretations and arguments can 
be viewed as a post-traditional Ruist cultural design supporting the tendency of a RFS. 
Ironically, he (1985:131) emphasizes unequivocally: 
One learns to be human not to please others or to conform to an external standard of conduct. 
Indeed, learning to be human (hsüeh tso-jen) [(學做人 p. xué zuòrén)] is a spontaneous, 
autonomous, fully conscious, and totally committed intentional act, an act of self-realization. 
It gives its own direction and generates its own form and creates its own content. 
But if this is his real position, such a description can only be viewed as idealistic at best. 
If one needs to learn to be human, how can one afford to escape from repressively 
imposed social demands before one reaches this idealistic perfection which anybody, 
including Confucius himself, cannot ever attain?93  
As early in his first academic stage, Tu (1979a:20) had started to base such kinds 
of arguments on two ‘interrelated assumptions’. The first one is that ‘the ultimate ground 
of [human] self-realization lies within his[/er] own nature’, ‘inner strength’, and 
                                                
92 ‘The images of the inner man and of his inner conflict are not essential to a concept of man as a being’ 
(Fingarette 1972:36). 




‘inherent’ creativity though s/he has all the time been ‘conditioned by a given structure 
beyond his[/er] control’. The second one is that in order to ‘become a fully actualized 
human being [human] must constantly engage in the process of learning to be a sage’ in 
spite of his/er ‘ontological self-sufficiency’. Precisely speaking, these two assumptions 
themselves are problematic? How can the ultimate ground of ‘self-realization’ lies within 
one’s ‘own nature’, ‘inner strength’, and ‘inherent’ creativity while one is controlled by 
an external social structure? How can one’s ‘own nature’, ‘inner strength’, and ‘inherent’ 
creativity be recognized as ontological self-sufficient while one is controlled by an 
external social structure? And how can one fully actualize oneself by means of both 
‘ontological self-sufficiency’ and ‘the process of learning to be a sage’ while one is 
controlled by an external social structure?  
Notably, Tu actually admits that ‘[he], however, does not purport to defend the 
Confucian position by rigorous analytical argument … [but] intends to understand the 
general direction of the Confucian persuasion by a preliminary inqutry ito the concept of 
li’ (ibid., eo). Tu’s candour implies that he is not arguing for Ruist position but 
introducing and advocating what he believes in by persuasion. Accordingly, it is 
understandable why his persuasion for avoiding the problem of the RFS in his account is 
not convincing all the time. 
11. The Presuppositions within Tu’s Interpretations of New Ruist Selfhood 
Both the responsive Tu’s and the resistant Tu’s interpretations of New Ruist selfhood in 
PTRIC social contexts are established by the same assumptions, some of which are based 
on circular reasoning. It is, therefore, not meaningful to include all these assumptions as 
presuppositions in Tu’s interpretations of New Ruist selfhood. I will specify here only the 
main ones that affect the knowledge of the self, the defining elements of the self, the 
property of the self, and the transformation of the self. It is these that are relevant to the 
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tendency of the RFS. (In what follows, P stands for presupposition; the relevance of the 
concept of the self is indicated in the parentheses found at the end of each P): 
P1: Chinese Ruist classics and ‘Chinese cosmology’ (mainly involving the ‘continuity of 
being’) are the assumed sources for seemingly self-evident truths, as explained in 
C4S4.1.94 All of these works are sources of collected wisdom, observations, and 
assumptions of ancient Chinese persons mainly based on their experiences of ‘xiànshí 
shìjiè’ ｢現實世界｣ (the real world).95 (The knowledge of and the knowing by and of 
the self: Chinese Ruist classics and ‘Chinese cosmology’ as ancient Chinese persons’ 
wisdom, observations, and assumptions.) 
P2: The self is determinedly shaped by other collective selves. Self-value is established 
by and from social recognition according to social norms and values, as explained in 
C4S4.1 and C4S4.2. (The defining elements of the self: given by social recognition, 
as well as social norms and values.) 
P3: The self is a centre of relationships, an ever-expanding circle of relationships, 
developing from the structures of the self. Being worthy of a relationship is always 
the precondition for the symbiosis of the self and others, as explained in C4S4. (The 
relevant properties of the self: focusing on dimensions of relational selfhood.) 
P4: Ultimate transformation is a ceaseless collective self-cultivation, a dynamic process 
leading towards a perfect sagehood, a ‘trinity’ among Heaven, Earth and ‘humanity’, 
                                                
94 The concept of continuity of being in Chinese cosmology had not yet developed well and systemized 
until three centuries BCE, since when the Lǚshì Chūnqiū《呂氏春秋》 (Lǚ, Búwéi 呂不韋 239 BCE), the 
Chūnqiū Fánlù《春秋繁露》 (Dǒng, Zhòngshū 董仲舒 206 BCE), the Huáinánzi《淮南子》 (Liú, Ān
劉安 et al. 139 BCE), the Báihǔ Tōngyì《白虎通義》 (Bān, Gù 班固 79) had been written in succession 
(Henderson, John B 2004:104). 
95 Du Baorui and Chen Ronghua (2008:206, 223–4). The cosmology that Du Baorui and Chen Ronghua 
explain here is Chinese traditional Ruist cosmology and Chinese Taoist cosmology of the school of Lǎozi 
老子 (ca. 571-471) instead of a single and uniform of Chinese cosmology. This is held to be different from 
other Chinese cosmologies that hold to the world view of ‘tāzài shìjiè’ ｢它在世界｣ (believing the existence 
of the other world) (Du, Baorui and Chen, Ronghua 2008:223–38). Tu tends to generalize them by referring 
only to a singular ‘Chinese cosmology’. 
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as explained in C4S3. (The transformation of the self: growing through a community-
based moral self-cultivation towards becoming a perfect sage.) 
The complicated and circular relations between these various presuppositions are 
illustrated in Diagram 5.2: 
(1) P1 is a presupposition of P2, P3, and P4;  
(2) P2 is a presupposition of P3 and P4;  
(3) P3 is a presupposition of P4;  
(4) P4 is also a presupposition of P1 and P3.  
 
 
Diagram 5.2 Interrelationships between the Tu’s Presuppositions and Their Relevance to the 
Concept of the Self (The direction of the blue arrows is from the presupposed to the predicated) 
 
12. Conclusion 
The highly industrialized and materialized Chinese social development in post-traditional 
society that has become a concern internationally in the past decades prompts new 
questions. A need is recognized by some writers and scholars for a new synthesis to be 
developed between individualism and collectivism,96 while there are problems connected 
                                                
96  Other philosophers and theologians also have similar concerns, either directly or indirectly, about 
collectivism and individualism and try to argue for or present a synthesis of them. For example, Bonhoeffer 
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to both of these ethical orientations. Tu Weiming’s post-traditional interpretations of New 
Ruist selfhood aim to change the collectivist image of traditional Ruism in the past and 
to present an account of New Ruist relational selfhood that he claims to be part of an 
orthodox vision. He pictures a circumspect and ideal blueprint for a healthy 
transformative project involving self and community, and argues theoretically for his 
case. He insists that it is completely different from a PTRIC relational selfhood, because 
it does not produce a RFS and its repressive social impositions. However, the traditional 
and post-traditional Ruist tendencies of imposing repressively a relational view of self 
within modern Chinese societies is the main feature and issue related to traditional and 
post-traditional Ru-based collectivism discussed by many scholars. Tu is not ignorant of 
these criticisms of traditional and PTRIC Ru-based collectivism. The more acceptive 
responsive Tu shows the potentiality of his account to be different from this collectivism. 
But to the contrary, the resistant Tu’s relevant works are a self-conscious defence of New 
Ruism in response to these criticisms. Nevertheless, the resistant Tu does not succeed in 
saving ‘the great [cultural] tradition of the Ruist refined intellectual spirit’ from problem 
associated with Ru-based collectivism, even in spite of his efforts to describe a New Ruist 
cultural structure that is significantly distinctive from the one criticized by these scholars. 
The resistant Tu’s arguments show that he either denies the existence of the 
tendency of a RFS in orthodox Ruism, or disputes the blame imputed on post-traditional 
Ruism as an incorrect assumption or a misunderstanding. I agree that it is not easy to see 
in what way post-traditional Ruism has been distorted within PTRIC cultural contexts. 
The answers vary, depending on studies about different individuals, families, societies, 
                                                
(1930, trans. in 1998), John MacMurray (1961, reprinted in 1999), Pannenberg (1970:94–5), Alistair 
McFadyen (1990), John D. Ashcroft and Christopher Townsend (1994:100f.), Colin Gunton (1999), Robert 
Neville (2000:167–92), Andres S. K. Tang 鄧紹光 (p. Dèng Shàoguāng) (2000; 2001), Theodor Damian 
(2011), and Kwan, Kaiman 關啟文 (p. Guān Qǐwén) (2016:lecture). The last two are social trinitarianists. 
There have been many debates between collectivism (or holism, in a positive way) and individualism (Eliot 
1912). Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate: Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science (Zahle and 
Collin 2014b) is a good reference work. 
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and locations in our post-traditional pluralized age. But could ‘the great [cultural] 
tradition of the Ruist refined intellectual spirit’ be merely a scapegoat in this situation? 
Further field research which surveys PTRIC people extensively and comprehensively 
might be helpful in answering this question more objectively.97 However, would we be 
able to find a comprehensive resolution of these problems through Tu’s account of New 
Ruist relational selfhood? 
In order to maintain his New Ruism as a synthesis having the strengths of both 
individualism and collectivism, but without all of their weaknesses, his strategy in 
defending New Ruist selfhood is to prevent it from falling into the extreme collectivist 
case characterized by the serious problem of the post-traditional Ruist repressive 
impositions mentioned in C4. However, he disputes the problems of individualism by 
always referring to its extreme cases. I agree that there are no adequately justified reasons 
supporting such claims of extreme examples within either individualism or collectivism, 
except special individual cases such as individualist anarchism or extremely co-dependent 
relationships, extremely controlling families or communities, or totalitarianism, in any 
post-traditional pluralized age. The remaining problem which causes scholarly concern is 
the tendency of a Ruist RFS. In the way the resistant Tu interprets these matters, it is as 
if there will be no problem at all within a perfected New Ruist selfhood, even though he 
claims repeatedly that the process of self-cultivation is a ceaseless process. Is what he 
presents a utopian theoretical ideal of New Ruist selfhood, something unreachable as the 
ultimate goal of his synthesis?  
Some twenty years later, the responsive Tu (2007c:153) unequivocally 
acknowledged human imperfectibility in reality, but still clings to this assumption as a 
guide to New Ruist practice:  
                                                
97 For example, case studies mentioned above by Evasdottir (2005) and Moskowitz (2007) point in this 
direction.  
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Human nature … is endowed by Heaven. Yet the uniqueness of being human is our inner 
ability to learn to follow the Way. We are capable of educating ourselves to become worthy 
partners of the cosmic process. This is predicated on the assumptive reason that we are 
empowered to apprehend Heaven through our self-knowledge. As Mencius avowed, if we 
can realize the full measure of our heart-and-mind, we will know our nature; if we know our 
nature, we will know Heaven. Surely existentially we cannot fully realize our heart-and-
mind, thus, in practical terms, it is unlikely that we will ever know our nature in itself and, 
by inference, it is unlikely we will ever know Heaven in its entirety. But, in theory and, to a 
certain extent in practice, we can be attuned to the Way of Heaven (Tu 2007c:153) 
Therefore, his arguments become invalid. This is because the tendency towards 
repressive social imposition plays no part in the process of developing into the ideal 
situation in his synthesis, so that the responsive Tu’s case for New Ruist selfhood turns 
out to be the resistant Tu’s unattainable utopian goal that never actually existed and will 
never exist. According to the responsive Tu’s account, the existence of this Ruist tendency 
to repressively impose a relational self in ancient and post-traditional Chinese communal 
contexts cannot be denied.98  It is still doubtful that this tendency of the New Ruist 
repressive imposition of a relational self can be easily prevented when there is, in fact, 
only an unreachable New Ruist ideal in the current cultural context. 
Although the responsive Tu (1985:25) acknowledges the imperfection of human 
beings in reality, the resistant Tu (1985:12) still denies that New Ruist selfhood is merely 
a romantic utopia. Nevertheless, it follows that Tu’s concept of self-transcendence is 
based on a New Ruist idealism that is ultimately incomprehensible. If any externally 
transcendent God is rejected by Ruism (de Vos 1993:117), which appears to be the 
position in both the responsive Tu’s and the resistant Tu’s New Ruist accounts, then New 
Ruist selfhood itself becomes the transcendent reference point. This being the case, will 
Tu and other New Ruists be able to transcend, or precisely, surpass, their own concept of 
selfhood? No, and there seems to be not need for them to do so in their mind, in their 
                                                
98 The Ruist tendency to repressively impose a relational self is still left unresolved, even if individuality 
and autonomy are not totally destroyed in New Ruist selfhood as Tu argues. As mentioned in C4, Ruism, 
especially in the responsive Tu’s interpretation, is also concerned about and recognizes the value, interest, 
and importance of the individual, highlighting a respect for individuality. But New Ruist individualism and 
the individual are secondary to New Ruist collectivism. The New Ruist individual self merely serves the 
purposes of the contemporary community, society and New Ruist collectivism. 
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system. Or will Tu’s New Ruist selfhood be able to transcend, or precisely, surpass, itself 
towards some other kind of real transformation?  
However, if we get to the bottom of this subject, as shown in C4S3.5, Tu’s account 
manifestly reveals that, within his claims about reality, there actually is no transcendent 
reference point in his New Ruist selfhood, precisely because it is based on Heaven, but 
Heaven also cannot be a transcendent reference point. Therefore, logically speaking, there 
actually seems to be no transcendence in Ruism, in spite of what Tu and other Ruists 
claim.99 The term Heaven seems only to be borrowed to make the ultimate transformation 
of selfhood in moral excellence sound like something religious and spiritual.100 
It is evident that Heaven, transcendence, and divine in Tu’s understanding are used 
to indicate only in a metaphorical manner the unfathomable and indescribable extent of 
self-realization that human beings may achieve. This is a form of self-realization that 
moves towards perfection, but does so without transcending the plane of human self-
realization. Evidence for this claim is justified by considering his statements already 
quoted in C4S3.4.1 about the human as an indivisibly single oneness that is a coexistence, 
or in coincidence, with Heaven (Tu 1976a:128-9; 1989a:84). On the one hand, Tu exalts 
the incomprehensibility of the sage, Heaven, transcendence, and ultimate self-
transformation, but on the other hand, he rejects the possibility of a transcendent God 
because he is ‘unknowable’ or incomprehensible (Tu 1985:36, 136). Therefore, self-
cultivation is strictly a human matter in his view, even if there is a Heaven, because 
                                                
99 Li Ming (2009) argues that the complete unity between humanity and Heaven in Ruism is to represent 
the ‘horizon’ of ‘personality super-promotion’, which is another term to mean Ruist sagehood or Ruist 
ultimate self-transformation.  
100 Three years after I stated this independent argument, I found support for it in Chin Kenpa’s (2011:557–
71) criticism of New Ruist concept of Heaven. He argues that the meaning of Heaven is borrowed and 
moral subject (‘dàodé zhǔtǐ’「道德主體」) recruits this virtualized (‘xūwèihuà’「虛位化」) and non-
objectified Heaven to be the practice subject (‘shíjiàn zhǔtǐ’「實踐主體」) (ibid.:565, eo). Accordingly, 
in terms of moral metaphysics, ‘subject’, namely human beings, becomes subject-centralism ( ‘zhǔtǐ 
zhōngxīn zhǔyì’「主體中心主義」) (ibid.). 
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Heaven is not a personal being but an ultimate self-realization of human beings. 101 
Although Tu criticizes sternly the anthropocentrism developed from the European 
Enlightenment (Tu 2006:6, 11, 19), his interpretation of Ruist relational selfhood is in 
reality also still an anthropocentrism102 wearing a mask of ‘the complete unity between 
humanity and Heaven’ — Tu’s (1976a:8) New Ruist vision of ‘anthropocosmic’ 
humanism, 103  precisely because Heaven is defined in terms of human beings by 
themselves. 
So we must continue to ask, because even if selfhood itself as Tu claimss serves as 
a transcendent reference point, does the concept of self-transcendence become a vacuous 
idealism because of the incomprehensibility of selfhood and self-transcendence? 
Although Tu and other Ruists often emphasize ‘transcendence’, Tu’s assumptions 
regarding self-cultivation and rejections of any interpretive possibilities beyond his 
assumptions, obviously makes his account of New Ruist selfhood something that 
seemingly cannot be transcended.  
Besides, the perfectibility and intrinsic goodness of human nature as a Heaven-
endowed nature, along with the complete unity between humanity and Heaven as the form 
of ultimate self-transformation, are linked together in Tu’s interpretations by means of 
circular arguments. 104  Although there must always be some unproved assumptions, 
                                                
101 As Robert Neville (2000:86) points out, there is ‘nothing like a theistic notion of divine intervention or 
grace’ in Ruism. It has been noted that even though Tu has apparently come to accept the idea of the 
Christian God as a living reality when he was sixty-seven years old, he still rejects or have net yet accepted 
that such a personal external creator can be taken as a viable Ruist alternative (Tu 2007c:150, 152). See 
also Tu Weiming (2008a:445). 
102 This independent argument of mine is supported by Chin Kenpa’s (2011:564–5) argument (see F80 
above) and Fan Ruiping’s (2010:xvi–xvii) work found later at the end of my research where he further 
distinguishes ‘three forms of anthropocentricism regarding [humans’] relationship with nature[:] … a 
robustly individualistic humanism … a contractual humanism … [and] a religious humanism’. The 
discussion here about Tu’s anthropocentric account is in the form of ‘a religious humanism’ related to 
‘one’s general relationships to God or Heaven and the cosmos’ (ibid.). See also Nakamura (1964:233–5) 
103 See also Tu Weiming (1985:10; 1989a:ix; 1990a:180f.; Tu 2007c; 2008a:438). 
104 For example, if one is as perfect as described, why does one need to learn to be human? If one is not at 
all perfect as described and needs to learn to be human within the PTRIC cultural contest, how can one 
afford to escape from a relational self repressively imposed by prevailing social demands? 
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premises, or presuppositions as the basis of any belief system or philosophy, the more 
circular arguments there are in a system, the less open it is to criticism, and so the weaker 
it is.105 It is understandable that those assumptions must be based on each other, since 
within his system in his work there is no external transcendent being which serves as their 
foundation. Because of these claims, I suggest that the term surpassing, simply meaning 
progressing, would be a more proper account of this claim when applied to self-
transcending realization, rather than the term transcendence as it applies in the current 
context of Tu’s and others’ New Ruist selfhood.106 
Will Tu and other Ruists be able to transcend this conceptualization of selfhood? 
Even though Tu repeatedly stresses that the union of Ruist selfhood and the cosmos is an 
‘open system’, it seems that his assumptions about self-cultivation make essentially make 
his form 107  of New Ruism, or New Ruist selfhood, an enclosed and self-justifying 
system.108 I have argued that Tu’s New Ruist selfhood should be seen as an enclosed 
system, noting that it has no external supreme being as a source for human cultivation 
and for the legitimization of its authority. If Tu and other New Ruists are not open to any 
other possibilities, they are ultimately unable to move beyond this enclosed system.  
Nevertheless, the main reason for the resistant Tu’s failure to save New Ruism from 
the mire of collectivism is the verification that there still is a tendency of asserting a RFS 
as a part of its post-traditional Ruist cultural design, namely that the privatized self or the 
                                                
105 In spite of the claim that there are at least five circular arguments linked together as demonstrated in 
Diagram 5.1 in Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist concept selfhood, Tu still expresses his strong faith in 
those assumptions as mutually reinforcing premises and rejects any possibilities outside of them. 
106 This suggestion appears to be supported by Ames (1997:44) whose discussion about it was found at the 
last stage of this research. 
107 Three years after I stated this independent argument, I found support for it in Derk Bodde’s (1953:68) 
observation that the Chinese ‘cosmic pattern is self-contained and self-operating’. Wei Zhengtong (1988 in 
Tu, Weiming 1997a:305) also points out that the concept of the complete unity between ‘humanity’ and 
Heaven is actually a closed subject. 
108 The only openness found with this claim is merely that of the individual self towards the collective self 
(1985:57), as expressed in the quotation in C4S4.5.1. 
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small self is devalued in New Ruism.109 Since the resistant Tu’s ideal synthesis is neither 
individualistic nor collectivist, his interpretation of the New Ruist cultural design 
invalidates his arguments in distinguishing his non-collectvist claims from collectivism. 
In this context, it is very difficult for the resistant Tu to eliminate the problem of imposing 
repressively a Ruist relational selfhood by merely denying that it happens. In addition, a 
specific New Ruist cultural design is consequently enhanced by Tu’s repeated emphases 
on the importance of communal self-effort and communal attainment in an ultimate self-
transformation as a communal act. In the end, the only way one can define the self is 
through one’s relationships with other collective selves.110 
 As a result, Tu’s interpretations of New Ruist selfhood do not convince one that 
‘the great tradition of the Ruist refined intellectual spirit’ is just a scapegoat when it is 
blamed for repressively imposing a relational self on persons. Although Tu continues to 
emphasize within his thesis that all human relationships would be based on ‘equality 
without uniformity’, the meaning of ‘equality’ in this context of a New Ruist relational 
selfhood only refers to a possible theoretical state between two particular selves, and not 
a substantially supported social reality observed in PTRIC societies.  
                                                
109 Some scholars — for example, Donald J. Munro (1977:40), R. Randle Edwards (1986:44), and Lucian 
Pye (1988:71) — view such a cultural design as stemming from a traditional Ru-based collectivist ‘Chinese 
ideal’ (Hall and Ames 1998:24). 
110 The sociologist Ambrose Y. C. King (1992:ix, 9-13) asserts that neither collectivism nor individualism 
is the central thought of Chinese Ruism. The individual is neither independent nor dependent but 
interdependent with others. He argues that the Chinese individual in Ruism is a ‘relational being’ with self-
centred spontaneity and autonomy in one’s relational nexus (ibid.:10). Although one cannot escape from 
the nexus where one belongs, especially one’s family, one has enough freedom and space to choose the 
nexus and decide the boundary between one and others. However, he also notes that Chinese Ruism does 
not provide an ethics to guide one to establish a relationship with strangers, outside one’s relational nexus. 
Accordingly, one will become aggressive without constraint under one’s nexus. One, with total freedom, 
will behave or act differently, even beyond the reasonable boundary of morality and ethics. His explanation 
is that the Chinese individual is no longer a Ruist relational being in front of strangers. Ruist value loses 
the moral binding to the individual. Does Ambrose Y. C. King’s interpretation of Ruist relational selfhood 
indirectly provide the evidence that the RFS is cultivated in Ruist relational ethics? It is worth noting that 
he does not specify his Chinese Ruism and tends to be too reductionist and generalizing. But according to 
his discussion on the rational traditionalism in Hong Kong (ibid.:152-69), Chinese Ruism should denote 
the idealized great tradition of Ruist spirit because he specifies the one existing in Hong Kong as ‘social’ 




Therefore, the issue is not whether the resistant Tu’s New Ruism completely 
ignores or denies these problems, but whether the responsive Tu’s New Ruism respects 
and emphasizes it enough to prevent any repressive social impositions to emerge within 
the post-traditional cultural design of (Ru-based) collectivism. 111  From the above 
analysis, the answer is that in the responsive Tu’s account it might be possible if he allows 
for flexibility in adjusting the presuppositions undergirding his account. Otherwise, due 
to the multi-faceted circular reasonings of his four presuppositions, the answer still tends 
to be negative. The individuality of PTRIC selves as well as the equality between them 
in the society, not to speak of between selves and society, cannot otherwise be sustained 
because society and its relations would still determinedly shape the self according to 
presuppositions P2 and P3 (S10).112 
Accordingly, it would be worthwhile if Tu and other New Ruists would check 
whether the egocentrism that they generally claim to oppose can still be found as a facet 
of their New Ruist selfhood.113 Any Ruist cultural design that devalues the privatized self 
or the small self, because of egocentrism, supports a hierarchical social structure that 
tends to promote those unhealthy repressive situations for the small self.  
Do these results lead us to the conclusions that New Ruism needs to be interpreted 
and justified in better ways? Do these indicate that some assumptions of New Ruism 
should be modified? Do these also reveal that traditional Ruism or New Ruist selfhood 
                                                
111 This challenge can be also applied to Ambrose Y. C. King and Michael H Bond’s defence (1985) of the 
Ruist individualistic dimension due to Ruist spirit of ‘keeping to the middle way’ (zhōngyōng zhī dào 中
庸之道) and Thomas A. Metzger’s defence (1988) for Modern Ruist Humanists’ emphasis on ‘the moral 
autonomy of the individual’. Both of their arguments also seem to ignore the empirical evidence that reveals 
the signs and symptoms for the existence of a Ru-influenced RFS. It is notable that emphasizing moral 
autonomy can be also a way of imposing oughts instead of encouraging intents on the inferior individual in 
the context of Ruist imbalanced relational ethics. 
112 The standard of interpersonal equality cannot be realized in PTRIC cultural contexts between one self 
and the larger communal society. Put another way, cultural design lacks a concept of constitutionality, so 
that the rights of an individual will not be protected by the whole group. 
113 Whenever self-realization in reality has not yet been reached, the traditional or post-traditional Ruist self 
is repressively imposed on by social demands. 
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becomes an enclosed system because of some unchangeable assumptions? Do they 
suggest that there would be some other possible interpretative options which New Ruism 
might find outside its own traditional resources? These are the questions which deserve 
to be explored by New Ruists and Ru-inspired Chinese intellectuals. However, a solution 
for the RFS in both PTRIC contexts and New Ruist context is necessary, as the evidence 
explored here has shown. It is in this light, and for these reasons, that a completely 








Jürgen Moltmann’s Understanding of Self 
1. Introduction 
I have argued in the preceding chapters that the relational selfhood in PTRIC contexts is 
the main factor contributing to the research problem of the RFS. I also found that Tu 
Weiming’s resistant account of New Ruist relational selfhood is almost the same as the 
conceptualization of relational selfhood in the PTRIC contexts criticized by the scholars, 
in terms of the research problem. Even though the responsive Tu’s account shows the 
potentiality to overcome the research problem, the presuppositions of his account are not 
at all adjustable for him. Accordingly, a completely different solution or some other 
culturally synthetic alternative for this problem in PTRIC contexts is necessitated. So 
what about the self in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology? Has it not been 
the impression that Christianity, especially trinitarianism, has promoted a view of 
European individualism1 — inaugurated by Augustine, augmented by the Enlightenment, 
and finalized by Kant (1724-1804) (Grenz 2001:60, 76)?2 I am interested to discover to 
what extent Moltmann’s thinking about the Trinity can escape this problem of 
individualism (Robbins 2012). For, as introduced in C3S1.2.2, the self in the account of 
trinitarian theological anthropology is indeed also a form of ‘relational self’ (Boff 
                                                
1 Through his works, surveys, and review of studies among Christian converts in different ethnic people 
groups, Joel Robbins (2012:5, 18f.) concludes that Christianity fosters ‘various kinds of individualism’. 
See also Hayek (1944:14). 
2 Based on the Early Fathers’ models of inter-personal ‘distinction of the divine hypostases’, Augustine 
assumes ‘internal relations within the Godhead’. But he dissociates completely ‘these eternal intra-
trinitarian relations from ordinary human relations’, so that he cannot but shape ‘a rather static concept of 
the deity’ and ‘an individualistic concept of humanity’ (Kaiser 2001:95). Grenz states that ‘Kant provides 
the final intellectual foundation for the shift to radical individualism’, because he develops ‘the capstone 
on the construction of the Enlightenment self’. He elevates the ‘active mind as the definitive agent both in 
the knowing process and in the life of duty, [and so] completed the turn towards the knowing subject’ 
(Grenz 2001:76). See also Moltmann (1998a:32) and Gunton (2003:93–5). 
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1988:149).3 But is such a relational self different in kind from the one supported by the 
Ru-Based collectivism in Tu’s New Ruism? Can its perspective be applied to provide an 
alternative solution (or a modification reference) for the RFS resulting from PTRIC 
relational selfhood? In other words, are there any significant differences offered by the 
notion of a relational self following from Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian 
relational selfhood, namely social trinitarian anthropology, which might prove insightful 
and effective in responding to the tendency of the RFS in PTRIC contexts? This chapter 
will aim to discuss Moltmann’s distinctive account of relational selfhood. Before doing 
that, Moltmann’s theological method had better be first introduced. 
2. Brief Introduction of Moltmann’s Theological Method 
Moltmann (2000a:xiv, eo) did not begin his series of theological works with a so-called 
‘prolegomena’. In other words, he did not do his theology in a fixed method adopted 
beforehand ‘but only as it was applied’ because he is not interested in theological method 
and its related questions but in the ‘real content of theology’ (ibid.:xiv-xv). To revise 
‘theological issues’ based on their ‘biblical origins’ and to renew or rework them in facing 
the present challenge are more important to him (ibid.). Accordingly, theology for him is 
always ‘an adventure of ideas’ (ibid.:xv). Its methods are like an open and inviting road 
which ‘emerged only as [he] walked it’ (ibid.:xv, eo). His ‘personal biography … the 
political context[,] and historical kairos [(opportune moment)]’ in which he lives 
determine his road (ibid.:xv). However, he wrote Experiences in Theology (2000, German 
original in 1999) as an afterword for explaining the methods he had applied in his previous 
theological works (ibid.:xiv, xvi). 
                                                
3 See also Grenz (2001:312). 
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First, Moltmann argues the indispensability of natural theology 4  in Christian 
theology (ibid.:64). He asserts three possible functions it has for Christian theology 
(ibid.:64-79):  
(1) ‘Natural theology is the general presupposition for specifically Christian theology’ 
(ibid.:65-70, eo); 
(2) ‘Natural theology is the consequence and the eschatological goal of historical and 
Christian theology’ (ibid.:70-73, eo); and 
(3) ‘Christian theology itself is the true natural theology’ (ibid.:73-79, eo). 
Luther (1518:52-5) opposed natural theology as ‘the theology of glory’. But does he 
question whether God’s self-revelation is in nature itself? Moltmann does not think so. 
He (2000:78) thinks the reason why Luther opposed it is rather because of its abuse by 
‘godless, self-deifying’ persons. He agrees with Luther that ‘the theology of the cross’ 
must come first to make the sinners who have gone astray right, namely making them 
justified by faith (ibid.). Accordingly, ‘the analogy of essence’ comes after ‘the analogy 
of faith’ and the theology of glory comes after the theology of cross (ibid.:79, eo). 
Likewise, ‘after the theology of grace [comes] the theology of nature, and after the 
theology of nature natural theology’ (ibid.). Consequently, he consider it as ‘a task for 
Christian theology’ (ibid.:79). Based on it, public theology can be developed, especially 
in facing the ‘new ecological crises’ (ibid.: 80). 
Secondly, in terms of ‘the reasonableness of faith’ (ibid.:45), Moltmann holds 
together Anselm and Aquinas, the mythic theology and the scholastic theology,5 and so 
                                                
4 Moltmann (2000a:64, eo) defines ‘natural theology’, derived from the ancient Stoicism, in Christian 
theological framework as ‘a discernment or knowledge of God derived from the book of nature, with the 
help of innate human reason’. He explains that ‘[it] is not self-evident, emerging of itself from observations 
of nature. It springs from a Christian theology of nature’ (ibid.:69). However, he does not think that it can 
stay still within ‘the closed Christian circle’ because such a natural theology must be ‘a cosmological and 
biological interpretative suggestion’ (ibid.).  
5  Although both Anselm and Aquinas are scholastic theologians, their positions are different in ‘the 
reasonableness of faith’ (Moltmann 2000a:45–8). Anselm’s is ‘from faith to understanding’ (ibid.:47) but 
Aquinas’ is the reverse (ibid.:48). 
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‘the modern subjectivity of faith and the modern objectivity of scientific or scholarly 
knowledge’ in his theological methods (ibid.:48). In his ‘theological epistemology’, not 
only does Moltmann draw on Aristotle’s ‘axiom of likeness’, namely ‘like is only known 
by like’, as his principle of cognition for knowing God (ibid.:151, eo), but also he argues 
that knowing and talking about God by us ‘who are not like God’ must be done ‘through 
negation and apophaticism’ as well as by means of ‘analogy and metaphor’ (ibid.:151). 
He (ibid.:166, eo) argues that the ‘negative or apophatic theology’ 6  is necessary a 
‘corollary of analogical theology’:7 
Nothing positive can be deduced from negations. It is only if the positive is experienced that 
negative paraphrases for it can be found. Negative theology is theology first of all, otherwise 
it insensibly becomes the atheistic negation of theology. So negative theology remains bound 
to affirmative theology as a necessary corrective, just as apophatic theology remains 
necessarily bound to cataphatic theology. It is a corrective, not a paradigm. (ibid.:169, eo) 
Based on the above epistemological assumptions, he presents the principle of ‘dialectical 
knowing’ God, namely ‘unlike knows unlike’ (ibid.:169-73, eo). It is only in the realm of 
‘what is essentially different’ from God that He can be ‘perceived as God’ (ibid.:172). 
Thirdly, Moltmann does not begin from any adopted theological position and read 
from there into the biblical text but bases his theology on the biblical story of Christ in 
particular. For example, the point of departure of his trinitarian theology is ‘the three 
Persons of the history of Christ’ in the biblical testimony (Moltmann 1981:149). If 
philosophical logic is made the starting point, then in the context of discussing ‘Jesus was 
a Jew’, he (1967:141) asserts that the path of knowledge in theology ‘leads irreversibly 
from the particular to the general, from the historic to the eschatological and universal’. 
For example, he (ibid.:17, eo) explains: 
Christian eschatology … sets out from a definite reality in history and announces the future 
that reality, its future possibilities[,] and its power over the future … [It] speaks of Jesus 
                                                
6 Negative theology, or Apophatic theology, is a theological approach to describe God only in terms of 
what He is not, instead of presumptuously attempting to describe what God is (Lossky 1948 renamed and 
edited in 2001:13–30). 
7 In the ‘principle of analogy’, human beings’ ‘similarities’ to God are perceived ‘in still [their] greater 
dissimilarity’ to Him (Moltmann 2000a:155–61, 167–8, 172, eo). 
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Christ and his future … [and recognizes the reality of the raising of Jesus and proclaims the 
future of the risen Lord 
Moltmann (1971:4–11) rejects reading the historical witnesses ‘like a palimpsest’ 
(ibid.:5), especially applying to both cosmological and anthropological starting points. 
He explains: 
For the concrete texts of God, a generally approachable text is substituted through which the 
Bible is to become more readable and more understandable...Interpretation then becomes a 
bridge between the witness of a specific history and a sphere of generally accessible 
possibilities which recur through the ages. (ibid.) 
For him (1967:142), a general truth in Christ does not become particular, ‘but a 
concrete, unique, historic event of the crucifying and raising of Jesus by Yahweh [the 
creator] … becomes general through the universal eschatological horizon it anticipates’.8 
Accordingly, this particular history of Jesus will affect everything.9 
It is worth noting that the Bible for Moltmann (2000a:xxii) is not ‘an authoritative 
blueprint and confining boundary’ but ‘a stimulus’ to the development of his own 
theology. However, what he means by such an assertion is about the transcultural and 
timeless relevance and application of ‘the matter of Scripture’ to the different cultural 
contexts of believers or its readers in different eras (ibid., eo). He explains that ‘the 
scriptural form of the matter’ is not important even though we reach ‘the substance’ only 
by way of that form. Only its matter pointing into believers’ future beyond the times and 
cultural contexts in which Scripture was written is relevant (ibid.:xxii). 
                                                
8 Cf. Moltmann (1967:194). 
9 Moltmann (1970:1f,) states that ‘Christian theology ... merges with specific recollection a universal and 
absolute claim ... As long as the dialectical unity of particular history and special historical mediation with 
the universally relevant that pertains directly to everyone can be retained ... Christianity is alive’. In other 
words, in his understanding, Christianity depends on ‘the unity of Jesus with God and of God with Jesus’. 
For ‘as soon as the dialectical unity between history and absolute is broken, Christianity disintegrates’. 
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3. Moltmann’s Social Trinitarian Anthropology10  
As described above in C3, Moltmann himself advocates freedom for the oppressed in 
many aspects and criticizes patriarchy. Nevertheless, instead of promoting individualism, 
he (1989:89) values much more ‘communalism’ and ‘personalism’ (‘réngé zhǔyì’「人格
主義」) (2000b:64).11 For him (2008b:72), the identity of individuals is shaped by the 
collective continuity of ‘the contract between the generations’ (1989:90) handed down 
from generation to generation, namely by the community existing between the 
generations at any one time. This is so in addition to the identity received from the imago 
Dei, upon which both ‘somatic identity’ (1990a:261–2), and ‘historical identity’ are based 
(ibid.:262). As mentioned in C2, Moltmann (2000a:333)12 like Tournier also makes a 
distinction between ‘an individual and a person’.13 Through tracing back the definition of 
individual as ‘something … indivisible’ in both Latin and Greek, the separate and isolated 
individual without relationships is not identical to a person (ibid.). A person is an existing 
human being with sociality and history.14 Moltmann highlights both the importance of 
securing personal liberation and protecting personal dignity as a human and the value of 
communities where people make decisions socially about their lives for themselves 
(ibid.). For he understands and explains the nature of true human community based on 
the divine community (ibid.),15 because the precedent for that community comes from the 
image of the triune God who is the Creator, the Lord, and the possessor of the earth.  
                                                
10 The Chinese brief version of S2, and S4 to S7 in this chapter were created and will be published in 2018 
(Hwang, Tsungi {forthcoming}2018:S3), but this English one was the original text. 
11 See also Moltmann (1967:304–28). 
12 See also Moltmann (2002a:7). 
13 As early as in the fourth century, the Cappadocian Fathers differentiated the person, in ‘love and 
relationship with others, from the individual, isolated from others (Zizioulas 1995:58–9). 
14 In terms of social trinitarian anthropology, a person’s history includes a forgiven past, a reconciled 
presence, and a promised redeemed future with hope. 
15 See also Moltmann (1981:198). 
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Moltmann (1985a:215–43) presents the imago Dei as an ‘analogy of relation’ 
(ibid.:220) (‘analogia relationis’) (ibid.:77), namely ‘social likeness to God’ (ibid.:234), 
seeking to differentiate it from an ‘analogy of substance’ (ibid.:219).16 From this aspect 
of relations, Moltmann (1981:197–200) explains this image as the mirror of the trinitarian 
life within relationships. Therefore, in his social trinitarian anthropology, following the 
thought of the Eastern Orthodox Church (ibid.:171-178), he (1981:134–200) affirms that 
‘individuality’ and ‘sociality’ are inseparable, and social relations are not to be prioritized 
over ‘personal identity’.17 Just as the unity and the distinction among the trinitarian 
Persons are equally preserved without sacrificing anything among them, so too human 
persons and relations are equally valued and maintained.18 The concept of the imago Dei 
in terms of relationships and community echoes Moltmann’s (1977) concept of ‘open 
friendship’ (ibid.:119-121), ‘open fellowship’ (ibid.:111, 189,343, 360), and ‘open 
church’ (ibid.:2, 334, eo) presented earlier, his understanding of which, argued by 
Bauckham (1995:126–30), can be traced back to his Theology of Hope. Such an open 
fellowship and church are realized and accessed by God’s grace instead of by the merits 
of human beings. Therefore, this kind of relational self in social trinitarian anthropology 
is developed from Moltmann’s concept of relationship, community and fellowship, all of 
those being based on his understanding of the imago Dei. Still, and here we come to a 
central question, is this kind of relational self able to escape or resist the tendency of 
                                                
16 ‘An analogy of substance’, by McDougall’s explanation (2003:191), ‘focuses on a singular attribute 
inherent in human beings, such as the rational soul or the will’ and ‘fixes the likeness to God in the 
individual’s possession of such a capacity’. 
17 Ibid.:192. 
18 Person in Christian theological language to indicate the distinct trinitarian Persons of God, the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit, means ‘the individuality of each Persons who simultaneously exists in itself 
and in eternal communion with the other two’ (Boff 2000:123). Its origin is persona in Latin and πρόσωπον 
in Greek referring to the actors’ varieties of masks representing their varieties of personae in the play on 
stage (Geddes 1911). ‘[l]argely due to the theologians who hit upon it when they were looking for some 
term that would enable them to assert the trinity of Godhead without admitting more than one ‘substance’, 
it is then adopted to denote an individual human being (Barfield 1967:59, eo). 
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repressive social impositions and the RFS as a product of a Ru-based cultural design in 
PTRIC contexts? 
In order to answer the second primary subsidiary research question in this thesis –
To what extent is the conceptualization of the social trinitarian relational selfhood 
presented by Jürgen Moltmann a suitable alternative or modification reference for 
solving the problem of the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the post-
traditional Ru-influenced Chinese relational selfhood? — several relevant secondary 
subsidiary questions will need to be examined first. 
(1)  What does Moltmann understand by the imago Dei and gracious moral cultivation19 
(moral transformation by Christ’s grace) disclosed in his social trinitarian 
anthropology in dealing with this research problem? 
(2)  How does the open community in Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology 
confront and overcome the research problem, if it can do so? 
(3)  What are the theoretical presuppositions undergirding Moltmann’s social trinitarian 
anthropology?  
4. Historical Doctrine of the Trinity: The Triune God 
Moltmann (1981:19) first developed a ‘historical doctrine of the Trinity’ (or trinitarian 
history of God) 20 by beginning with ‘the history of Jesus the Son’. He then developed ‘a 
social doctrine of the Trinity’ in distinction to what he calls ‘abstract monotheism’ 
(ibid.:3, 17).  
                                                
19 See S8.5. 
20 The phrase historical doctrine of the Trinity used here by Moltmann is not about the history of dogma or 
historical theology. It denotes a notion of the triune God who engages in history and indeed possesses a 
history of His own. 
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4.1 The Issue of Abstract Monotheism 
For Moltmann (1981:16–18), both the Trinity of a homogenous divine substance as well 
as the Trinity of an identical divine subject result unwittingly in the collapse of trinitarian 
doctrine into abstract monotheism. The former is derived from the ‘general concept of the 
divine substance’ (‘una substantia － tres personae’, or one substance － three Persons) 
proposed by Tertullian (155-240) (ibid.:19). The latter is derived from the ‘general 
concept of the absolute subject’ (‘one subject － three modes of being’) proposed by 
Hegel (1770-1831) (ibid.).  
In the former, God’s existence and uniqueness are to be proved and assured first, 
by means of the cosmological argument, namely derivations logically drawn from the 
premise of the existence of ‘an ordered cosmos’ (ibid.:19). Then the three Persons of this 
existing God are to be explained by the doctrine of the Trinity. Accordingly, not only is 
the unity of the three divine Persons stressed unduly, but also the triune God tends to be 
reduced to the One God (ibid.:13-17).  
In the latter, God is presented as the absolute subject, namely ‘God reveals Himself 
through Himself’. In other words, God communicates Himself in ‘this triadic way’, 
namely the Father is the ‘I’, the Son the ‘self’, and the Spirit as ‘the identity of the divine 
I-self’ (ibid.:18, eo). In this portrayal of the Deity, there are no interpersonal relationships 
between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. The conceptualization of the absolute subject 
is based on ‘anthropological reasons’ (ibid.:15). In the light of such reasons, the centre 
and reference point of this world is ‘the human subject’ rather than a supreme divine 
substance; ‘the unity of what is real’ is not determined theocentrically and 
cosmologically, but anthropologically. Accordingly, the concept of the absolute subject, 
namely ‘God as person’ (ibid.:4), is to confirm God’s sovereignty and liberty, in order to 
prevent God from being a passively changeable object that would reduce God to the level 
of creation. However, this homogenization of divine subjects cannot but reduce the plural 
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concept of Persons to ‘the one, identical God-subject’ (ibid.:18, 189). Consequently, this 
approach reduces the language of three Persons to an alternative ‘non-subjective 
expression’, for example, ‘mode of being’ (ibid.:15-18, 63). Therefore, ‘the unity of the 
absolute subject’ is easily reduced to merely three aspects of the one subject, three modes 
of being (tending towards modalism)21 (ibid.:18).  
In the Western European Church tradition, the discussion of the Trinity started from 
‘God’s unity’ (mainly employing the above two types), and then moved to discuss His 
trinity (ibid.:2, 19). Instead, Moltmann (1981:19) begins with the trinity of the Persons, 
required to narrate the particular history of Jesus Christ according to the Biblical witness, 
and then goes on to discuss their unity, namely ‘a concept of the divine unity as the union 
of the tri-unity’. Therefore, Moltmann’s social doctrine of the Trinity in the trinitarian 
history of God is in fact an attempt to build a dialectical synthesis22 between the thesis of 
God as the supreme substance (God as supreme object) and the antithesis of God as the 
absolute subject based on modalism (God as supreme subject). 
To sum up, even if the Western European Christian churches all reached a 
consensus in confessing trinitarianism, the tendency to abstract monotheism in 
Moltmann’s eyes appeared alongside it for the purpose of preventing the churches from 
falling into the trap of tritheism. 23  But how can we balance, on the one hand, the 
distinctiveness of the three Persons without falling into tritheism and, on the other hand, 
their unity without falling into abstract monotheism (erroneously as one substance)?24 
                                                
21 Three modes of being or modalism refer to the concept that the three Persons of God are not in fact 
‘distinct from one another’, but just the one God expressed in different guises or roles (Rea 2003:443). 
Therefore, Moltmann criticizes modalism as ‘abstract monotheism’ (Moltmann 1981:16–18). 
22 This phrase is suggested by Jeremy Law in our discussion on 29 July 2013. 
23 Tritheism interprets trinitarianism as not a monotheism but as that ‘there are three eternals or three who 
are eternal, three Gods or … three who are God’ (Plantinga 1989:37). Such a God who is conditioned by 
other Gods could not be truly God. 
24 Lin Honghsin (2010:30) does not think ‘an absolute balance’ between the distinctiveness of the three 
Persons and their unity can be maintained in reality. This is because even the definition or demarcation for 
such a balance is difficult to express concretely. 
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The former is the most common criticism25 levelled against the social trinitarian doctrine 
(Brown 1989:48);26 later we shall see how Moltmann also makes his own criticism along 
this line.27  
4.2 The Eucharistic Form of Trinity  
In order to explain the reciprocal relationships between the three Persons of the triune 
God further, and so to distinguish them from the concept of the Trinity of the identical 
subject (God as absolute subject), Moltmann (2009b:299) presents ‘the eucharistic form 
of Trinity’. In this from, ‘activity proceeds from the Spirit and with the Son in the 
direction of the Father’ (ibid., eo). In differentiating this form from the ‘monarchical form 
of the Trinity’ in which the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son, he highlights 
the role of the Spirit ‘as the real subject’, namely ‘the Spirit glorifies the Son and the 
Father’, instead of acting in a ‘subordinate’ and ‘purely passive’ position to them 
(ibid.:298-300). In the light of the trinitarian history of God, Moltmann understands 
different forms of the Trinity at different historical points. The monarchical form of the 
Trinity is understood in the light of the origin of the trinitarian history of God towards the 
past (Moltmann 1977:53–6; 2009b:298–300). 28 The initiative lies with the Father who 
                                                
25 Such as John Milbank (1986:223), Kelly James Clark (1996), Edward C. Feser (1997), Karen Kilby 
(2000), Brian Leftow (2002; 2010), Sarah Coakley (2002), Richard Cross (2002), Daniel Howard-Snyder 
(2003), Norman Metzler (2003), Dale Tuggy (2003; 2011; 2013), Jeffrey E. Brower (2004), Michael C. 
Rea (2006), Trenton Merricks (2006), Brandon Carey (2011), David W. Congdon (2012:website), and 
Vincent Brümmer (2013:97–106). 
26 See also McCall (2003:406; 2009:340), Meeks (2006:13), Chalamet and Vial (2014:6), and Venter 
(2015:3). 
27 Besides Moltmann, some other theologians, such as Claude Welch (1952:259, 281–290), Joseph A. 
Bracken (1974a; 1974b; 1985:24–5), C. Stephen Layman (1988), Plantinga Cornelius, Jr. (1989), David 
Brown (1989), Peter Forrest (1998), Thomas Morris (2001:210–18), Kim Byunghoon (2002), J. P. 
Moreland and William Lane Craig (2003:575–96), Tom McCall (2003), J. Scott Horrell (2004), Carl 
Mosser (2009), William Hasker (2010), and Gijsbert van den Brink (2014), also defend for the social 
trinitarian doctrine against such a criticism. 
28 It is notable that Moltmann follows the theological tradition in the understanding of the monarchical form 
of the Trinity in the light of the trinitarian history of God. However, he (2009a:289, 327, eo) rejects ‘all 
monadic and all monarchical concepts of unity’ or ‘monarchical monotheism of the Lord God’. Although 
he does not differentiate his usages of monarchical in different contexts, the former monarchical might 
mean more functionally but the latter two more substantially. 
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sent the Son and the Holy Spirit. But he (1981:188–9) accentuates that the concept of 
origin here is not about generation but understood only ‘in a transferred sense’. The 
‘messianic’ form of the Trinity is understood in the light of Christ’s ‘messianic mission’ 
in the trinitarian history of God towards the future. The initiative lies with the Son who 
consummates his sending ‘in his self-giving’ and his incarnation ‘in his death’ (Moltmann 
1977:56–7). The Eucharistic form of Trinity is understood in the light of the 
eschatological trinitarian history of God. The initiative lies with the Holy Spirit who 
glorifies the Father and the Son through Christ’s ‘transfiguration, resurrection … 
exaltation, and the consummation of the lordship of God (Moltmann 1977:57–60; 
2009b:298–300). In the light of the ‘eschatological goal’ of trinitarian history of God and 
‘the completion of God’s history with the world’, all of the above forms of the Trinity are 
‘gathered up and transcended’ into ‘the trinitarian doxology of the eternal God’, namely 
‘the fellowship of the Spirit with the Father and the Son’ (Moltmann 1977:57–60; 
2009b:298–300, eo). 
Moltmann (1981:64) also argues for ‘the eucharistic form of Trinity’ by stating that 
the Son and Father reveal each other (Matthew 11:27; Galatians 1:16) rather than God 
reveals God-self. It is not that God gave of Himself for us. But God simply gave His own 
Son up for us (Romans 8:32), and the Son, as subject, ‘gave himself for me’ (Galatians 
2:20). Therefore, Jesus as the Son who incarnated in the midst of the histories of human 
beings was ‘not consummated and fulfilled by a single subject’ but emerged from the ‘co-
efficacy’ of all the three Persons of the triune God.29 This miraculous act within human 
histories is derived from ‘the reciprocal, changing, and living relationship’ among them.  
                                                
29 This co-efficacy can also be manifested obviously by Jesus’ baptism with the Father’s voice and the 
Spirit’s descending (Matt. 3:16f.) and His transfiguration with the Father’s voice (Matt. 17:1-5). 
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It is worth noting that Moltmann himself did not use Staniloae’s phrase divine 
intersubjectivity30 in the beginning to explain inter-trinitarian reciprocal relationships, but 
Richard Bauckham (1946-) (2005:155) uses it31 to introduce Moltmann’s concept of the 
‘relationship between the divine Persons’.32 However, in one of his more recent work, he 
(2008a:374) adopted it in stating, ‘what constitutes the Unity is the triadic inter-
subjectivity we call perichōrēsis’, although he did not continue to explain and expand it.33 
4.3 An Eschatological Panentheistic Perspective 
Moltmann’s trinitarian concept of creation is presented from an eschatological 
panentheistic perspective. He (1985a:98) explains that ‘creation exists in the Spirit, is 
moulded by the Son and is created by the Father’ and, therefore, not only the creator God 
dwells in creation, but also creation is ‘from God, through God and in God’. This concept 
brings into focus two essential truths about God: ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’ 
(ibid.). He (1992b:31–8) then calls this concept of ‘God in all things’ ‘immanent 
transcendence’. 34  Stressing only one aspect, according to Moltmann, leads to either 
                                                
30 The concept of ‘divine intersubjectivity’ was proposed by Dumitru Staniloae (1903-1993) (1994:260–
78) to explain inter-trinitarian reciprocal relationships. He emphasized that in divine perfect love the 
‘Persons do not merely engage in a reciprocal exchange of self; they also affirm themselves reciprocally 
and personally, and establish themselves in existence through giving and receiving’ (ibid.:257). What does 
divine intersubjectivity mean? In a nutshell, it means there is no passive object and act in the triune 
relationship; all the divine Persons are subjects and all their acts are active. Staniloae (1980:94, eo) adopts 
the term ‘pure subjectivity’ to explain this absolute freedom, namely ‘existing in itself and determining 
itself’. God’s mode of perfect existence and being is as a subject. In the subject-object relations among the 
triune Persons of God, ‘even the object is all subject, even if it occupies the position of object’ (ibid.). He 
also terms this intersubjectivity (or ‘common subjectivity’) in God ‘the most consistent mode of reality, an 
objective subjectivity, or a subjective objectivity’ (ibid.:94). LaCugna (1985:647) also uses 
‘intersubjectivity’ to describe triune God’s personhood. 
31 The relationship implied by divine intersubjectivity is different from the one implied by ‘universal 
intersubjectivity’ in the philosophical discussions in cosmology, arguing that ‘objectivity is grounded in 
habit or repetition of pattern among [interrelated] subjects of experience rather than in fixed essences within 
a pregiven causal scheme’ (Bracken 1998:704). See also Bracken (2001). 
32 See also Isaac (2010). 
33 It is notable that ‘Divine intersubjectivity’ is a general term to describe the reciprocal relationships 
between the three Persons of the triune God. However, Moltmann’s ‘eucharistic form of Trinity’ is a 
particular term for a historical point in the trinitarian history of God. 
34 This concept of ‘immanent transcendence’ about God in Moltmann’s account can be traced to Calvin, 
Luther, and Aquinas (1996:111, 128). See also Kwok Hungbiu (2001:83–4, 88–97). It is worth noting that 
this kind of ‘immanent transcendence’ in Christian theological accounts has a completely different meaning 
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‘deism’ (lack of God’s immanence) or ‘pantheism’ (lack of God’s transcendence) 
(Moltmann 1985a:98). Therefore, he (1985a:103) considers that panentheism can bind 
together God’s immanence and transcendence in his ‘trinitarian doctrine of creation’.35 
As the Spirit creates the world and indwells in it, the Spirit not only sustains creation and 
its ‘communities’, but also guides them beyond themselves. Accordingly, the world 
becomes a ‘divine environment’ that shelters and nurtures every living creature. 
Moltmann quotes ‘In [H]im we live and move and have our being’ (Acts 17:28) to 
support his ‘panentheistic understanding of the world’ (ibid.:103, 300). In this sense, God 
is the divine environment of the world through ‘the symbol of the redeeming cosmic 
human being, Christ’ (ibid.:300). Although panentheism is not a normal Christian 
theological term, it is evident that Moltmann (1996:327) uses it to apply and extend the 
relationships of the perichōrēsis among trinitarian Persons, and so is able to explain the 
relationships between the triune God and the created world from the perspective of this 
social trinitarian doctrine. However, as already mentioned above, God and the world are 
differentiated on the basis of panentheism. Moltmann (1985a:84) consequently asserts 
that ‘even in the kingdom of glory the world remains God's creation and will not become 
God himself’. 
5. Social Doctrine of the Trinity through Perichōrēsis (Pericw,rhsij) 
From his understanding of the history of the three Persons’ relations of fellowship, to 
which the scriptures offer multiple testimony, Moltmann (1981:19) develops his social 
                                                
from the meaning of the same phrase in Tu Weiming’s account discussed in C5S6. Tu Weiming’s 
‘transcendence’ is only about self-realization of humans. 
35 Drawing upon the explanation of Heinrich Heine (1797-1856), Moltmann makes a distinction between 
pantheism and panentheism. Pantheism views everything as God without difference, and so sees only 
‘eternal, divine presence’ (ibid.:103). However, panentheism differentiates God from the world, and so can 
identify ‘future transcendence, evolution and intentionality’ within the Deity (ibid.). For God discloses 
God-self in certain different degrees within various things, and so there is an impulse in everything to ‘strive 
after a higher degree of divinity’ (Heine 1882:57–8). It is worth noting that Heine (1882:57–8) points out 
the error of ‘the pantheism of the Goethe era’ through manifesting the meaning of what Moltmann 
(1985a:103) terms as ‘panentheism’ but Heine himself does not use the term panentheism. 
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trinitarian doctrine. This is based on a form of ‘trinitarian hermeneutics’. It directs us to 
the aspects of relationships and communities, first among the trinitarian Persons, and then 
as their form of fellowship becomes ‘open to men and women’, extending to the whole 
creation in the world (ibid.).36 In his view, this trinitarian hermeneutics takes the place of 
the ‘subjective thinking’ which can only function in ‘separation and isolation’ from its 
objects (ibid.).  
5.1 The Concept of Perichōrēsis 
Moltmann practically applies this social trinitarian doctrine to thinking ‘ecologically 
about God, [hu]man[ity] and the world in their relationships and indwellings’. For him, 
this application is drawing upon ‘panentheistic ideas’ which are rooted in both Jewish and 
Christian traditions (ibid.). While expounding on the concept of personhood in trinitarian 
terms in his The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, Moltmann (1981:174–5) follows the 
thoughtful ‘doctrine of the eternal pericw,rhsij’ (perichōrēsis) of John Damascene (676-
749). This term refers to the ‘reciprocal indwelling and mutual interpenetration’37 of the 
divine Persons without being mixed or divided.38 The concept of perichōrēsis highlights 
                                                
36 I assume that this is not in the sense of an ontic order but a noetic one. Carver T. Yu (1987:181–200) also 
highlights the similar ‘openness’ of these relations of ‘being-in-communion’. However, the openness in his 
account starts from the openness of the Creator God to His creatures but not from the openness of the 
Trinity. 
37 Moltmann (2009a:288). 
38 Moltmann (2008a:372). pericw,rhsij indicates ‘circumincessio of the trinitarian Persons’ (Moltmann 
1981:174) and is transliterated to perichōrēsis as an English word. Semantically speaking, the original 
meaning of this Greek word is related to ‘rotation’ and ‘surrounding region’ in its noun form or ‘to go 
round … to encompass’ in its verb form (Moltmann 2008a:372–3). The concept of perichōrēsis was first 
used to explain ‘the intimate communion of the two natures of Christ’ by Gregory Nazianzen (329-390), in 
the fourth century, and Pseudo-Cyril (ca. 313-386) was probably the first to apply its usage further to ‘the 
trinitarian relationships, around 650’ (Otto 2009:368–9). 
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the ‘circulatory character’ of the triune God. Moltmann (1981:178) discloses its meaning 
when he states: 
To throw open the circulatory movement of the divine light and the divine relationships, and 
to take men and women, with the whole of creation, into the life-stream of the triune God: 
that is the meaning of creation, reconciliation and glorification.  
This manifests also how he applies panentheistic ideas to this realm of creation in 
his theological reflections.  
Moltmann also explains perichōrēsis as a process of ‘the exchange of energies’ 
occurring in the trinitarian Persons of God (ibid.:174-5).39 They attain perfect oneness 
through their ‘fellowship and unity … in the eternal love’. In other words, through the 
eternal love of the triune God, the Persons live and ‘dwell in’ each other and 
‘communicate eternal life’ to each other. The divine Persons attain these aspects of 
mutuality to such a degree according to Moltmann that they become one (ibid.:175). He 
(ibid.) explains: 
The trinitarian Persons do not merely exist and live in one another; they also bring one 
another mutually to manifestation in the divine glory. The eternal divine glory is for its part 
displayed through the trinitarian manifestation of the Persons  … The Persons of the Trinity 
make one another shine through that glory, mutually and together. They glow into perfect 
form through one another and awake to perfected beauty in one another … The mutual 
transfiguration and illumination of the Trinity into the eternal glory of the divine life is bound 
up with [the perichoretic unity of the Trinity]. This uniting mutuality and community 
proceeds from the Holy Spirit. The unity of the Trinity is constituted by the Father, 
concentrated round the Son, and illumined through the Holy Spirit. 
This is how Moltmann’s trinitarian doctrine still upholds monotheistic truth but 
differentiates this from abstract monotheism. 
5.2 The Issue of Tritheism 
Tritheism is most criticized by other theologians as a severe problem of social trinitarian 
theology. Moltmann is not exempted from such a criticism.40 However, he also worries 
                                                
39 As mentioned in C2S5, the term ‘exchange’ is used by Triandis (1989:517) to describe the relationship 
of the private self with others in a more individualistic culture. 
40  See also O’Donnell (1982:13), Meyendorff (1984:187), Gresham (1993), Kim Byunghoon (2002), 
Williams (2003:99), Bauckham (2005:160), Jeroncic (2008:193 n.282), and Kärkkäinen (2011:236–7). 
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about tritheism. Moltmann (1981:13–19, 175) convincingly presents the Trinity of 
perichōrēsis as a solution to the contradiction between the thesis as abstract monotheism 
and its antithesis in tritheism. As mentioned above, he criticizes both the Trinity of a 
homogenous divine substance and the Trinity of an identical divine subject as leading 
only to an ‘abstract monotheism’. As a result, through this dialectical synthesis, 
Moltmann argues that in the perichōrēsis, the ‘personal characteristics’ of the Persons, 
being ‘the very thing that divides’ the triune Persons, simultaneously turn out to be the 
very thing that ‘binds them together’ (ibid.:175): 
Interpreted perichoretically, the trinitarian persons form their own unity by themselves in the 
circulation of the divine life. The unity of the trinitarian Persons lies in the circulation of the 
divine life which they fulfil in their relations to one another. This means that the unity of the 
triune God cannot and must not be seen in a general concept of divine substance. That would 
abolish the personal differences. But if the contrary is true – if the very difference of the three 
Persons lies in their relational, perichoretically consummated life process – then the Persons 
cannot and must not be reduced to three modes of being of one and the same divine subject. 
The Persons themselves constitute both their differences and their unity. If the divine life is 
understood perichoretically, then it cannot be consummated by merely one subject at all. It 
is bound to consist of the living fellowship of the three Persons who are related to one another 
and exist in one another. Their unity does not lie in the one lordship of God; it is to be found 
in the unity of their tri-unity. 
Accordingly, the Persons of the Trinity are neither ‘three different individuals’ 
subsequently interacting with each other in relationships, nor ‘three repetitions of the One 
God’, namely ‘three modes of being’,41 based on the concept of God as the absolute 
subject (of revelation). The former is reproached usually as ‘tritheism’, and the latter as 
modalism (ibid., eo). The trinitarian ‘doctrine of the perichōrēsis’ integrates ‘the threeness 
and the unity’ in a perfect way, so that the threeness does not disappear in the unity and 
the unity does not collapse into Threeness (ibid.:175). The trinitarian and perichoretic 
unity of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit consists both of relationships — the 
relationship of their mutual ‘absolute dependence’ and of their ‘self-differentiation’ from 
                                                
41 This is exactly Barth’s (1886-1968) (1932 translated in 1975:44) understanding of the Trinity. See also 
Barth (1958a:44, 338, 341; 1975:382). 
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each other — and in their ‘reciprocal indwelling and mutual interpenetration’ (Moltmann 
2009a:288).  
The concept of the Trinity transcends the ability of human reason to understand and 
describe it concretely and fully. Although the term perichōrēsis is useful and helpful in 
explaining more deeply the features of threeness and the unity of the triune God, 
particularly in a negative theological way, it is still an abstract or metaphysical term.  
5.3 The Concept of Essence and Energies 
Is the term energy, that Moltmann uses to explain the meaning of perichōrēsis as a process 
of ‘the exchange of energies’ within the threeness (as mentioned above in S5.1) a more 
understandable term? Unfortunately, this term, energy, is never fully explained by 
Moltmann. Rather its usage is confusing and misleading, because this term was never 
used within any pre-modern Christian tradition to explain the relations of the Persons of 
the Trinity. It is used, rather, to indicate ‘the knowable … in God’, in contrast with its 
‘antinomy’, essence, indicating ‘the unknowable in God’ (Lossky 1948 renamed and 
edited in 2001:52).42 
                                                
42 This word ‘energy’ or ‘energeia’, which is usually translated as ‘actuality or activity’, is taken to be the 
opposite to ‘dynamis or potentiality’ (Zavershinsky 2011:101, eo). Zavershinsky explains the theological 
development of the usage of the term energy (ibid.:101). The term energy was originally used by Aristotle 
(384-322 BCE). Aristotle used it to identify a ‘form or determinate structure’, and so to indicate God as a 
‘pure form without … any potentiality’. Nevertheless, Aristotle did not differentiate God’s energies from 
God’s essence (ibid.:101). The Western philosophical and theological traditions followed Aristotle’s view 
of the inconceivability of both God’s essence and energies. It was St. Gregory Palamas (1296-1357) and 
his followers who overcame this problem by making them distinct. In differentiating between them, 
Palamas followed the earlier Fathers, like Dionysius the Areopagite [(ca first century)], Basil the Great 
[(330-379)] and Gregory the Theologian [Gregory of Nazianzus (330-389)]. Through Palamas’ 
understanding of these two terms, Zavershinsky explains that ‘God’s uncreated, eternal energies’ can be 
understood as ‘ineffable, suprasensible light’ that is graspable and felt as ‘Divine grace’ (ibid.:101). In 
Palamas’ observation, Orthodox theologians referred to the uncreated energy of God ‘as one and as many, 
as being divisible indivisibly’, but never mentioned the essence of God ‘in the plural form’ (ibid.:102, eo). 
For the uncreated energy of God would contrast with God ‘being one and altogether indivisible’. Unlike 
the essence of God that is beyond human reason and so unfathomable, the uncreated energy of God is ‘like 
the rays of the sun’ through which God’s existence is knowable, even if what He is not knowable (ibid.:102). 
Palamas asserted that the term ‘light’ is used to refer to God ‘not according to His essence, but according 
to His energy’ (Palamas n.d., cited in Zavershinsky 2011:109). 
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I infer that Moltmann has probably been influenced by the meaning of energies 
given by Orthodox theologians, and borrowing it to explain perichōrēsis. In expositing 
‘you [(humanity)] may participate in the divine nature’ (2 Peter 1:4), Lossky (1903-58) 
explains that God can be ‘participable’ only ‘in His energies’, but not in His ‘essence’ 
(Lossky 1948 renamed and edited in 2001:56).43 I find that the divine participability in 
those energies and the meaning of 2 Peter 1:4 (‘you … may become participants in the 
divine nature’) can be also applied to understand Moltmann’s panentheism as explored in 
S4.3. The term energies and its differentiation from essence, according to the Orthodox 
tradition, does help to crystallize the meaning of the threeness in the divine unity (in the 
light of energies) and the unity of the threeness (in the light of essence), even though we 
acknowledge here again our human finitude in knowing and describing God. 
5.4 The Importance of Perichōrēsis 
Moltmann (1981:198, eo) points out that Patristic theologians understood the concept of 
perichōrēsis ‘as the sociality of the three divine Persons’. 44  Perichōrēsis keeps 
                                                
43 Lossky (1948 renamed and edited in 2001:n.27) argued that if humanity could participate in God’s 
essence itself, then ‘God would no longer be [a] Trinity, but a multitude of Persons’. He explained that this 
is because the term ‘divinities (in the plural)’ is ‘proper to the Three consubstantial Persons as their life, 
power, wisdom, [and] sanctity, [being] common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’, therefore Palamas 
designated those energies by the term ‘divinities’ (ibid.:57, eo). Another term used by St. John Damascene 
to designates energies is ‘movement’ or ‘impulse from God’ (Lossky 1948 renamed and edited in 2001:55, 
eo). 
44 Orthodox theologians down to the present day follow the ‘Cappadocian Fathers’ in the fourth century, 
who wrote about the analogical ‘category of community’, namely the church, as it applied to ‘the eternal 
life of the Trinity’ (Moltmann 1981:198). In contrast, the Western European Church has employed the 
analogical ‘category of the individual person’, the so-called ‘psychological analogy’ (Ormerod 2001), a 
concept Augustine developed in his ‘psychological doctrine of the Trinity’ (Moltmann 1981:198–9). 
Augustine (2002:4.9.12) had actually mentioned the sociality of the Trinity by indicating the Father and the 
Son are of ‘same society of love’. But he either did not emphasize and develop it for some undisclosed 
reason (Plantinga, Cornelius Jr. 1988:24; 1989:33) or rejected it because of his different interpretation of 
Gen 1:26f. and his shrinking from accepting ‘the (gnostic notion of a divine family in heaven’ (Moltmann 
1985a:235). According to Augustine, the analogies of the trinitarian Persons are reflected in the psyche of 
every human, for example, ‘the self, the understanding, and the will’ (Moltmann 2009a:290–91). The 
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Moltmann’s social triune God distinctive and distinguishable from either God as the 
supreme substance or God as three modes of being. That unity obtained through 
perichōrēsis depends on ‘the circulation of the divine life’ that is fulfilled by the Three 
Persons in their reciprocal relationships to each other (Moltmann 1981:175). In this way, 
the personal differences are not ever abolished and ‘the very difference of the three 
Persons’ depends on ‘their relational, perichoretically consummated life process’ 
(ibid.).45 Consequently, by distinguishing his social triune God from a general concept of 
divine substance, would his position on the trinitarian ontology be vulnerable to criticisms 
laid against some46 other social trinitarian theologians (Wilks 1995)? In other words, does 
Moltmann indeed deny the fundamental, ontological, substantial, and objective nature of 
God’s reality? What viewpoint does Moltmann adopt with regard to this issue? This 
problem will be discussed later in C7S1.  
Based upon his semantic studies of the term perichōrēsis and its theological 
meaning through interpreting the Gospel of John, Moltmann (2008a:372–5) establishes 
three indispensable elements in the interpersonal relationships of the Triune God by 
explaining his social trinitarian doctrine through ‘three levels of perichoretic existence of 
                                                
psychological analogy of the Trinity originates in Augustine’s De Trinitate (The Trinity, trans. and 
published in 2002) and was systematically made use of by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae 
(ibid.:281). Moltmann (1981:198–9) earlier on highlighted that the Eastern Orthodox theologians held 
firmly to the social trinitarian doctrine, disagreeing with the Western European Church’s ‘modalistic 
tendencies’ in understanding personhood in the trinitarian doctrine. 
45  The explanation of Staniloae might be helpful to embody the understanding of perichōrēsis in 
Moltmann’s social trinitarian doctrine. In attempting to solve a dilemma of maintaining ‘the definition of 
love as the essential divine act and, simultaneously, the definition of this act as a relation while the divine 
being remains one’, Staniloae (1980:258) asserts that ‘we must see the divine being at one and the same 
time as unity and as relation, as relation in the very heart of unity’. Accordingly, ‘unity must not be 
destroyed for the sake of relation, nor relation abolished in favour of unity’. He further denotes this kind of 
perichoretic relation as a ‘ “substantial relation” ’ by quoting Pavel Florensky (1914 reprinted in 1970 
quoted in Staniloae 1994:258), stating that ‘ “The true subject is a relation of the three but a relation which 
appears as essence, that is, a substantial relation” ’. He (1994:72, 100) also explains that the communion of 
the triune Persons is neither ‘a non-substantial relationship’, namely ‘emptied of nature’, nor ‘separated 
from relationship’. In other words, ‘the essence subsists only in the Persons found in community’. 
Therefore, the ‘person without communion is not person, while communion is conditioned by a common 
nature’, which Staniloae (1980; 1994:255) also terms as ‘consubstantiality’. 
46 For example John Zizioulas (2004).  
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the triune God’: unity; diversity; and equality (‘non-hierarchical’ symmetry).47 In this 
way, what Moltmann tries to fight against is tritheism (polytheism), abstract monotheism 
(modalism), and subordinationism. The erroneous danger of tritheism (or polytheism) in 
the doctrine of the Trinity results from denying or debasing divine unity. The erroneous 
danger of abstract monotheism (or modalism) comes from denying or debasing the three 
Persons; while the erroneous danger of subordinationism happens in denying or debasing 
equality between the three divine Persons.48 
6. The Imago Dei in Moltmann’s Trinitarian Theological Anthropology 
Grenz (2001:304) presents the imago Dei as a concrete and pragmatic basis for the self 
to be grounded in God. The imago Dei means that all human beings are created in the 
image of God (Genesis 1:26).49 Grenz (2001:17) summarizes four different approaches 
to understanding the imago Dei throughout theological history:50 
(1) as our soul (the substantial view) — ‘certain attributes or capabilities’ embedded 
within the human soul;51 
(2) as our God-given authority (the functional view) — the divine commission to ‘have 
dominion’ over the whole earth (Gen 1:26, 28);52  
                                                
47 See also Erickson (1984:337–8), White (1998:23–32), and Horrell (2004:399). It is notable that some 
social trinitarian theologians, such as Zizioulas (1995:50–55), interpret the triune God as an asymmetrically 
hierarchical community (Volf 1998a:76–81).  
48 James R. White (1962-) (1998:28) defines equality as ‘the persons are coequal and coeternal’. 
49 In the Bible, only five texts may be discerned to connect the image of God directly to humankind: Genesis 
1:26-27; 5:1-3; 9:5-6; 1 Corinthians 11:7 and James 3:9. Psalm 8 as the ‘best commentary’ on Genesis 1:26-
28 can be added (Grenz 2001:184). 
50 Even though the imago Dei as the basis for constructing a Christian anthropology has been a common 
understanding throughout church history (Grenz 2001:141), what the concept entails has not been agreed 
upon by exegetes and theologians. 
51  See also Anderson (1982:69–87), Erickson (1984:495–517), Staniloae (1994:70f.), Douglas J. Hall 
(1986:89–98), Cunningham (1998:165–95), Pannenberg (1999:1–143), and David T. Williams (2011:315–
17). 
52 See also Calvin (1559, trans. in 1909:177), Thielicke (1981:157), Erickson (1984:495–517), and Boyd 
and Eddy (2002:76). 
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(3) as our relationality (the relational view) — a ‘fundamental relationship’ between God 
the Creator and humankind as creatures, including relationships between humans;53  
(4) as our God-given destiny (the telic view) — a God-given goal or destiny for 
humankind’s living in this life and becoming in the eschatological future.54  
Do these four different views mutually exclude each other? I do not think so. In 
terms of the selfhood of human beings, all of them together might disclose the 
comprehensive meaning of the imago Dei. These four interpretations function in logical 
correlation and overlap to a certain degree. They can be integrated, and their correlation 
explained, from three historical aspects of God’s creation. I find that in Moltmann’s God 
in Creation (1985a), his ‘threefold’ historical doctrine of the imago Dei includes all of 
the above four views related to the imago Dei (ibid.:215-29):  
(1) ‘nature’, in ‘creation in the beginning’ (ibid.:226-9) (mainly the substantial, 
functional, and relational views);55 
(2) ‘grace’, in ‘the beginning of the new creation’ (ibid.:225) in ‘the continuous creation’ 
(ibid.:206-14) (mainly the functional, and relational views);  
(3) ‘glory’56, in the ‘consummation’ (ibid.:5-8) of the new creation in the continuous 
creation (mainly the functional, relational, and telic views).57 
Through these three historical aspects of God’s creation, Moltmann seeks to 
understand and explain the imago Dei as related to the doctrine of Trinity. I shall now 
exploit these three aspects to look at human beings as the image of God in the history of 
                                                
53 See also Barth (1958b:191–228, 286; 1960:323–4), Anderson (1982:69–87), Erickson (1984:495–517), 
Moltmann (1985a:225, 228–9; 2009b:289), Douglas J. Hall (1986:98–108), Staniloae (1994:252–4), 
Pannenberg (1999:157–314), Grenz (2001:142), David T. Williams (2011:316f.), and Flett (2012:116–38). 
54 See also Herder (1800 reprinted in 1966:91, 125, 188–256), Dorner (1881:77–83), Brunner (1939:103–
104, 283, 329), Piper (1971:website), Zizioulas (1975:418–21), Anderson (1982:177), Douglas J. Hall 
(1986:98–108), Berkhof (1990:188), Staniloae (1994:188), Pannenberg (1999:43–79), Grenz (2001:177), 
Boyd and Eddy (2002:74–86), Moltmann (2009b:277, 289), and Flett (2012:116–38).  
55 See also Moltmann (1979:118–22). 
56 Calvin (1559, trans. in 1909:173–7) stresses his understanding of the imago Dei as ‘the glory of God’. 
57 See also Moltmann (1979). 
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God’s creation: that is as the ‘imago Dei’(‘Trinitatis’) (Trinity), as the ‘imago Christi’ 
(the image of Christ), and as ‘gloria Dei est homo’ (the glory of God is human) (ibid.:215-
43). 
6.1 Nature, Imago Dei, and the Original Designation of Human Beings 
Firstly, Moltmann (1985a:216–25) follows the traditional Christian hermeneutics in 
explaining the imago Dei as the source of the original designation and superiority of 
humankind above all other living things. He (ibid.:218, eo) explains: 
God created human beings to be his image. But the traditional translations say ‘according to 
his image’ — on the pattern of his image. In saying this they are presupposing an archetype 
in God, a pattern on which human beings are modelled and of which they are the copy, the 
sensible counterpart. This is based on the Platonic ‘archetype-representation’ thinking of 
patristic theology. 
Human beings are also granted the commission of ‘dominum terrae’ (being lord of 
the land) (Moltmann 1998a:30). He argues that, theologically speaking, it comes from 
‘the imago Dei structure’ that endows meaning to being human (ibid.). Based on biblical 
traditions, he also maintains that humans’ dignity in their superiority above other 
creatures originates in their unique status as being created in the image of God. In his 
understanding (ibid.), such a unique status justifies humans in having more freedom,58 
precisely an ‘infinite freedom’,59 and ‘a special commission’ in God’s name that includes 
‘special responsibility for other living creatures’. 
6.1.1 The Theologically-Based Interpretation of the Imago Dei 
Yet with regard to the question about the constituents of human beings’ likeness to God, 
Moltmann (1985a:219–20) rejects each of the answers given by theological traditions in 
the history as ‘a false inference’. These include: 
                                                
58 Schwöbel (1995) uses imago libertatis to denote and explain such true human freedom from Divine 
freedom. 
59 Moltmann (1976:109) highlights the meaning of the imago Dei is to destine humankind to infinite 
freedom over against all finite things and relationships and even [their] own reality’. 
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(1)  ‘the soul’ — based on ‘the analogy of substance’; 
(2)  ‘the human being’s upright walk and upward glance’ — based on ‘the analogy of 
form’;  
(3)  the biblical interpretation of ‘man’s lordship over the earth’ — based on ‘the analogy 
of proportionality’; 
(4)  ‘the community of man and wife’ — based on ‘the analogy of relation’. 
This is because each of them in their own way have reduced the meaning of the 
likeness to God to humankind’s relationship to God in general. While all of them 
distinguish human beings from animals by their distinctive characteristics, any one of 
them is merely a reduced form of their relationship to God in general described in 
religious terms rather than the theologically-based interpretation rooted in the imago Dei 
of the social Trinity. As God created human beings ‘out of His special resolve’60 instead 
of ‘through God’s creative word’61, he argues that humankind’s likeness to God should 
be ‘a theological term’ before it becomes an ‘anthropological’ one (ibid.:217-220). In 
other words, God ‘creates his image’ and participates in ‘a particular relationship with 
that image’, so that God creates humans in likeness to Him for Himself (theologically),62 
but not primarily for humankind’s superior status over creatures (anthropologically) 
(ibid.:220). This means that God actively intends to have an extraordinary relationship 
with His image for His own sake, so that He creates His image as humankind. 
                                                
60 Namely, ‘Let us make … So God created’ in Gen 1:26-7 when He created human beings. 
61 Namely, ‘Let there be [X] … and there was [X]’ in Gen 1:3, ‘Let there be a [X] … So God made [or 
created] the [X]’ in Gen 1:6-7, 20-21, 24-5 ‘Let the [X] … and it was so’ in Gen 1:9, 11, or ‘Let there be a 
[X] … and it was so’ in Gen 1:14-16, when He created other things except human beings. 
62  In explaining this, Moltmann (1985a:218–221, eo) makes a distinction between the two terms for 
describing God’s creation of human beings: image and likeness (~l,c , and tWmD> in Hebrew, eivkw,n and 
om`oi,wsij in Greek, or imago and similitude in Latin). In his understanding of them, the former denotes ‘the 
concrete representation’ and thus ‘more the outward representation’ but the latter denotes ‘the similarity’ 
and thus ‘the reflexive inward relationship’. As representing God on earth, human beings are ‘God’s 
representatives’ to ‘rule over’ other creatures on earth, ‘God’s counterpart’ to communicate with Him, and 
God’s ‘appearance’ of glory and splendour on earth. 
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Accordingly, the nature of human beings comes from being created in the imago Dei and 
being related to God. As a result, human nature should be defined by this special 
relationship to God, instead of through some set of distinctive characteristics over against 
other living things. It is human beings’ ‘whole existence’, ‘whole person’ (rather than 
only ‘his soul’), and ‘the true human community’ (rather than the mere ‘individual’) that 
make them God’s image (ibid.:221, eo).63  
6.1.2 The Exegesis of Genesis 1:26-29 
The evidence for this kind of argument comes from Moltmann’s exegesis of Genesis 1:26-
27 (Moltmann 1985a:222). In Genesis 1:26, a ‘singular’ human being, Adam, 
‘corresponds to a divine plural’.64 However, in Genesis 1:27,65 a ‘plural’ set of human 
beings, men and women, ‘corresponds to a divine singular’. Moltmann (1985a:218–22) 
believes that the ‘interplay’ or ‘grammatical shift’ of the singular and plural of the divine 
and human beings here is deliberate, purposeful, and so highly meaningful (ibid.:218). 
Accordingly, the shift from a singular human being to plural human beings is intended to 
disclose that to be human implies not only ‘being sexually differentiated’ (as a singular 
human being), but also ‘sharing a common humanity’ (of plural human beings) 
                                                
63 On this point of analogia relationis, both Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-45) (1937 trans. in 1959 reprinted 
in 1997:41), Karl Barth (1958b:185–6, 195–6, 288–90; 1961:150), and other theologians, such as Oshima 
(1973:185–9), Frykberg (1993:32–3), and Congdon (2007), had also made a similar observation. 
64 Moltmann (1985a:217) disagrees other interpretations of this divine plural, for example, ‘an assembly of 
God’, God and goddess, or ‘plural of majesty’ (W. H. Schmidt 1967 quoted in Moltmann 1985a:217) 
because none of them denotes that God in this passage addresses Himself.  
65 Cf. different English versions of Gen 1:26-7 (especially the different translations of ‘humankind’ in 
NRSV and ‘man’ in NKJV).  
NRSV Then God said, ‘Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild 
animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.’ So God created humankind 
in his image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them. 
NKJV Then God said, ‘Let Us make [hu]man in Our image, according to Our likeness; let them have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, over all the earth and over 
every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.’ So God created [hu]man in His own image; in the image of 
God He created him; male and female He created them. 
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(ibid.:222). Both facets are ‘equally primary’ (ibid.). For him, this observation also 
invalidates the argument that ‘being human is the generic term for which man and woman 
are simply sub-divisions, or that man and woman are two different creatures’ (ibid.).  
Moltmann agrees that the commission to have dominion over other living creatures 
and the charge to ‘subdue the earth’ are granted to human beings following ‘the creation 
of God’s image on earth’ according to Genesis 1:28 and 29 (ibid.:224).66 However, he 
views these commissions as ‘a specific addition’ to ‘the likeness to God’, instead of being 
congruent with it, but these two diverse commissions obviously complement each other. 
The first is determined by the second. For Genesis 1 reveals that the rule of humankind 
over other living creatures has to be separated from humans’ ‘subjection of the earth’ in 
order to nourish humans and animals (Gen 1:29-30). He (1985a:224) criticizes and 
blames the traditional theological doctrine of the dominium terrae for intermingling the 
two commissions together, and so bringing about the ‘disastrous consequences for the 
world’.  
6.1.3 Human’s Perichoresis-Oriented Relationships 
Besides the nuance of the interplay of plural and singular grammatical forms of the 
Creator triune God and humanity, Moltmann also explores the subtle different meanings 
of the two words describing the designation of human beings in Genesis 1:26: image 
(imago in Latin) and likeness (similitudo in Latin). He (1985a:219) explains: 
The first of these terms is used for the concrete representation, the second is used for the 
similarity. The first first expresses more the outward representation, the second rather the 
reflexive inward relationship. Both terms have probably been borrowed from Egyptian royal 
theology … If it is correct to see the terminology about the image of God as derived from 
royal theology, then this derivation itself contains revolutionary political potential: it is not a 
prince who is the image, representative, deputy and reflection of God; it is the human being 
— men and women in like degree, all human beings and every human being … [t]his passage 
has certainly had a democratizing effect throughout the whole of Jewish and Christian 
                                                
66 Moltmann’s explanation (1985a:224) of the sequence of the charges of ‘rule over the animals’ and 
‘subdue the earth’ from God in the text of his God in Creation has an obvious error of transposing verses 
about the references to Genesis 1. The charge of ‘rule over the animals’ from God appears actually for the 
first time in verse 26, instead in verse 28, and then the second time in verse 28. 
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political history. As far as the subsequent charge to rule over the earth is concerned, there is 
no distinction at all between human beings; there is only equality. 
Subsequently, Moltmann demonstrates how a perichoresis-oriented relationship can be a 
functional, but not ontological, element of the triune God’s image and the triune God’s 
likeness in which the Deity made human beings (ibid.224-34).67 He (1992a:xiii) asserts 
that ‘the Trinity is our [functional] true social programme’. In this way, the triune Persons 
not only set the ontological relationships among them as a functional template for human 
interpersonal relationships, but also endowed them to humanity through creation 
(Moltmann 1985a:234).68 Accordingly, the perichoretic divine community is not only in 
se (in itself) or directed ad intra (within), but also directed ad extra (without) as an open 
community (Moltmann 1981:198). 69  Such interpersonal relationships integrate and 
maintain the unity of the divine community, the (ontological) equality among the 
individual Persons, and the diversity of each individual Person with different functions. 
These three elements (unity, equality, and diversity) endowed in humanity’s perichoresis-
oriented communal relationships are parts of the likeness of the triune God among whom 
these three (unity, equality, and three Persons) are indispensable, as mentioned above.70 
He (2008a:372) considered this image of perichoresis-oriented relationships endowed by 
the triune God as of ‘a community without uniformity and a personhood without 
                                                
67 As I will demonstrate later in this section and argue in C7S3, the functional likeness of the perichoretic 
relationship of the triune God is different from the ontological perichoretic relationship of the triune God 
which provides a functional proto-type of human interpersonal relationship through the imago Dei in 
Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology. Therefore, I coin the term perichoresis-oriented to denote this 
functional human interpersonal relationship for the purpose of differentiating it from the ontological 
perichoretic relationship of the triune God. 
68 See also Staniloae (1980:36), Moltmann (1985d:57; 2008a:375–81), LaCugna (1991:266), Leonardo 
Boff (2000:66–7), Isaac (2010:326), and Flett (2012:116–38). 
69 See also Moltmann (2000a:333). In Venter’s (2015:4) language: the triune God ‘first lives for God-self 
and then enters into some relationship with creation’. 
70 In the Eastern Orthodox tradition, the trinitarian anthropology is based on these three elements: ‘person 
(hypostasis) … communion (koinonia)’, and ‘nature (ousia)’ (Bates 2012). But in Moltmann’s (1981:188–
9) viewpoint, the Eastern Orthodox tradition still support an asymmetrically hierarchical Trinitarian 
structure because the Father is still as ‘sole origin’ of the Son and the Holy Spirit (Zizioulas 1995:50–55; 
2004:45; Volf 1998a:76–81). See also C7F6. 
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individualism’. Therefore, Moltmann (1998b) goes to great lengths to emphasize the 
value of freedom (to be discussed in 2.6) and equality in being human, especially in his 
work, God for a Secular Society (1999:46–70). 
In Moltmann’s concept of the imago Dei, though it has not been accepted without 
criticism (see S4.1 above), the relational self is developed from God’s image as part of a 
community characterized by perichōrēsis. Needless to say, perichōrēsis is used here to 
expound the functional meaning of analogia relationis imaged in human beings, but this 
is not the same thing as the ontological relationships of the three Persons of the triune 
God. The relational self  also will neither be the separate, isolated, and autonomous self 
developed in ‘egoistical individualism’ (Moltmann 1990a:270f.), nor be similar to the 
socially soluble or ‘absorbed’ and devalued self developed in collectivism (Triandis, 
Brislin, et al. 1988:272). 71  In Moltmann’s social trinitarian doctrine (2009a:288), 
‘individual and community’ are maintained as ‘equally primal’. He (ibid.) explains: 
In Trinitarian thinking, however, substances and relations are equally primary. According to 
the new ecological understanding, everything has its time, and every activity its occasion, 
and every living thing its environment among other living things. Consequently, individual 
and community are equally primal too. 
In the same dialectic, we find this balanced relational self is a dialectic synthesis drawn 
from the separate and autonomous self in individualism as the thesis, and the socially 
soluble self in collectivism as the antithesis (Moltmann 1992b:254; 1990a:269–71). 
6.2 Grace, Imago Christi, and the Messianic Calling of Human Beings 
Moltmann (1985a:215) disagrees with a ‘one-sided viewpoint’ of theological 
anthropology, because it confines the consideration of human beings’ ‘likeness to God’ 
merely within the doctrinal context of creation. This means, in that particular 
interpretation, the image of God that first was blurred or ruined through the Fall is then 
                                                
71 See also Moltmann (1990a:270f.) and Bochner (1994:281). 
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restored through God’s grace. This approach was only used to describe an ‘ideal picture’ 
of human beings in their original condition (ibid.). 
He reinterprets such a classical notion of the imago Dei along ‘the messianic 
alignment’ of the historical trend of human beings (ibid.). Following the Christology of 
the New Testament, Moltmann (1985a:94–5) applies the likeness to God to the 
incarnated, transfigured, and raised Messiah, Jesus Christ.72 For He is ‘God’s true image’ 
(2 Corinthians 4:4), ‘the reflection of God’s glory and the exact imprint of God’s very 
being’ (Hebrews 1:3), ‘the glory of God’ (2 Corinthians 4:6), ‘the first-born of all 
creation’ (Colossians 1:15), ‘the first-born from the dead’ (Colossians 1:18), and ‘the 
image of the invisible God’ (Colossians 1:15).73 Jesus Christ is the image of the invisible 
God mediating in the work of creation, reconciling the world to God, and ruling as the 
divine Lord. Based on these claims, Moltmann (1985a:226) argues that ‘God appears in 
his perfect image, God rules through his image, God reconciles and redeems through his 
image on earth’.  
Not only is Christ ‘God’s true image’, but also everything is created by Him 
(Colossians 1:15f.; Hebrews 1:3). Therefore, the Apostle Paul stresses that ‘[F]or those 
whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order 
that he might be the firstborn within a large family’ (Romans 8:29). Based on such 
Christology in the New Testament, Moltmann (1985a:218) develops and presents: 
The imago Christi is an imago Dei mediated through Christ. Christians therefore liked to 
translate the Genesis passage we are considering as ‘according to his image’. But the 
christological bearing of the phrase can also be read into the translation to be his image, if 
this is taken to mean that the human being has been created ‘in the direction of’ the image of 
God which Christ is — that this is the whole trend of his designation — so that the creation 
of human beings is open for the incarnation. Then the christology is understood as the 
fulfilment of the anthropology, and the anthropology becomes the preparation for the 
christology. 
                                                
72 See also Moltmann (1977:101f.). 




Besides, Moltmann maintains on the eschatological principle that the end reveals 
the beginning that ‘Christ must already be the mystery of creation in the beginning’ that 
is comprehended according to ‘the [later] consummation’ (ibid.:226). Accordingly, 
seeing God’s creation from an eschatological perspective, he (2003:189) indicates that 
‘the final is greater than [the] original’. This is not only in relation to human beings’ 
present misery, but also points to their transformed future revealed and promised by the 
triune God.  
Therefore, for him (1985a:227), ‘being human means becoming human in this 
process’.74 In other words, the imago Dei will be consummated and the consummation is 
to be obtained at the end of the history, when God is in full communion with human 
beings, rather than at its prelapsarian beginning before the ‘lost origin’75 (ibid.:225-7). 
However, ‘as goal’, the imago Dei indeed exists throughout ‘every moment of that 
history’, from its beginning to its messianic end. According to this interpretation, the 
reality of the imago Dei in human beings is a dynamic process of already-and-not-yet, 
instead of a static one.76 This statement can be also understood by claiming that this final 
real self is far more complete than the original because in Moltmann’s (1981:116) 
eschatological perspective Christ did not become incarnate ‘simply because of the sin of 
[humans], but rather for the sake of perfecting creation’ so that ‘the Creator no longer 
remains over against his creation’ (Moltmann 1996:295).77  
Moltmann cannot understand the imago Christi apart from his social doctrine of the 
Trinity. It is in the ‘fellowship of believers with Christ’ and through the grace of God that 
                                                
74 See also Benner (2012:199). 
75 McDougall (2003:190). 
76 As Hebrews 2:5-18 and Romams 8:18-30 reveal. 
77 J. Matthew Bonzo (2009:82) summarizes this eschatological aspect of Moltmann in this way, ‘Creatio 
or[i]ginalis with its historical transitions was destined from the beginning to be overcome (rather than 
restored or renewed) in the redeemed creation nova.’ According to Ilia Delio’s (2005) study, St. 
Bonaventure (1217-74) had earlier on held these similar concepts of ‘eternal creation’ and the purpose of 
Christ’s incarnation. 
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the ‘restoration or new creation’ of the imago Dei happens.78 It is because Christ is the 
‘messianic imago Dei’ that believers can enter upon the path towards the ‘gloria Dei on 
earth’ (the glory of God on earth) (Rom 8:29-30) (Moltmann 1985a:226). For Christ is 
the only way (John 14:6) that persons can be ‘accepted and promised, wholly, bodily and 
socially’ into the ‘imago Christi’ (Moltmann 1985a:215–27), In other words, the 
holistically ‘embodied and social’ humankind can only be fulfilled in the ‘messianic 
fellowship of Jesus’; then, even death can never separate humankind from God and from 
each other, or separate them into ‘soul and body’ (ibid.:227).79  In ‘an open history’ 
(ibid.:350 n.22), 80 the process of ‘the messianic[-]becoming-human’ of humankind will 
be neither complete nor completable (ibid.:227). Yet it is in ‘the process of resurrection’ 
that believers already live in fellowship with Christ here and now, so that they can 
‘experience themselves as accepted and promised’ holistically (ibid.). According to the 
aforementioned Moltmann’s exposition of this likeness to God through the messianic 
imago Dei, believers are not only the imago Christi socially, but also the imago Christi 
wholly and bodily. Here, Moltmann does not exclude the ontic nature of humankind, but 
affirms its completion within the likeness to God expressed by means of the social Trinity. 
6.2.1 The Concept of an Heir 
Based on the Old Testament, Jesus’ revelation, and his own understanding of Jesus Christ 
as God’s true image,81 the Apostle Paul expounds his conception of the imago Dei and 
                                                
78 Since Moltmann (2003:189) highlights that the final creation is greater and better than the original one 
from the eschatological perspective of God’s creation, the ‘new creation’ of the imago Dei should be the 
precise expression here although he (1985a:227) uses the ‘restoration’ of the imago Dei, too. These two 
terms mean differently. Probably it is in adopting the Christian traditional way to express the transformation 
of the ‘obscured or destroyed’ imago Dei through Christ’s salvation that Moltmann uses the term 
‘restoration’ (Moltmann 1985a:215, 227). 
79 For the overcoming of separation, see Moltmann’s detailed discussion in his The Way of Jesus Christ 
(1990a:260–70). 
80 Moltmann (1985a:350 n.22) here understands human beings in the light of the concept of ‘an open 
history’ in modern philosophical anthropology that assumes ‘the human being is not fixed by nature’. 
81 Besides Colossians 1:15; and 2 Corinthians 4:4 mentioned in C6S6.2, there are Philippians 2:6, 3:21; 
Romans 8:29; and 2 Corinthians 3:18. 
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the nature of the relational self by means of a metaphor: being an heir.82 Moltmann 
(1981:120) is familiar with this metaphor presented by Paul and applies it to explaining 
his social trinitarian theological anthropology.83 In Paul’s works, the status of an heir 
belongs to the ones who are granted a privilege or adopted (Ephesians 1:5) as ‘sons of 
God by faith in the Christ’ (Galatians 3:29).84 In this sense, they are heirs according to 
God’s promise (ibid.), namely ‘sugklhrono,moj’ (joint-heirs or co-heirs with Christ) 
(Romans 8:17; cf. Mark 12:1-12; Galatians 3:28f.; Hebrews 1:2) (Tabor n.d.:website, 
eo).85 Based on this revealed concept of joint-heirs, Moltmann (1981:73) points out it as 
the source of the liberation of human beings by saying: 
[w]hat he [(the Apostle Paul)] means is emancipation: the people who believe through the 
Son are no longer slaves under the law of a divine master. They are the beloved children of 
the heavenly Father. Sonship and to be the child of God therefore means liberation, the 
chance to come of age. As the Father's own sons and daughters, believers become 'heirs of 
God and joint heirs with Christ' in the fellowship of the Son. 
He (ibid.:165) also points out it as the source of non-heirarchical equality among human 
beings by saying:86 
Monotheism was and is the religion of patriarchy, just as pantheism is probably the religion 
of earlier matriarchy. It is only the doctrine of the Trinity, with the bold statements we have 
quoted, which makes a first approach towards overcoming sexist language in the concept of 
God. It leads to a fellowship of men and women without privilege and subjection, for in 
fellowship with the firstborn brother, there is no longer male or female, but all are one in 
Christ, and joint heirs according to the promise (Galatians 3:28f.). 
                                                
82 The verses about it include, but are not limited to, Romans 8:17; 9:7-8; Galatians 3:29; 4:1,7; Ephesians 
3:6. 
83 See also Moltmann (1981:73, 165, 220). 
84 James D. Tabor (n.d.:website, eo), a notable New Testament scholar, Professor at University of North 
Carolina at Charlotte, points out that Paul’s discussion of being an heir (klhrono,moj) has to do with ‘the 
issue of who is to be considered an heir’, namely ‘how one is declared righteous, and whether Gentiles must 
become Jews to be a part of God’s elect people’. This kind of concept of an heir does not originate from 
the Old Testament (cf. the concept of heir in Old Testament mentioned or quoted in Galatians 3:18, 28; 
4:30; Romans 4:14).  
85 See also Everett F. Harrison (1976:93), Moo (1996:505f.), and Haldane (1997:494). 
86 In terms of the opportunity to be granted heirship, Gentiles and Christ-followers are equal with Jews 
(Cereghin 2013:252). In terms of the covenant with God, it stems ‘from the promise made to Abraham that 
he would inherit the world (cosmos) (Romans 4:13; Galatians 3:26-29; 4:1-7)’ (Tabor n.d.:website, eo). 
See also Campbell (2008:87, 153). 
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Through the concept of heir, Moltmann reinforces the strong link of the imago Christi not 
only to new human selfhood but also to new human interpersonal relationships. 
6.3 Glory, Gloria Dei, and the Future of Human Beings 
Moltmann (1985a:228) emphasizes that human beings are not only ‘commissioned by 
God’, but also made ‘the mode of his appearance in his creation’. Through Jesus the 
Messiah, human beings are called to enter into ‘the eschatological history of the new 
creation’ according to the form of their likeness to Christ (ibid.). This argument by 
Moltmann is based not only on the biblical tradition that ‘human beings are created as the 
image of God for the divine glory’, but also on his understanding of the imago Christi 
that human beings are redeemed to become the imago Christi for ‘eschatological 
glorification’ (ibid.). Human beings move from justification, through ‘sanctification’ and 
onto glorification. Even as ‘the coming glory of God’ shines upon the face of the 
resurrected Messiah, so Spirit-filled believers right now also have a reflection of the glory 
of God on their ‘unveiled face[s]’ (ibid., eo). It is obvious that this is how Moltmann 
interprets Gloria Dei est Homo. 
In Moltmann’s opinion (1985a:228–9), ‘theosis’ marks ‘this promised 
glorification’ by way of human beings’ perfect likeness to God. Theosis means 
humankind’s eschatological becoming-one-with-God. In reality, this promised 
glorification can be fulfilled when ‘the imago per conformitatem gratiae’ (the image of 
the conformity of grace) is transfigured into ‘the imago per similitudinem gloriae’ (the 
image of the likeness of glory) through the work of the Holy Spirit. Human beings can 
eventually unveil their faces to reflect God’s glory. He stresses the differentiation of glory 
from grace, of redemption from reconciliation, and of ‘the eschatological naturalizing of 
history’ from ‘the historicizing of nature’ (Moltmann 1992a:129–30, eo). For, besides 
using the phrase ‘participation in the divine nature’ from 2 Peter 1:4 in describing the 
concept of ‘theosis’, Moltmann (1985a:229) also uses other phrases in a different context. 
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These include ‘becoming-one-with-God’, ‘to participate in the divine life and beauty’, 
‘conformity to God’, ‘flowering into perfect resemblance’, ‘a realistic divinization’, ’the 
deification of man’, and ‘the visible indwelling of God in His new Creation’ (Moltmann 
1974b:93, 277).87 Does Moltmann mean by this that human beings will acquire the divine 
nature and become beings equivalent to God? Moltmann (1981:107) absolutely denies 
that humanity can be identical with God or the Son of God. This he (1976:108) asserts in 
his statement, ‘There are no divine men’, and stresses the absolute distinction between 
God the creator and the world God created by pointing out ‘the infinite distance of the 
creator from his creation’ (ibid.) and also by stating ‘[God’s] own infinity and the finitude 
of his world are eternally distinguished by their difference; but in this difference they are 
at the same time eternally united’ (Moltmann 1996:327). He (1981:68) unequivocally 
contrasts the likeness between ‘the Father and the Son’ with the unlikeness between 
humanity and God by referring to the exclusive mutually-knowing relationship between 
the Father and the Son in Matthew 11:27. In other words, what is ‘like’ (the Father) is 
exclusively known by what is ‘like’ it (the Son) (ibid., eo).88 However, what is like (the 
Father) can also be known by what is ‘unlike’ it (humanity), but only by means of 
revelation (ibid., eo).89 He (1981:107) also argues that the world and God’s ‘only begotten 
Son’ are not identical, and maintains emphatically the differentiation of ‘the world 
process’90  from ‘the inner-trinitarian process’ (ibid.:107).91  Only in one place, while 
explaining the relationship of Christology and eschatology, does he use theosis to indicate 
                                                
87 See also Moltmann (1992a:130; 1999:140). 
88 In Moltmann’s language (1981:68), ‘like is known by like applies to the exclusive relationship of the 
Father and the Son.’  
89 Moltmann’s distinguishing trinitarian God and humankind by Matthew 11.27 can be also understood by 
1 John 3:1-3 where he states that the unlike (humankind) can be like the like (the Son) through revelation. 
90 Moltmann seems to have not defined precisely the meaning of ‘world process’ in this book but from its 
context it means ‘the existence of the world and its history’ (Moltmann 1981:42).  
91 ‘Inner-trinitarian process’ means that ‘the Son to whom the Father has subjected everything will then 
subject himself to the Father and will give the kingdom (basileia) over to him’ (ibid.:92). 
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Jesus’ ‘becoming God’ (Moltmann 1979:86). But does it mean the same thing for human 
beings as for Jesus Christ? Seemingly not, even though he does not elaborate this point.  
7. Imago Trinitatis: Eternal Fellowship with the Open Trinity 
Moltmann’s (1981:199) concept of the imago Dei is self-consciously never merely about 
an individual, so that it stands in contrast to accounts of individual human beings ‘made 
in the image of God’, as presented in Augustine’s writings (Moltmann 1985a:235).  
7.1 The Imago Trinitatis as the Imago Dei 
Moltmann’s (1981:199) imago Dei involves ‘person[s] with person[s]’, such as Adam, 
Eve and Seth as a family being made in the image of ‘the unity of the Triunity: three 
Persons － one family’.92 This perspective was specifically and first proposed by Gregory 
of Nazianzus (Moltmann 1985a:235).93 Though Adam and Eve and Seth are ‘dissimilar’ 
persons, they are ‘an earthly image and parable’ of the Triune God because of their shared 
life together, their consubstantiality (Moltmann 1981:199). 94  When they are united 
perichoresis-orientedly together , they are ‘the imago trinitatis and correspond to the 
triune God’ (Moltmann 1985a:216). 
Through this approach to the imago Trinitatis and ‘the first human family as a 
trinitarian analogy’, Moltmann (1981:199) underlines the importance of harmonizing 
‘personality and sociality’ in the human community without compromising or 
surrendering the one to the other. He (1985a:241) here indicates that this designated ‘true 
human community’ as the imago Trinitatis should not be misunderstood as and reduced 
to ‘a religious family ideology’. According to his explanation, this ‘true human 
                                                
92 Referring to Moltmann’s distinction between an individual and a person in S3. 
93 What Moltmann (ibid.:250 n.22) refers to is The Oration, 31.11, by Gregory of Nazianzus (fourth 
century, trans. in 2011). 
94 Moltmann (1981:199) here adopts the term ‘consubstantial’ used in The Oration, 31 of Gregory of 
Nazianzus (fourth century, trans. in 2011) to describe Adam and Eve and Seth as ‘consubstantial persons’. 
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community’ — ‘the simultaneous community of the sexes in space’ (husband-wife) and 
‘the community of the generations in time’ (parent-child) — is the basic unit within 
human cultures, no matter what their religious orientations would be. The former 
indicates an ‘inextinguishable sociality’, and the latter, an ‘equally unalterable 
generativity’ (ibid.). On the basis of his observations, Moltmann (1981:199, eo) feels that 
the lack of stress on perichōrēsis in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity in the 
Western European Church leads to ‘the development of individualism, and especially 
possessive individualism’. 95  Already within theological developments in the fourth 
century, individualism became inconceivable within the Cappadocian Fathers’ concept of 
the trinitarian doctrine, because the unity of the three divine Persons is unbreakable 
(Zizioulas 1995:48). 
Therefore, Moltmann (ibid.) raises a further question: ‘everyone is supposed to 
fulfil himself[,] but who fulfils the community?’ Accordingly, he (1985a:223–4) argues 
that ‘the trinitarian concept of community’ is the solution to this question, because it 
surmounts both ‘the ego-solitariness of the narcissist’ and ‘the egoism of the couple’ — 
husband and wife. For Moltmann, the triune God is the source and the ‘archetype of true 
human community’, and so human beings in community are the ‘imago Trinitatis’ 
(ibid.:234); therefore, he maintains that they can correspond to the trinitarian God only 
when they are united as a community (ibid.:216). Based on his commentary on John 
17:21, he defines his social Trinity as the ‘the community within the Trinity’, instead of 
simply ‘the Fatherhood or the Sonship’ within the Trinity (ibid.:241, eo).96 Accordingly, 
based on the imago Trinitatis, what is intended are earthly representations at the level of 
‘the relations in the Trinity’ rather than at the level ‘of the trinitarian constitution’ 
                                                
95 ‘Possessive individualism’ is the idea that ‘everyone is a self-possessing, self-disposing centre of action 
which sets itself apart from other persons’ (Grenz 2001:11). 
96 See also Moltmann (2009a:289). 
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(ibid.:241). But since perichōrēsis and Trinity are terms used to describe the trinitarian 
mystery of God, how is the concept of perichōrēsis applied rightly to the relationships 
between human beings? What does ‘the trinitarian concept of community’ mean? What 
can the unity within the Trinity portray to reveal actualities and possibilities in the unities 
among human beings? How do the relationships in the Trinity, even when they are united 
with one another, offer new insights for the relationships among human beings? These 
important questions must be considered in the next section. 
7.2 The Open Trinity 
Moltmann (1985a:242, eo) uses the primal and fundamental human community in the 
imago Trinitatis, namely Adam, Eve, and Seth, to understand human beings as a whole 
because in the unity of the triune God ‘the Trinity itself is whole’. He further explains that 
after the Fall, human beings are not only to be ‘restored … to this divine image’ from 
their sinful natures ‘through the messianic fellowship with the Son’, but are also to be 
called together into the ‘open Trinity’ (ibid.:242).97 But what is this open Trinity? Based 
on John 17:21, Moltmann (1981:90–96) uses this phrase to disclose a relationally and 
dynamically open unity of the Trinity towards His people, contrasting it with a closed or 
exclusive unity. For the fellowship of disciples is not only ‘a fellowship with God’, but 
also more than that, becoming ‘a fellowship in God’ (ibid.:96. eo). There are three main 
aspects of Moltmann’s open Trinity revealed in his discussion of ‘the sending of the 
creative Spirit’ (ibid.:90):98  
(1)  It opens a way for believers to participate not only in ‘the eschatological history of 
the new creation’ but also in ‘the trinitarian history of God himself’; 99 
                                                
97 The concept of ‘open Trinity’ is presented as early as in Moltmann’s The Church in the Power of the 
Spirit (1977:55, eo). 
98 See also ibid. 
99 See also Venter (2015:3). 
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(2)  It opens a way towards to a ‘forwards-looking’ future;  
(3)  It is ‘open for unification with’ believers, with humankind, and with all other living 
creatures, including the whole of creation. Therefore, according to his viewpoint the 
‘union’ of the Trinity is a ‘soteriological’ (and functional) term  as well as a 
(trinitarian) ‘theological’ (and ontological) one (ibid.:96) because the union of the 
whole creation with one another must ‘resemble the union of the son with the Father’, 
based on John 17:21 (ibid.:95).100  
However, before the open Trinity opened itself externally, the triune Persons first 
internally offered themselves as ‘the inviting, open [and wide] rooms’ for each other to 
move, live, and indwell in themselves (Moltmann 2008a:374). As ‘there can be no 
personal freedom without free spaces’ in a community, Moltmann states that they are not 
only Persons, but also ‘spaces’ (ibid.).  
Noticeably, based on the concept of the imago Christi and following the Orthodox 
theologians who rely on the teachings of Gregory of Nazianzus, Moltmann (1985a:242–
3, eo) presents his account of the ‘open Trinity’ as standing apart from ‘a closed and self-
contained Trinity’ as promoted by Augustine and followed by Thomas Aquinas. An open 
Trinity manifests the divine Persons ‘outwardly in differentiated form’, whereas a closed 
and self-contained Trinity only manifests the divine ‘outwardly without differentiation’ 
(ibid.:242). In Moltmann’s understanding, Augustine views the Trinity as a ‘whole’ 
(ibid.:242, eo). For Augustine, the imago Dei ‘in the unity of the Tri-unity’ indicates ‘the 
image of the whole Trinity’, instead of the image of the differentiated three Persons in the 
unity of the triune God (ibid.). As a result, the whole Trinity is a closed and self-contained 
Trinity. On the contrary, in the open Trinity, the restoration of sinful humans is through 
                                                
100 The union of the whole creation is not only ‘with’ the union of the triune Persons but also ‘in’ itself 
(Moltmann 1981:96). The unity of the triune Persons lies in the ‘union’ or ‘fellowship’ of them but not in 
‘their numerical unity’ or ‘the identity of a single subject’ (ibid.:95). So does the unity of the whole creation. 
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conformity to ‘a single Person of the Trinity’, only the Son who incarnates and embodies 
the imago Dei (ibid.:242). It is through the Son that the Triune God throws God-self into 
an openness for humankind. (ibid.:243). Consequently, human beings regenerated in the 
imago Christi are creatively assembled ‘into his relationship of sonship’ and so call the 
Father, ‘Abba, Father’ (Galatians 4:6) and Jesus the Son, their brother.101 From these 
reflections, we can see how the imago Christi of the open Trinity is the key to 
understanding the meanings of the imago Dei and the imago Trinitatis in Moltmann’s 
trinitarian theological anthropology. Through the Son, not only the divine Triune God 
unfolds God-self to welcome humankind, but also human beings ‘as God’s image[s] on 
earth’ obtain admittance to the Father (ibid.:242). In other words, Moltmann states, ‘the 
Father creates, redeems and perfects human beings through the Spirit in the image of the 
Son’ (ibid.:243). It is worth noting that this statement should be understood as a promised 
process towards an eschatological future of new creation as mentioned above. 
Apparently, only an open Trinity makes possible an interweaving of the imago Dei, the 
imago Christi, gloria Dei est homo, and the imago Trinitatis into a harmonious whole. 
But does this lead Moltmann into a commitment to the universalist’s salvation? That is, 
does Moltmann intend here a necessary salvation for all, since he mentions the openness 
of the open Trinity for uniting ‘with mankind, and with the whole creation’ (Moltmann 
1981:90)? This issue will be discussed in more detail in C7S2. 
8. Open Friendship: The Community of Grace  
Jesus’ relationship with his Father and the relationships amongst his believers can be 
explored further in order to inform us about the imago Dei (imago Trinitatis) and the 
significance of this trinitarian theological anthropology. For Moltmann (1978:50–63), 
                                                
101 See also Psalm 22:22, Matthew 25:40-46, 28:10, John 20:17, Romans 8:29, Hebrews 2:11f.. 
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Jesus’ ministry exemplifies and characterizes perfectly what he terms ‘open 
friendship’.102  
8.1 Open Friendship 
By means of his concept of the ‘open Trinity’ (1977:55, eo), Moltmann develops his 
trinitarian concept of fellowship (ibid.:111, 189, 343, 360). The English word fellowship 
is translated from the Greek word koinwni,a| (koinonia) in the Bible. It is also a business 
term and can be also translated as partner (Moulton & Milligan 1976:351).103 Therefore, 
we can understand Moltmann’s trinitarian concept of fellowship to mean that we have 
partnership/fellowship with/in the perichoretic Trinity. 
Fellowship is described as ‘the special gift of the Spirit’ (Moltmann 1992b:217). In 
his trinitarian concept of fellowship, Moltmann asserts that the Spirit gives Himself in 
order to participate in fellowship with believers, and then attracts them into fellowship 
with Him (ibid.). Karl Rahner’s (1904-84) words are quoted to emphasize that God’s 
fellowship with us is a ‘free and unmerited’ relationship of grace.104 In Moltmann’s 
understanding, fellowship ‘liberates’ and attracts others to enjoy relationships, instead of 
possessing and taking the other ‘by force’ (ibid.:217f.). In a true fellowship, people open 
themselves to each other with ‘respect for one another’, so that they let each other have a 
share in themselves and participate in each other’s lives on the basis of ‘mutual 
recognition’ (ibid.:217). Therefore, fellowship or community is formed ‘when what is in 
common is shared’ by dissimilar people with their own personal different attributes 
(ibid.).105 It is a community or fellowship of both ‘like with like, and … the unlike’, not 
                                                
102 See also Moltmann (1977:119f.). 
103 For example, Luke 5:10: ‘James, and John … were partners [or had fellowship] with Simon [in their 
father’s boat].’ N. T. Wright (1948-) (2013:10f.) explains this Greek word as follows: ‘the central Pauline 
theme of koinonia, fellowship or partnership, - a word with multiple resonances both in the commercial 
world, where it might describe a business partnership, and in many personal or familial settings.’ 
104 Rahner (1966, cited in Moltmann 1974b:240). 
105 See also Moltmann (2000a:332). 
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exclusive, but ‘open, inviting, and embracing’ (Moltmann 2009a:289). For the purpose 
of contrasting with the repressively socially-imposed relational self, I suggest naming the 
relational self found in the open Trinity and grounded in the open friendship as the open 
relational self. This open relational self receives wide ‘space’ in the open Trinity and then 
gives to and receives from each other wide ‘space’ in the open friendship. Through this 
trinitarian perspective of community, Moltmann (1992b:220) emphasizes repeatedly 
‘diversity in unity’ existing from the very outset of Christian faith. Community or 
fellowship in the trinitarian sense does not only ‘unite the differences’ — instead of 
‘standardization’ — but also ‘differentiate[s] the One’ (ibid.). 106  Differentiation is 
indispensable to a true community, where ‘individual potentialities’ can be developed in 
‘the greatest given diversity’ (ibid.). This community or fellowship is not a general one. 
Instead, it is ‘the trinitarian fellowship of the Spirit’ with a love that binds together things 
in common and a freedom which develops the scope and uniqueness of things ‘individual 
and singular’ (ibid.). God can be experienced both individually and socially within 
interactions with others in this community. 
8.2 Freedom in the Relationships  
Talking about freedom, Moltmann (1981:214) stresses its two main elements: ‘the 
liberation from compulsion and necessity, and the striving for the realization of the Good’. 
Only in the realm of the Good, ‘freedom may be used properly — that is to say, for life’s 
preservation and not for its destruction’ (ibid.:213f.). About forms of human freedom, 
Moltmann (1981:216f.) first differentiates two dimensions of freedom:107 
(1) a dimension involving a ‘function of property’: ‘freedom as lordship’ which exists in 
the subject-object relationship;  
                                                
106 See also Joseph Hongzhang Bai (2013:247). 
107 See also Moltmann (1985c:94–7). 
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(2) a dimension of ‘social function’: ‘freedom as community’ or as fellowship in the 
subject-subject relationship.  
He rebukes the former freedom as a ‘lie’, because it undermines community, 
reviving ‘inflicted’ wounds from the past that persist even till today (ibid.:216). He 
(ibid.:215, eo) explains: 
The person who interprets freedom as rule is really only aware of himself and his own 
property. He is not aware of other people as persons. Even when we say that a person is free 
to do and leave undone what he likes, we are interpreting freedom as lordship — as the 
person’s mastery over himself. Even when we say that a person is free if he is not determined 
by any inner or outer compulsions, we are interpreting freedom as lordship: everyone is to 
be his own king, his own master, his own slave-owner. And in saying this we have simply 
internalized external compulsions, transferring them to an inward compulsion … Everyone 
finds in the other person a competitor in the struggle for power and possession. Everyone is 
for everyone else merely the limitation of his own freedom. Everyone is free in himself, but 
no one shares in the other. In its ideal form this is a society of individuals who do not disturb 
one another but who are themselves solitary. No one determines the other, everyone 
determines himself. Freedom has then really become general. Everyone has the right to be 
free. But is this true freedom? 
In his view, true freedom can happen only in the love that tears down barriers, so 
the wounds can be healed in ‘unhindered, open communities in solidarity’ resulting from 
such a freedom (ibid.). Community does not limit the freedom of individual but expand 
it. He asserts: 
[t]he truth of freedom is love. It is only in love that human freedom arrives at its truth. I am 
free and feel myself to be truly free when I am respected and recognized by others and when 
I for my part respect and recognize them. I become truly free when I open my life for other 
people and share with them, and when other people open their lives for me and share them 
with me. Then the other person is no longer the limitation of my freedom; he is an expansion 
of it. In mutual participation in life, individual people become free beyond the limits of their 
individuality, and discover the common room for living which their freedom offers. That is 
the social side of freedom. We call it love and solidarity. In it we experience the uniting of 
isolated individuals. In it we experience the uniting of things that have been forcibly divided. 
Based on freedom as community or fellowship, Moltmann presents a third, special 
and indispensable dimension of freedom granted by ‘the experience of the Spirit’ 
(ibid.:216f., eo):108  
(3) a dimension of ‘creative function’: ‘Freedom as a passion for the future’ in ‘the 
relationship of subjects to a project [of the future]’. In other words, this freedom 
                                                
108 See also ibid.:97-9. 
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exists in the relationships enduring in the promise of love and so being filled with 
hope. 
One is free to think, say, and do only when, in the Spirit, one ‘transcend[s] the 
present’ towards the promised future by God, that is, ‘the kingdom of not yet defined 
potentialities’ (ibid.:217). For the ‘kingdom of reality’ of the past is limited. Freedom as 
a passion for the future is not only a choice for ‘creativity’, but also an empowerment 
promoting ‘initiative’ (ibid.). Moltmann summarizes the above three dimensions of 
freedom respectively (ibid.):  
(1) ‘having’;  
(2) ‘being’;  
(3) ‘becoming’. 
 However, the most important concept of freedom is its theological dimension — 
the source of human freedom. Moltmann (ibid.:218, eo) states:  
An immovable and apathetic God cannot be understood as the foundation of human freedom. 
An absolutist sovereign in heaven does not inspire liberty on earth. Only the passionate God, 
the God who suffers by virtue of his passion for people, calls the freedom of men and women 
to life … The triune God, who realizes the kingdom of his glory in a history of creation, 
liberation and glorification, wants human freedom, justifies human freedom and unceasingly 
makes men and women free for freedom. Trinitarian theology is directed towards the 
justification of a comprehensive, many-dimensioned doctrine of freedom. The conception we 
shall go on to develop is therefore the following: 
The trinitarian doctrine of the kingdom is the theological doctrine of freedom. The 
theological concept of freedom is the concept of the trinitarian history of God: God 
unceasingly desires the freedom of his creation. God is the inexhaustible freedom of those he 
has created. 
Therefore, human freedom comes from the triune God. 
8.3 The Community of the Free 
If everyone understands and desires ‘the project of the common future’ promised by God, 
and assumes their ‘common responsibility’, their society will turn into one that is 
‘personal and authentically social’ (Moltmann 1981:217). I think that such a society can 
be formed because here persons act out of freedom instead of repressive social imposition. 
Accordingly, if freedom as a passion for the future initiates and assumes ‘the 
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responsibility for a common future’, in order to benefit freedom as community (being), 
freedom as lordship (having) would be abolished, or at least diminished significantly if it 
is not ‘possible and desirable’ to abolish it totally within our earthly existence (ibid.). 
Moltmann terms this new community in the Spirit ‘the community of the free’, where no 
relationship is defined merely by ‘privileges and subjection’ (ibid.:211). Such a 
community is called into being only by the passionate triune God on the cross, instead of 
‘an immovable and apathetic God’. That is by the God who suffers for His people for the 
sake of their ‘liberation and glorification’ in the new creation of the continuous creation 
in His trinitarian history (ibid.:218). In the light of this, Moltmann argues that trinitarian 
theology can be used to justify ‘a comprehensive, many-dimensioned doctrine of 
freedom’ (ibid.).109 Therefore, he (ibid., eo) proposes to unfold the following conception: 
The Trinitarian doctrine of the kingdom is the theological doctrine of freedom. The 
theological concept of freedom is the concept of the Trinitarian history of God: God 
unceasingly desires the freedom of his creation. God in the inexhaustible freedom of those 
he has created. 
Moltmann (1977:119–20) consequently presents his theology of open friendship to 
embody the conceptualization of such a community.  
8.4 The Community of Grace 
In the hope of the future, ‘the community of the free’ involves reciprocal self-giving and 
acceptance of other persons which can be practised only in grace.110 ‘Diversity in unity’ 
is realized and may abound (Moltmann 1992b:219–20, eo). The archetype of this open 
friendship is Jesus Christ, as cited in the New Testament: ‘ “He is called the friend of tax 
collectors and sinners.” (Luke 7:34)’ (Moltmann 1992b:258, eo)111 Through ‘the law of 
                                                
109 Moltmann (1981:218) criticizes the ‘atheistic justification of freedom’ in the ally of modern political 
world order and religion. He points out that the crude either-or alternative, ‘atheistic freedom’ or 
‘monotheistic dependency’, leads to a world order ‘contrary to [hu]man’s freedom and self-responsibility’. 
110 See also Moltmann (1978:50–63). 
111 Moltmann (1981:221–2, eo) argues that the ‘indivisible and all-comprehensive’ complete freedom can 
be experienced only in the ‘growth’ of our experience as ‘God’s servants, as His children, and as his friends’ 
in the history of the trinune God’s kingdom and can be fulfilled in ‘the unhindered participation’ in the 
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grace’ (Moltmann 1977:117), Jesus offers open fellowship to other people who are not 
only different, but also have been cast out of their community. In the joy of inviting them, 
Jesus ‘celebrated the messianic feast with’ them, accepted them as human beings with 
dignity, and respected them ‘as the first children of the divine grace’ which renews all 
things. Accordingly, the ‘social prejudice’ and ‘self-isolation’ that they suffered could be 
done away with (Moltmann 1992b:258). 
Here, Moltmann (1974b:275–6) highlights a core truth distinguishing Christian 
theology from other religions. It is exactly that God himself through Christ ‘creates the 
conditions’ of participating in the relationship with the open Trinity for ‘the sinners, the 
godless and those forsaken by God’ (ibid.:275).112 They are not able to ‘satisfy these 
conditions’ by themselves (ibid.). Only through God’s ‘self-humiliation’ in Christ’s death 
on the cross and ‘through his exaltation of [hu]man[ity]’ in Christ’s resurrection from 
death, God creatively and purposefully provides the conditions for reconciliation with 
God-self (ibid.). In other words, reconciliation with God can be accessed only through 
the Person Christ and ‘His history’ (ibid.). Moltmann states very clearly that this 
relationship with the open Trinity is neither a religion, a law nor an ideal (ibid.:276):  
God does not become a religion, so that [hu]man[s] participates in him by corresponding 
religious thoughts and feelings. God does not become a law, so that humankind participates 
in him through obedience to a law. God does not become an ideal, so that humankind achieves 
community with him through constant striving. He humbles himself and takes upon himself 
the eternal death of the godless and the godforsaken, so that all the godless and the 
godforsaken can experience communion with him. 
Furthermore, only through the one-sided covenant provided by God for all by way of 
Christ on the cross, do such true community and fellowship turn out to be a ‘gracious, 
                                                
triune God’s life of eternity only ‘in the kingdom of glory’. No thirst for total freedom can be satisfied and 
quenched by any partial freedom. 
112 Marcus Borg (1942-2015) (1998:147) highlights Jesus’ holiness as ‘a contagious power’ to ‘overcome’ 
the ill and unclean but not to be overcome by them or needing ‘protection through rigorous separation’. 
Luke Bretherton (2004:94, eo) emphasizes by quoting Borg that ‘Jesus’ holiness ‘infects the impure, sinners 
and the Gentiles’ but not ‘sin and impurity infecting him’. 
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presuppositionless and universal community of God’ (ibid.:275). In this community, all 
miserable persons are welcomed unconditionally. Moltmann (ibid.:275-6, eo) stresses: 
Christian theology cannot develop any dipolar theology of the reciprocal relationship 
between the God who calls and the man who answers; it must develop a trinitarian theology, 
for only in and through Christ is that dialogical relationship with God opened up … In 
Christian terms, therefore, no relationship of immediacy between God and man is 
conceivable which is separated from this person and his history … Only the covenant founded 
one-sidedly by God and opened to all in the cross of Christ makes possible the covenant 
relationships of dialogue in the spirit, in sympatheia and in prayer. God was in Christ — that 
is the presupposition for the fellowship of sinners and godless with God, since it opens up 
God’s sphere for the whole of man and for all men. We live in Christ — that is the 
consequence for the faith which experiences the full communion with God in communion 
with Christ.  
Therefore, for the sake of this kind of ‘community of grace’, Christian theology must not 
separate ‘Christocentric’ thought from trinitarian thought (ibid.:275). 
8.5 Gracious Moral Cultivation 
Who can enter into this covenant relationship with the open Trinity? Is it only one who 
has been granted a new being made possible by divine calling? Without Christ and the 
cross, human beings are kept insuperably far from God’s call. Therefore, ‘Christian 
baptism … as a form of grace’ marks and displays an identity alteration by the burial of 
the old and the rebirth of the new (Moltmann 1976:16, 18). Although moral cultivation is 
not a term normally used in Christian theology, the theology of life transformation 
developed from imago Christi explained above can be understood and coined as gracious 
moral cultivation (moral transformation by Christ’s grace) in contrast to Tu Weiming’s 
New Ruist moral self-cultivation (moral transformation by oneself). This is worked out 
within discussions related to the imago Dei in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological 
anthropology. Nonetheless, Moltmann (1992b:259, eo) does not consider ‘the moral 
purpose of changing the world’ as ‘the motive’ for the imago Christi. It is instead a festive 
exultance over God’s kingdom having made itself ‘wide open for the others’. Yet though 
Moltmann gets this far, he does not explain more directly why he considers this to be so 
in this context. However, he (1981:125, eo) earlier states: 
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[t]he experience of the Holy Spirit, as distinct from human forms of spiritualization and 
sublimation, is always a physical experience. This experience is the beginning of the 
resurrection of the body (Romans 8:23), which is the direct opposite of the body’s repression 
or exploitation. The experience of the Spirit sets the person who is touched by it in a 
beginning event which is open for the coming liberty of the whole creation, and is therefore 
still incomplete. The experience of the Spirit begins the completion and perfecting of the 
creation of human beings and all things, which makes them the home of the triune God. In 
the indwelling of the Spirit, whether it be in the heart, in the community of believers, or in 
the new creation, God always comes to be at home in his own world. 
Therefore, it is not difficult to infer from Moltmann’s historical and cultural contexts 
(ibid.:248-63) his reasons for highlighting an ‘open friendship’ that is based on God’s 
‘grace’ and ‘love’ through the work of the Spirit. 
8.6 A Non-Hierarchical Fellowship 
Open friendship is passed down through the community of God’s people: ‘Accept one 
another, then, just as Christ accepted you, in order to bring praise to God’ (NIV Romans 
15:7).113 Therefore, Moltmann’s social Trinity provides a healthier relational self, the 
open relational self, one that can be built up in such a community made possible by Christ. 
For its basic law is ‘acceptance of others in their difference’ without surrendering one’s 
identity, but mutually revealing what each other is (Moltmann 1992b:258–9). In other 
words, the diversity reveals the individual identity more clearly. 
Moltmann’s open friendship emphasizes ‘a non-hierarchical fellowship of equals 
in the Holy Spirit’ in which everyone in this community ‘contributes what is his or hers’ 
(ibid.:224). It is neither any kind of collectivisms nor any kind of individualisms, because 
as Moltmann states (ibid.): 
The true unity of the church is an image of the perichoretic unity of the Trinity, so it can 
neither be a collective consciousness which represses the individuality of the persons, nor 
[be] an individual consciousness which neglects what is in common.  
                                                
113 Cf. ‘accept’ (NIV), ‘welcome’ (NRSV) and ‘receive’ (NKJV) are different English translations for the 
Greek term prosela,beto in Romans 15:7: 
NRSV Rom 15:7 ‘Welcome one another, therefore, just as Christ has welcomed you, for the glory of God.’ 
NKJV Rom 15:7 ‘Therefore receive one another, just as Christ also received us, to the glory of God.’ 
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Moltmann (1998b:5, eo) emphasizes that ‘by equality we do not mean collectivism, 
but equality in the conditions and possibilities of life for everyone. As a social concept, 
equality means justice. As a human concept, equality means solidarity’. This open 
friendship provides the positive aspect of a non-hierarchical society in which people are 
not being repressively imposed upon, controlled, and suppressed. Nobody has a special 
prerogative and nobody’s freedom is offended (Moltmann 2000a:332). It is a kind of 
relationship where ‘what is truly human emerges and remains’, even if other types of 
relationships cease to exist, change more or less naturally, or move into unforeseen forms 
(Moltmann 1977:116). These other types include the ‘parent-child’, ‘master-servant’, 
superior-inferior, and man-woman relationships (ibid.). Such a friendship is not 
‘existence for others’ but ‘existence with others’ where ‘freedom’ is sustained (ibid., eo). 
It can only happen ‘in unexacting friendliness’, namely under conditions that are exempt 
from ‘necessity and compulsion’ (ibid.,116). In this relationship within the grace of the 
triune God, ‘the new [hu]man, the true [hu]man, the free [hu]man [becomes] the friend’ 
(ibid.). The more people begin to trust one another as friends, ‘the more privileges and 
claims to domination become superfluous … the less they need to control one another’ 
(ibid.). Therefore, in this fellowship of grace, people are not necessarily there to please 
others and God, or to pretend to be good before them anymore. As a result, they can live 
out their real self without wearing a mask to hide their weakness, ugliness and sinful 
nature.114  
As Carl Henry (1913-2003) (1999:136) argues, the rational part of humans, as a 
fundamental part of the imago Dei and human nature, makes communication possible and 
enables this sort of relationship. Therefore, I find that through rational communication, 
                                                
114 This open fellowship is similar to the Christian community Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) describes 
in his Life Together (1939, trans. in 1954, reprinted in 1996:95–6) (though not developed by Bonhoeffer 
on the basis of reflections related to social trinitarian doctrine). 
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open friendship is one of the practical outcomes of the imago Dei as a goal in trinitarian 
theological anthropology and is also the way to such a goal. However, because it is based 
on Moltmann’s analogy of relations as mentioned above, open friendship relies 
exclusively on a free gift of grace that God offers in Christ’s Spirit. It is absolutely not 
realizable by means of an inborn nature or any inherent capacity of humans after the Fall. 
McDougall (2003:192) points out that the analogy of relations also assures a ‘social or 
interpersonal reality’ that the imago Dei bestows. In other words, only through 
relationships in an open community can humans come to recognize and experience ‘their 
messianic destiny as imago Trinitatis’ (ibid.). It is through divine grace that ‘God pours 
the supernatural virtue of caritas (charity) into a person’s heart’ (Moltmann 1992b:249). 
Accordingly, anyone’s spontaneous longing for God will be adequately directed and 
consummated in ‘the friendship with God’ that God-self endows (ibid.). Consequently, 
such a person’s commitment will be aligned with God’s; everything will be loved which 
God loves for God’s sake. This is where, when, and how the personage will genuinely be 
expressed and so reveal the open and regenerated person. 
In the next chapter, I shall evaluate Moltmann’s interpretation of Christian social 
trinitarian anthropology and how well his account of relational selfhood can be applied 







Evaluations of Jürgen Moltmann’s Views on Selfhood and Their 
Implication for the Repressed Form of Self 
 
After examining Moltmann’s interpretation of Christian social trinitarian relational 
selfhood, I am going to evaluate to what extent Moltmann’s account can provide an 
alternative solution for the research problem of the repressed from of self in the PTRIC 
contexts. It is notable that Moltmann did not develop his account of social trinitarian 
relational selfhood for solving such a problem resulting from Chinese forms of (Ru-
based) collectivism, especially New Ruist and PTRIC conceptions of relational selfhood, 
although he is always been concerned about any collectivist-related issues (as mentioned 
in C3S1.2). On the contrary, he developed that account mainly in response to 
individualist-related issues which he argues follow from the psychological aspect of 
trinitarian doctrine in the Western European Church tradition inherited from Augustine's 
account. His response, notably, was presented as a synthesis between ‘[modern Anglo-
European] individualism’ and ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’, as mentioned above. As 
Moltmann himself has not yet addressed this PTRIC problem of RFS by reference to his 
social trinitarian relational selfhood, naturally there has been no direct discussion or 
criticism of Moltmann’s perspective about it by scholars. I, therefore, offer my own 
critical review. Although there are many other discussions and criticisms related to 
Moltmann’s theology, some of which to his social trinitarian doctrine (Gresham 1993), 
due to the limitation of space, I will only focus here on issues relating to Moltmann’s 




1. Moltmann’s Argument for the Ontology of God and Human Selfhood 
Moltmann’s open Trinity and open friendship together make a strong case for rejecting 
not only a non-trinitarian theist conception of God, but also the other two visions of 
abstract monotheism in Christian theologies of the Trinity: God as a supreme substance, 
and God as an absolute subject. Nevertheless, his seemingly questionable denial of the 
ontological ground of God’s reality is criticized by a number of scholars.  
It is insightful that Moltmann defines human nature first by means of theology and 
then by means of anthropology. Or more precisely, the imago Dei ‘refers to something 
[hu]man[kind] is rather than something [hu]man[kind] has or does … it is not dependent 
upon the presence of anything else’ but only on the Creator God (Erickson 1984:513).1 
Theologically speaking, we affirm that human beings are uniquely created in the imago 
Dei. Hebrews 2:5-8, quoting Psalm 8:4-6, reveal the particularity of humankind’s 
relationship to God above all creatures by stating: 
Now God did not subject the coming world, about which we are speaking, to angels. But 
someone has testified somewhere, ‘What are human beings that you are mindful of them, or 
mortals, that you care for them? You have made them for a little while lower than the angels; 
you have crowned them with glory and honour, subjecting all things under their feet.’ Now 
in subjecting all things to them, God left nothing outside their control. As it is, we do not yet 
see everything in subjection to them. 
It seems methodologically justified that anthropology should be based on the 
knowledge of God’s creation held to be revealed through the Bible by God. But the 
question is, according to Moltmann’s account, whether or not God possesses ontological 
attributes that are fundamental to human nature and make human community possible 
(even necessary). Moltmann seems to want to avoid this question, yet as Carl Henry 
(1913-2003) (1999:136) argued, community presupposes intelligence. Can humankind 
without intelligence form a community? In other words, can relationship alone define 
                                                
1 ‘We are God’s treasured creatures who deserve respect, not because of what we have done [or what we 
have], but because of who we are’ (So, Damon WK 2012:email). Shirley Isaac (2010:326) argues that 
human beings, as ‘fragmented’ selves, evidently are not equipped to ‘answer the question “Who am I?” ’. 
‘Assuming that the question can be answered, the answer cannot come from’ human beings themselves. 
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human nature, without any immanent reference to the ontological nature of the imago 
Dei? 
1.1 The Issue about God in Se and God quo ad Nos 
Henry Jansen (1994:106, 129) criticized Moltmann for basing his ‘concept of God’ 
exclusively on ‘God quo[ ]ad nos’ (to us) and at the same time plays down ‘God in se’ 
(in God-self) (ibid.:228).2 By citing Stoker’s argument (1985 in ibid. 1994:227-8), Jansen  
explains two different kind of relationships involved in the doctrine of God. God quo ad 
nos refers to the personal one which is ‘related to the world’, while God in se refers to the 
‘(impersonal) ontological’ one which is ‘independent of the world’ (ibid.:228). Jansen 
insisted on maintaining both complementary ‘aspects of God as person and God as Being 
Itself’ in a ‘paradoxical’ tension with each other (ibid.). Although the conflict between 
these two aspects might not be utterly resolved, they ‘cannot be separated from nor 
reduced to each other[s]’. Otherwise, we would end up either losing ‘the notion of God 
as Being Itself’ or missing ‘the understanding of God as person’ (ibid.). Do these two 
aspects of God lose their balance in Moltmann’s account? 
I find that Jansen’s criticism here is not based on a proper understanding of 
Moltmann’s account. First, Moltmann (1981:151–61) argues the equal importance of the 
immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity to be discussed in the next section.3 Secondly, 
he (ibid.:xv) dedicated The Trinity and the Kingdom of God especially to overcome the 
disputed issue of ‘filioque’ causing the schism between the Eastern and Western churches, 
as introduced in C3S1.2.1. This attempt is made through resolving the problematic 
accounts of God as the supreme substance and God as the absolute subject in the Western 
                                                
2 See also Lee Seunggoo’s (2009:97–101) similar criticism. 
3  In Moltmann’s (1981:151) definition, the immanent Trinity, also named the ‘substantial Trinity’, 
designates ‘the triune God as he is in himself’. The economic Trinity, also named the ‘revelatory Trinity’, 
is given to call ‘the triune God in his dispensation of salvation, in which he is revealed’. 
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church, as discussed in C6S4 above, and arguing his understanding of ‘the constitution of 
the Trinity’ (ibid.:162-71, eo), especially the crucial question whether or not ‘the Holy 
Spirit proceed from the Father and from the Son’ (ibid.:178-90, eo). All of these 
discussions are about God in se rather than God quo ad nos. Thirdly, the very important 
concept of perichōrēsis adopted by him (ibid.:150-58, 174-87) is mainly for explaining 
the ‘inner-trinitarian’ relationships which are also about God in se instead of God quo ad 
nos, as discussed in C6S5.4 and to be discussed later in S3. Besides, the term ‘inner-
trinitarian’ appears frequently in his discussion of the Trinity (ibid.:111-18, 182-9).4 
Accordingly, it is very obvious that Moltmann’s concept of God is substantially based on 
God in se.  
It is because of his deeper ontological concern that Moltmann (1981:171) 
emphasizes God’s three Persons as ‘the non-interchangeable, untransferable individual 
existence[s]’ as well as their relationships. He construes this so-called ‘existing-in-
relationship’ in the following manner (ibid.:172, eo): 
In respect of the divine nature the Father has to be called individua substantia, but in respect 
of the Son we have to call him Father. The position is no different in the case of the Son and 
the Spirit.  
According to this evidence, Moltmann never ignores the importance of God in se 
while emphasizing the forgotten social trinitarian doctrine, which seemingly highlights 
more the importance of God quo ad nos, in the Western European Church.  
1.2 The Issue about the Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity 
Jansen holds the classic differentiation of the ‘economic Trinity’ from the ‘immanent 
Trinity’ that Moltmann has deserted. Moltmann follows Karl Rahner’s argument 
(1970:22, eo) that ‘the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and the immanent Trinity 
                                                
4 See also Moltmann (1981:25, 58, 92, 106., 127, 165, 169). 
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is the economic Trinity’.5 Moltmann (1981:160, eo) tries to bring together ‘the substance’ 
(the ‘inwardness’ of the triune God) and ‘the revelation’ (the ‘outwardness’ of the open 
Trinity) through the crucified Christ. He argues that ‘the economic Trinity not only 
reveals the immanent Trinity; it also has a retroactive effect on it’. He (ibid., eo) interprets 
the trinitarian doctrine from the perspective of ‘the theology of the cross’: 
The Augustinian distinction between the opera trinitatis ad extra, which are undivided 
(indivisa) and the opera trinitatis ad intra, which are divided (divisa) is insufficient. It ascribes 
unity to God outwards and threeness inwardly. But the event of the cross (which is an 
outward event) can only be understood in trinitarian terms — i.e., terms that are divided 
(divisa) and differentiated. Conversely, the surrender of the Son for us on the cross has a 
retroactive effect on the Father and causes infinite pain. On the cross God creates salvation 
outwardly for his whole creation and at the same time suffers this disaster of the whole world 
inwardly in himself. From the foundation of the world, the opera trinitatis ad extra correspond 
to the passiones trinitatis ad intra. God as love would otherwise not be comprehensible at all. 
In his social trinitarian doctrine (2009a:288), ‘substances and relations’ are 
maintained as ‘equally primary’. 6  In the sense of the economic Trinity that we can 
experience, the triune God opens God-self to the world and enters into our histories 
through Christ’s incarnation and crucifixion. As is commonly understood, Jesus as the 
Son of God is the second Person of the Trinity. On the one hand, the Son is indeed a 
relational term, although eternally so in that relationship; on the other hand, the Son is 
also God — YHWH — I AM — and so possesses ontic identity as God. God is something 
distinct. Therefore, Jesus has both relationality and ontic identity. 
At this point, I do not sense that Moltmann would understand God quo ad nos and 
God in se to be in conflict with each other. Instead, they are two descriptions and 
understandings about God, demonstrated in two different dimensions that complement 
each other in trying to paint a full picture of the triune God. Yet because there is a 
mysterious dimension of the Trinity that goes beyond the confines of human reason, I 
                                                
5 Nevertheless, Rahner (1970:106) rejects that there are three ‘subjectivities’ in the triune God.  
6 It is through insisting this concept of ‘equally primary’ that Moltmann (1981:188–90) criticizes the 
hierarchical trinitarian structures in both accounts of the Latin church tradition and the Eastern church 
tradition. In his (1981:191–202) viewpoints, the two traditions both support ‘clerical monotheism’ and 
‘political monotheism’ both of which are based on asymmetrical Trinitarian structure. See also C6F70 in 
this chapter and Moltmann (1977:291–300, 305–306; 1981:129–37; 1985d; 1992b:290–95).  
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agree to the subtle distinction Leonardo Boff (1938-) (1988:215) makes between them: 
‘the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, but not the whole of the immanent Trinity’. 
For there certain mysteries within the immanent Trinity still exist, because they have not 
yet been revealed in the economic Trinity. Without the understanding of ‘God as Being 
Itself’, the incarnation and crucifixion of Jesus Christ, the gift of grace, and even the 
relationship with a personal God, all become vague, abstract, metaphysical, and 
problematic. However, without any revelation in the economic salvation of Christ, the 
immanent Trinity is hard to grasp because God does not reveals Himself apart from His 
acts of salvation from a perspective of the theology of the cross.  
Therefore, both aspects are also indispensable in establishing a foundation for a 
relational selfhood for humans. In facing the contemporary trend of uniting humankind’s 
dignity with the ‘purely humanistic’ philosophy of existentialism or ‘an autonomous 
morality’, Zizioulas (2004:27) argues that the link between the conceptualizations of 
selfhood or personhood and theology, especially within the trinitarian doctrine (ibid.:36), 
is indissoluble ‘historically’ and ‘existentially’.7 He points out that ‘in one’s social or 
legal relationships … the moral or legal person … has nothing to do with the ontology of 
the person’ (ibid.:34, eo). If there is not ontology of the person, one’s selfhood can only 
be given and confirmed by one’s society, either relationally or legally and politically 
(ibid.:34-5).  
Traditionally, the ontological dimension of God (the immanent Trinity) is discussed 
in the context where historical time is transcended, in timelessness, and the personal 
dimension of God (the economic Trinity) is discussed in the context within historical 
time. However, Moltmann does not see the necessity of such a distinction,8 one that, he 
                                                
7 See also (Zizioulas 1995). 
8 See also Moltmann (1972b:96; 1973, cited in 2009:98). 
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argues, will dissolve ‘the one in the other’ (ibid.:160).9 Moltmann (1981:160) highlights 
that the sociality of the Trinity corresponds to the substance of the Trinity from the 
beginning of creation. We can use some terms by other scholars to denote this concept: 
such as ‘irreducible relationality of being’ by Torrance (1996:285) or ‘relational 
ontology’ called by some other scholars.10  
Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational selfhood tends to be this kind of selfhood in 
which one’s individual self tends to be dissolved into the collective self or hidden behind 
one’s adopted social masks. On the contrary, Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational 
selfhood encourages people to search for liberty on the path to the person, rather than 
moving only towards the personage (Tournier 1957:224). This foundation is the 
relationship of grace with God, within the self, and with others.  
1.3 The Source of New Human Selfhood 
Although Moltmann’s account of the imago Dei (on which his social trinitarian relational 
selfhood is based) was not developed originally for liberating the RFS (C6S6), the 
doctrine of the imago Dei is unanimously recognized in the Christian world as the source 
                                                
9 Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014) (2004:300–327) integrates these terms for explaining the seemingly 
conflicting concepts between God in se and God quo ad nos into a new term: ‘reciprocal’ or ‘mutual self-
distinction’. 
10 This is what Alan J. Torrance (1996:285) calls the ‘ontological originality of personhood’ and the 
‘irreducible relationality of being’. See also Torrance (2003:148–9). This is also what Todd H. Speidell 
(1994) calls ‘a trinitarian ontology of Persons in society’, and what Gunton (1999:51) and some other 
scholars, for example, Catherine M. LaCugna (1991:46, 205), John Heywood Thomas (1995), Wildman 
(2010), Zizioulas (2010), David Martin (2010), and Coakley (2010), Sandage and Brown (2015; 2015), call 
a ‘relational ontology’. In ‘relational ontology’, being is understood ‘as being-in-relation, not being-in-
itself’ (LaCugna 1991:46, 205) or ‘person as relational being’ (Chiu, Shungming 趙崇明  {p. Zhào 
Chóngmíng}2004). But it is worth noting that the term relational ontology does not necessary specify the 
Christian social Trinitarian relational ontology. It is also used to describe different concept of ontology in 
other contexts, for example in Foucault’s account (Asch 2009). There are some other terms used by scholars 
to describe the concept of relational ontology. For example, ‘being-in-communion’ is used by Edwin C. 
Hui 許志偉 (p. Xǔ Zhìwěi) (2002:197) and Carver T. Yu. With this term, Barth describes the feature of the 
triune Persons and human beings created in God’s likeness. Although Carver T. Yu (1987:147–213) use it 
to describe the relational ontology of both the Creator God and human being, his ‘being-in-communion’ of 
God denotes ‘being-in-communion’ with his ‘creatures’ instead of among three Persons (ibid.:180f.). 
Besides Carver T. Yu, based on Thomas Aquinas’ (1270s, trans. in 1921:34–37 {Q.29 Art.4}) account, W. 
Norris Clarke (1994:102–122) gave this similar concept of relational ontology the term ‘substance-in-
relation’. See also Edwin C. Hui (2000:50–60). 
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of human selfhood and the foundation for a healthy selfhood. Moreover, Moltmann 
elaborates the doctrine of the imago Dei to focus more on the new creation of the triune 
God, i.e. soteriologically on the imago Christi (C6S6.2) which must be extended to stress 
eschatologically on Gloria Dei est Homo (C6S6.3). Will this focus in his account provide 
a basis for liberating the RFS? 
Moltmann applies the concept of an heir presented by the Apostle Paul to explaining 
the significance of the imago Christi in providing new human selfhood and new human 
interpersonal relationships. Paul states that ‘Christ is both the imago Dei (Colossians 
1:15) and the one in whose image believers are to be formed (Ephesians 4:13)’ (Grenz 
2001:174). He presents the concept of an heir to show, firstly, the inevitability of parent-
child relationship of the triune God with human beings, secondly, the necessity of 
redemptive salvation and gracious moral cultivation granted towards human beings by 
the triune God, and thirdly, the hope of the promised future transformed self as the gloria 
Dei in the consummation of the new creation in eternity (Titus 3:7). Therefore, I find that 
Paul’s concept of an heir employed by Moltmann is helpful in embodying the theological 
meaning of the imago Christi in Moltmann’s account, because it restores postlapsarian 
humankind to the imago Dei (the imago Trinitatis), by way of the imago Christi. The 
imago Christi denotes the action done and granted by the triune God. Being an heir 
denotes a status and relationship with the triune God, grounded in Jesus Christ the Son, 
which humankind accepts and receives.11 
In Romans 8:29, Paul uses the Greek word ‘su,mmorfoj’, meaning having ‘a similar 
form, nature, or style’ (Bauer 2000:958, eo), or having ‘the same form’, sharing ‘in having 
the likeness of’ (Louw & Nida 1989:586, eo),12 to highlight God’s transformative work 
                                                
11 I am indebted to Peter K. Chow’s inspiration, in our conversation (2012), for this application of Paul’s 
concept of an heir to explain relational selfhood. 
12 See also Moulton and Milligan (1976:598), United Bible Societies (1987b), and Zodhiates (1993:1328). 
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in conforming the elect to the image of Christ. This depicts the meaning and effect of the 
imago Christi in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology. This is also the 
transformative goal of the Holy Spirit that Paul describes in 2 Corinthians 3:17f.: 
Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. And all of 
us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror, are being 
transformed [(metamorfou,meqa)] into the same image [(eivko,na)] from one degree of glory to 
another; for this comes from the Lord, the Spirit.  
Paul used the verb metamorfo,omai with the noun eivkw,n (image or form). This Greek verb 
means literally being changed in form, namely being changed ‘inwardly in fundamental 
character or condition … [and] be[ing] transformed’ (Bauer 2000:639, eo)13 and shares 
the same root of morfh, (form) with the adjective su,mmorfoj. Paul, in this passage, clearly 
points out that the goal of transforming the elect to the same image of Christ will be done 
and fulfilled by the Holy Spirit. Moltmann (1981:124) explains this goal more concretely: 
In the Spirit is anticipated what will be in the future … In the activity of the Spirit, 
consequently, the renewal of life, the new obedience and the new fellowship of men and 
women is experienced. The marks of the eschatological experience of the Spirit are boundless 
freedom, exhuberant joy and inexhaustible love. 
Therefore, in applying theologically to anthropology, the source of our confidence is in 
the Holy Spirit, not any more in ourselves, in Moltmann’s account as already 
demonstrated in C6S8.5. For not any more are we ‘concerned about transforming 
ourselves, but rather in being transformed by the power of His Spirit’ (Swindoll 1989:47). 
Consequently, not any more do we live in fear that we are not good enough, ‘because we 
are free to live by His power’ (ibid.). This is the reason why the RFS can be liberated in 
the imago Christi through the work of the Spirit. 
                                                
13 See also Moulton and Milligan (1976:403), United Bible Societies (1987a), Louw and Nida (1989:155, 
587), and Zodhiates (1993:968–9). 
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The destination or final stage of transformation is the glorification of the children 
of the triune God at the second coming of Christ (Seifrid 2014:183–6).14 In Philippians 
3:21, Paul connects su,mmorfoj to this ultimate do,xa (glory): 
But our citizenship is in heaven, and it is from there that we are expecting a Saviour, the Lord 
Jesus Christ. He will transform the body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the 
body of his glory [(or literally: transform our lowly body into the same form (su,mmorfon) as 
his glorious body)], by the power that also enables him to make all things subject to himself. 
Biblically it is stated that the first human creatures broke their covenant with God 
the Creator, and so the image and likeness of God imprinted within humans were marred 
and distorted (Romans 3:23),15 especially within their relationality. The main purpose of 
Jesus’ incarnation to redeem sinful humankind is not merely to absolve the punishment 
or condemnation of sin, but also to restore the broken imago Dei in humankind and in 
their relationships (Romans 8:29-30; cf. Matthew 5:4816). We need to realize that the 
triune God has not yet finalized transforming us in God’s image (Moseley 1991:17), so 
that the restored imago Dei through Christ’s salvation, namely the imago Christi in 
Moltmann’s account, in us has not yet been able to manifest fully the glory17 of God, i.e. 
Gloria Dei est Homo in Moltmann’s account. Besides the liberation of our repressed form 
of selves, this transforming work of the Spirit should lead us into an even more robust 
                                                
14 See also Kistemaker (1997:130), and William R. Baker (1999:167–70). 
15 In Paul’s conception of God’s glory and the imago Dei, it is because sharing in the glory of God involves 
conforming to the imago Christi (Romans 8:29-30; Philippians 3:21) so that ‘fall[ing] short of the of glory 
of God’ (Romans 3:23) is evidence of a ‘declension’ from the imago Dei (Moo 1996:226). In other words, 
the absence of glory indicates that ‘all people fail to exhibit that being-like-God for which they were created’ 
(ibid.). See also Utley (2013:52). 
16 ‘Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect’ (Matthew 5:48) because human beings were 
created to be the likeness of God (Constable 2017:121). See also Barclay (1958:176–7). 
17 Those who suffer with the Son of Man ‘shall share his glory also’ (Spurgeon 1893:321). When He is 
‘seated on the throne of his glory’ (Matthew 19:28), all things shall have been renewed. Then ‘the highest 
honours’ shall await the ones who have followed Him (ibid.). See also Calvin (1555, trans. and published 
in 1999:252) and Henry (1721:494–5). 
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security and self-confidence, as well as be realized in healthier and more intimate 
relationships with God and others. 
2. Moltmann’s Arguments about Soteriology and Sin 
Wáng Wénjī 王文基 (2005) is impressed with Moltmann’s concept of open friendship, 
but is very concerned about its obscurity. The boundaries of Moltmann’s open community 
work under the shadow of ‘universalism’ (ibid.:20), which is criticized by evangelicals.18 
Wang criticizes Moltmann’s ‘over-optimistic’ attitude about ‘human nature’, noting that 
one’s ability to enter into this open community appears not to involve the problem of ‘sin’ 
in Moltmann’s theology (ibid.:19). Accordingly, Wang worries that human beings can 
enter into this open relationship with God without any mention of the Cross or messianic 
salvation.  
2.1 The Issue about Universalism 
Wang’s concerns about Moltmann’s universalist stance are reasonable from a Protestant 
evangelical perspective (one that I share), but his criticisms are not based on Moltmann’s 
clearly expressed rationale. Moltmann neither undervalues the despairing state of human 
sinful nature, nor opens a side door for salvation that avoids the messianic Cross or 
crucified Christ (Moltmann 1967:22–6; 1996:235–55).19 
Moltmann (1974b:194–5) unequivocally takes his universalist stand early in The 
Crucified God, claiming that ‘the theology of the cross is the true Christian universalism’. 
For him, there cannot be any distinction among sinners and ‘all will be made righteous 
without any merit on their part by his grace which has come to pass in Christ Jesus (Romans 
3.24)’. Jesus’ death for all the world must ‘undermine, remove and destroy the things which 
mark men out as elect and non-elect’ (ibid.:194). It is notable that Moltmann (1976:20, eo) 
                                                
18 Müller-Fahrenholz (2001:102f.) and Richardson (2012:23, 38). 
19 See also Moltmann (1974b:275–6; 1979:117f., 122-3; 1985a:242; 1990a:185, 243; 2004:94–6). 
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differentiates his ‘Christian universalism’ from general universalism, because he insists 
that the most fundamental rationale for his ‘Christian universalism’ is to believe in the 
crucified Christ, instead of relying merely on ‘monotheism, one God, so one humanity’. 
The only hope for ‘men in their shared lack of full humanness’ is the acceptance of the 
‘crucified God’ (ibid.). He (1990a:222–5) also reclaims and emphasizes, at length and 
unequivocally, his universalist stand in some of his later works. Especially, Moltmann 
(1996:235–55) refutes ‘double predestination’ (p.246), and makes a synthesis between 
the thesis of ‘the universal theology of grace’ (p.254) and the antithesis of ‘the 
particularist theology of faith’ (ibid.).20 Based on God’s love for the sinner and that grace 
is greater than sin, Moltmann refuses to accept God as condemning any sinner to spend 
eternity in hell. Instead, he argues for his universalism on the basis of the purposeful and 
ultimate ‘restoration of all things’ by Christ’s ‘all-reconciling love’, because he takes the 
condemnation for all sinners on the Cross (ibid.:254, eo).  
I do not find Moltmann’s account of ‘Christian universalism’ to be convincing. 
However, due to the limitation of space, my brief criticism of his ‘Christian universalism’ 
is provided in A-O for reference. Even though space does not allow for this issue to be 
analysed and argued comprehensively here, one could at least ask whether Moltmann’s 
positions on ‘human nature’ and sin are over-optimistic or not. 
2.2 The Issue about Sin 
As disclosed above, the imago Christi is central to Moltmann’s concept of the imago Dei. 
Moltmann (1985a:229–34) never undervalues the despair of humans’ sinful nature. He 
understands sin not as a change of substance, but as a relational change; in this way, 
therefore, his view is that ‘the image is in no way … diminished’ (ibid.:233).21 This is the 
                                                
20 See also Moltmann (1994b:138–44; 2004:140–51). 
21 For Moltmann’s universalism, see also Nik Ansell (2011) although he does not analyse it in detail. 
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main reason that he might be misunderstood by Wang or some others. In trying to hold 
the position of ‘at once God’s image and a sinner’ (ibid.), Moltmann (1985a:232–4) 
argues that what sin may damage is not the imago Dei but humankind’s relationship to 
God. This is why he (1999:84) underscores humankind’s likeness to God as being not 
grounded in certain ‘qualities’ of humankind, but rather in their ‘relationship’ to the 
trinune God. Therefore, the sinners are ‘slaves of sin’ (Romans 6:17), instead of being 
servants of God. However, God’s relationship to humans, namely humans’ objective 
likeness to God’,22 cannot be damaged by sin, so that God’s presence faithfully keeps the 
imago Dei from being deprived.’23 Does Moltmann, as Bonzo (2009:82) critically claims, 
try to defuse sin’s radical rupture, while admitting human’s sin? Indeed, it seems that 
Moltmann (1985:233–4) obviously contradicts himself when he discusses these matters. 
On the one hand, he calls a sinner God’s ‘refractory image’, reaffirming the need and 
hope for ‘the completion of the imago Dei’24 that comes about through the restoration 
from sin to the divine image. Furthermore, he explains that sinners maybe turned from 
being in the imago Dei into ‘an imago satanae or an imago mammonis’ (an image of Satan 
or an image of Mammon). Here, Moltmann clearly admits that a sinner may experience a 
situation of falling short of likeness to God. If the imago Dei is undiminished, how can it 
become ‘refractory’? Why would it need to be completed?  
In fact, social likeness to God is the core value of the imago Dei in Moltmann’s 
(ibid.:234-43) social doctrine of the Trinity. Does social likeness to God not include 
                                                
22 Moltmann understands human beings’ relationship to God as ‘a double one. It means God’s relation to 
human beings and the relation of human beings to God.’ The former one cannot be destroyed or lost unless 
God ends it. ‘Human beings’ objective likeness to God subsists in God’s relation to them’ on both of which 
the dignity and human rights of each and every human being are based (Moltmann 1999:84). See also (Sider 
2012:39, 105, 118). 
23 See also Moltmann (2004:107). 
24 As Moltmann explains (1985a:243, eo), ‘As God’s image, human beings are the image of the whole 
Trinity in that they are conformed to the image of the Son: the Father creates, redeems and perfects human 
beings through the Spirit in the image of the Son.’ 
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humankind’s relationship to God? How can human’s relational social likeness to God in 
the imago Dei be kept intact, while humankind’s relation to God is perverted by sin? 
Since Moltmann accepts perverting but refuses to claim sin’s destroying power as the 
nature of its influence in humankind’s relationship to God, why cannot he accept that the 
imago Dei might be perverted, rather than insist on it being undiminished? I am afraid 
that Moltmann’s insistence and arguments on this issue are not very coherent or 
convincing. 
While I disagree with Moltmann’s universalism, still his social trinitarian theology 
recognizes the reality of humankind’s imperfectibility because of their original sinful 
nature. After the Fall, imperfect human beings cannot and do not need to earn their worth 
by (moral) achievements and other performances before the Triune God and other people. 
As growth comes as a result of gracious moral cultivation in Moltmann’s social 
Trinitarian relational selfhood, instead of moral self-cultivation, imperfect humankind is 
ultimately and completely accepted by the grace of the Son through His crucifixion and 
resurrection, and will be perfected in the eschatological future as promised by the Father 
through the work of the Holy Spirit. 
2.3 The Issue about the Tension between Divine Grace and Human Endeavour 
It is obvious that Moltmann’s emphasis on Divine grace demonstrates his typical 
Reformed theological stand. Some people might criticize the unbalanced roles between 
Divine grace and human endeavour in the transformation of the self in his account. Does 
gracious moral cultivation implies no human endeavour in the transformation of the self? 
This criticism or question is not a new one. This debatable issue is about the tension 
between Divine sovereign grace and human responsibility in salvation that has been 
disputed for over two millennia. It is still an on-going debating issue between Calvinist-
oriented or Lutheran-oriented theologians and Arminian-oriented theologians (Boyd and 
Eddy 2002:132-45). Therefore, it is not the scope of this research to comprehensively 
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discuss and solve this debate. I only try to clarify here what and why he really argues 
about Divine grace in his Reformed theological position as described above in Section 2 
and C6S6 to C6S8. 
Firstly, Moltmann tends to hold the doctrine of total depravity of human which is 
argued by Calvinist-oriented and Lutheran-orented theologians. It follows that he might 
have not ever engaged in dealing the tension between Divine grace and human 
responsibility in salvation in his works. The Apostle Paul stresses in Ephesians 2:8-9: 
‘For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the 
gift of God — not the result of works, so that no one may boast’. This theological position 
also shared by Martin Luther is suggested by Tournier as mentioned in C3S2.4. 
Secondly, the transformation of the self is in the realm of salvation and new creation 
from the eschatological perspective of Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology. 
Accordingly, it can only be initiated and completed by Divine grace. Its initiation and 
completion does not matter with human endeavour because of total depravity of human 
or the bondage of human’s will. In other words, human endeavour or moral self-
cultivation is not in the realm of salvation and new creation. Therefore, the transformation 
of the self is gracious moral cultivation in contrast to moral self-cultivation in terms of 
Ruist perspective of moral cultivation. As having been mentioned in C6S8.5, Moltmann 
(1981:125, eo) unequivocally highlights the incomparable distinction of these two 
different transformations in different realm by saying: 
[t]he experience of the Holy Spirit, as distinct from human forms of spiritualization and 
sublimation, is … the beginning of the resurrection of the body (Romans 8:23), which is the 
direct opposite of the body’s repression or exploitation … The experience of the Spirit begins 
the completion and perfecting of the creation of human beings and all things, which makes 
them the home of the triune God. In the indwelling of the Spirit  … in the new creation, God 
always comes to be at home in his own world. 
Accordingly, it can be inferred that this is the reason why Moltmann does not see the 
existence of the tension between Divine grace and human endeavour (or responsibility) 
and, therefore, does not talk about human endeavour while he is discussing the 
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transformation of the self by Divine grace. It follows that the RFS of the self can 
eventually be liberated when the initiation and completion of the transformation of the 
self does not depend on the endeavour of humans of total depravity but on Divine grace. 
3. Moltmann’s Argument for the Perichoretic Relationship 
In the perichōrēsis of Moltmann’s social trinitarian doctrine, three elements are not 
negotiable: unity, (ontological) equality, and diversity. In fact, like the term ‘Trinity’, it 
is to some extent a mystery that a dynamic ‘diversity in unity’ as well as a unity in 
diversity can simultaneously exist. In the cultural and theological contexts of the Western 
European Church, Moltmann is more concerned about the loss of diversity than the loss 
of unity in the conceptualization of the doctrine of Trinity.  
Yet by seeking to sustain diversity within the Triune God, the dynamic equality 
associated with the three Persons is also being challenged. For example, based on Barth’s 
trinitarian concept of the modes of being, a Chinese theologian named Simon Chan 
(2014:43–4) criticizes Moltmann’s emphasis on equality within the triune relationship. 
He argues for a kind of semi-hierarchical Father-Son relationship based upon an assumed 
principle of a ‘command-obedience’ structure within that relational order informing the 
doctrine that the Father ‘eternally generates his only begotten Son’.25 However, as already 
demonstrated in S2.3 above, such an argument tends to fall into subordinationism, though 
we may ultimately require some form of a functional order, when trying to explain the 
trinitarian doctrine (Basil of Cæ sarea 1895:27–8).26 Therefore, I argue instead that the 
triune Persons are ontological egalitarian, as revealed in John 5:17f., 14:9, and Philippians 
                                                
25 Intriguingly, the social trinitarian doctrine is also criticized for creating ‘inequality’ among the triune 
Persons by Brian Leftow (2002:243–8) just because it claims that the Father begets the Son. 
26 See also Isaac (2010:333–4 n.2). 
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2:6, in their relational energies (status) where they operate within a triune (functional) 
order.27  
In Moltmann’s own language (2000a:317) according to the definition of trinitarian 
doctrine by the Council of Florence (1438–1445), the triune Persons are (ontologically) 
‘non-hierarchical’ in the perichoretic life of the Trinity and functionally hierarchical or 
‘monarchial’ (1981:177), if possible, only on the level of His ‘constitution’. The divine 
oneness (John 17:21-3; cf. 10:30) of Father and Son that in John appears to be 
synonymous with their mutual inness (e.g., John 14:10f.,17:21), on which the doctrine of 
perichoresis is based, is a unity both metaphysically ontological and morally functional 
(Barrett 1978:72). Thomas R. Thompson (1996:49, eo) interprets pertinently Moltmann’s 
(and Boff’s) conception in this way as: 
A social model of the Trinity more properly distinguished economically and immanently 
better enables us to affirm the complete ontological equality of persons while simultaneously 
maintaining their differential freedom, and therewith those arrangements necessary to the 
functional well-being of society — subordinations or hierarchies, that is, based on abilities, 
gifts and the exigencies of life, and not upon any created distinctions which are rather to be 
celebrated.  
Human beings’ relationships are endowed with this kind of perichoresis-oriented 
egalitarian capacities because they have imago Dei as the foundation of their functional 
familial and social orders. 
However, J. Matthew Bonzo (2009:126–7) and Nengean (2009:86) see as a 
fundamental problem in his account the applying of the concept of perichōrēsis in the 
Trinity to humans as the imago Trinitatis. As we have discussed above in C6S6.1.3 and 
C6S6.3, Moltmann (1981:68, 107) strongly disagrees that any redeemed human being can 
become identical with God or with the Son of God.28 Yet in other places Moltmann 
                                                
27 This argument is supported by Millard J. Erickson (1984:338), Thomas R. Thompson (1996:292–303), 
and J. Scott Horrell (2004:420) whose sources were found later. There have been discussions and debates 
on how to understand such a functional unequal order in the triune Persons (Gons and Naselli 2015) and 
how to apply ‘functional hierarchy in the Trinity’ to social class structure, especially in an Asian context 
(Lee, Jungyoung 1996:205).  
28 See also Moltmann (1976:108-11). 
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(ibid.:199) tends to obscure the differences between the triune Creator God and created 
humans by applying the concept of perichōrēsis.29 Moltmann (1981:199) even uses the 
term ‘consubstantial’ to explain how human beings bear the imago Trinitatis and 
experience their relationship within an open community. On the contrary, I argue that 
such terminology is normally adopted to describe only the mysterious attributes of God, 
ones that are beyond the confines of human beings’ reason and experience. Since human 
beings are created and sustained in the imago Dei, they are only like God and will never 
have the same attributes as the triune God, even during the glorious completion of God’s 
history with human beings. 
It is noteworthy that what the relational view of the imago Dei denotes is more 
dynamic than static. The relational view of the imago Dei shifts the focus from ‘image’ 
as a noun to a verb (Hall, Douglas John 1986:98). Relationality is endowed for humankind 
in the image and likeness of the triune God through creation. This view is based on a 
relationship existing between Creator and creature, the triune God and humankind. 
Accordingly, the image is ‘as a consequence of the relationship’ — namely, humankind 
images the triune God (Grenz 2001:162).  
Biblical teachings come after the created orders have been realized; they include 
obeying or disobeying (such as Acts 5:29) the (functional) authority, and how to function 
well with other human beings, including ‘be[ing] subject to one another’ (Ephesians 
5:21), in that preferred social order operating in an open relationship in the open Trinity. 
All of this is echoed in the metaphor of ‘one body with many members’ used by the 
Apostle Paul to explain how Christian relationships should be in Christ (see Romans 12:4-
5 and 1 Corinthians 12). In this metaphor, unity, equality, and diversity are highlighted in 
balance. Based on this imago Dei with a Christological link in Hebrews 2:5-9 (mentioned 
                                                
29 See also Moltmann (1985a:17). 
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above and to be discussed in the next section), human persons with their superior position 
are not to abuse either the world or other living creatures. On the contrary, they are to 
take a special commission and exercise particular responsibility to rule in a way that 
nourishes the world and all other living things within it and even more to rule as Christ 
does, sacrificially, after they have been reborn in Him. 
Moltmann (1977:116, eo) recognizes the fact that sustaining an ‘existence for 
others’ is necessary and legitimates the function of a social order. However, open 
friendship is also an ‘existence with others’ that does not involve ‘necessity and 
compulsion’.30 It has been noted that repressed forms of self in PTRIC cultural settings 
are cultivated by forced obedience under repressive social impositions.  
It is notable that voluntary obedience, in this light has nothing to do with the RFS. 
For example, Jesus’ voluntary obedience to the Father in his prayer in Gethsemane 
included a request that the Father would take away his cup of suffering (Matthew 26:36-
42). Luther highlighted and valued this kind of Christian voluntary obedience because of 
love in his famous work The Freedom of a Christian (1520a:344, eo). He explained : 
A Christian man is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian man is a perfectly 
dutiful servant of all, subject to all. Although these two theses seem to contradict each other, 
yet, if they should be found to fit together they would serve our purpose beautifully. For they 
are both Paul’s own, who says, in 1 Corinthians 9:10, ‘Whereas I was free, I made myself the 
servant of all,’ and, Romans 13:8, ‘Owe no man anything, but to love one another.’ Now love 
by its very nature is ready to serve and to be subject to him who is loved. So Christ, although 
Lord of all, was made of a woman, made under the law, and hence was at the same time free 
and a servant, at the same time in the form of God and in the form of a servant. 
Therefore, a self who is voluntarily obedient to anyone is not a RFS. 
                                                
30  Gunton (1989:77) explains this perichoresis-oriented ecclesiology as a community without any 
‘permanent structure of subordination’, but constituted by ‘overlapping patterns of relationships’ in which 
both subordination and superordination can be functions of the same person, dynamically activated 
according to their gifts and graces. 
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4. Moltmann’s Argument for Open Friendship and Relational Self 
In response to Moltmann’s essay on modernity, Ellen T. Charry (1947-) (1998:102) 
indicates that ‘the modern worldview lacks not only a doctrine of sin, but also a doctrine 
of grace’. Even if ‘the self-sufficiency of the self’ has prevailed after Descartes, Charry 
(ibid.:100-101) points out that the other side of this trend is that the modern self depends 
on ‘the respect accorded one by others’. Such dependence leads to a distorted ‘natural 
self’, namely ‘just be yourself’, suffering from fear and insecurity before gaining respect 
from or ‘power over others’ (ibid., eo). I find that such a ‘self-constructed self’ (ibid.:100) 
is similar to the self-cultivated self in Tu Weiming’s New Ruism.31 This self is always 
striving for self-formation and achievements recognized by others through its own 
endeavours, will-power, and extrinsic ‘reinforcement’ (ibid.:101). Charry worries about 
the negative impact felt by a ‘self-esteem’ supported and strengthened by unrelenting 
efforts at straining for success ‘in a competitive, accomplishment-driven society’ 
(ibid.:102). As she notes, these are often established by the use of the psychological 
mechanisms of ‘guilt and shame as instruments of moral formation’ (ibid.). She is 
convinced that such a self-understanding would be hurt and damaged by these values and 
priorities. Charry points out that if self dignity relies on respect from others, it will cause 
‘an insecurity in the self’ (ibid.:101). As discussed in C2, the insecurity in the self which 
Charry highlights is a sign of the problem of the RFS.  
However, humans cannot live without getting along with others. Moltmann’s social 
trinitarian theological anthropology not only emphasizes the restoration of individual 
personal relationships in connection with God, moving from the imago Dei through the 
imago Christi so as to attain our real personhood, but also retrieves the likeness of the 
trinitarian perichoretic relationship as a relational prototype for human relationships. That 
                                                
31 See C4S3, C5S12, and C8S3.2.6. 
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prototype, an image of divine communion, is obtained through the imago Trinitatis, 
providing a model and grounding for the interpersonal relationships in a community of 
grace, augmented by the redemptive human-divine relationship. Accordingly, ‘image’ 
becomes a verb and the subject is humankind in the relational view. None of this depends 
on human being’s efforts, but rather on the gracious salvation of the Son through the 
imago Christi and the work of the Spirit, as emphasized in Moltmann’s account (C6S8.5). 
Besides, these interpersonal relationships are in a community between subjects built upon 
a divinely-led project of hope (Moltmann 1981:216, 253 n.49). 
Jesus, in Mark 12:28-31, ‘was laying out for us the three dimensions of reality as a 
self in terms of relation: God, others, and the self’ (Bellinger 2010:6). These three loves 
comprise ‘the core of healthy and balanced human existence’ (ibid.). In other words, 
missing any one of them and transposing their priority can lead to the problem of the RFS.  
What about the priority of the self? Will not putting God and others prior to the self 
cause the problem? Moltmann (1967:91–2) argues that ‘the promised identity’ of human 
beings is acquired by ‘self-emptying’. Self-emptying is the way to gain oneself by 
‘abandoning’ oneself, to find ‘life by taking death’ upon one, and to attain to ‘freedom by 
accepting the form of a servant’ (ibid.:92). I found that the self-emptying Moltmann uses 
here closely relates to the denying of oneself that Jesus teaches as the way of being His 
disciple and living well (Matthew 16:24-5, Mark 8:34-5, and Luke 9:23-5).32 The Greek 
term translated in English as ‘life’ in Matthew 16:25, Mark 8:35, and Luke 9:24 is yuch, 
which may refer to one’s ‘physical life’ (Louw & Nida 1989:322)33 and might also mean 
                                                
32 Compare the differences of English translation for the simple reflexive in the following two English 
versions: 
NRSV Luke 9:25: ‘What does it profit them if they gain the whole world, but lose or forfeit themselves?’ 
NIV Luke 9:25: ‘What good is it for a [hu]man to gain the whole world, and yet lose or forfeit his very 
self?’ 
33 See also Danker et al. (Bauer 2000:1099). 
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one’s ‘inner self, mind, thoughts, feelings, heart, being’ (ibid.:106, 321, eo),34 namely 
one’s ‘conscious self’ (Liddell et al. 1940) according to its context.  
In Luke 9:25, Jesus uses directly the singular reflexive pronoun to warn of losing 
one’s ‘very self’ (NIV). The ‘experience’ of this promised real self through self-emptying 
in ‘the event of promise’ in Christ’s resurrection has a very direct and close connection 
with a commensurate experience of the world. One attains one’s real self ‘by emptying 
himself into’ the world, rather than by differentiating oneself from it (ibid.:92). 
Jesus reveals this paradoxical truth: 
If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross daily 
and follow me. For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life 
for my sake will save it. What does it profit them if they gain the whole world, but lose or 
forfeit themselves? (Luke 9:23-25)  
The translation of this passage in the NIV — ‘what good is it for a man to gain the whole 
world, and yet lose or forfeit his very self?’ (Luke 9:25) — highlights the relevance of 
Jesus’ statement on the issue of the self. For the Greek word here ‘yuch ,’ translated in 
English as ‘life’ in Luke 9:24, means one’s ‘inner self’ (Louw & Nida 1989:321) or ‘the 
conscious self’ (Liddell et al. 1940) as explained in C3S1.2.5. Accordingly, what Jesus 
means is that self-denial is the only means to ‘self-discovery’; to ‘die to our own self-
centredness’ is the only means to live (Stott 2011:211).35 This self to be denied, emptied, 
lost, or forfeited is the self-centred self who amasses wealth, power, fame, and interest 
for oneself. In other words, ‘when you think you have lost everything, the miracle takes 
place and you find yourself’ (ibid.). François Bovon (2002:366, eo) stresses:  
To deny oneself [here in this context] does not mean to hate oneself (cf. 10:27), but, expressed 
in modern terms, to deny one’s inauthentic manner of existence, to deconstruct the proud 
                                                
34 Or ‘self, inner life, one’s inmost being’ (United Bible Societies 1987) and the ‘seat and centre of the 
inner human life in its many and varied aspects’ including ‘desires … feelings and emotions … heart … 
mind’, (Bauer 2000:1099, eo) ‘senses … affections, appetites, [and] passions’ (Zodhiates 1993:1494). See 
also Moulton and Milligan (1976:698). 
35 Cf. Pannenberg (1970:66–7). 
285 
farçade of one’s identity, and to bring to view one’s genuine, plain, fragile I in relationship 
to Christ. 
Though this is paradoxical, it reveals where the value of the self comes from. One’s value 
is not acquired by one’s doing or having through earning, but by one’s being the imago 
Christi and so also as God’s child and Jesus’ follower, as Moltmann highlights. Such a 
value of one’s self and one’s relationship with God is not gained by one’s efforts but 
granted by the grace and works of the triune God.36 
Theologically I find the concept of the open Trinity Moltmann presents very 
suggestive. As the Trinity is open rather than closed, the Son was sent to suffer, risk, and 
sacrifice His life for human beings. Consequently, this radical openness of relational 
engagement stemming from the open Trinity brings an ultimate hope and possibility for 
humans to form their own open communities, serving in transformative mission work and 
nurturing an ecological transformation for all living things. As this crucified God is 
perichoretically trinitarian — suffering and groaning for and with us (Romans 8) — we 
can be released from the pressure to mask our real selves. In the presence of such a 
merciful empathetic Saviour, we do not need to pretend to be good and strong.37 
Based on the concept of the open Trinity, ‘community’ developed in Moltmann’s 
trinitarian theological anthropology is a community of grace, a fellowship of open 
friendship, and an imago Trinitatis of the open Trinity as described above. As explained 
in C5S8.1, I name the self cultivated in such a community of grace opened by the open 
Trinity the open relational self in contrast to the repressively socially-imposed relational 
                                                
36 According to Brunner (1939:104): ‘Since then the gift comes first, and not the task — “Let us love Him 
because He first loved us” [1 John 4:19] — the original, God-created state of life is to be understood as an 
existence in love, as a justitia originalis.’ Justitia originalis here means original justice, namely ‘an actual 
communion with God’ (Pannenberg 1999:47). Grenz (1997:109) also stresses that living an ethical life for 
Jesus is realized through our responding to the triune God’s endowment of grace, love, and favour towards 
us, rather than through our attempting to ‘win God’s favour’ by means of our obedient acts. 
37 Moltmann’s ‘crucified God’ challenges significantly and pertinently traditional theology in facing the 
wars and suffering of the twentieth century. God is no longer impassible but is present with us suffering 
and groaning for and with us (Moltmann 1972a; 1972b; 1974b). 
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self. This open relational self is based on the imago Dei, especially on the imago Christi. 
Therefore, I argue that one’s self can be transformed into an open relational self when 
one’s identity, in terms of the defining construal of the self, comes from the imago Christi 
by free and unmerited grace alone. Only when the self and the community can be 
transformed in God’s grace can the real self be experienced and unveiled. Then it does 
not need to be masked or hidden (Grenz 1997:139).38 One’s ‘intimacy with God’, referred 
to by Moltmann in terms of the Eastern Orthodox emphasis on theosis, forms the ground 
for liberation from ‘the pressure of the world’ (Charry 1998:106). 
As mentioned in C6S8.5, Moltmann (1992b:259, eo) asserts that ‘the moral purpose 
of changing the world’ is not ‘the motive’ for the imago Christi. It is instead a festive 
exultance over God’s kingdom having made itself ‘wide open for the others’. I argue that 
the distinctive claim Moltmann (ibid.) wants to assert involves a disjunction between a 
celebratory meditation and exploration of God’s kingdom and an insistent moral purpose 
or ‘moral monotheism’.39 In other words, he (1981:8f.) tries to differentiate friendship or 
relationship from ‘moral notions’ or ‘competition’, to distinguish grace and love from 
being merely a ‘commandment’, an obligation, a duty, or a ‘law and compulsion’.  
In this way, Moltmann drives a wedge between relational intents from moral 
oughts. Such a distinction to some extent also differentiates the human relationships 
shaped in Moltmann’s open friendship and rooted in the trinitarian reality from those 
guided by Tu Weiming’s New Ruism, because the latter still prioritizes moral purpose. 
In the former, the relationship is open to anyone unconditionally by grace and love in 
order for them to receive salvation and transforming powers continually offered through 
the imago Christi and the Spirit. Accordingly, the diversity of every individual self is 
accepted, encouraged, and valued within these open communities that embody such 
                                                
38 See also Moseley (1991:17, 78), Bellinger (2010:151), and Benner (2012:74). 
39 Moltmann (1981:8f.). 
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liberating communion and share in a common future. But in the latter, the relationship is 
only open conditionally to those who can transform themselves morally and attain to 
shared elitist norms by their own capacities, even though it involves other communal acts. 
Accordingly, all privatized selves and their diversities are devalued within the conception 
promoted by the resistant Tu’s New Ruist collective self. Therefore, the latter relationship 
is in reality a closed one as mentioned in C5S11 and will be explained more in C8S3.2.5 
and C8S3.3.3. 
4.1.1 A Synthesis between Individualism and Collectivism 
During the twentieth century, debates about individualism (prevailing more in Western 
Anglo-European countries) and collectivism (dominating more in Eastern Asian 
countries) have been discussed more than ever before. Problems on both sides of these 
debates have been examined and criticized, as mentioned in C1S3.1.2, C3S1.1.3, 
C3S1.2.3, C4S1, C4S4.1, C4S4.4.4, C6S6.1, C6S8.6, and A-C, and to be discussed in 
C8S2.2. These different problems are generally identified as self-centredness, egoism, 
isolation, exclusiveness, enclosedness, loss of relatedness, and ignoring ‘social 
responsibilities’ in the case of individualism in a general sense. Collectivism, in a general 
sense, promotes a social-roles-assigned self, loss of individual subjectivity and autonomy, 
repressive social imposition, ‘dominance’, and ‘coercion’ (Tu 1976a:52–4).  
It is in this cultural and interpretive context that Moltmann presents his trinitarian 
theological anthropology as an alternative synthesis. He purposes to prevent not only the 
concept of the self developed in individualism from being merely separate and 
autonomous, but also the concept of the self developed in collectivism from being merely 
soluble in relationships. By suggesting a dialectical resolution of the relational self, 
Moltmann’s explanations and arguments for trinitarian theological anthropology not only 
display points of great relevance in facing the tendency of repressive social impositions 
and its outcome in a RFS, but also suggests a possible positive solution for the problem 
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of the RFS found in PTRIC contexts as well as in Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational 
selfhood.  
Moltmann’s dialectical resolution is effective because one’s self is made secure by:  
(1) the embedded imago Dei as the source of the self by creation, meaning that both the 
self and the community of selves come from creation in the form of the imago Trinitatis;  
(2) the imago Christi as the reconciled and redeemed self appearing at the beginning of 
the new creation is made possible and sustainable by messianic grace applied as a form 
of continuous creation;  
(3) the gloria Dei as will be realized in the promised future self revealed in the 
consummation of the new creation by means of gracious moral cultivation expressed in 
continuous creation.  
As indicated above, both collectivism and individualism lead to the loss of self in 
human beings. I found that Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology is not only 
an open friendship that relies on neither collectivism nor individualism, but also locates 
the imago Christi as the source of the self. It follows that it is free and unmerited grace 
which makes possible the openness of friendship in the Spirit, the grounding for the 
relational self, and the attainment of the goal for humanity as promised by God. As 
mentioned above, it is the Triune God who creates the conditions for sinners to participate 
in the relationship with the open Trinity. It is also He who creates the conditions for 
sinners to live in an open community of grace.  
Therefore, I assert that in this unconditional acceptance within the open Trinity and 
open relationships, where there is no need for repressive social impositions, there also are 
no conditions to support a RFS. It follows that Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational 
selfhood is manifested as a suitable and promising alternative paradigm as a synthesis 
between individualism and collectivism. The most important feature of this paradigm is 
a relational selfhood embedded within a dynamic diversity in unity as well as a unity in 
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diversity. Such a relational self and the community of selves come from creation in the 
form of the image of the Triune God. After the Fall, they have been redeemed through 
the image of Christ made possible by messianic grace in the continuous creation and they 
will be realized as the glory of God in the new creation promised by the Triune God. True 
unity or oneness is not achieved by demanding moral self-cultivation and conformity of 
others, especially that of inferiors. It is done by dying to self in Christ and letting the 
‘motives and urges’ of a new self of the imago Christi arise in us (Sandford, John and 
Sandford, Paula 1982:378). Only when the self and the community can be transformed in 
God’s grace, can the individuality of self, the unique self within, become unveiled, with 
no need to be repressed and hidden anymore. Accordingly, this synthesis is theoretically 
also a solution for the RFS in PTRIC contexts. 
5. Moltmann’s Argument for the Promised Future Self 
It is obvious that Moltmann’s interpretation of Gloria Dei est Homo is drawn from his 
interpretation of Romans 8:30, 1 Corinthians 13:12, 2 Corinthians 3:12-18, 4:6, and 1 
John 3:2. The veil presented in the context of 2 Corinthians 3:12-18 can be applied to 
referring figuratively to the relational barrier or problem between God’s people and God.  
Furthering this point, I think the veiled face can also be extended to address the 
relational barriers or problems between human beings, and even the relational barrier or 
problem between the personage and person within any particular human being. Just as 
mentioned in C3S1.2.2, the initial actions of the first man and woman after the Fall of 
humankind were to hide their nakedness from their own eyes, and then from one another’s 
eyes (Genesis 3:7); their third action was to hide from the Lord God (Gen 3:8). As holistic 
beings, the relational barrier of human beings due to the Fall blocks their authentic 
relationships not only with God, but also with their fellows and their own true self.  
As 2 Corinthians 3:18 promises, the glory of the Lord is to transform us sinners into 
the imago Christi, moving from glory to glory when the veil is taken away (2 Corinthians 
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3:14). This is by the grace and work of the Spirit. This is not only an eschatological goal 
promised by the Triune God, but also an anticipatory present experience of grace under 
the conditions of the history of God’s new creation. After the relational barrier between 
human beings and God is removed, human beings no longer need a mask to hide their 
true self from others. This is because the relationship between humans and God in a 
trinitarian theological anthropology is the first step for all the other relationships, because 
humans all have the triune God as the source of their selfhood and the template of their 
interpersonal relatioships. These relationships include both social relations and relation 
to oneself. If the veil between human beings and God disappears, the veils between human 
beings will also disappear and eventually their masks can also be taken off, because their 
real self no longer needs to be hidden. 
In Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood, the transformation of the self 
is by means of the free and unmerited grace granted by the Triune God. This kind of 
gracious moral cultivation is entirely an antithesis of Tu Weiming’s moral self-cultivation 
by which the achievement and social recognition of the ultimate self-transformation is 
earned. We can recognize gloria Dei est homo as the future of any self and so also for the 
goal of humanity,40 even in spite of our sinful nature after the Fall. Because of such grace, 
the real self can be contextualized in the community of grace. While there is no insecurity 
arising from a failure to win recognition from God, or from others, or even from one’s 
self, there is no need for the self to pretend to perform sufficiently well to acquire one’s 
self security. This corresponds to Touriner’s understanding of the person as a ‘true self’ 
in Christ.41  
                                                
40 Saint Irenaeus (ca. 130-202) (1985:IV, 20, 7) states that ‘for the glory of God is a living [hu]man; and 
the life of [hu]man consists in beholding God’. 
41 See C3S2.4. 
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Besides, the concept of the real self discussed in the research problem found in A-
ES2, can be also interpreted in Moltmann’s way: the real self focuses its present being in 
the process of its promised becoming in the future. 42  As Jeroncic’s (2008:259–60) 
interpretation of Moltmann’s anthropology maintains, the ‘true self’, in contrast to the 
self-realization in Tu Weiming’s account, is not to be discovered inwardly, and then 
sought by striving to ‘overcome the various modalities of the false self’, but is to be 
approached or, rather, is ‘approaching me from the future and reaching into the present’. 
In Moltmann’s understanding, our eschatological adventus, instead of futurum, is based 
on a new divine work, the Son’s resurrection.43 Accordingly, he (1979:29) explains that 
‘the future does not simply emerge from the present … the present springs from a future 
which one must be expectant of in transience’. 
Therefore, I found that the being and becoming of the open relational self in 
Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology must be understood in the sense of adventus 
instead of futurum. The being of the open relational self is coming about from its 
becoming and, therefore, is dynamic. The promised future of self is neither based on 
moral self-cultivation nor on an expectation or hope growing out of humans’ experiences. 
It is a totally new thing, based on a new divine work, the Son’s resurrection. Of course, 
this understanding needs presupposing the existence of the Triune God and the Bible as 
the primary source of revelation, 44 which will be discussed in C8S3.2.2. 
                                                
42 See also Carver T. Yu (1987:163–81, 199). 
43 It is worth noting that Moltmann (1979:29–31, eo) differentiates two understandings of the future: (1) 
futurum: ‘the future of what has already come’, namely, what is going to be develops out of the becoming 
of what was in the beginning. In other words, this kind of future is based on our past history as well as our 
‘present experience and contingency’ (Neal 2009:373), so that we can seek to plan for it. (2) adventus 
(Zukunft in German): ‘the present of what is still to come’, namely, what is going to be does not develop 
out of the present, but comes or arrives to transform and/or impinge on the present. In other words, this 
kind of future is something radically ‘new and transforming’, something that has not existed before, in any 
form that we would recognize. See also Kelsey (1993:175). 
44  Moltmann (2000a:61) views the word ‘revelation’ as a general term and does not consider that 
‘revelation’ is originally a central concept in the Bible and Christian theology. It was for an apologetic 
purpose that in the European Middle Ages and the beginning of the Enlightenment it became the centre of 
theological discussions. ‘Revelation’ was highlighted to differentiate biblical knowledge particularly 
accessible to those supporting the Christian faith from knowledge generally accessible to reason (ibid.). 
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I consider the implication of Moltmann’s thought here for the RFS as that the RFS, 
whether in terms of any individual or any society at large, can be liberated only through 
the love of the crucified Christ which opens up a new future. The final real self in the 
promised future of Christ that Moltmann highlights provides a concrete and definite 
biblical description for the hoped-for goal. This goal is what Tournier affirms in his 
concept that the personage will express and show forth the person genuinely, instead of 
stripping off the personage directly, as discussed in C3S2.4. Therefore, this final real self 
is definitely not repressively imposed by society. That is to say, the final real self, as well 
as the ‘eschatological hope’ drawn from the divine ‘mission and call’ (Moltmann 
1967:285), becomes the ultimate destination of the congruence of the personage and the 
person. The reverse is also true that the congruence of the personage and the person will 
never find its concrete and ultimate realization without the omnipotent and omnipresent 
personal creator God and divine revelation. Only with the hope for the promised 
eschatological real self and the ‘eschatological hope’ of the divine ‘mission and call’, can 
one accordingly resist the social pressure to turn to a RFS. 
The RFS is cultivated mainly due to the imperfectibility of human beings, i.e. sinful 
nature in the language of Chirstian theology, under repressive social impositions (the 
social oughts). Without the promised future (the divine oughts) of self, liberation would 
definitely be a delusion. As argued in C3S2.5 and illustrated in Diagram 3.1, the two 
possible transforming paths presented by Tournier actually involve two dimensions: the 
present (being) and the future (becoming), and two transforming facets of the self: the 
private and the social, at the same time. Based on this two-dimensioned framework of the 
concept of transformation of those two facets of self discussed in terms of the RFS (the 
                                                
Moltmann seldom calls the Bible directly God’s revelation but identifies the Bible more often with (the 
‘witness’ to or the ‘proclamation’ of) God’s ‘promissory history’ (ibid.:61, 126-34, 140). For the purpose 
of this thesis, the phrase the Bible as God’s revelation, as Moltmann (ibid.:140) himself recognizes, will be 
used to refer to this part of his worldview in contrast to Tu Weiming’s New Ruist account, where no external 
revealing God is acknowledged (as described in C4S3.4). 
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negatively masked self), the dynamic real self interacting with the masked self in 
Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology as illustrated in Diagram 7.1 is evaluated. 
 
 
Diagram 7.1 The Dynamic True Self in Two Dimensions Based on Moltmann’s Account  
 
Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood is easily understood in two 
dimensions, present and eschatological since eschatology is always his perspective in 
doing theology as mentioned and demonstrated in C1, C3, and C5. It is worth noting that 
sin not only leads to shaping the masked self under the social oughts in the present 
dimension but also impedes the real self from becoming the one of the divine ougths in 
the eschatological dimension. The future real self of the divine ougths will never be 
realized until sinful nature is eliminated in the consummation of the new creation in the 
second coming of Christ. The hope for the promised eschatological real self in the 
promised future of Christ plays a very important and significant role understanding and 
transforming the present real self as it is, as well as the imperfect past real self. Both 
elements of the self, the private and social facets, have been damaged by sin. No matter 
what the causal reasons for the tendency of the RFS, the common social behaviour 
associated with it is to hide the undesired self, precisely because it is perceived as being 
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not good enough to be accepted by others, or even by oneself. This hope for the 
eschatological real self gives one the courage to face, admit, suffer under, and contradict 
the reality of the imperfect and ugly past and present self as it is/was. 
6. The Presuppositions of Moltmann’s Anthropology 
Though biblically and theologically I do not agree with either Moltmann’s firm 
universalist position or his equivocal stand on the condition of the imago Dei after the 
Fall of humankind, neither of these are the central presuppositions of his trinitarian 
theological anthropology. According to the analytic studies of Moltmann’s trinitarian 
theological anthropology presented in previous sections in this work, I can find and 
summarize the presuppositions of Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology in 
four claims. His trinitarian theological anthropology is predicated on: (1) specific 
knowledge of the self; (2) particular defining elements of the self; (3) the relevant 
properties of the self; and (4) the expected transformations of the self. These 
presuppositions are relevant to the tendency of the RFS and are expanded below (with the 
P standing for presupposition, and the relevance of each P to the concept of the self being 
indicated in parentheses at the end of each paragraph). 
P1:The Bible constituted by Old Testament and New Testament is the revelation, or rather 
the ‘promissory history’, of the triune God (Moltmann 2000a:62, 129–30). Its 
function is perceived in and through the work of the Spirit as ‘the real interpreter’, 
experienced within the fellowship of human beings with the open Trinity (ibid.:145-
9). Here is where the source of all Christian theology is found (ibid.:133-50), 
revealing how Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology is developed through 
his ‘trinitarian hermeneutics’45 (ibid.:145). (The knowledge of and the knowing by 
                                                
45 For a detailed presentation of Moltmann’s trinitarian hermeneutics, see Moltmann (2000a:134–51). 
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and of the self is: revealed through the Bible by the Holy Spirit as the promise of the 
triune God.) 
P2:There is an ‘omnipotent, omnipresent’ (Moltmann 1981:108), and personal triune God 
(ibid.:139) who is the creator of all things in the world (ibid.:100), including 
humankind . Humankind is created by the creator triune God in Their image and 
according to Their likeness (Moltmann 1985a:218–22). (The defining elements of the 
self: given by the creator triune God.) 
P3:The creator God is a triune God: three intersubjective Persons (Moltmann 2008a:374) 
— the Father, the Son, and the Spirit — united in Oneness through perichoretic 
relationships (Moltmann 1981:150–58, 174–87). Humankind is created in the image 
and likeness (the imago Dei) of God. The imago Dei includes the imago Trinitatis 
involving social and relational likeness to God (Moltmann 1985a:215–43). (The 
relevant properties of the self: focusing on dimensions of relational selfhood.) 
P4:Humans became sinners after the Fall (ibid.:242), causing damage to human beings’ 
relationships to the triune God (ibid.:229-34). Though all sinners are slaves of sin 
(Moltmann 1981:66), through the triune God’s grace in the crucified Christ, the sinner 
receives the imago Christi for the sake of eschatological glorification (the gloria Dei), 
and the promised future of the true self (Moltmann 1985a:215–43). (The 
transformations of the self: growing through gracious moral self-cultivation towards 
a redeemed and promised future self.) 
The relations between these various presuppositions are illustrated in Diagram 7.2: 
(5) P1 is a presupposition of P2;  





Diagram 7.2 Interrelationships between Moltmann’s Four Presuppositions and their Relevance to 
the Concept of the Self (The direction of the blue arrows is from the presupposed to the predicated) 
 
7. Conclusion 
Given that post-enlightenment forms of Christianity are recognized or even criticized by 
some scholars as being the source for Western individualism, Moltmann has developed a 
social trinitarian anthropology relying on pre-Enlightenment teachings coming from 
Eastern Orthodox Christian traditions. According to Moltmann’s interpretation, one’s self 
is made secure by the embedded imago Dei as the source of the self by creation. This 
means that both the self and the community of selves originate from creation in the form 
of the imago Trinitatis. Those relationships within the Trinity described by the term 
perichōrēsis are endowed within humankind that bear the image of God described by the 
term perichōrēsis-oriented relationships. These two terms are meant to indicate how the 
three elements of unity, equality, and diversity maintained within the Trinity may be 
within human relationships (Moltmann 1985:1–19, 215–43; 1981:174–99).  
Due to the reality of sin after the Fall, human beings cannot transform themselves 
in order to redeem the ruined imago Dei, because of ‘the bondage of the will’ (Luther, 
Martin 1525). In this predicament, gracious moral cultivation through the imago Christi 
is the promised way to liberate them from hiding their real selves, the way to unmask the 
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real self. Such an open relational self is developed in the open Trinity and strengthened 
in open friendship sustained within a community of grace. In the dynamic relational 
settings, one does not need to sacrifice one’s own individuality, but one is confirmed as 
a person, while also valuing others’ individuality in a perichoresis-oriented unity. In other 
words, one important feature of Moltmann’s account is a relational selfhood embedded 
within a dynamic diversity in unity as well as a unity in diversity. However, this means a 
person is able to maintain a relational unity with others without sacrificing their personal 
diversity while simultaneously maintaining that personal diversity without sacrificing the 
dynamics of its basis in relational unity. 
Besides, the relational self is created in the imago Dei, and Moltmann, in his 
trinitarian theological anthropology, highlights two important affirmations. The first 
affirmation involves the restoration of individual personal relationships to God after the 
Fall through the imago Christi, so that all redeemed human persons may attain real 
personhood. Secondly, the provision of the likeness of the trinitarian perichoretic 
relationship serves as a prototype for interpersonal relationships in a community of grace 
through the imago Trinitatis of the open Trinity. 
With the self in such a community of grace, a fellowship of open friendship is based 
on the imago Christi, so that each human’s identity comes from the imago Christi by free 
and unmerited grace alone. Only when the self and the community can be transformed 
together in God’s grace can the real self, the unique self within, be able to experience its 
fullness, and so become unveiled without a mask. The liberation experienced in such an 
open relational self from ‘the pressure of the world’ is based on one’s ‘intimacy with 
God’ (Charry 1998:106) . 
As already learned previously, the loss of self in human beings results from patterns 
of life and values supported in either collectivism or individualism, but because open 
friendship in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology does not appeal to either 
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collectivism or individualism, it can effectively avoid these dangers of the loss of self . 
When the imago Christi is confirmed as the source of one’s self, free and unmerited grace 
directs one along the path of attaining the goal of humanity, namely gloria Dei est homo. 
The real self is subsequently nurtured and sustained in the community of grace. In this 
context, there is no insecurity about failing to win recognition from God, from others, or 
even from one’s self, because there is no need for the self to pretend to perform well 
enough to acquire one’s self security. Moltmann’s imago Christi within his account of 
trinitarian theological anthropology can be seen as deepening Tournier’s understanding 
of the person as a real self in Christ. 
Some criticisms of the perspective related to Moltmann’s social trinitarian 
anthropology from certain aspects of Christian theology have been discussed mainly in 
S1 and S2. As discussed above, some are based on misunderstandings overlooking the 
actual content of Moltmann’s arguments. The others are not the central presuppositions 
of Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology so do not affect its relevance to the 
problem of the RFS and its implication on the issue of repressive social impositions. 
Therefore, in my comparison between Tu Weiming with Moltmann in the next chapter, I 
will suggest how Moltmann’s account of relational selfhood, shaped by his convictions 
regarding trinitarian theological anthropology, is an important alternative solution (or 





The Solutions for the Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts: 
Three Possible Alternatives 
1. Introduction 
In C1 and C2, the problem of the RFS and the relational selfhood from which it results in 
PTRIC contexts was identified and described along with the necessity of a solution. In 
C4, Tu Weiming’s response to the problem was introduced and examined through his 
interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood. In C5, two forms of Tu’s responses were 
evaluated respectively: the responsive Tu and the resistant Tu. The responsive Tu’s 
account shows a potentiality to overcome the problem of the RFS if its presuppositions 
are adjustable. But the resistant Tu’s account discloses that his New Ruist relational 
selfhood is not significantly different from PTRIC relational selfhood criticized by 
various scholars. In C6, Jürgen Moltmann’s response to the research problem was 
introduced and, in C7, examined through his interpretation of Christian social trinitarian 
relational selfhood. His response shows a positive potentiality to be applied to overcome 
the problem of the RFS in PTRIC. In this chapter, I will compare Tu Weiming’s and 
Moltmann’s responses and analyse their similarities and differences in order to suggest 
some possible alternatives for solving the research problem. It is worth noting that it is 
not meaningful to always separate Tu’s responses into the responsive Tu and the resistant 
Tu in analytic comparison with Moltmann’s responses. For there is not a significant 
distinction between them in the main idea, framework, presuppositions of the 
interpretations and arguments of New Ruist relational selfhood, except the issues of 
sangang and wulun.1  
                                                
1 The differences between the responsive Tu and the resistant Tu in the analytic comparison in C5 are 
mainly about Tu’s different attitudes towards scholars’ criticisms of Ruist relational selfhood in terms of 




2. The Similarities between Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s Responses to Our 
Research Problem 
In analytically comparing Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s responses to the research 
problem of the RFS, especially in PTRIC contexts for Tu’s accounts, we can find some 
similarities between them in the following areas. 
2.1 General Concerns about the Repressed Form of Self 
As introduced mainly in C3S1, Both the responsive Tu and Moltmann are concerned with 
the problems of any form of oppression and repressive social imposition, especially in 
patriarchal, totalitarian, and authoritarian social contexts. They advocate the values of 
freedom, autonomy, dignity, sincerity, and authenticity in individual persons and the 
values of equality and diversity among individual persons in their social relationships. 
However, as C4 disclosed, the resistant Tu still argues — in terms of post-traditional 
Chinese societies’ hierarchical social structures and the privatized self in comparison to 
the great self in New Ruist relational ethics — that Ruist hierarchical society is a 
necessary social stabilizer. Consequently, in the resistant Tu’s arguments, the privatized 
self is greatly devalued. He still justifies the particular traditional Ruist pattern of 
authoritarianism in hierarchy, age, and gender, and insists that sangang is significantly 
important in post-traditional Ruist family ethics. 
                                                
of the interpretations and arguments of New Ruist relational selfhood is the same between them. In his 
wavering positions about them in different contexts, the responsive Tu shows his willingness either to get 
rid of sangang, or even wulun in some contexts, or to reinterpret wulun into a five dyadic equal 
relationships. However, the responsive Tu has not yet shown his flexibility to any other parts of the 
framework and presuppositions of his interpretations that validate each other mutually in multiple circular 
reasoning. 
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2.2 The Pursuit of a Synthesis of Collectivism and Individualism 
As C1S3.1.3 and C3S1 disclosed, both Tu Weiming and Moltmann are concerned with 
the different general problems of the self when influenced either by ‘collectivism [in a 
general sense]’ or by ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’.2 Therefore, they both 
present their own accounts of relational selfhood as a synthesis of collectivism and 
individualism in responding to the research problem. In interpreting them, they all try to 
demonstrate that their own accounts keep the strengths of both collectivism and 
individualism but avoid the weakness of both of them. 
2.3 The Framework of Three Views of the Concept of the Self 
As discussed in the previous chapter, selfhood, namely the imago Dei, in Moltmann’s 
account of social trinitarian theological anthropology, can be understood as an integration 
of these three logically correlated views from a temporal perspective (Moltmann’s 
threefold historical doctrine of Trinity): 
(1) the substantial view (the aspect of the creation in the beginning) explains the 
ontological and epistemological origin of the self that comes from the past: creation;3 
(2)  the functional and relational views (the aspect of the beginning of the new creation 
in the continuous creation) shows the pragmatic and ecclesial receiving and retaining 
                                                
2  In discussing the issue of the self, the terms collectivism and individualism tend to be either too 
reductionist or misleading. A-C provides the ways suggested by social psychologists how to discuss it more 
specifically. However, like so many non-psychologist scholars, both Tu Weiming and Moltmann use these 
two terms in a very reductionist and generalizing way. Therefore, it is not proper for me to arbitrarily 
describe specifically all the times these two terms used by them. 
3 In terms of the self, Bellinger’s (2010:3f.) three statements summarize the meaning of the imago Dei from 
the substantial view: (1) ‘there are some ways I am like everyone else’: ‘I am like all other human beings 
in terms of our basic physicality; we all need to breathe oxygen to survive; we have bones, muscles, skin, 
a brain, etc., that are expressions of our human DNA’ (ibid.:3); (2) ‘there are some ways I am unique’: ‘I 
am unique as an individual; I have my own memories, thoughts, emotions, plans, etc. Even if I had an 
identical twin, I would still be unique in this sense’ (ibid.:4); and (3) ‘there are some ways I am like some 
people and unlike other people’: ‘I am like some people and unlike others when I consider factors such as 
gender, ethnicity, nationality, and religion. But all human beings are my neighbour’ (ibid.). 
302 
 
of the self that reveal the path to it now: reconciliation or already-and-not-yet 
redemption; 4  
(3) the teleological view (the aspect of the consummation of the new creation in the 
continuous creation) reveals the transforming and eschatological goal of the self that 
directs it to the future: sanctification and redemption. 
These three views can be understood as an ‘imprint’, ‘endowment’ and ‘gift’ from the 
triune God (Anderson 1982:71; Brunner 1939:104). 
Can we find in Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood any significant 
similarities to the features of the imago Dei in Moltmann’s account? In responding to the 
RFS through interpreting the selfhood of New Ruism, the three aspects of the New Ruist 
self Tu presents seem to parallel the aforementioned three or four views of the imago Dei. 
Chart 8.1 illustrates the seeming parallel in this framework of three views of Tu’s concept 
of the New Ruist self to Moltmann’s concept of the social trinitarian self. From this 
perspective we can intuit that, first of all, Tu’s ‘Heaven-conferred self’ (Tu 1985:63) is 
more related to a substantial view; secondly, Tu’s relational self appears to match both 
relational and functional views, and thirdly, Tu’s ‘transcendental self’ (ibid.:137) is more 
related to a teleological view. 
                                                
4 As explained in C6, these different views might overlap. The functional view is put with the relational 
view in the same category for the purpose of illustration. For what both of them denote is more dynamic 
than static. As discussed in C6, Moltmann rejects the relational view as functional even if he does not view 
the relationality of triune persons as ontological but calls it existing-in-relationship. 
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Chart 8.1 The Framework of Moltmann’s and Tu’s Concepts of the Self in Seeming Parallel5 
 
                                                
5 It is worth noting that I found the three main elements: ‘faith, love, and hope’, in Christian belief stressed 
by the Apostle Paul (1 Corinthians 13:13) can interpret the responses of the self cultivated in Moltmann’s 
account in terms of the three views of the imago Dei. The self responds with faith in the triune God who 
creates relational ontological human selfhood, with love to the open Trinity and the open friendship in the 
community of grace endowed by Christ, and with eschatological and telic hope for the promised future self 
fulfilled by the Holy Spirit. 
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2.4 The Indispensability of Relationships with Others 
Both Tu and Moltmann emphasize the relationality of the self and the indispensability of 
relationships with others. In Tu’s account (see C4S4), the absolute necessity of others’ 
participation in selfhood, especially in moral self-transformation, is emphasized. 
Accordingly, Tu describes such an indispensability of communal relationship as 
‘symbiosis’. Likewise, as disclosed in C6, Moltmann highlights the necessity of 
relationship with others by differentiating a person with sociality from an isolated 
individual. In Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropological account, the sociality of 
humankind is endowed by the social triune Creator God through creating humankind in 
the imago Trinitatis. 
2.5 The Ideal Community for Overcoming the Repressed Form of Self 
Tu Weiming (1976a:52–99) presents the ‘fiduciary community’ as a New Ruist model 
for his ideal human-relatedness, promoting a sociality involving unity in diversity and 
equality in diversity without relying on coercive pressure groups or requiring conformity. 
Likewise, the term ‘community’ is used to denote the relationships among the three 
persons of God and the ideal relationships of humankind granted by God in Moltmann’s 
(2000a:333) account.6 He presents the ‘open community’ of grace in the ‘open Trinity’. 
Perichoresis-oriented relationships of humankind in this open community of grace uphold 
simultaneously the unity, diversity, and equality of all who are involved. 
                                                
6  Communitarianism is a philosophy, emphasizing the importance of community, as an antithesis to 
individualism and liberalism (Christians 2006; Bell 2012). Both Tu Weiming’s concept of (fiduciary) 
community and Moltmann’s concept of (open) community are similar to communitarianism although both 
of them do not identify their accounts as communitarianism. However, there are some other Ru scholars, 
for example, Russell A. Fox (1997), de Bary (1998), and Kim Sungmoon (2011), who identify Ruist 
accounts of community as a communitarianism. Moltmann’s social Trinity is also called communitarian 
Trinity by Kurt Anders Richardson (2012). There are some overlaps between the concepts of 
communitarianism and Tu’s (fiduciary) community and Moltmann’s (open) community. Since 
communitarianism is more of a political philosophy it is beyond the scope of this research. 
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2.6 The Being and Becoming of the Self 
Both Tu and Moltmann highlight the becoming, as well as the being, of the self in the 
transforming process of the self. Although Tu assumes the perfectibility and intrinsic 
goodness of human nature, he admits that no one could and can ever attain the ideal 
sagehood — the ultimacy of self-transformation of the self (see C4S3). This reality of 
human nature he recognizes is similar to the reality of humankind with original sin in 
Moltmann’s theological anthropology. Since the transformation of the self is limited to 
this-worldliness in Tu’s New Ruism (Metzger 1988:298–348), and the promised future 
of the self is in the eschatological after-life in Moltmann’s theological anthropology (see 
C7S5), the unattainability of the ideal real self in this life in Moltmann’s account is similar 
to the unreachable absolute sincerity of the ideal self in Tu’s account. If there is no after-
life and no Creator God and so a Bible without true revelation, the promised future of the 
eschatological self in Moltmann’s account becomes an idealistic utopia similar to the 
unattainable sagehood in Tu’s account.  
2.7 The Presuppositions of Relational Selfhood 
Both the relational selfhoods presented in Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s accounts are 
based on some presuppositions they have faith in. Their presuppositions provide for the 
knowledge of the self, give definitions to the self especially as a ‘relational self’, and 





Diagram 8.1 Comparison of Tu’s and Moltmann’s Presuppositions and Their Relevance to the 
Concept of the Self (P Standing for Presupposition; the direction of the blue arrows is from the presupposed 
to the predicated)7 
                                                
7  The Chinese version of this diagram was created and will be published in 2018 (Hwang, Tsungi 
{forthcoming}2018:S4). 
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3. The Differences between Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s Responses to Our 
Research Problem8 
3.1 The Framework of Three Views of the Concept of the Self 
According to C4 and C6, although both Moltmann and Tu Weiming highlight the 
transforming aspect of the self, Moltmann’s three views of the imago Dei are due to 
gracious moral cultivation in contrast to Tu’s three aspects of the transformation of the 
self that are based on one’s own disciplines of moral self-cultivation as shown in Chart 
8.1.9 According to Moltmann, what the human self should do is to receive or respond to 
God’s imprint through His creation by faith; only by this means can a gracious and 
transformative endowment be received through His redemptive love as a hope-filled gift 
experienced through the Holy Spirit’s sanctification.10 
In Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist relational selfhood, Heaven is merely an ideal 
goal of ultimate self-realization defined by humankind. Accordingly, Tu’s Heaven-
conferred self is not in fact an ontologically substantial view of the self. Furthermore, Tu 
is also concerned more about the present self rather than where it came from and where 
it will go, although he stresses that ultimate self-transformation is part of the definition of 
New Ruist selfhood. It is arguable whether or not post-traditional Ruism is in fact only 
dealing with epistemology and not with ontology. But the relational self in Tu’s account 
is merely a functional one, since it is situation-oriented. Since there is no external, 
supreme, personal Creator in Tu’s traditional Ruist ontology, the hierarchy, admittedly, 
is preordained by human relationships, and then the relational self also functions 
                                                
8 The Chinese brief version of this section was created and will be published in 2018 (Hwang, Tsungi 
{forthcoming}2018:S4), but this English one was the original text. 
9 Cai Lizhen (2001:211–20) points out that these two completely different way of moral cultivation result 
in an essential conflict between Ru-influenced Chinese culture and Evangelical Christianity. 
10 As Grenz (1997:109) states ‘we might say that for Jesus the ethical life arises as our response to God’s 
demonstration of love, grace and favour towards us, rather than as our attempt to win God’s favour through 
acts of obedience’. 
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according to its position in that hierarchy. Social norms and relationships determine all 
including the value of the self. 
As for the relational self in Moltmann’s account, its source and value come through 
creation from the imago Trinitas. The perichoresis-oriented egalitarian relationship 
expressed through diversity in unity and unity in diversity is endowed to humankind first 
as the foundation for their social functional order. Based upon this foundation, biblical 
material provides teachings about how to live with others within a social functional order 
in distinct open communities sovereignly guided by the triune God. 
The resistant Tu’s transcendental self appears to be an idealistic utopian illusion in 
the light of his concept of ultimate self-transformation. He presents the whole concept of 
the self as an expression of optimistic this-worldliness. However, this characterization 
reveals the helplessness and hopelessness of this portrayal because of unattainable 
sagehood. The difference of their frameworks will be discussed below. 
3.2 The Presuppositions of Relational Selfhood 
We can find in C4 and C6 that both Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts stress the importance 
of the conception of relational self and its relationship to community. Accordingly, what 
makes their accounts different in responding to our research problem are the different 
presuppositions that shape their varying construals of the relational self and their distinct 
conceptualizations of community.  
John H Berthrong (1994:183) argues that ‘truth claims’ are one of the pivotal issues 
for advancing dialogue between Ruism and Christianity. Scholars should not ignore 
debates over truth claims ‘in the name of good taste or fear of disagreement’. In this light, 
it is clear that Tu’s and Moltmann’s presuppositions constitute a major part of their truth 
claims. Therefore, I will critically compare these differences within their accounts. 
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3.2.1 The Differences in the Sources of Their Presuppositions 
As analysed in C5S10 and C7S7, Tu Weiming bases the framework of his New Ruist 
relational selfhood on some presuppositions he assumes to be self-evident and in which 
he demonstrates faith. The source of Tu’s presuppositions is rooted in a traditional Ruist 
worldview, including the reality of sages, but he claims to possess universal values.  
In contrast to Tu’s presuppositions, Moltmann bases the framework of his Christian 
social trinitarian relational selfhood on the God-revealed presuppositions in which he has 
faith. Accordingly, the source of Moltmann’s presuppositions is the self-revealing Creator 
God. But we must admit objectively that any so-called God-revealed claims either would 
be considered to be untrue or would be possibly recategorized as self-evident if the 
Creator God does not exist. If it is the case, Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian 
relational selfhood, in term of the source of presuppostions, would not provide more 
significant strongpoints  than Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood. It would be merely on 
the basis of very different cultural and historical presuppositions and worldviews than 
those appealed to by Tu Weiming. Consequently, the source of Moltmann’s 
presuppositions must be expressed in human language, but would claim a very different 
origin for its content. Accordingly, as mentioned above in S2.6, Moltmann’s would 
become, at least to some extent, also an idealistic utopia.  
However, since the existence of the Creator God can be neither proven nor denied 
and the existence of Chinese sources (sages) past and present cannot be fully justified, 
the sources of both Tu’s and Moltmann’s presuppositions will not be questioned or 
challenged in my discussion. What we must question or challenge in the following 
evaluation is what significant differences the existence of the Creator God and the way 
He treats and interacts with humans and the world could make in solving the research 
problem. For example, will problems related to the RFS be solved by ‘[modern Anglo-
European] individualism’ or a humanistic synthesis of ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ 
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and ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’ even if Tu could work it out successfully? 
The answer might be negative. 
In order to avoid the problems of ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’ and 
‘collectivism [in a general sense]’, a social philosophy that distinguishes community from 
society emerges.11 In making such a differentiation, Gunton (2003:88) explains that a 
society is a unity constituted by groups of ‘isolated individuals’. Its existence is not for 
itself, but as ‘a means to some end’. Therefore, it is impersonal and external. Gunton 
(ibid.) highlights the features of a community further by quoting John Macmurray as ‘a 
unity of persons with persons . . . Each remains a distinct individual; the other remains 
really other. Each realizes himself in and through the other’.12 Both Tu and Moltmann 
value the importance of community (see below S2.5).  
But as discussed in C5, the resistant Tu’s account of New Ruist relational selfhood 
fails to disprove that Ru-based collectivism is misunderstood by scholarly critics. Also 
whether or not New Ruism stems directly from the orthodox heritage inherited from ‘the 
great tradition of the Ruist refined intellectual spirit’ remains a serious issue.  
Likewise, as Tuan Yifu (1982:162) argues, similar questions regarding 
individualism arose from the European Renaissance. These questions ask whether or not 
                                                
11 Leonardo Boff (2000:66) emphasizes their distinction by the equality of their members’ status and 
function. Community’s members share equal responsibility but society’s members’ ‘functions and tasks’ 
are not distributed equally. Philip Yancey’s (2009:174) distinction between ‘club’ or ‘clique’ and 
‘community’ is even more relevant to the distinctive characteristics of Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts of 
relational selfhood (see S2.5). A club, according to Yancey, is formed by the people who most want to live 
with by each other. By quoting Henri Nouwen’s words (originally quoted from Parker J. Palmer), Yancey 
explains that a community is ‘the place where you least want to live … always … and which ‘it takes grace, 
shared vision, and hard work to form’. 
12 Macmurray (1961 reprinted in 1999:157–8). See also Carver T. Yu (1987:222–32). According to such a 
differentiation between community and society, I consider that the phrase communal Trinity rather than 
social Trinity might be more pertinent to denote Moltmann’s understanding of the perichoresis of the triune 
Persons (Isaac 2010:319, 331). It is notable that the English phrase ‘social doctrine of the Trinity’ in 
Moltmann’s account (1981:19) is literally translated from the phrase ‘soziale Trinitätslehre’ in Moltmann’s 
German version of The Trinity and the Kingdom of God (1980:35). 
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there was ‘an authentic self exist[ing] behind the various masks’, since individualistic 
people still need to face ‘the question of self and of the roles [they] could play’ (ibid.).13 
Therefore, some Christian writers argue that both ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ 
and ‘[modern Anglo-European] individualism’ can lead to a loss of self when there is no 
communion with God and His people (Grenz 2001:105–118).14  In other words, the 
problem of the RFS might occur in both ‘collectivism [in a general sense]’ and ‘[modern 
Anglo-European] individualism’. However, since problems in individualist settings are 
not mainly caused by repressive social imposition in PTRIC contexts, further discussion 
will not be presented here but summarized in A-J for reference. However, it is notable 
that what matters is where the self comes from and what the centre of the self is. What is 
the centre of human beings? Humans themselves or something other? 
3.2.2 The Tenability of Their Presuppositions 
As discussed in C5 and illustrated in Diagram 5.2, Tu Weiming’s four presuppositions 
are arranged in a complicated set of circular arguments. Therefore, there is not any 
ultimate presupposition in Tu’s account, no single fundamental presupposition that 
grounds all of his various claims. In contrast to Tu’s multiple circular arguments, there is 
an ultimate presupposition within Moltmann’s four presuppositions: P1 (the Bible 
providing the primary revelation of the triune God), as discussed in C7 and illustrated in 
Diagram 7.2. The rest are based upon this ultimate presupposition and elaborated without 
any recourse to circular reasoning. In other words, as long as any one of the 
presuppositions in Tu’s argument is not tenable, the whole framework of relational 
selfhood collapses. Moltmann’s framework of relational selfhood collapses only when its 
ultimate presupposition cannot be sustained. 
                                                
13 See also McCubbins and Turner (2014). 
14 See also Montaigne (1935, cited in ibid.:103), Carver T. Yu (1987:45, 214–33), Grenz (2001:16f., 58, 
134), Gunton (2003:87), Postman (2006), Carkner (2006:6), Ess (2010:114), and Bellinger (2010). 
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When we examine the content of these presuppositions illustrated in Diagram 8.1, 
none of Moltmann’s presuppositions are based upon the efforts or achievements of human 
beings. However, three of Tu’s presuppositions, P1, P3, and P4, must be sustained directly 
by the efforts or achievements of human beings because P4 (a ceaseless collective self-
cultivation as a dynamic process) is the direct presupposition of P1 and P3, as explained 
in C5S11. The second presupposition, P2, is dependent indirectly on human activity 
because P1 (which depends on human achievement) is the direct presupposition of P2, as 
explained in C5S11. Under the realistic condition of human beings’ imperfectibility, Tu’s 
four interdependent presuppositions support cultural conditions that to some extent are 
sustained by means of repressive social impositions experienced especially by those in 
the lower ranks of hierarchical societies. As we have shown by means of empirical 
studies, the relational self shaped by these presuppositions unavoidably suffers to some 
extent from repressive social impositions. When both Tu and Moltmann base their 
interpretations of relational selfhood on very different presuppositions, we discover 
significantly different consequences of their claims within their conceptualizations, 
frameworks, meanings, construals, characteristics, and defining features of relational 
selfhood.15 However, the analytic comparison and discussion here will be limited to the 
significant contrasting differences theoretically and culturally relevant to the problem of 
the RFS in PTRIC contexts. 
3.2.3 The Transcendent Reference Point 
Tu bases his interpretation of Ruist relational selfhood on a traditional Ruist account of 
Chinese cosmology (P1), specifically the part predicating that ‘all things are my 
companions’ and there being a complete unity between ‘humanity’ and Heaven. 
                                                
15 For the comparison of anthropologies in New Ruism and Neo-Orthodox Protestant Christianity, see 
Zhang Delin 張徳麟 (p. Zhāng Délín) (1984). 
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However, Chinese cosmology was constructed by human beings and established through 
several circular arguments illustrated by Diagram 8.1, but not revealed by any 
suprahuman god. Besides, this particular part of Chinese cosmology has never been able 
to be sustained by ultimate self-transformation through collective self-cultivation. That is 
because Tu himself, as well as his teacher Mou Tsungsan, claimed more than once that 
in reality no such sage has ever existed (as explained in C4S4.1 and C5S6).  
As disclosed many times in C4 and C5, ‘Heaven’ in Tu’s interpretation denotes 
something that is not at all an external, supreme, personal being or Creator, but is 
redefined as the ultimate realization of (communal) self-cultivation in morality even if no 
one has ever attained it. Since there are no external resources for humans to rely on, 
humankind, as Tu himself claims, the historically extended community of Chinese 
persons is the only transcendent reference point. This human-defined Heaven and the 
unreachable ideal unity between ‘humanity’ and Heaven in Tu’s (1985:12) account are 
advocated as metaphysical conceptual incentives in order to motivate humans’ action to 
appeal to their wills. Accordingly, they shall employ their own particular internal 
resources in pursuing that idealistic or utopian ultimacy of self-transformation. This kind 
of concept by Tu is exactly as what Sun Lungkee (1983 reprinted in 2004:39, eo) points 
out: 
There is not a transcendent principle of Heaven in Chinese culture. The so-called principle 
of Heaven is in fact only principles of humans (the idealization of human relationships, 
communities, and collective relationships). 
However, the notable New Ruist Liu Shuhsien16 (1988:263–5) earlier on suggested, or 
even warned, that the disparity between Heaven and humans (‘tiān rén bù yī’「天人不
一」) in [New] Ruism should be also stressed in order to overcome the weaknesses of 
                                                
16 Liu Shuhsien was recognized as a ‘giant of Neo-Confucian study’ who was a researcher and advisor at 




making Heaven succumb to humans (‘qū tiān yǐ cóng rén’ 「屈天以從人」) in the post-
imperial traditional Ruism. 17 Tu’s interpretation of Heaven reveals that he obviously 
ignored such kind of warning. 
Tu argues for humans’ perfectibility by maintaining the intrinsic goodness endowed 
by Heaven. He (1976a:116, eo) also insists that Heaven’s endowment is not ‘Heaven’s 
grace’18 and (1979a:8) rejects the Creator God’s grace as the ‘ultimate source’ of human’s 
efforts towards moral perfection or sagehood. I argue that the concept of Heaven in Tu’s 
account in fact does not provide a source of power and capability, but serves only as a 
symbolic source of moral pressure individually and of authoritarian imposition 
collectively in a Ru-based collectivism. 
From a Christian theological perspective, Paul Fiddes (2000:24, eo) asserts that 
there is ‘a need for a return to the still centre in which the self finds unity by being 
grounded in God’. In contrast, Zhai Xuewei (2010:345), after summarizing the features 
of traditional and post-traditional Ruist ‘face culture’, unequivocally concludes by 
pinpointing an essential divergence in the motivations for personal growth between 
PTRIC and Christian persons: 
The people who have God in their hearts neither consider how bright and beautiful their 
appearance looks, nor do things in a perfunctory manner, not in superficial ways. But the 
motivation of the people who live under the gaze of those who assess their ‘face’ is to get 
                                                
17 Does an externally transcendent Heaven exist in traditional and post-traditional Ruist interpretative and 
cultural contexts? If yes, is this externally transcendent Heaven a personal being? There have been many 
debates on these unsettled issues. This is not the place to go into an extended discussion of them due to the 
limitation of space. A contemporary Ruist, Lǐ Shēn 李申 (1995:4), claims that since Confucius, there has 
none of Ruist who does not believe in a personal God or acknowledge His existence. Although he is a 
theistic Ruist, his claim is over-generalized. Are all the atheistic Ruists not Ruists? Such as Xunzi, most of 
New Ruists. Through interpreting the Zhongyong, Hall and Ames (2001:27) claim that Heaven is merely 
‘the environing social, cultural, and natural context that is brought into focus and articulated by sagacious 
human beings’. Pfister (forthcoming-a, eo) disputes their atheistic interpretation and through reinterpreting 
the texts problematically interpreted by them, argues for a ‘Ruist theism’, which is not a ‘Judeo-Christian 
theism, or European deism, and definitely not a Christian Trinitarianism’. Other sources related to the 
debate on these related issues are: Paul Fong (1967:79–199), L ǐ Dù 李杜 (1978:1–115, 171–200), Yang 
Sēnfù 楊森富  (1984:85–98), Küng (1993 in Ching, Julia & Küng 1993:97–101, 109f.), Berthrong 
(1994:133–64), Chin Kenpa (1995a; 1995b), Cheng Chungying (1998:226–7), Dong Xiaochuan 
(1999:153–5), Zhou Xiaoan (2001), Guo Qingxiang (2006:59–69), Li Ming (2009), Zhong Xinzi (2014:41–
97), and C5F34. 
18 See also Tu Weiming (1989a:77, eo). 
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their work done so others will see it. For them, it is a waste of time to do things that others 
can not see.19 
Although Zhai Xuewei’s argument and explanation are simplistic, appealing to cultural 
reductionisms and over-generalizations, the claims they underscore suggest an essential 
difference in that is worth considering. 
Moltmann is interested in Chinese culture so that the concept of the complete unity 
of heaven, earth, and humans in Chinese cosmology is not unknown to him. However, in 
Moltmann’s account, humankind is not created by heaven, but by the triune Creator God, 
according to his understanding of heaven and earth and their relations with God and 
human beings in Christianity, especially in God in Creation (1985a). Therefore, from his 
viewpoint, God and God’s revelation, to which the Bible witnesses, become the most 
profound source for knowing one’s self, no matter what kinds of cultural or historical 
contexts would also be involved in forming one’s self. 
Not only has personal identity originated in the triune Creator God, but also 
humankind in general has been created and human relationships with other persons have 
been ordained by the triune God. Heaven and earth are also created by God, so that their 
significance and value to God and human beings in Moltmann’s contemporary Protestant 
account20 are very different from Tu’s New Ruist account.21 In his account, human beings 
can enter into God’s heaven of ‘relative transcendence’ because God has absolute 
                                                
19 Zhai Xuewei (2010:345) exemplifies this argument by quoting a story about the medieval stone masons 
by Charles A. Murray (2003:458). See also Hwang Kwangkuo (1998:29–32). 
20 For example, according to Moltmann (1985b:173–4), heaven denotes ‘Gottoffenheit der gottgeschaffenen 
Welt’ (the openness of God to the world God has created) (ibid.:173, eo) and reveals ‘the kingdom of God’s 
energies, [God’s] potentiality (possibilitas) and [God’s] efficacious power (potentia)’ (Moltmann 
1985a:165). I adopt this English translation for that phrase corrected by Lin Honghsin (2011:253 n.66), 
Moltmann’s former Ph.D. student. He pinpoints that this phrase in his English version is translated wrongly 
as ‘the openness to God of the world he has created’ (Moltmann 1985a:165). Also in his Chinese version. 
The whole sentence in his German version (1985b:173, eo) is that ‘Um aus der Zweideutigkeit 
herauszukommen und diese Abwege zu vermeiden, sprechen wir im Folgenden vom Himmel im Sinne der 
Gottoffenheit der gottgeschaffenen Welt’. However, its correct meaning and translation should be grasped 
from the whole context (pp.173-4). 
21 See also Guo Qingxiang (2006:330). 
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transcendence and is open to human beings on earth. Heaven represents the relative 
beyond of the world and the earth is the relative this-worldliness of heaven (Moltmann 
1985a:182 eo). In Tu’s account, human beings can unite with Heaven and Earth because 
human beings can be transcendental and open. Moltmann (1976:109) highlights the 
wretchedness of human beings in such thought by quoting both Luther and a Chinese 
proverb: 
[i]t is … [human being’s] wretchedness that from the moment  … [human beings] forget[s] … 
[their] transcendent background, [human beings] must expect or fear infinitude in finite 
things, and divinity in earthly and human relationships. ‘What you put your heart on is your 
God’, Luther rightly said in the Large Catechism. ‘[One] … who looks upon … [one]self 
does not give out light’, says a Chinese proverb. 
However, in terms of relational selfhood, a comprehensively analytic comparison of 
Heaven and Earth in Moltmann’s and Tu’s interpretations is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.22 
How does the self in Tu’s New Ruism find its definition and its unity with Heaven, 
Earth, and all other things by being grounded in Heaven? Is it enough to explain being 
grounded in Heaven by an abstract and vague concept such as ‘our nature is conferred by 
Heaven’ (Tu 1985:63), without any further, concrete, and pragmatic explanation or 
description? Or is this unity only to be experienced anticipatorily by an optimistic 
expectation of having ‘a transcendent vision’ that our infinite nature will be good enough 
to ultimately reach the stage of a Ruist trinity of Heaven, Earth, and ‘humanity’ (Tu 
1985:137)?  
Grenz (2001:304, eo) argues for a theological basis on which the self is grounded 
in God by maintaining the following: 
                                                
22 Lin Honghsin (2011) provides a valuable analytic comparison of Heaven and Earth between Moltmann’s 
and Ruist understanding in his ‘Cóng Jīdū Zōngjiào “Tiān” de Gàiniàn Kàn Rénwén Jīngshén: Yǔ Dōngyà 
Rúxué duìhuà chúyì’ 〈從基督宗教「天」的概念看人文精神：與東亞儒學對話芻議〉 (A perspective 
of the Concept of ‘Heaven’ in Christianity on Humanism: Discussion on the dialogue with East Asian 
Ruism). It is notable that the discussions of Earth between Moltmann’s and Ruist understanding are also 
included in this article although only the theme of Heaven is indicated in its title. 
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The intellectual journey through the imago Dei texts, read in the light of theological history 
and in the context of the contemporary loss of the centred self, has as its goal the construction 
of the relational self by means of a systematic delineation of an eschatologically determined, 
social conception of the image of God … [It is] the basis for bringing together human and 
divine relationality in a mutually informing manner. 
Therefore, in Moltmann’s account, the human self not only comes into being by the 
creative act of the triune Creator God, but also comes from the divine through creation in 
God’s image and likeness. It is because of God’s absolute and external transcendence that 
the salvation in Christianity, the transformation of human beings through gracious moral 
cultivation becomes possible and unique.23 
In Tu’s account, the Heaven-conferred self is in fact a human-defined self, because 
the meaning of Heaven is ultimately dependent on its conferment by humans. Tang Yijie 
(1988 in 1997:303) points out that the necessity of a ‘wàizài chāoyuè’「外在超越」
(transcendence to the outside) in Ruism in order to overcome the limitation of its 
immanent transcendence.24 Although Tu admits the insufficiency in New Ruist concept 
of surpassing the immanence (‘chāoyuè nèizài’ ｢超越內在｣) (1995 in Tu Weiming and 
Zhou Qin 1996:65), he rejects a way of advocating New Ruist atheism from an aspect of 
instrumental rational traditionalism and also refuses any remedy of ‘chāoyuè wàizài’「超
越外在」(transcending the externality) provided by Christianity or other monotheist 
religions. But of what type is the transcendence of Ruist religiousness? What are its 
internal resources? Which of them can be used for reference? Which of them must be 
complemented? Which of them can be put to good use? None of these questions posted 
by himself he and other New Ruists have had satisfactory answers because they have just 
begun to explore (ibid.). It seems that Tu puts himself in a predicament on the issue of 
                                                
23 See also Chao Tsuchen 趙紫宸 (p. Zhào Zǐchén) (1888-1979) (1948, cited in Ying, Fooktsang 邢福增 
{p. Xíng Fúzēng}1999:149). 
24 See also Tang Yijie (1996a:61–2). 
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Ruist transcendence by sticking exclusively to a seemingly inflexible concept New Ruists 
have not yet explored well. 
I will go on to discuss other differences between Tu’s and Moltmann’s 
presuppositions derived from this difference in their primary and fundamentally 
presupposed transcendent reference point. 
3.2.4 The Self-Definition within the Relational Self 
As mentioned in C4S4, Tu Weiming (1985:54) stresses that the meaning of the self 
constituted by the communal property in Ruism is completely different from the meaning 
of the self in a modern Western context. Does the Ruist self, in his argument, inherently 
have a communal property that the Western one lacks? Or does it lack something that a 
modern Western one possesses? Could it be possible that what is missing within a modern 
Western account of the self is the very element leading to the tendency of a repressively 
imposed relational self in a PTRIC cultural heritage? 
As clarified in A-C, other individuals and the social contexts are indispensable for 
both the interdependent self25 (collectivism) and the independent self (individualism). 
Therefore, the main distinction between the construals of these two selves relies on how 
others are involved in the self-definition of the self. Although both selves in Tu’s and 
Moltmann’s accounts are relational, do their different presuppositions result in different 
self-defining features of their relational selves? 
In Tu’s account, as discussed in C4S4.2, society in a general sense (including social 
norms, standards, and social recognition), but actually Ru-influenced societies in the 
concrete cultural contexts where his account applies, and important human others, are 
directly involved in the self-defining construal of the self. This is exactly the feature of 
                                                
25 As explained in C1F57, interdependent self might mean co-dependent self in some collectivist context 
when it stresses an unhealthy interpersonal relationship between self and other persons. 
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the unhealthy interdependent self as explained in A-CS3. Social influence is a case in 
point. Social influence for persons and cultures supporting independent selves means the 
same thing as social ‘conformity’ (Markus and Kitayama 1991a:40, eo). It involves giving 
up ‘one’s own perceptions, attitudes, or beliefs (the defining features of the self)’ in order 
to adapt to an irresistible ‘social pressure’ (ibid.:40). However, social influence for 
persons and cultures supporting unhealthy interdependent selves means ‘adjustment of 
one’s self’ according to relevant significant others (ibid.:40f., eo). It is ‘a willingness to 
be responsive to others and to regulate one’s own demands and desires’ for the sake of 
maintaining those essential relationships (ibid.:41). Markus and Kitayama point out 
repeatedly that ‘the [unhealthy] interdependent selves do not prescribe or require 
consistency between behaviour and one’s internal attributes because the private, internal 
features of self are not given as much weight’ (ibid.).26 This is exactly the case of the 
devalued privatized self in both traditional and post-traditional Ruist cultural designs as 
mentioned in C4 and C5. Markus and Kitayama argue further that such inconsistency is 
rather unlikely to be cognitively sensed by the ones with an unhealthy interdependent self 
(ibid.). For ‘private attitudes’ might be neither important nor ‘self-defining’ for them. 
Within such a state, the unhealthy interdependent self, as Winnicott (1965:133) has 
described it (see also C2), ‘can easily get the false self mistaken for real’, i.e. self-
deception. As the traditional and post-traditional conceptions of Ruist selfhood are more 
pragmatic than principled (as mentioned in C3 and C4), this problem can arise easily 
within the self. 
Societies characterized by Ru-based collectivism tend to cultivate ideologies and 
standards of social conformity mainly by means of feelings of shame, in order to drive 
                                                
26  In C2S4.4, it was mentioned through Thielicke’s observation (1959, cited in Cheng, Stephen KK 
1990:511) that Chinese people are ‘the most magnificent play-actors in the world’ lacking ‘the will to be 
individual human beings, to be themselves’. See also C5F91. 
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their people to earn social recognition or worthiness in a relationship. Admittedly, there 
is no absolute and objective value for the self in Ru-based collectivism. The value of such 
a Ruist self depends on individual subjective efforts and social subjective recognition and, 
therefore, it is subjective, relative, and unsteady. Tu Weming (2006:227) admits this 
point: 
I think that the criticism of Ruism by Christianity is acceptable. In Christianity, only God is 
absolute: any person, any group, any event, all are not absolute, but relative. Without the 
Christian God who is transcendent and external, tradition can probably turn the relative into 
the absolute. 
However, as mentioned in C4, Tu (2007c:150, 152) still rejects such a transcendent God 
as the post-traditional Ruists’ alternative option.27 Does this not lead Tu into a theoretical 
predicament, when he excludes the adjustability of his presuppositions? Just as Abbott 
(1970:293) pointed out, changes that take place in traditional Ruism are changes ‘within 
the system rather than change[s] of the system’, because of the teachings of Yi Jing (Book 
of Change). He (ibid., eo) explains: 
While the I Chine [Yi Jing] has since then always provided justification for change or 
adaptation it has provided for change within the system for the most part rather than change 
of the system. Evidence of change within tho system rather than change of the system can be 
seen in the current continuation of widespread adherence to Confucian thinking. 
Therefore, besides Heaven serving vertically as an ideal of moral self-cultivation, the 
society with its pressures towards social conformity reinforces horizontally the realization 
of moral self-cultivation. As a result of such doubled up cultural reinforcements, 
especially in PTRIC context, repressive social impositions are often applied and become 
very hard to avoid.  
As disclosed in C6S6, in Moltmann’s framework of relational selfhood, the self is 
created in and as the imago Dei. Its nature derives from the creator God, including its 
relationality. Obviously, in Moltmann’s account, the relationship with God is not earned 
                                                
27 Mou Tsungsan (1977, cited in The Editorial Board of Éhú Yuèkān 1977:3) stresses that the dignity of 
human beings is earned by moral practice, and accordingly rejects help from an external God. But how can 
humans maintain their dignity by themselves, since Ruist sagehood is unattainable (see C4S3.1)? 
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by efforts of the self, but bestowed by the love and grace of God. The absolute and 
objective value of the self is defined and granted vertically (from above) by God, so that 
the self does not need to earn the value of the self horizontally from others or from social 
recognition by means of moral self-cultivation. Since human nature is corrupted and every 
human’s relationship with God is broken after the Fall, the restoration cannot be attained 
by any efforts of incorrigible human beings. Only by God’s unflagging grace and love, 
faithful promise, and transforming power for fallen human beings can the damaged imago 
Dei of the self be restored to become even better than its original state before the Fall. In 
Moltmann’s account, it is the triune Creator God who is involved in the defining construal 
of the self. The initiation and completion of the transformation of one’s self in this account 
is not by one’s own having or doing but by one’s being and becoming the imago Dei by 
God’s promising and doing. Therefore, in the broadest sense of that term, there is no 
repressive imposition either from God or from society upon one’s being and becoming, 
and no cultural boundaries or historical conditions in the contemporary world can force 
God to stop this gracious work in terms of God’s omnipotence. However, God never 
forces anyone to accept it in terms of human freedom. 
3.2.5 Unity, Diversity, and Equality in Community 
In Moltmann’s account, as explained in C6S7 and C6S8, through creation in His image 
and likeness, the triune God endowed the imago Trinitatis (with the form of trinitarian 
elements and characteristics) to humans as a template for human interpersonal 
relationships. Such a perichoresis-oriented relationship aims at keeping simultaneously 
the three elements of unity, equality, and diversity.28 In other words, within Moltmann’s 
                                                
28 In arguing for the sexual equality in 1 Corinthians 11:7, David T. Williams (2011:321), based on his 
interpretation through the imago Trinitatis and perichoresis, asserts, similar to Moltmann’s viewpoint 
explained in the C6F70, that ‘origin does not give superiority …the eastern tradition sees the Father as the 
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theological anthropology personality and sociality can be harmonized. It is because of the 
imago Trinitatis that human beings can correspond to the triune God when they are united 
as a community. It is also because of the imago Trinitatis that the imago Christi as the 
only means for the restoration of fallen humankind becomes possible (to be discussed in 
the next section). Furthermore, because of the imago Trinitatis, human beings after the 
Fall can be restored not only from their sinful natures, but also from their sinful 
interpersonal relationships, even as Jesus Christ, the Holy Son, prayed for His people to 
be one as He and His Father are one (John 17:11). In this account, relationships with 
others are not earned but created, granted, and restored after the Fall by the triune God. 
In other words, the triune God is ‘the ground and paradigm of true social life and 
liberation’ as well as the source of the self and salvation (Thompson, John 1994:3). 
Therefore, equality and diversity are made possible to be kept in unity in Moltmann’s 
open fellowship within any cultural context, as argued also by Thomas R. Thompson 
(1996:49). It is notable that a recent paper by Lydia Hogewoning (2012) in the field of 
social work demonstrates how Moltmann’s and Volf’s social trinitarianism theology of 
equality as well as love and openness to other people can be applied significantly to 
enhance core ‘anti-oppressive social work’ principles of critical consciousness and 
empowerment.29 
The resistant Tu did his utmost to protect post-traditional Ruism from scholars’ 
criticism related to the problems of repressive social impositions and the RFS. However, 
in order to advance human beings’ virtues, his ideal fiduciary community is unavoidably 
                                                
source of divinity of the other Persons, yet in perichoresis the three are equal; there is a parallel here to the 
relation of man and woman’. See also Tien, Hungen (2007:40), Huáng Yìmíng 黃奕明 (2009:82–5), and 
Lynne Taylor (2016:12f.). 
29 Some psychologists also base the anthropology of their social psychologies and psychotherapies upon 
social trinitarian anthropology, for example, Mark R. McMinn and Clark D. Campbell (2007:26–37), Todd 
W. Hall (2010:234–5), and Maria L. Boccia (2011:25–6). 
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established and built up by means of moral persuasion and education, especially by means 
of rites and ceremonies. Nadeau (2002:116) pointed out that rites and ceremonies 
operating within traditional Ruism have an ‘oppressive quality’. As argued in C4, such a 
Ruist method (moral persuasion and education) implies both the reality of human nature’s 
imperfections without ‘intrinsic goodness’, justifying the tendency to assert repressive 
social impositions, leading to a much devalued privatized self in Tu’s interpretation. 
Furthermore, such a cultural system of human relationships is in reality a closed one, 
since one must and prove to be good enough to be worthy of those relationships on the 
basis of standards established and proven to be supported by that cultural system. 
Therefore, individuality and diversity are not freely kept in unity within Tu’s account of 
traditional or post-traditional Ruist society, not to mention society at large. As argued in 
C5, equality in these cultural contexts is very hard to maintain between self and 
community, even if it might be achieved between two particular individual selves in 
various dyadic relationships.30 Besides, as discussed in the previous section, unity within 
Tu’s account of traditional or post-traditional Ruist society tends to be social conformity 
at the sacrifice of individuality and diversity because of a strong Ru-based collectivist 
ideology manifested in his account. 
3.2.6 The Transformation of the Self 
In Tu’s account explained in C3S3, moral self-cultivation is the only way to achieve the 
New Ruist ultimate transformation (New Ruist selfhood or sagehood). Even if Tu 
Weiming emphasizes the indispensable communality of moral self-cultivation, his 
account still depends only on humanity’s own admittedly imperfect internal resources as 
explained above in S3.2.3. The real self in Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood is 
                                                
30 See also Peter K. H. Lee (1991:68). 
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inseparable from relationships with other human beings. He (1979a:26) has previously 
emphasized this claim in the following manner:  
Sociality as a spiritual value is justified neither on grounds of transcendent reference nor on 
grounds of collective goal. It is in the perfectibility of man as an ethico[-]religious being that 
the justification for sociality really lies. Indeed, a Confucian tries to be social for the sake of 
self-realization. His personal authenticity is inseparable from his sociality. If he fails to relate 
himself to others in a meaningful way, he does violence not only to his social relations but 
also to his authentic self. Unless he cultivates himself in the context of human-relatedness, 
no matter how high a spiritual level he is able to attain, from the Confucian point of view, his 
claim to self-realization is inauthentic. 
However, moral self-cultivation (self-realization) is also for the sake of harmonizing 
human relations (Tu 1985:55). Accordingly, communal moral self-cultivation is 
motivated and driven inescapably by various kinds of repressive social impositions. 
Unfortunately, another form of circular reasoning appears here. I have argued that 
such a circular argument is inescapable because there is no other absolute source and truth 
acceptable and accessible to New Ruists, but only their own preferred social norms and 
standards as well as various forms of recognition and approval. By this same form of 
reasoning, Tu’s efforts to avoid the problem of the RFS in Ru-based collectivist relational 
selfhood appear to be in vain. 
In Moltmann’s account as explained in C6S6.2, in spite of the Fall of human beings 
created in and granted the imago Trinitatis (imago Dei), the image of and likeness to God 
is embodied by the incarnated, transfigured, and raised Messiah, Jesus Christ. What then 
is the status of this person in the Trinity, God the Son? Jesus Christ is the perfect image 
of the invisible God, through which God mediates all things in creation, reconciles the 
world to God-self, and rules now and will rule eternally on earth (Moltmann 1985a:226). 
Moltmann clearly views God’s creation from an eschatological perspective: the final true 
human self (or imago Dei) is more perfect than the original (Moltmann 2003:189). 
Therefore, in Moltmann’s account, being human after the Fall is a process of becoming 
transformed into being a full human through the imago Christi to the gloria Dei. This 
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process is revealed and promised by the triune God and being operated by His grace and 
work. 
However, as some people, especially Chinese people, might ask, do gracious moral 
cultivation in Moltmann’s account and moral self-cultivation in Tu Weiming’s account 
need to exclude each other? The answer would be both yes and no.  
As demonstrated above in Section 3.2, C4S3.4, C4S3.5, C5S5, C5S6, and C5S9, 
there is only human responsibility in Tu’s account bercause he does not accept the 
possibility of any external supreme being or the creator God. Humankind is the only 
transcendent reference point. Accordingly, moral self-cultivation in Tu’s account is only 
in the realm of self-transformation of imperfectible human beings. It will never be an 
attainable solution to the imperfectability of human beings in the transformation of the 
self.  
However, as demonstrated above in Section 3.2, C6S6 to C6S8, and C7S2, 
Moltmann’s gracious moral cultivation is a solution to the total depravity of human 
beings. Accordingly, this kind of transformation of the self is in the realm of salvation 
and new creation provided by Divine grace. In other words, the transformation of the self 
can only be initiated and completed by Divine grace. 
Therefore, Moltmann’s gracious moral cultivation and Tu’s moral self-cultivation 
exclude each other because they are two substantially different approaches engaging in 
two substantially different realms of transformation of the self. As having mentioned in 
C7S2.3, Moltmann (1981:125, eo) unequivocally highlights the uncomparable distinction 
of these two substantially different transformations: ‘the experience of the Holy Spirit, as 
distinct from human forms of spiritualization and sublimation’ But since they deal with 
two substantially different realms of transformation of the self, there is actually no such 
an issue as excluding or including each other between them because Moltmann and Tu 
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Weiming are talking about two substantially different things in terms of the 
transformation of the self. We can explore this substantial difference. 
Lawler (2008:101, eo) points out that ‘being an (authentic) identity’ in European 
and American cultural settings is conventionally counterposed against ‘doing an identity 
(performing)’. The former expresses ‘who we are, really’, but the latter usually involves 
‘a false expression, denying, negating or concealing who we are really’ (ibid.). When 
there is a discrepancy found to exist between doing (‘semblance’) and being (‘substance’), 
‘the person is liable to be accused of pretension, inauthenticity or acting a role’ (ibid.). 
In these cultural contexts, it is deemed that semblance and substance should be consistent. 
If that is not the case, ‘that is because of some dissembling — some attempt to deceive 
others’ (ibid.:101). Acting is taken to be ‘acting inauthentically’ when one makes others 
believe that we are better than we really are (ibid.).31 Therefore, Lawler (2008:102) argues 
that ‘reality, of course, is seen to inhere in substance (who we are really) rather than in 
semblance (who we appear to be)’. No wonder Xunzi, a pre-imperial rationalistic Ruist 
and self-proclaimed followers of Confucius, insists that ‘goodness can only be imposed 
externally through education and disciplined self-cultivation’, as interpreted by Tan J. Y. 
(2003a:96–7). Xunzi’s imposed external goodness and Lawler’s semblance denote 
exactly the same thing, but use different terms to describe them. Both manifest cultural 
systems where repressed forms of self appear to be unavoidable. 
As Jesus illustrates by the parables of the wolves in sheep’s clothing and good and 
bad trees and their fruit in Matthew 7:15-23, parables presented to warn against false 
prophets (hypocrites in spirituality), pretence in semblance is not merely non-identical 
with reality in substance, but is regarded as evil in God’s eyes.32 In terms of being as 
                                                
31 Alison Young (1995:112), a criminologist, recognizes semblance and substance as ‘two orders of being’ 
that should remain distinct; otherwise, a ‘misidentification of appearance and reality’ happens. 
32 A good tree naturally bears good fruit, but this does not mean that good fruit makes a tree good. In other 
words, a bad tree can mask itself by hanging some fake good fruit (hypocrites in spirituality which Jesus 
referred to by metaphors of sheep’s clothing on ravenous wolves, grapes from thorns, and figs from thistles) 
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perfect as the imago Dei (Matthew 5:48), humans appear as thistles or thorn bushes which 
cannot bear fruit because of their corrupted human nature after the Fall. Likewise, fruit 
trees will never yield thorns. A change of environmental factors can only change the 
quality and quantity of the thorns or the fruit of fruit tree, but it does not transform the 
nature of their species. However, thistles or thorn bushes might be decorated by fake fruit 
to look like fruit trees, whom Jesus calls ‘false prophets’ (Matthew 7:15) or ‘hypocrites’33 
(Matthew 6:1-6). Such a pretence in semblance may be able to deceive others, but can 
never change one’s own substance.34 The effect of the imago Christi through one’s having 
died, been buried and resurrected with Christ by His grace (Romans 6:1-11; Colossians 
2:12) is to be transformed by the indwelling Spirit in one’s spiritual nature. The Apostle 
Paul describes such a transformation of his own life in the following way: ‘it is no longer 
I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me’ (Galatians 2:20b).35  
It is helpful to integrate the above clarification and distinction of doing (semblance) 
and being (substance) into the definition and dimensions of the personage and the person 
                                                
to make itself look like a good tree. But it is in fact a bad tree. God’s transforming work (gracious moral 
cultivation) makes what is a bad tree (sinner) into a good tree (the imago Christi). Good fruit will then 
appear naturally. Moral self-cultivation makes bad fruit look like good fruit, but does not make a bad tree 
into a good one. 
33 The term hypocrite is also a metaphorical description of the one who wears a negative mask (see C5F95).  
34 Then, as Jesus stated in Matthew 7:21, whoever does the will of the Father can enter the Kingdom. A bad 
substance (being) must be first transformed by salvation into a good substance, and then it can bear real 
good fruit (actual doing, and not just a semblance of goodness) whose good substance is the same as being’s 
transformed substance. If the doing (coming from bad substance) which is only a semblance of goodness, 
but is not stemming from an actual good substance, comes before the transformation of being (of bad 
substance), the doing (of bad substance) cannot produce good being (of good substance). Therefore, that 
kind of doing (of bad substance) is still a mask. A good tree (being of good substance) bears good fruit 
(doing of good substance). The doing that is a mere semblance can never make a bad tree good. If the doing 
is from a good substance, it will not be a mere semblance. Therefore, the doing stemming from a good 
substance is always the result of a transforming salvation upon that being (from bad to good). According 
to my own understanding, the main purpose or theme of these parables of Jesus is to remind or warn His 
audience of giving up the pretence of looking good, but instead admitting their needs to be transformed 
first. This teaching is reflected also in the first Beatitude (Matthew 5:3). It is also the core message of the 
work of His transformative salvation. 
35 Based on these biblical principle and concept, Timothy S. Lane and Paul David Tripp (2010) developed 
a practical programme for life transformation.  
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explained in A-E and illustrated in Diagram 3.1 in C3. Based on this integration, the 
transformation trends in Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts are illustrated in Diagram 8.2.  
In Tu’s account, to be a sage, namely a real or sincere self, means to be perfect in 
character or virtue (Power 2007). In order to attain such sagehood by emphasizing either 
individual or communal doing (self-cultivation) within a social imposing cultural context 
of Ru-based collectivism, this cultural design tends to cultivate the semblance instead of 
the substance of the self. This can easily lead to shaping a repressively social imposed 
self and a personage that often lives by dissembling. But to be a saint in Moltmann’s 
account means to be oneself (a real self as he/she is) before the Triune God by accepting 
His salvation through grace.36 In other words, the morality, holiness, and wisdom that 
humankind is encouraged to pursue through moral self-cultivation in the New Ruist 
tradition are granted to humankind as the renewed image and likeness of God through the 
transformative and gracious gift of the image of Christ.37 
  
                                                
36 I consider that Moltmann’s core conception of being a saint is the same as the main purpose or theme of 
Jesus’ parables explained in F31 and F33 above. Some other theologians, such as Merton (1961:31) and 
Rohr (2013), present a similar concept in searching for the true (or real) self. 
37 Ephesians 4:24 and Colossians 3:10. This gift must beget a task. However, the task, or an action of good 
substance that is not a mere semblance, including the ability to do such things, are all the result of the gift 
and the transforming salvation explained in F31 and F33. It is notable that this semblance is exactly the 




Diagram 8.2 Comparison of the Transformation Trends in Tu’s and Moltmann’s Accounts 
330 
 
Therefore, Tu’s problematic perfect morality38 turns out to be a demand that will 
make imperfectible human beings hypocrites, because they cannot reach perfection even 
though they must aspire to do so (Hè, Zhāngróng 賀璋瑢 2002:204).39 Likewise, if 
Christians devote themselves by means of spiritual exercises energized by their own 
efforts to reach the ideal moral example set by Jesus or expected by Christian social norm, 
they will certainly become hypocrites as well (Martin Luther n.d., cited in Wilson 2016),40 
especially in the families of ministers and missionaries,41 even in the Anglo-European 
Christian societies. This is the reason why the RFS or the behavioural custom of 
negatively masking is still a relatively prominent issue among Chinese Christians. 
However, the Triune God’s righteousness in Moltmann’s account is a free ‘gift’ (Luther 
1545:337) promised by the Father, granted by the Son, and empowered by the Holy Spirit.  
3.2.7 The Ultimacy of the Transformation of the Self 
In Tu’s account, it is over-optimistic to say human nature is perfectible through a 
ceaseless process of communal self-transformation. It is utopian to claim that everyone 
can be a sage. It is this-worldly to say the central concern shared by all Three Teachings 
(Ruist, Buddhist, and Daoist) about existential human beings is ‘the human condition here 
and now’ but not in the past and utopian future (Tu 1985:25). An ultimate self-
transformation is the foundation for Tu’s definition of New Ruist selfhood (or sagehood). 
                                                
38 See Zhou Cuishan (2006:website) for a similar criticism on social Ruism. 
39  Hypocrisy is exactly the danger Hiromichi Kozaki 小崎弘道  (1856-1938) (1986 in Ballhatchet 
1988:359–60) was concerned about in the Ruified Japanese societies, where all the ethical teachings 
advocate self-cultivation. Another perspective related to these matters has been articulated by Kozaki 
(2000:162). He had pointed out that traditional Ruism contributed to preparing the hearts and minds of 
Japanese people to embrace this free gift. When Japanese persons despaired in reaching the ideal of moral 
self-cultivation and thereby recognized their sinful natures that they could not overcome, they consequently 
could see their need and accept this free gift. In terms of this empirical finding, this negative effect of self-
transformation in Tu’s account might contribute to God’s transformative process of self in Moltmann’s 
account as it is predicated by Moltmann’s presupposition 4. This finding also witnesses the transformative 
procedure of sinful humans explained by the Apostle Paul in Romans C1 to C3. 
40 See also Hwang Tsungi (2017:12f.). 
41 See Kay Warren (2017). Warren’s example is typical and must be a case among many other similar ones. 
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However, what concerns Tu more is the this-worldliness of the self, rather than where the 
self came from and where it will go. Therefore, Tu’s New Ruist relational selfhood is 
ultimately nothing other than a utopian optimistic this-worldliness. It seems that one has 
to pretend to be like a sage and to some extent deceive others, even to the point of self-
deception as well and promote a kind of mutually enforced wilful deception if one 
embraces or conforms to such an optimistic worldly utopia because of the repressive 
social impositions that it presupposes. 
In Moltmann’s account, the self comes from the imago Trinitatis (imago Dei), 
restored in the imago Christi, realized to be the gloria Dei in the future by the promise of 
the Father and the work of the Spirit. In this account, the becoming of the self cannot and, 
therefore, does not need to rely on oneself. For in reality, ‘our hope and confidence cannot 
be based on the capacities of human beings to survive death and become immortal … 
such confidence depends entirely on God’s promise of resurrection and new creation’ 
(Thiselton 2012:xiii). Therefore, the futurity of the self promised by the triune God can 
only be transformed and finished by the Deity’s work and grace. As I have already 
explained above, this ultimacy promised and done by the Creator triune God would also 
become an over-optimistic utopia in Moltmann’s account if it were the case that this God 
does not exist, or the Bible is not revealed by the triune God. However, these important 
issues are beyond the scope of this thesis, as explained above in S3.2.1. 
3.2.8 Conclusion to the Evaluation of Tu’s and Moltmann’s Different 
Presuppositions 
The above analytical comparison of the contrasting characteristics in Tu’s and 
Moltmann’s accounts of relational selfhood in responding to the research problem is 
based on their own different presuppositions. On the basis of what has been learned 
through this comparison, we can see the importance of the role of the imago Dei in 
Moltmann’s account of relational selfhood. His account provides a positive alternative 
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for relational selfhood in overcoming the RFS in PTRIC contexts. On the contrary, Tu’s 
account does not manifest a sufficiently significant difference from PTRIC relational 
selfhood criticized by the scholars and so does not provide a feasible alternative account 
that can effectively serve within those same cultural contexts. 
3.3 The Openness of the Relational Self, Interpersonal Relationships, and 
Community 
Both Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts stress the importance of community or communal 
acts (efforts) in the transformation of self, a matter that is also valued by other scholars, 
for example, Dave G. Benner (2012:173–90). In responding to the RFS or repressive 
social impositions, both Tu and Moltmann claim that their accounts of relational selfhood 
are open ones. I will critically compare the differences between their claims in this regard.  
3.3.1 The Openness of the Relational Self 
Openness is a standard of judgment to describe the varying degrees of overcoming 
repression; in its strongest expression it would indicate the least degree of repression. As 
we have seen abundantly above, in the resistant Tu’s interpretation of New Ruist 
relational selfhood, the privatized self is still devalued because New Ruism in his account 
is still associated with Ru-based collectivism. Therefore, a repressive and socially-
imposed relational self cannot be avoided in his account. The degree of openness within 
Tu’s relational self is quite low for the ordinary people because the acceptance given to 
or received by others is conditioned by the achievement, in excelling above the common, 
of the perceived worthiness of the self in its relationships and within the community. 
Moltmann’s account presents an open relational self based on the model of 
perichoresis-oriented interpersonal relationships and on the imago Trinitatis (involve also 
the imago Dei and imago Christi). As mentioned above, the three elements of unity, 
equality, and diversity are valued and so maintained simultaneously in such relationships. 
Consequently, theoretically speaking, the diversity and ontological equality of persons 
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are not devalued in unity, even while their unity is not devalued in maintaining their 
diversity and equality. Practically speaking, as presented of the transforming direction in 
C6 and C7, in such a fellowship of grace with the open Trinity and other persons, all 
relational selves are cultivated individually and communally to open themselves up to one 
another’s dissimilarity and distinctiveness while preserving mutual trust and respect 
because they have received wide ‘space’ in the open Trinity. Accordingly, they give one 
another their ‘space’ or a share of themselves, and creatively participate in each other’s 
lives, or ‘spaces’ because of the degree of mutual recognition and openness they realize 
in the imago trinitatis, with its high degree of mutual support and intimacy. 
 
 
Chart 8.2 Chinese and Western Cultural Conceptions of the Relation between the Individual and 
Society (Yang, Zhongfang 1991b:99, Chart 1) 
 
Yang Zhongfang (1991b:99) makes a typical over-generalized distinction between 
‘Chinese’ and ‘Western’ conceptions of the relationship between individuals and society 
on the basis of their cultural influences. She claims ‘the Western’ social structure is 
individual-oriented, but ‘the Chinese’ is society-oriented. Chart 8.2, translated from her 
comparative chart (ibid., Chart 1), lists these comparative cultural features of two 
stereotyped social structures. Even though her distinctions between so-called Chinese and 
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Western cultural features tend to be reductionist and over-generalized, these features are 
not groundless and invalidated in terms of some of their basic prevalent tendencies. 
Although Yang’s comparison does not add any critical value judgments on either side, it 
is notable that most of the features she describes for the Chinese society-oriented social 
structure match features of the post-traditional New Ruist relational selfhood highlighted 
in Tu’s account. 
Robert C. Neville (2000:168) compares Ruist and ‘Western’ conceptions of 
selfhood through a lens of his account of Ruism. Accordingly, the features of ‘Western’ 
conceptions of selfhood in Neville’s account include criticisms that they are:  
(1)  ‘too atomistic and individualistic’; 
(2)  ‘too inwards-looking to be responsible’; 
(3)  ‘too selfish to serve the community’; and 
(4) ‘too ready to give the personal sphere an unrealistic priority over both nature and 
social institutions’.42 
Like Yang Zhongfang, the terms Western, Ruism, or Chinese Neville uses are also 
highly reductionist and over-generalized. However, can Tu’s interpretation of Ruist 
relational selfhood avoid the problems of so-called Western selfhood and at the same time 
prevent the typical problems of the RFS and its accompanying repressive social 
impositions in Ru-based collectivism, as criticized by the scholars’ accounts we have 
previously referred to? The answer is negative, at least in the resistant Tu’s account. Yī 
Jùnqīng 衣俊卿 , a contemporary Chinese philosopher, states in a dialogue with Tu 
Weiming that China has never gone through a cultural stage where the free development 
of the individual persons was permitted and there has not been a prevailing development 
of distinct personalities.43 Therefore, he argues that the development of Chinese persons’ 
                                                
42  The features of Ruist conceptions of selfhood Neville’s (2000:168) account include (1) ‘attaining 
selfhood’; (2) ‘personal transformation’; and (3) ‘achieving concreteness’ in interpersonal relationships 
through affirming ‘the individual worths of people and things’. 
43 Yi Junqing (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:14f.). 
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personalities would be suppressed if Ruist relational ethics would be applied to rectify 
the problems caused by the trend of individualist thought in PTRIC settings before 
Chinese persons’ individuality has been widely  developed.44 
3.3.2 The Openness of the Interpersonal Relationships 
As manifested in C4S4.4, at different period of his career and writings, Tu Weiming 
wavers between opposing and supporting the Ruist asymmetrical hierarchical 
relationships. The responsive Tu admits that these asymmetrical and hierarchical 
relationships exist within PTRIC social contexts and goes so far as to suggest throwing 
away sangang. Yet the resistant Tu wavers between rejecting it as a politicized form of 
traditional Ruism and justifying it as a particular pattern of authority important in PTRIC 
family ethics. However, it seems clear that the resistant Tu’s equivocal attitude indirectly 
manifests how the existing asymmetrical hierarchical relationships could still serve as the 
social framework for one of his possible interpretations of New Ruist relational 
selfhood.45 His interpretations appear to be situation-oriented and so adapt to different 
                                                
44 William Theodore de Bary (1998:28–9) argues that the traditional Ruist ideal is to maintain ‘a balance 
of public and private (gongsi yiti 公私一體), [but] not the person or individual subordinated to the 
collectivity or state’. De Bary’s ideal of ‘gongsi yiti’ (its literal meaning is that the public and private form 
into one body) is impossible to realize without the individual becoming subordinated to the collectivity. For 
gongsi yiti in traditional Ruist relational selfhood means that the individual disappears into the collectivity. 
Based on and extended from traditional Ruist relational ethics and selfhood, there are quite a few 
discussions and debates on Ruist positive or negative values on human rights. Besides de Bary, scholars 
with positive concerns about it are Hsieh, Yuwei (1968:277–80), Nathan (1986a:114, 127), Lau Siukai and 
Kuan Hsinchi (1988:50–52), Rosemont (1988; 1998), Tu Weiming (1998b), Julia Ching (1998), 
Peerenboom (1998), Ho Hsinchuan 何信全 (p. Hé Xìnquán) (1999), Joseph Chan (1999), Li Minghui 
(2002), Ames (2006:524–71), Flakk (2003), Chang Yutzung and Chu Yunhan (2004), Ihara (2004), David 
B. Wong (2004), Fetzer and Soper (2007), and Lai Panchiu (2013). Scholars with negative concerns about 
it are Huntington (1991:71–4, 294–315), Amartya Sen (1997), Huang Junjie (2002:34–8), Nadeau (2002), 
Bretzke (2004), Chad Hansen (2004), Chu Xiao (2005), Zhuāng Jǐngshēng 莊景升 (2006), Yáng Zhēndé 
楊貞德 (2007), and Chan Benedict (2014). See also other integrative sources: Edwards et al. (1986), Rouner 
(1988:167–216), Davis (1995), Henkin (1998), de Bary and Tu Weiming (1999), Angle and Svensson 
(2001), Angle (2002), and Shun Kwongloi and David B. Wong (2004:3–7). Due to the limit of space, 
comprehensive discussions about issues related to developing human rights in Ruism are not included in 
this thesis. 
45 Randall Nadeau (2002:114) argues that rén 仁 (benevolence) in traditional and post-traditional Ruism, 
which defines human reciprocal relationships, is ‘fundamentally egalitarian … but the practice of ren is 
never egalitarian. That is to say, it is a basic characteristic of human relationships that they are hierarchical 
and therefore non-egalitarian’. 
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changing social conditions, revealing evidence of his internal self-inconsistency of 
argument and collectivist characteristic. Nevertheless, it is important to stress here that 
an asymmetrical hierarchical relationship generally will not be a truly open relationship. 
As explained in S3.2 above, in Moltmann’s account, the imago Trinitatis is 
endowed in the primal and fundamental human community (the whole of human beings). 
Human beings restored through the imago Christi (the ‘messianic fellowship’ with the 
Son) are called together into the open Trinity (see C6S7.2 and C6S8.2). This openness is 
made possible only by means of God’s grace; only by the grace of the infinite triune God 
can the finite human beings go beyond their limitations. Therefore, the relationships in 
the open Trinity are built out of a dynamic reciprocity in uniting with the triune God, with 
other human beings, and with the whole creation. Because of the perichoresis of the triune 
Persons, the perichoresis-oriented relationships among human beings are equality-
oriented. They depend on the openness (of spaces) of the triune God instead of the 
unattainable idealistic perfectibility of humankind that seeks to win a sense of personal 
worthiness in Ru-informed asymmetrical hierarchical relationships through a ceaseless 
process of moral self-cultivation. Consequently, it can release the felt burden of 
pretending to be good enough and empower persons to unveil the self-distorting masking 
they have submitted to. Lynne Taylor (2016:12f.) argues, therefore, that the ‘imago 
Trinitatis offers a model for relational authenticity’. We can infer that the Persons of the 
Trinity have no veil between them in their communication: total transparency, trust, and 
love, from the revealation in the Bible, for example, the authentic prayer of the Son in the 
Gethdemane (Matthew 26:36-42; Mark 14:32-9). 
It is notable that in practice, this perichoresis-oriented relationships might be a 
challenge due to a functional difference in social order. 
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3.3.3 The Openness of the Community 
As discussed and argued above and in C4 and C5, the fiduciary community in Tu’s 
account is an idealistic system of relationships that is, in fact, of closed relationships that 
tend to support repressive social impositions. Because one must be good enough to be 
worthy of such a relationship, the social impositions cannot be avoided, even although Tu 
tries to present them as working within an ‘open system’. Moral self-cultivation as an 
evaluating condition for those in such a fiduciary community only leads to the conditions 
for strengthening the closedness of those relationships.  
On the contrary, the meaning, reality and goals of the self in Moltmann’s account 
can be realized only by the works of the triune God. All is from His grace. This is a form 
of gracious moral cultivation,46 set in contrast to the form of Tu’s New Ruist self moral 
cultivation.  
For Christians, gracious moral cultivation means: 
The renewal of human life depends on the relation to Christ. The imago Dei in Christ is the 
paradigm for the restoration of wholeness. This wholeness (shalom) is precisely what the 
resurrected Christ bequeathed to his disciples — “Peace be with you” (John 20:19). In the 
sacrament of holy baptism, we declare our acceptance of the transforming presence of the 
Holy Spirit. This paradoxical rite of death and rebirth marks the beginning of the conversion 
of the imagination to the wholeness of Christ. (Moseley 1991:78) 
However, human persons, including some Christians and many Ruified Christians, 
tend to cultivate morality by their own efforts: 
To be retaken and re-formed by God is a scary prospect, for it means that we live on the 
boundary of the finite and the infinite. In this state of vulnerability and fragility, we are 
tempted to cling to the finite, to what is immediately fulfilling and self-affirming. We are 
also tempted to resort to the will, as if by mere strenuous moral effort we could appropriate 
the imago Dei into the structure of our psyches. (Moseley 1991:17) 
Therefore, besides the communion between the self and God being formed in and 
by divine grace, it is also crucial that the community constituted by the self and others in 
                                                
46 As Grenz (1997:139) affirms, ‘We can live ethically, then, only as we become the recipients of God’s 
grace. In short, ethics is God’s love for us; the ethical life comes as the gift of divine grace.’ 
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God must be built up in the Deity’s grace.47 The true unity or oneness is neither reached 
by obliterating one’s self for the other, nor by expanding one’s self by various means over 
the other. This is the essence of Moltmann’s open Trinity, open fellowship, and open 
friendship. The possibility of humankind’s open community in Moltmann’s account is 
made by dying to the self in Christ and letting the ‘motives and urges’ of a new self of 
the imago Christi arise from within us.48 Only when the self and the community can be 
transformed in God’s grace, the real self, the unique self within, can become the open 
relational self in the open community that is unveiled and does not need to be masked or 
hidden any more. This is clearly a positive possibility for the RFS that could lead to a 
transformative solution to the problem. 
Therefore, the potential for overcoming the research problem by means of 
Moltmann’s account of social trinitarian relational selfhood can be positively summarized 
by Bellinger’s words (2010:151, eo): 
A way of existing as a human being that embodies humility in relationship with God (rather 
than arrogant self-righteousness and idolatry), openness to growth in selfhood (rather than 
egocentric refusal to change), and social solidarity (rather than splitting the world into good 
and evil camps).  
Undoubtedly, when selves and communities are being transformed in God’s grace 
by means of the Christian liturgy, teaching, and practices in our age, ‘it becomes one of 
those very rare places where a genuine alternative to hypocrisy is found’ (ibid.:151).  
                                                
47 This community is restricted only to the community of believers, namely the church, rather than wider 
society, as explained in C6, especially in S6.2, S7.2, and S8.1, because only believers accept the Deity’s 
grace and then live in this fellowship with and in the open triune God. However, Christians can treat non-
Christians by the grace of God unidirectionally in the same way they treat Christian although non-Christians 
cannot reciprocate unless they accept God’s grace. Therefore, Christians can apply this understanding of 
open fellowship not only to evangelism but also to establishing a public theology that can speak and imply 
more widely in general societies. In God for a Secular Society, Moltmann (1999:19, 137–49) advocates 
such societies implied by this kind of public theology but he does not present it directly in the name of open 
Trinity or open fellowship. However, he (ibid.:139, 146, eo) adopts Karl Popper’s (1945a; 1945b) phrase 
to call such societies ‘open societies’. 
48 See also Sandford, John and Sandford, Paula (1982:378). 
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4. Assessment of Transforming the Repressed Form of Self 
As mentioned in C3 and A-E, the problem of the RFS (or the repressively masking 
personage) is not to be solved simply by discarding this personage. The solution is a 
journey of becoming the person, namely, transforming the personage to express and show 
forth the person in accordance with the person’s sincerest convictions (Tournier 1957:81). 
Tournier is a pioneer in the field of integrative psychotherapy. Therefore, his framework 
for dealing practically with the problem of negative personage is a valuable reference for 
measuring the value of any theoretical path that seeks to transform the RFS in PTRIC 
contexts, including those provided in Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s accounts of 
relational selfhood. 
4.1 The Criteria for Tournier’s Path of Transforming the Personage into the 
Person 
Both the pressures of repressive social impositions from outside and the fear, anxiety, and 
insecurity that lay bare the real self inside prevent the personage from expressing and 
showing forth the person in accord with the person’s sincerest convictions. Based on the 
discussions of Tournier’s conceptualization of two ‘diametrically opposite paths’ to the 
person through the revealing personage (ibid.:81) and to the contrastive personage49 in 
seeking freedom (ibid.:224) in C3S2.4 and their summary in Chart 3.1, we can identify 
Tournier’s (1957:220–24) essential elements for distinguishing these two paths as 
follows: 
(1)  The source: trusting in a personal encounter (with Jesus Christ, according to 
Tournier’s theology) or the effort of one’s own will; 
                                                
49 As explained in C3S2.4, in order to contrast the path to the personage with the practically transforming 




(2)  The action: acknowledging the deepest problems through the fellowship or 
attempting to insist on imposed expectation from others; 
(3)  The purpose: boldly revealing the person or artificially making up a personage; 
(4)  The result: easing tensions or exciting tensions; 
(5)  The means: relying on a self-abandonment (to Jesus Christ, according to Tournier’s 
theology) or the glorification of will-power; 
(6)  The principle: acknowledging the true solution of grace or relying on any self-
generated system or rule.50 
4.2 Measuring the Transforming Paths in Tu’s and Moltmann’s Accounts 
On the basis of Chart 3.1, Chart 8.3 manifests a comparison of the various features of the 
transforming paths disclosed in both Tu’s and Moltmann’s relational selfhood with the 
measurement reference to Tournier’s criteria for the path to the person through the 
revealing personage and his contrasting criteria for the path to a contrastive personages 
(Tournier 1957:224). 
4.2.1 Tu’s Path for Transforming the Repressed Form of Self  
As manifested in Chart 8.3, Tu’s transforming path reflects much more of the 
characteristics of the path to a contrastive personage than the path to the person through 
the revealing personage. Three of the six features — of the source, of the action, and of 
the principle — in Tu’s transforming path and Tournier’s path to a contrastive personage 
are obviously quite similar. In the other three features, of the purpose, of the result, and 
of the means, Tu’s transforming path and Tournier’s path to a contrastive personage are 
also quite similar through further logical inference of their relatedness. Based on one’s 
own efforts to pursue becoming a sage through learning, such a pursuit will naturally 
                                                
50 What Tournier (1957:224) was particularly concerned with here in his cultural settings is Stoicism. 
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glorify one’s own will-power. Provided that humans cannot attain perfectibility or 
sagehood in reality, as acknowledged by Tu, the pursuit of becoming worthy of any a 
relationship in a context with a strong tendency for repressive social impositions leads 
regularly to making up an artificial personage, as illustrated in Diagram 8.2. It occurs 
within the cultural design that seeks to manifest the great self and dissolve the small self. 
Given such a cultural design, the inner/outer split within one’s self is a corollary and so 





Chart 8.3 Comparison of Tu’s and Moltmann’s Transforming Paths with Reference to Tournier’s 
Measurements51 (for Explanation, See S4.2) 
                                                
51 For Moltmann (1976:20f.), the phrase ‘iconoclasm of liberation’ means that people do not need to 
‘deceive themselves and others about the truth’ in a ‘beautiful and pious pretence’. 
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4.2.2 Moltmann’s Path for Transforming the Repressed Form of Self 
As manifested in Chart 8.3, Moltmann’s transforming path reflects much more the 
characteristics of the path to the person through the revealing personage rather than those 
of the path to a contrastive personage. Moltmann’s departure point to the person through 
the revealing personage is from being reconciled to God through the salvation of the 
crucified Christ, instead of from the effort of one’s own will. Christ’s salvation releases 
one from the pressure to mask their true self. Whenever one depends on one’s own effort 
in this realm, one does not release such pressure due to one’s limited capability and 
imperfectibility. When one can abandon illusions about oneself in an open friendship of 
grace, then there is no shame or troubles that would need to be hidden, and the tensions 
caused by anxieties and self-accusations can be eased. 
In Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology and Tournier’s path to the 
person through the revealing personage, there are four of the six features — of the source, 
of the action, of the purpose, and of the result — obviously sharing similarities. In the 
other two features, of the means and of the principle, Moltmann’s trinitarian theological 
anthropology and Tournier’s paths to the person through the revealing personage are also 
quite similar through extending the logical inferences from their relatedness. The 
transformation of the self in Moltmann’s Christian trinitarian theological anthropology 
undoubtedly depends totally on the grace of the crucified Son through renewal by the 
Holy Spirit in anticipation of the Father’s promised futurity. In Moltmann’s social trinity, 
human beings redeemed to become the imago Christi for eschatological glorification is a 
prominent feature. Therefore, comparing Tournier’s paths to the person through the 
revealing personage, Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology directs the path of 
the relational self to a more specific promised future, namely reflecting the glory of God 
with an unveiled face. This promised future for the relational self is an eschatological 
destination of the real self recreated by God, where the revealing personage becomes the 
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person, and the divine oughts become what the true self intends, as illustrated in Diagram 
8.2. When the transformation of imperfectible human beings is initiated and is promised 
by the triune God, both human awareness of incompetency and willingness can 
accordingly increase, so that they can grow towards the path to the person through the 
revealing personage. Besides, in a community of grace, the imposition of external social 
oughts also tends to disappear. Consequently, it is apparent that Moltmann’s relational 
trinitarian theological anthropology provides a concrete foundation theologically and 
practically in overcoming the problem of the RFS. 
4.3 Conclusion to Measuring the Transforming Paths 
As discussed above, through this analytical comparison, the critical differences that have 
been revealed between Tu’s and Moltmann’s accounts responding to the problem of the 
RFS do not stem from their methodologies, but from their ontologies because one’s 
ontology determines one’s methodology. In other words, the path to the person through 
the revealing personage depends on who the self is, where the self comes from, and where 
the self will go, rather than how to be the ideal self. Without Heaven and humankind 
defining each other in circular arguments, Tu’s account cannot provide concrete answers 
to those questions. Who is the self really? Where does the self exactly come from? Where 
will the self go in the future? In Tu’s account of relational selfhood without the creator 
God, the self is basically a functional concept, because it lacks an absolute and objective 
value. Consequently, living and acting according to the conditions of prevailing 
relationships becomes the main focus of the self in Tu’s account.  
In Moltmann’s account, the main focus of the self is about who the self is, where 
the self comes from, and where the self will go. As the triune God grants humankind their 
identities and purposes in His image and likeness, the self finds its value and security in 
the open Trinity. The transformation of humankind after the Fall depends not on moral 
self-cultivation, but on gracious moral cultivation, i.e. the reconciling, redeeming, and 
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transforming work of the trinune God. This is done for the future consummated glory of 
God by His promise within human lives, as both an eschatological goal and an 
anticipatory present experience. Consequently, being and receiving becomes the main 
focus of the self in Moltmann’s account. In other words, applying Moltmann’s account 
to solve the problem, I argue that the first steps need to be taken by finding out who the 
self is, where the self comes from, and where the self will go in relationship to the triune 
God, who bestows on the self its dynamic authenticity in His image. 
5. Suggestions for Alternative Theoretical Solutions for the Repressed Form of 
Self in PTRIC Contexts 
Undoubtedly, there are many strengths in the traditional Ruist cultural heritage as 
mentioned in C1. However, this research is to respond to the problem of the RFS and 
repressive social impositions found in PTRIC contexts criticized by scholars from many 
academic disciplines. On the one hand, the responsive Tu is quite alert to the problem and 
affirms some Ruist weaknesses, recognizing the necessity of some modification of New 
Ruist relational selfhood, especially by getting rid of the sangang traditionalism. 
However, the Ruist presuppositions in his accounts are unfortunately not adjustable, even 
on his own account. On the other hand, the resistant Tu’s interpretative approach shares 
the same problematic features with PTRIC relational selfhood in terms of the problem of 
the RFS and its accompanying repressive social impositions. Although Moltmann’s social 
trinitarian relational selfhood offers a constructive possibility for overcoming that same 
problem, his account is not developed originally for engaging in PTRIC contexts. 
Considering the fact that more and more Chinese Christians and non-Christians live in 
multi-cultural contexts, there are three possible alternative solutions offered to readers, 
especially those who are suffering in the problem of the repressed form of self, at the end 
of this research following an analytical comparison between Tu and Moltmann. 
346 
 
5.1 The Responsive Tu’s Account of New Ruist Relational Selfhood 
This first possible solution is offered for people who admit that there exists, more or less, 
a significant Ruist problem that reinforces the RFS, even though they choose to stick to 
the Ruist presuppositions as stated in Tu’s account.52 These people might not see the need 
for any direct cross-cultural influences from outside into contemporary PTRIC cultural 
settings. They might think that the responsive Tu’s account, like some modifications 
offered by other scholars mentioned in C1, is a good enough modification of Ruism that 
can solve the problem without adjusting any Ruist presupposition. In other words, this 
alternative is engaged in retaining the strengths and abandoning or changing the 
weaknesses within Tu’s New Ruist presuppositions. It is worth noting that Tu insists 
(1979a:7f.) that to reach the ultimate achievement of self-realization in morality is a 
repeated ‘decision-making process … [for] the individual in all situations’ with no need 
for God’s grace. Therefore, there is no room in Tu for any possibility of gracious moral 
cultivation, such as Moltmann’s account. 
The challenge for this alternative is how far this modification can eliminate Ruist 
weaknesses. This could involve, at the very least, the development of suitable models of 
Chinese personalities, a strong and new ideology supporting Ru-influenced hierarchical 
relationships, articulating a viable Ru-based collectivism, and enhancing its strengths 
without any significant change of any of the presuppositions anchoring that New Ruist 
relational selfhood. Within all of this, however, the most critical challenge is the 
possibility whether or not the fundamental issue of repressive social imposition can be 
prevented without any change, as Tu (1999 in Li Minghua 1999:33) himself insists, in 
spite of the multifaceted forms of circular reasoning that plague his presuppositions. Can 
                                                
52 The New Rusti Liu Shuhsien (1988:259) also emphasizes that a New Ruist will not easily change his/er 
belief or ultimate mandate. The contemporary Ruist scholar Zheng Jiadong (2001:517) does not consider 
the possibility that New Ruists will accept a Christian understanding of ‘transcendence’ or adopt any 
compromise form of New Ruist understanding of it.  
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the problem of the RFS resulting from the burden of doing and achieving things in order 
to win social recognition be significantly improved without recourse to any alternative 
cosmologies or metaphysics? Obviously, this kind of question needs more advanced 
theoretical and empirical studies in order to provide justified answers to those who would 
support this perspective. 
5.2 The Combination of the Resistant Tu’s Account of New Ruist Relational 
Selfhood and Moltmann’s Social Trinitarian Relational Selfhood 
The second possible solution is offered for people who to some extent are not satisfied 
with both PTRIC and Tu’s relational selfhood in solving these problems. They are eager 
to find a possibility of a healthier version of Ruist relational selfhood,53 even by means 
of cross-cultural influences from outside, but without getting rid of Ruism totally. In other 
words, this is a solution through revitalizing instead of replacing Ruism with 
Christianity.54 Fang, Keli 方克立 (p. Fāng Kèlì) (1991:39), a contemporary Chinese 
historian and Ruist scholar, points out that Ruism can only offer a suitable ‘cíhuì’「詞
彙」(vocabulary), but not an adequate ‘wénfǎ’「 文法」 (grammar) for the framework 
of any future creatively synthesized civilization.55 Fang Keli neither specifies which kind 
of Ruism would suffice nor offers any details about what the contents of such a 
civilization should be. Nevertheless, his approach would support the application of other 
accounts of relational selfhood with different presuppositions (a different ‘grammar’ in a 
developing ‘language’) for solving the research problem we have been considering. 
                                                
53 A version built upon balanced relationships between the individual self and the group. 
54 Yang Fenggang (2014, cited in Doyle 2014:2). See also Jochim (1995) and Yang Fenggang (2014 in 
ChinaSource 2014:17). However, in what way this solution is to be worked and its feasibility is complicated 
and debatable (Lee, Peter K. H. 1991:67–68; Küng 1993 in Ching, Julia and Küng 1993:231–84; Neville 
2004:457–60; Berthrong 2004:433–7), and is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
55 Sun Lungkee (1983 reprinted in 2004:9, eo) also uses ‘wénfǎ’「文法」(grammar) as a metaphor to 
denote and discuss the deep structure of Chinese culture mainly based on Ruism. 
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Therefore, Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood deserves to be considered as 
something that might be coalesced with some form of a revised Ruist account. 
The challenges faced by this alternative are considered fundamental by some 
people. They would need to determine where the boundaries of cross-cultural influences 
would lie, and then reconsider its impact on the identities of Ruism, contemporary 
Chinese culture, and contemporary Chinese persons. As mentioned in C1, the term Ruism 
itself is ambiguous, so that there is no consensus about its definition among many 
contemporary Ruist scholars. Must the definition of Ruism be determined only by the 
Tu’s presuppositions? If not, by what? In spite of the length of Ruist history in varying 
ages of Chinese culture, must the preferred kind of Chinese culture and the cultural 
identity of Chinese people be construed only on the basis of Ruist teachings and 
institutions? Which kinds of Ruism would be most suitable for these developments? Some 
Ruists, including Tu Weiming, try to promote and justify some elements in their preferred 
Ruist worldview as universal values. Whether their arguments or strategies can succeed 
or not, should we reject the possibility of having some expression of Ruism as possessing 
universal values because it is of Chinese culture or East Asian culture? Likewise, shall 
we reject the possibility of various kinds of non-Chinese thought, and in particular 
Christianity, as a vital option for life in PTRIC cultural settings, as possessing universal 
values because they are stereotyped as of Western culture?56 Peter K. H. Lee and Lai 
Panchiu (2000:114, eo) remind that ‘internationalization does not necessarily mean 
westernization’. I believe that Tu Weiming and other post-traditional Ruists would agree 
with this ethos. However, would they agree that internationalization does not necessarily 
mean sinicization? Can we, at some time in the future identify Christianity, like 
Buddhism, as an inherent part of a new form of Chinese culture? There have been many 
                                                
56 As Andrew F. Walls (1996:129–57) lists seven main traditions of Christianity, most of them are not 
Western.  
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discussions, debates, and studies seeking to answer these questions, but they still need 
more advanced theoretical and empirical studies, in order to provide justified answers for 
those who would support this perspective. 
5.3 Moltmann’s Social Trinitarian Relational Selfhood 
This third possible solution is offered for conception of people who are not satisfied with 
either the PTRIC cultural situations or and Tu’s (or any other Ruist) relational selfhood 
in solving these problems. These persons may be open to a large degree of cross-cultural 
influences from outside of traditional or post-traditional Chinese cultural societies, even 
if it might involve a replacement of Ruism. Therefore, Moltmann’s social trinitarian 
relational selfhood could serve as a living option for these kinds of persons. 
The challenges that this alternative would have to face are the various kinds of 
perceived conflicts between two or more social contexts, two or more cultures, two or 
more worldviews, and two or more beliefs (Dong, Rui 2007:115). In terms of some degree 
of cultural replacement, what part(s) of Ru-influenced tradition should be replaced? Only 
those obstructive features of Ruist relational selfhood? Only simply the vision of Ruist 
relational selfhood? Or something more drastic? Since relational selfhood always 
involves relationship with other people, can Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational 
selfhood work out without this replacement occurring in the lives of all those involved? 
The processes involved in such a cultural transformation are not at all easy to conceive, 
but in the light of the tumultuous changes that occurred from the time of the last years of 
the Qing dynasty to the emergence of a Post-Mao era of the People’s Republic of China, 







Towards the Liberation of the Repressed Form of Self 
The motive in researching for a solution to the problem of the RFS within the theoretical 
context of a PTRIC relational selfhood started this academic and personally spiritual 
journey of discovery and liberation. The main research question guided the direction and 
range of this journey: 
To what extent do Tu Weiming’s and Jürgen Moltmann’s conceptualizations of 
relational selfhood provide a suitable alternative or modified modern resource for 
solving the problem of the repressed form of self within the theoretical context of the post-
traditional Ru-influenced Chinese relational selfhood? 
At the end of this Ph.D. thesis and research, but not the end of this journey, reviewing the 
whole course of it until now will be significant and valuable. 
1. The Journey of Discovery and Liberation 
David L. Hall (1994:214), as well as other scholars in different fields,1 asserts that a 
religion or a culture fundamentally shapes its people through the ways that selfhood is 
formed and morality is cultivated. Besides, studies in psychiatry as well as in the 
behavioural sciences have found that in dealing with mental disorders one cannot achieve 
insights without considering two other variables: culture and the concept of self. As these 
studies show, these three variables are ‘interdependent’ (Marsella 1985).  
Without taking this journey of research, I could not have found evidence about how 
PTRIC cultural contexts had considerably and deeply shaped the ways I myself think and 
feel, the patterns of the ways I behave and react, especially interpersonally. I now see how 
                                                
1 See also Yang Kuoshu (1988), Barnlund (1989:32), Markus and Kitayama (1991a; 1991b), Miller (1997), 
Holland (1997), Baumeister (1997:193–5; 1999a), Kitayama (2000), Andersen and Serena Chen 
(2002:637), Kim Heejung S. and Deborah Ko (2007), Serena Chen and Andersen (2008:248), Zusho 
(2008), Shi Yuanyuan (2013:353,358), and O’Neill et al. (2015). 
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the value system and the worldview that I regularly rely on stem from that cultural 
orientation; this includes perspectives by which I look at myself and other persons. I have 
grown up in an environment of Protestant Christianity mixed with the traditional Chinese 
Three Teachings, especially the small folk Ruist tradition. I became a devoted Christian 
in my early thirties and later also became a minister. Even though my Christian parents, 
especially my father, are very Ru-inspired and I was indoctrinated with Ruist teachings 
in my school education, nevertheless, I have never thought about becoming a follower of 
Ruism. Still, the Ruist influences on me have been, as I now realize, quite beyond my 
initial imagination or intuitions, far greater than most Christian influences. This journey 
has also made me more and more sensitive to such influences on other PTRIC persons, 
so that I have collected many stories from other persons echoing my own experience and 
identifying my research problem in their own lives. To liberate our repressed forms of 
self by means of overcoming repressive social imposition is undoubtedly our common 
yearning. To recognize its existence is a way to begin to identify the cause of its 
formation, and can become the departure point towards a path of personal and communal 
liberation.  
Based on scholars’ evidence, studies of the way the repressed form of self appears 
in PTRIC cultural contexts are significant because they point to some underlying causes 
of certain mental disorders and their related personal and social problems (C2S3). As seen 
in the previous chapters, to deal with the problem of the RFS requires that we also deal 
with the religions or cultures that shape the RFS and might become engaged in liberating 
or transforming it. The varying ways of forming selfhood and pursuing moral cultivation 
influence the degree to which any RFS might be liberated. Before starting this research, 
I had no clear picture of the repressed form of self I suffered from, nor had I ever 
considered that the study of Christian trinitarian doctrine would be able to provide any 
solution for it.  
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What I did recognize was that when one’s self is repressed, a disharmony is formed 
between the self (the person, or the unique self within, or the spiritual self) and its 
presentation (the personage, or the social self). Through studies of Tournier’s 
observations and analyses (A-E), I came to understand that the problem of repression lies 
not in the personage itself, or its roles, but within the discord between the personage and 
the person. Under those discordant situations, people might cripple themselves by trying 
to live up to an ideal image, or acting out an ideal role, for instance, as a parent, a child, 
a teacher, or a student (Fiddes 2000:21–2). This is exactly what has been criticized by 
certain scholars from different academic disciplines: many PTRIC persons suffer from a 
RFS that is shaped by and sustained within the structures and institutions associated with 
PTRIC cultural settings and their associated understanding of relational selfhood. 
In order to search for solution/solutions to liberating or transforming this RFS in 
PTRIC societies, this research first examined Tu Weiming’s New Ruist conception of 
relational selfhood, including looking in depth into his two inconsistent attitudes towards 
scholars’ criticisms, what I have referred to as the responsive Tu and the resistant Tu. 
Subsequently, Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian relational selfhood was explored 
as a potential means for responding to this problem of the RFS. These were done in order 
to assess whether or not any of Tu’s or Moltmann’s conceptions of relational selfhood 
could become an appropriate alternative solution/solutions for the research problem. 
However, this cross-cultural and interdisciplinary study proved to be a daunting task 
involving challenges and complicated interpretative difficulties. Here below I will 
summarize these challenges and difficulties, and indicate how they have been overcome.  
As explained in C1, C3S2.6.2, and mentioned elsewhere regularly in most chapters, 
most of the primary and secondary sources I investigated are full of problematic 
expressions and arguments. Scholars make broad claims in these writings without 
specifying or analysing more precisely their ambiguous, generalized, or even over-
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generalized, terminology and interpretations. This is especially manifest in the often used 
and abused monolithic comparative methods in their general cross-cultural (China-West 
or East-West) and other specific interdisciplinary analyses. In this regard, I am indebted 
to Lauren Pfister who always questioned and challenged such kinds of presentations 
appearing in my thesis, but also encouraged and instructed me how to avoid them as much 
as possible during this intellectual journey under his supervision. 
Many of the efforts at dialogue among different cultures, religions, and disciplines 
within modern Chinese cultural contexts — especially between different cultural and 
religious studies, but also between them and the social scientific disciplines (Tu, Weiming 
1967:77–80) — have been filled with interpretive challenges and difficulties. According 
to the evidence disclosed in the relevant literature, I have identified four main reasons for 
persistent difficulties leading sometimes to ineffectiveness in those dialogues:  
(1)  Some of the same or similar terminology is employed to denote ambiguous meanings 
or different scopes of study as used by different authors in varying contexts. For 
example, consider the general use of terms such as Confucianism (Ruism) (as 
mentioned in C1S1.1), individualism (or collectivism) (as explained in A-C), 
Christianity (Walls 1996:129–57), true self (as explained in A-D), Heaven (as 
discussed in C4S3.4 and C5S6), transcendence (as discussed in C4S3.4.2, C5S6, and 
C8S3.2.3), and [European] individualism and egoism (as mentioned in C5S4.1.2) or 
Sino-theology and Chinese theology (Chin, Kenpa 2006:126). 
(2)  Some different expressions, probably including employing technical terms in non-
technical or other disciplinary contexts, are adopted to denote the same or similar 
thing (Tu, Weiming 1967:75–6) or two similar things without a clear demarcation. 
For example, there are different phrases describing the phenomena associated with 
the problems of RFS (as discussed in A-E), different phrases denoting the same or 
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similar meaning of true self (as discussed in A-D), or different Ruist traditions with 
high overlap of their characteristics (as discussed in C1S1.3 and C1S 1.4). 
(3)  Some evidence provided by social scientists is ignored or rejected simply due to the 
excuse of their unrecognized authority or different professional approach to 
interpreting religions or cultures. For example, this is one of the reasons the resistant 
Tu argues against the social scientists’ criticisms of PTRIC relational selfhood (as 
discussed in C5S3.1). 
(4)  Some terms and concepts used in Chinese language contexts are not precisely 
translated, and so cannot be adequately understood or communicated in English 
language studies (Tu, Weiming 1985:7). For example, consider the differences 
between zìwǒ 自我 and self (ibid. and as explained in A-E), guānxì 關係 and 
relationships (as explained in C2F70), lunli 倫理 and ethics (as explained in C3F64). 
This is a special challenge for this research, because most of the secondary sources in 
this research are presented in Chinese language, and the vast majority of the issues 
involve concepts linked directly to Chinese contexts. 
As C4 and C5 disclosed, when discussing the issues related to asymmetrically 
hierarchical social relationships, Tu’s attitudes towards scholars’ criticisms are wavering 
and even reasoning circularly from time to time, without providing enough rationale to 
explain their decisive change. Besides, some of his arguments and expressions tend to be 
either extremely absolute or reductionist, and so easily appear to be over-generalized. The 
presentation and evaluation of Tu’s overall integrated account in both his English and 
Chinese works tend to look like I have a critical bias against Tu, especially if readers have 
no opportunity to review enough of his works in both languages. I have suffered from 
such a misunderstanding every time I presented this part of my thesis throughout this 
journey of discovery even at my pre-viva review. Tu addressed the same questions with 
different attitudes when he wrote and published in these two languages. This adds both 
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to the interpretive difficulties and to the sense of what some might see negatively as either 
his inconsistencies or his positively as flexible explorations. It is notable that these 
variances are more evident in Chinese than in English, especially in those works produced 
during the 1980s and 1990s. 
As manifested in C6 to C8, Moltmann did not present and argue his vision of social 
trinitarian relational selfhood directly for liberating the problem of RFS, let alone for 
interacting with PTRIC cultural contexts. Although I was attracted to this conception of 
relational selfhood as soon as I got to know it, there is a significant explanatory challenge 
to apply it to this research problem within the particular cross-cultural contexts I have 
considered 
For my personal existential need and the yearnings of all the other suffering PTRIC 
persons mentioned above, this research adopts an ‘indirect dialogue’ as the main approach 
(C3S2.6.2) to solve the research problem, instead of merely exchanging information 
about different conceptions of relational selfhood. However, in PTRIC multifaith and 
multi-cultural societies within the contemporary world, the paths towards liberating the 
RFS for varying cultural types of Chinese Christians and non-Christians must be very 
different. While this is not the place to go into further diversifying PTRIC person into 
subgroups, as field research methodology does, it is enough to suggest possible alternative 
solutions based on the studies of Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s accounts of relational 
selfhood for readers, especially for those who are suffering problems related to the RFS. 
While a comprehensive examination of all these difficulties in the primary and 
secondary literature would take us too far away from our declared research project, I 
believe it is enough to seek to avoid ambiguities caused by them as much as is possible 
in the discussions and arguments of this thesis. Without many good academic examples 
to follow and refer to, I have taken extra efforts in this thesis to avoid the over-
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generalizations that are so prevalent in the secondary literature as much as it has been 
possible for me to do. 
2. Discovery of Tu Weiming’s Account as Moving from the Person to the Personage 
As manifested in detail in C1, the deep and profound influences of traditional Ruism 
across the spectrum of dynamic histories especially on Chinese peoples, societies, 
education, politics, and cultures are obvious to all. As a contemporary Ruist missionary 
in Anglophone settings, Tu Weiming has devoted himself for decades to introducing and 
re-interpreting the universal values of Ruism for modern Anglophone readers. The scale 
of his contributions in making non-Chinese persons understand traditional Ruism through 
cross-cultural dialogue and in applying traditional Ruist values to a wide variety of 
contemporary issues is unquestionable. As shown in C4 and C5, when facing scholarly 
criticisms of the RFS caused by repressive social impositions in PTRC cultural settings, 
Tu went to great lengths to defend his own conception of post-traditional New Ruist 
relational selfhood against these criticisms. Until now, he is probably the only 
contemporary Ruist who has published a monograph to defend a specific Ruist conception 
of selfhood.2 
About the controversial and highly criticized problems involved in the 
asymmetrical hierarchical version of a traditional Ruist social structure, especially as it is 
expressed in the teaching of sangang (the three bonds), Tu’s positions obviously alternate 
and sharply divide into bipolar attitudes (the responsive Tu and the resistant Tu), 
seemingly depending on the situation he is addressing. This analytically creative account 
of Tu’s attitudes in C5 was generated by a very difficult effort at trying to make sense of 
what may appear to be immense inconsistencies within Tu's various writings. Tu’s 
                                                
2 There are some other articles and chapters discussing this issue of Ruist selfhood by other scholars, but 
none of them have ever published a monograph specifically about this theme like Tu Weiming. 
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inconsistent attitudes towards them shift back and forth between (the resistant Tu) 
supporting and (the responsive Tu) denouncing sangang. His attitudes seem to change in 
order to avoid various objections, showing his pluralistic demeanour, and catering to his 
different audiences. However, his wavering bipolar attitudes towards scholars’ criticisms 
appearing in his textual accounts, his public lectures, and his interviews are confusing, 
frustrating, and even irresponsible; he seems to have never either explained or corrected 
his previous different attitudes or adjusted or reinterpreted the framework and 
presuppositions of his New Ruist relational selfhood whenever he changed. As a 
consequence, his attitudes of dealing with these related issues demonstrate one of the 
features of the PTRIC relational selfhood: situational determinism. It is worth noting that 
he is one among a number of contemporary Ruists trying to argue that some traditional 
and post-traditional Ruist values are universal values (C1S3.1.1), especially within 
internationally-interconnected modern and mass education in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century. While this is not the place to go into an extended discussion of his 
motivations and rationales for engaging in this Ruist promotion campaign, it is enough to 
ask how an interpretation of these Ruist values depending only on specific situations, 
instead of consistently providing coherent evidence and universalizable moral arguments, 
can realize any universal value. In pursuing these claims, Tu also discloses a tendency 
towards supporting a Ruist moral perfectionism, so that Ruist values always appear to be 
morally impeccable and, consequently, not vulnerable to ethical criticisms.3 Whether or 
not other contemporary Ruists also speak in multi-form voices in facing criticisms of 
Ruism will not be addressed here, but I feel obliged to underscore this discursive problem 
in Tu’s own corpus. 
                                                
3 In a recent interview, in defending the highly criticized ‘Chinese culture’ and ‘Ruist tradition’ in modern 
times, Tu Weiming (2013 in Lì, Huá 栗華 and Tu, Weiming 2013) claims that the survival of ‘Ruist 
tradition’ until now proves its incorruptibility, because ‘it has smelted itself into a body with an adamantine 
skeleton’. 
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Although the responsive Tu offers criticisms of authoritarian hierarchical societies, 
especially by opposing the rigidity of the traditional Ruist teaching of sangang, the 
resistant Tu either denies that authoritarianism is part of orthodox Ruist interpretations 
and teachings, or seeks to justify a particular traditional Ruist pattern of authoritarianism 
promoted by sangang (as explained in C5S3.1 and C5S7.1). These inconsistent responses 
can only lead to frustration for those who would seek to follow his claims, but for those 
who have reasons to oppose his claims, this can only confirm their deeper suspicions. As 
already explained in C8S1, the responsive Tu has not yet shown any flexibility in 
adjusting any of his presuppositions or even some parts of the framework of his post-
traditional Ruist interpretations. So, one is left with a quandary: the responsive Tu only 
continues to advocate the elements of a framework that validate each other mutually in 
multiple steps of circular reasoning, while the resistant Tu negates these interpretations 
of the responsive Tu by justifying a particular traditional Ruist pattern of authoritarianism 
promoted by sangang (C5S7.1). 
There are some significant relational tensions and conceptual predicaments 
involved in Tu’s account as a path moving away from the person and towards the 
personage. These include at least the following problems. 
Firstly, there are four major relational issues, rooted in the actual conditions 
affecting the personage existing in this idealized vision of Tu’s New Ruist community. 
These include (1) the restrictive imperfections plaguing humankind within our earthly 
lives, (2) the asymmetrical hierarchical version of a traditional Ruist social structure, (3) 
his version of Ru-based collectivism, and (4) his version of New Ruist cultural 
devaluation of a privatized self. In addressing these problems, Tu’s idealistic 
interpretations of traditional Ruist persons and communities do not provide any new 
solutions for problems of the RFS. Instead, within his discourse, the responsive Tu 
acknowledges the existence of certain problems including the RFS, but the resistant Tu 
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evades them. This kind of moral idealism manifests itself precisely in binding up the 
personage within a framework of a repressively imposed relational self. These findings, 
which are also supported by related conclusions found in other scholars’ criticisms, have 
helped me understand how PTRIC relational selfhood has been formed, and why PTRIC 
persons have been suffering from the RFS. Negatively masking one’s self indicates why 
it is such a struggle for PTRIC persons to liberate themselves from these complexities 
and their discursive justifications. 
Secondly, Tu’s relational selfhood is in fact restricted within a tightly bound closed 
system. In relation to humankind in general, a group of collective selves for Tu constitutes 
a society, and so becomes the only effective transcendent reference point for any 
conception of selfhood (C4S3.5). In his interpretation, there is a discrepancy between the 
limits and imperfections of interpersonal relational reality and his idealistic assumptions 
about human perfectibility Tu claims. The existence of this discrepancy is critical for the 
emergence and liberation of any PTRIC personage under conditions of a repressed form 
of self or repressively imposed relational selves. Tu tries to resolve this discrepancy by 
adding several interconnected assumptions that he himself claims he has faith in, all being 
related to his post-traditional accounts of a traditional Ruist worldview. These involve 
teachings such as a Heaven-endowedly perfectible human nature of ‘intrinsic goodness’, 
an unceasing communal moral self-cultivation without help or grace from any external 
personal God, and the ultimate transformation of selfhood (or sagehood) as preconditions 
for knowing and uniting with Heaven. All of these have been discussed and evaluated in 
C4. For Tu (1985:125–7), Heaven is not ‘a transcendent reference point (such as God)’, 
but ‘reaching Heaven’ is precisely equivalent to a human being’s full self-realization of 
one’s selfhood. As a result, his putative solutions actually lead him into further 
discrepancies in linking his perfectionist relational selfhood to the circular arguments 
summarized in Diagrams 5.1 and 5.2. Consequently, this account of relational selfhood 
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becomes an idealized vision that is actually unrealizable. Besides, from Moltmann’s 
perspective (1974a:7), Tu’s vision of relational selfhood tends to become a form of 
humanistic idolatry, because Heaven is completely reduced to an aspect of selfhood. 
Although Tu unequivocally refuses that theism is a Ruist alternative (C4S3.4 and 
C8S3.2.4), the fact is that if he took up a theistic Ruist option as some other historical 
Ruists have done — such as the Han Dynasty Ruist, Tung Chungshu 董仲舒 (p. Dǒng 
Zhòngshū) (179–104 BCE) (Taylor 2005:599) and the Qing Dynasty Ruist, Lo Chungfan 
羅仲藩  (p. Luó Zhòngfān) (d. circa 1850) (Pfister 1999) — there would be more 
flexibility for providing an ‘external transcendent reference point’ in a vital Tian/Shàngdì 
天／上帝 theism. It might also even provide a real and open relational dynamic ‘dialogue 
with the transcendent’. 4 
Thirdly, Tu denies that traditional Ruism is a form of collectivism, and so tries by 
this means to get rid of any elements of repressive social impositions and coercive 
strategies in his account of relational selfhood. Nevertheless, his interpretations still 
verify that the privatized self is devalued within his accounts of traditional Ruist cultural 
structures (C4S4.5). Given that it is not possible to valorize the person independent of 
his/er communal and social contexts in Tu’s closed system of relational selfhood, a 
PTRIC society can only be comprised of collectivist selves, instead of any freely 
interacting relational selves. As a consequence, his interpretations of PTRIC communities 
are unavoidably collectivist. 
                                                
4 As I was completing this thesis, I found a subtle statement made by Tu Weiming in a recent interview in 
the year of his retirement from Harvard University and his inauguration at Peking University. He (2010 in 
Hong, Gu 2010) surprisingly expressed, in ways that are opposite to his previous positions, that ‘Ruism is 
not my faith because faith does not allow doubting … If I encounter a more powerful knowledge and 
thought which is opposite to Ruist tradition, I would choose truth’. He rejected the misunderstanding about 
him to say that ‘[Tu Weiming] is a propagator and believer of Ruism who hopes to expand its influences’ 
(ibid.). He even stressed ‘Ruism is not the basis of advanced humanistic studies, but merely an alternative 
for facing a problem’ (ibid.). Does this suggest that Tu Weiming has greatly changed his thought, positions, 
and direction? Or is this dramatic change still another situation-oriented expression? We all need to wait 
and see what the answer to these questions actually will be. 
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Fourthly, as mentioned in C1S1.3, C1S1.4, and C1S2, the third form of Ruist 
tradition — popular culture — embodies the social and relational problems mentioned 
above. Tu does not recognize that this popular expression of PTRIC culture is 
participating in or related to any form of orthodox Ruist tradition. Nevertheless, in terms 
of the problems of the RFS, Tu’s own so-called orthodox post-traditional New Ruist 
relational selfhood does not display any significant conceptual differences or relational 
values distinct from those that appear in PTRIC relational selfhood. Therefore, in an 
ironic twist, Tu’s account actually verifies indirectly the link between traditional Ruist 
orthodoxy and popular PTRIC forms of relational selfhood. 
Due to all the above significant predicaments, the responsive Tu, along with some 
other contemporary Ruists, endeavours to defense for the healthy version of New Ruist 
relational selfhood which is built upon balanced relationships between the individual self 
and the group. Still, the most critical question they must answer is whether or not this 
version of New Ruist relational selfhood is possible to be formed without significant 
changes in any of the presuppositions anchoring it. Although I do not see this possibility 
through this research, this question deserves more advanced study by both Ruist and non-
Ruist scholars. 
To sum up, the discovery of Tu Weiming’s account answers the first primary 
subsidiary research question by indicating that his account of New Ruist relational 
selfhood generally is not a promising solution for the research problem related to the RFS 
shaped in PTRIC conceptions of relational selfhood. Although the responsive Tu’s 
attitude shows some potential to overcome the problem of the RFS, this can only occur if 
the presuppositions of his account are adjustable. From the analytical explanations5 
presented in C3, C4, C5, and C8, it has been shown that Tu’s general interpretive account 
                                                
5 Their summaries are illustrated in Chart 8.3, Diagrams 3.1 and 8.2. 
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of relational selfhood is based upon doing things by oneself (moral self-cultivation) 
within an authoritarian hierarchical society reinforced by a strong ideology requiring 
social conformity and enforced by means of feelings of shame. Therefore, it tends to lead 
to a repressive form of a socialized imposed relational self, moving along a path from the 
person to the personage, rather than the reverse. When the value of an individual human 
being depends so much on others’ subjective recognition for one’s own subjective moral 
cultivation, the problems of a repressive form of social imposition leading to the RFS are 
inescapable. This is especially the case when it is experienced within the asymmetrical 
hierarchical relationships found in PTRIC social structures. Accordingly, Tu’s account of 
relational selfhood is essentially the same as the account of PTRIC relational selfhood; 
he fails to prove that there is any significant distinction between his so-called orthodox 
Ruist account and the PTRIC account categorized as the small folk tradition. 
3. Discovery of Jürgen Moltmann’s Account as Moving from the Personage to the 
Person 
Given that post-enlightenment forms of Western European Christianity are recognized, 
or even criticized by some scholars, as being the source for Western individualism,6 
Jürgen Moltmann creatively enriches a social trinitarian anthropology drawing upon 
Eastern Orthodox Christian traditions. According to Moltmann’s interpretation 
(summarized in C7S8), one’s identity is not made secure by moral self-cultivation, 
namely the efforts, performance, and achievements of human beings, to earn worthiness 
of social relationships, but by gracious moral cultivation. That is to say, a real self for 
any person is realized by the works, grace, and promise of the triune God, through the 
embedded imago Dei, in the form of the imago Trinitatis. This is a divine work within 
                                                
6 Scholars usually tend to generalize and homogenize accounts about the actual pluralities existing within 
Christianity as well as in Western civilization, characterizing them as if all Christians and Westerners think 
and act in the same ways. From an empirical point of view, this is blatantly false. For example, as mentioned 
in C6F2, modern individualism is related to European post-Enlightenment forms of Christianity, and not to 
Christianity as a whole. 
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human beings, a messianic reconciling and redeeming imago Christi, leaving a hope for 
the transforming gloria Dei that is realized for future fellowship with God and others in 
Christ.  
Therefore, on the basis of these analytical explanations7 found in C3, C6, C7, and 
C8, Moltmann’s account of relational selfhood is grounded on being and becoming the 
imago Trinitatis, namely humans’ status as both existent and transformable beings as the 
imago Trinitatis. In other words, as demonstrated in C8S3.2.6, morality, holiness, and 
wisdom are the results of a renewed image and likeness of God granted to human beings 
in the New Creation, instead of pursuing but unattaining to them through a ceaseless 
activity of moral self-cultivation as promoted in Tu’s accounts of traditional and post-
traditional Ruist ethics.  
Consequently, the community in Moltmann’s account is an open community of 
grace framed within its relationship with the open Trinity according to the perichoresis-
oriented template from social trinitarian relationships. Such perichoresis-oriented 
relationships among human beings are created in the imago Trinitatis, ruined after the 
Fall, and restored through the imago Christi. Accordingly, this Christian vision of open 
community includes open relational selves, an orientation towards relational ontological 
equality among individuals, a dynamic balance between the unity of the community and 
the diversity of each individual with their different duties and roles in the functional social 
order of that community. That community is lived out with an eschatological goal 
expressed in an anticipatory present experience, as mentioned in C6. Such a community 
helps the personage to reveal the true person without the persistent need for negatively 
masking, by offering relational options that do not require a repressively socially-imposed 
idealised morality, and so is able to liberate the repressed form of the self. In other words, 
                                                
7 Their summaries are illustrated in Chart 8.3 and Diagrams 3.1 and 7.1. 
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Moltmann’s account forms a path to the person which is realized through the revealing 
personage, rather than moving from a form of relational personhood to an oppressed 
personage. 
Before taking this intellectual journey of discovery, the social trinitarian doctrine 
was totally strange to me. I accepted and learned the trinitarian doctrine, but it was 
expressed merely as a metaphysical conceptualization that seemed irrelevant to my daily 
Christian life. The discovery of Moltmann’s account of social trinitarian relational 
selfhood, encouraged and inspired by Damon So, not only gave me a new perspective of 
relating human life to the Divine Trinity, but also made it relevant to my research into 
relational selfhood and the dynamics of interpersonal relationships in daily Christian 
living. The concept of the perichoresis-oriented open community created a new way of 
seeing others and myself, cultivating a new sensitivity to respect and cherish other 
persons’ diversity and my own diversity. This has been an immense breakthrough for my 
inherent collectivist mindset. This does not mean, however, that I agree with every aspect 
of Moltmann’s theological position. For example, I find good biblical reasons not to agree 
with Moltmann’s interpretation of sin and his promotion of ‘Christian universalism’ 
(C7S2 and A-O). Still, by exploring the path moving towards the already-and-not-yet 
person reached by means of the revealing personage, I came to realize how it could 
provide an alternative solution for PTRIC persons suffering from a RFS.  
That an individual person is necessarily always embedded in his/er own communal 
relationships, and that some special synthesis of the best elements of both collectivism 
and individualism is to be pursued, form a universal hope among many scholars. These 
include Tu Weiming and Moltmann, both of whom argue that their accounts of relational 
selfhood can serve as such a synthesis (A-E, A-J, and C8S2.2). What this research is 
concerned about is what kind of synthesis can help in liberating the RFS prevalent in 
PTRIC societies. As mentioned in the previous chapters, mainly in C1 and C2 (and also 
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A-E and A-F), the problems of the RFS are closely related to problems of personal 
development; these naturally involve the dynamics of interpersonal relationships, linking 
them also to a variety of other social issues and problems. In this light, I have argued that 
Moltmann’s account has multiform significance for PTRIC selfhood. In other words, 
taking Moltmann’s account as a transformative model of relational selfhood that is able 
to overcome constraints leading to RFS can result in the following changes in any PTRIC 
social contexts. 
Distinctively from a Christian stand point, it offers an external transcendent 
reference point in addition to a relational foundation for affirming the absolute and 
objective value of the self. This serves well as a template for an open perichoresis-oriented 
community of selves shaped by gracious moral cultivation. 
Moltmann’s approach also provides a theoretical foundation for integrative 
psychotherapy, transformative psychology, and counselling, in order to liberate those 
individuals and their communities who are suffering from repressive social impositions 
(and so negatively masking). In this manner it offers a concrete alternative to cultural 
conditions where there is a loss of self and various forms of related addictions, mental 
illness, or even felt pressures tending towards despair and committing suicide. 
Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology nurtures a transforming perspective for 
personal development within familial and communal settings, especially in relation to 
growth in personality, creativity, moral thinking, assertiveness, self-affirmation, and self-
confidence. 
In addition, Moltmann’s promotion of open relationships based on the imago 
Trinitatis suggests ways to overcome coercive, hurting, broken, demanding, 
manipulating, and co-dependent interpersonal relationships. 
Furthermore, the humanity envisioned through the imago Trinitatis provides a way 
and framework for establishing an open community of mutual reciprocity, expressed by 
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means of diversity in unity and unity in diversity. It could shape a more healthily and 
securely relational culture for building up mutually supportive relationships between 
parents and children within renewed love and new forms of filial responsiveness. In this 
same manner, it could enliven suitable relationships between husbands and wives, 
teachers and students, and other relationships between superiors and inferiors in various 
social settings. 
The dynamics involved in Moltmann’s account of open relationships offer a 
transforming perspective for reconsidering the functional orders of families, 
communities, schools, businesses, and governments, that should lead to direct and 
effective communication, sincere and appropriately assertive expressions of self, as well 
as mutual respect and submission. 
Moltmann’s engaged theology suggests a perspective of openness for reconceiving 
accounts of ethnicity and nationality, extending even to embrace ecological concerns. The 
openness of the open Trinity to the world which God has created (1985b:173–4) so that 
He can unite ‘with [hu]mankind, and with the whole creation’ (Moltmann 1981:90) 
provides a completely distinct perspective for addressing ethnicity, nationality, and 
ecology. Most other perspectives find it hard to escape from being either atheistically 
anthropocentric or theistically patricentric. Even if Tu claims his New Ruism is 
anthropocosmic, it is in fact still essentially anthropocentric (as argued in C4S3.5). 
To sum up, this discovery of Moltmann’s account of a social trinitarian relational 
selfhood has answered the second primary subsidiary research question by indicating that 
his account provides an appropriate and better alternative account of relational selfhood. 
It can, therefore, serve as a promising solution for the research problem shaped in PTRIC 
conceptions of relational selfhood, because it opens up possibilities for liberating the RFS 
and replacing repressive social impositions with open relational options. 
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Related to all the above multifaceted possibilities of applying Moltmann’s account 
of relational selfhood in PTRIC contexts, two very challenging questions arise for those 
who would want to put them into practice. Firstly, can this theoretical version of Christian 
social trinitarian relational selfhood really work within PTRIC cultural contexts? What 
kind of concrete institutional and relational options would need to be created or developed 
in order to make this feasible? Secondly, might Moltmann’s insights still be selectively 
applied even without accepting all of the presuppositions anchoring them? For example, 
could it be combined with some aspects of the responsive Tu’s approach to relational 
selfhood as a possible alternative (C8S5.2) or could it be adopted by Ruified Chinese 
Christians (as explained in C1F3)? These questions deserve more advanced exploration 
by researchers, especially in contexts where practitioners are applying Moltmann's 
insights in specific kinds of PTRIC cultural contexts. 
4. Multiple Theoretical Alternatives for Liberating the Repressed Form of Self in 
PTRIC Contexts 
Effectively then, in C5, C7, and C8, analytical comparisons have revealed that, besides 
the similarities, the critical and decisive differences in those accounts leading to or 
preventing the problem of the RFS are related significantly to their different 
presuppositions. Therefore, the main finding of this research in answering the main 
research question is that the concept of relational selfhood nurtured within the social 
trinitarian anthropology of Jürgen Moltmann theoretically might lead to an inner 
transformation of character and virtue for PTRIC people, and would do so in ways that 
cannot be achieved easily by Tu Weiming’s account of New Ruist relational selfhood. 
However, according to the analysis presented in the previous chapters, although 
Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood offers a more constructive possibility for 
overcoming the research problem of the RFS than Tu Weiming’s New Ruist relational 
selfhood overall, nevertheless, Moltmann’s account was not originally designed for 
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solving that problem in PTRIC contexts. Since more and more Chinese Christians and 
non-Christians live in multi-cultural contexts, three possible alternative theoretical 
solutions have been considered in C8 for Chinese persons, especially for those who are 
suffering from the problem of the RFS:  
(1)  the responsive Tu’s account of new Ruist relational selfhood; 
(2)  a selective combination or synthesis of the resistant Tu’s account of new Ruist 
relational selfhood and Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood; 
(3)  Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood. 
As presented at the end of C8, each of these above three possible alternative 
solutions has its own strengths, weaknesses, and challenges to face, and so each 
alternative has its own applicability for differing needs of suffering Chinese persons. As 
for how they might work in concrete circumstances, further empirical research in the 
future would be needed to verify each alternative’s worthiness. At the very least, there 
would be two other alternatives to try out further if one alternative were to fail. This kind 
of indirect dialogue (see C3S2.6.2) — searching for common solutions for resolving the 
social and practical research problem rather than merely exchanging different ‘religious 
ideas’ — is worth exploring, and may reveal even more benefits stemming from focused 
interactions between contemporary Ruist and Christian traditions. 
5. Limitations of this Research and Future Research Possibilities 
This research project has its inherent limitations, and so here I will suggest some future 
research possibilities in six topical realms based upon the theoretical discussions and 
evaluative conclusions already reached here and in previous chapters. 
Due to focusing on the research problem of the RFS, the exploration and analytical 
comparison of Tu Weming’s New Ruist relational selfhood and Moltmann’s Christian 
social trinitarian relational selfhood are limited to the materials relevant to my explicit 
research problem. In this sense, it is not an exhaustive or comprehensive study of the 
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nature of selfhood within a larger range of more diversified teachings with the major 
streams of Ruist and Christian traditions. All of the arguments in this thesis are about 
Tu’s and Moltmann’s interpretations, even though the discussions of post-traditional 
Ruist and Christian social trinitarian conceptions of relational selfhood have not been 
limited to them. This research is a pioneering attempt to apply Tu’s New Ruist relational 
selfhood to the social scientific criticism of traditional and post-traditional Ruism in terms 
of the issue of the RFS among PTRIC persons. Similarly, this is the first time anyone has 
sought to apply Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood to both PTRIC contexts 
and the issue of the RFS. In addition, applying the method of an indirect dialogue to both 
Tu’s and Moltmann’s corpuses has been done here through an analytical comparison 
between their accounts of relational selfhood in searching for a solution/solutions for this 
fundamental problem among PTRIC persons. Based on this thesis, further research can 
both verify the results of this thesis and its suggestions for advanced studies and other 
dialogues, both direct and indirect, between PTRIC intellectuals and contemporary 
Christian scholars on these themes as well as on other related topics. 
The characterization and evaluation of the research problem have been based upon 
previously published theoretical and empirical studies. In contrast, this research is 
primarily a text-based theoretical study. Therefore, there are needs for further empirical 
(qualitative and quantitative) field research and case studies to explore, verify, modify, 
and/or rectify these conclusions I have argued for in the latter part of this thesis. The topic 
is of such importance that it merits professional input from psychological perspectives, 
especially involving social psychology and personality psychology, to establish practical 
and effective strategies for helping Chinese people. This new kind of research may help 
substantially in understanding more precisely and insightfully ways of overcoming the 
problems related to the RFS due to the impact of a repressively imposed understanding 
of relational selfhood in PTRIC cultural contexts. Furthermore, efforts at applying the 
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results of this theoretical research to the fields related to social behaviour would further 
call for research to be undertaken by scholars in other disciplines such as sociology, 
anthropology (especially in the realm of culturology), history, ethics, behavioural 
sciences (especially in the realm of organizational management and organizational 
behaviour), religious studies, communication studies, political science, economics, 
theology, and missiology. The primary and secondary sources in this thesis have 
manifested that scholars in the above disciplines are concerned about and interested in 
the issues related to this research problem and have already provided valuable academic 
contributions in this area. However, the current academic situation would benefit greatly 
from more interdisciplinary studies and indirect dialogues to improve practical solution(s) 
for liberating the RFS in PTRIC contexts as well as in other relevant cultural contexts. 
Although PTRIC societies are not the only ones influenced by traditional values 
related to Ruist teachings and their contemporary advocates, and the problem of the RFS 
might not even be found in its severest form in Chinese societies, this research is limited 
to those PTRIC cultural contexts. Further theoretical and empirical research needs to be 
done in relation to relevant dimensions in Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese cultural 
contexts across various periods of history because of the influence of various kinds of 
Ruist traditions within those cultural contexts over many centuries, including also the 
emergence of various Christian traditions within those cultural contexts, most notably in 
Korea.  
Although this research has limited its scope to explore issues of the RFS prevalent 
in Ru-influenced relational selfhood, it would be valuable to identify and explore the 
problems of RFSs and their related repressive social impositions as they occur in 
international and cross-cultural contexts, especially where Ruist traditions have not been 
operative, such as in various Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Daoist cultural contexts, or 
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under various forms of ideology, such as chauvinism, racism, postmodern contexts8 and 
feminist contexts (Bacon 2009). Strong social expectations do exist in various kinds of 
contemporary European and North American cultures as well. A strong work ethic, linked 
to selfish and competitive drives and social pressures to succeed within contemporary 
societies, may involve people from many quarters, including even Protestant pastors.  
This research has found that Moltmann’s social trinitarian relational selfhood can 
serve as a promising alternative solution for the RFS phenomenon related to conceptions 
of relational selfhood prevalent in contemporary Chinese popular culture (and also 
actually promoted generally by Tu Weiming’s account). However, in considering 
different needs of PTRIC persons in multifaith societies, two other possible alternative 
solutions have also been suggested here above and at the end of C8. Accordingly, these 
possible alternative solutions based on the discovery of Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s 
accounts of relational selfhood might be applied to those aforementioned contexts where 
problems of the RFS and a repressive social imposition of relational selfhood may also 
be found. This research can, therefore, also become a model for further studies in the 
above contexts where these problems may occur due to a relational understanding of 
selfhood that prevails in those settings. 
 Finally, the conclusions of this research reveal much about the actual conditions at 
large in PTRIC social settings. However, the influences of traditional and post-traditional 
Ruism vary among PTRIC persons in multifaith and pluralistic post-modern societies. 
There are definitely important sub-cultural differences manifested within its demographic 
                                                
8 Rebecca J. Erickson (1995:139) does not think there is an ‘unidimensional inner core to be trusted above 
all else’ in postmodern ideology. For ‘what is true’ for postmodern people is decided by ‘who you are 
talking to’ (ibid.). Accordingly, ‘the potency of relying on internal logic has been replaced by the power of 
presenting the right image’ (ibid.). Therefore, ‘being true to self for all time’ is no longer important (ibid., 
eo). What matters is ‘being true to self-in-context or true to self-in-relationship’ (ibid.). That is to say, ‘the 
importance of the particular self-values that are implicated in any two situational contexts or relationships 
may differ’ (ibid.). From this characterization of postmodern selfhood, we can find the similarities with 
selfhood in postmodern and PTRIC Ruism. However, insincerity or negatively masking is not an issue in 
postmodern contexts (Baudrillard 1983:5–13; Tseëlon 1992). See also Gergen (2000:139–70). 
373 
subgroups (as mentioned in C1S1.4 and disclosed by other empirical studies in my 
secondary sources). This is especially the case when studies consider differences in sex, 
geography, age, and education, because PTRIC cultural contexts are more or less 
structured in authoritarian ways according to hierarchy, age, and gender (C4S4.4.3). 
Further theoretical and empirical research is needed in each of these realms, in order to 
assess how far the issues raised in this thesis can be concretely addressed within these 
specific sub-groups. 
6. Details of this Research Project’s Original Contributions to Knowledge and New 
Insights 
This research makes original contributions to knowledge and/or offers new insights in a 
number of areas that I will now highlight in this final section. 
6.1 Neologisms and Conceptual Development 
Firstly, in order to solve the problem of generalization and ambiguity of the term Ruism 
used in most of the literature I investigated, the phrase post-traditional Ru-influenced 
Chinese (PTRIC), inspired by Pfister, is coined with the definition of its content. PTRIC 
specifies the cultural contexts of both the research problem and the Chinese societies 
within which Tu Weiming interacts (C1S1.4).  
Secondly, different degrees of problems related to repression or negatively masking 
of the real self and the problem of repressive social impositions as found in PTRIC 
cultural contexts are integrated into the research problem. The phrase the repressed form 
of self (RFS) is coined to denote this integrated research problem (C1S2.3 and A-F). 
Thirdly, the phrases repressive social impositions and the repressively imposed 
relational self are also coined to be designated as indicators of the problem of the RFS, 
since their phenomena are more easily grasped than the various descriptions presented in 
scholars’ discussion of the problem of self (C2S5). 
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Fourthly, in order to avoid any ambiguity in confusing contextual theological 
terminology in use currently with our own usage, two phrases have been coined to name 
and clarify two distinct aspects of contextual theology: theology-contextualizing and 
content-theologizing (C3S2.1). 
Fifthly, in order to describe certain aspects of Christian theology expressed in Ruist 
language for the purpose of theology-contextualizing in comparative contrast to the Ruist 
doctrine of moral self-cultivation, the phrase gracious moral cultivation has been coined 
(C6S8.5). 
6.2 Methodology 
Firstly, contextual theology is applied to deal with the problem of the RFS in PTRIC 
contexts, and to offer multiple theoretical alternative solutions for the research problem 
in response to different needs of suffering Chinese persons (C3S2.1). Through the 
theology-contextualizing approach, the differences within the concepts of moral 
cultivation as expressed in both major traditions in this thesis can be articulated, 
compared, and communicated more lucidly and effectively (C6S8.5). 
Secondly, when there is no common ground that can be agreed to advance effective 
interaction, the presuppositional analytical method is probably the best way to deepen the 
dialogue or debate between two parallel concepts, their positions and/or their varying 
evidential arguments. This situation is anticipated by this research and the 
presuppositional analytical method, originally used in Christian apologetics, has for the 
first time been applied to examine the alternative solution(s) for the research problem by 
means of a comparative analysis of Tu Weiming’s post-traditional New Ruism and 
Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropological relational ethics (C3S2.3). 
Thirdly, indirect dialogue is applied to search for a solution/solutions for the 
research problem of the RFS in PTRIC contexts between Tu Weiming’s New Ruist 
account and Moltmann’s Christian social trinitarian account of relational selfhood 
375 
(C3S2.6.2). As far as I know, this approach has not been previously employed in 
relationships to the worldviews and values promoted in the works of these two 
contemporary intellectuals. 
Fourthly, Tu Weiming’s New Ruist interpretation of relational selfhood is 
comprehensively studied and systematically constructed from most of his works. As a 
consequence, it has been questioned from numerous perspectives in terms of the problem 
of the RFS, especially as evaluated through its influences involving repressive social 
impositions (C4). This has rarely been addressed in any academic context, being either 
avoided or only mentioned briefly.  
Fifthly, this is also the first attempt to comprehensively analyse the interrelated 
assumptions informing Tu Weiming’s conception of a New Ruist selfhood, besides 
integrating and concluding them with the presuppositional analytical method as 
mentioned above (C4 and C5). 
Sixthly, this is also the first attempt to comprehensively analyse Moltmann’s 
conception of social trinitarian relational selfhood with the presuppositional analytical 
method (C6 and C7). 
6.3 Analytical Approaches 
Firstly, in order to avoid any analytical tendency towards over-generalizing Tu’s different 
attitudes into only one attitude, I have distinguished two prominent interpretive attitudes 
expressed by means of the phrases the responsive Tu and the resistant Tu. Inspired by and 
worked out with Pfister, these two phrases have been coined to differentiate and analyse 
what otherwise would be simply considered to be Tu Weiming’s inconsistent attitudes 
towards the research problem and related criticisms raised by scholars. However, it is not 
easy in some contexts to discern completely independent voices that reveal these two 
attitudes in Tu’s works. In particular, it is worth noting that these two different attitudes 
do not indicate that Tu has two well-organized and systematically different visions of his 
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interpretations of New Ruist relational selfhood, but intends to indicate the range of 
interlinking evaluations and claims found within his wavering interpretations of sangang, 
and sometimes wulun, in different texts and contexts (C5). 
Secondly, this is the first systematic effort at seeking to understand Tu Weiming’s 
claims in relationship to the phenomenon of the RFS and the social scientific criticisms 
of the RFS in PTRIC cultural contexts (C4, C5, and C8). 
Thirdly, the concepts of the two facets (private and social) of the self in two 
dimensions (present and future) with two possible transforming paths (from the 
personage to the person or the reverse) are for the first time integrated into examining the 
conceptualization of the transformation of selfhood (C3S2.5 and C8S3.2.6). 
6.4 Theoretical Innovation 
Firstly, this is a pioneering attempt to suggest multiple theoretical alternative solutions 
for liberating the repressed form of self in PTRIC contexts by means of integrating the 
discoveries found in Tu Weiming’s account and Moltmann’s account of relational 
selfhood (C8S5). 
Secondly, since this research is an attempt to deal with the social psychological 
problem of the RFS from a Christian theological approach, a comprehensive discussion 
of the problem of repressed behavioural custom of social masking offered by Tournier, 
but introduced by Pfister, has set out a suitable theoretical measurement reference to this 
research (A-E). Tournier’s psychological interpretations, especially in the concept of the 
‘person’ and the ‘personage’, are for the first time applied as an assessment tool for 
examining the nature of the transforming path of Tu Weiming’s New Ruist and 
Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropological interpretations of relational selfhood 
(C3S2.4, C8S4, and A-E). This has never before been done by anyone. 
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Thirdly, this is the first attempt to modify Francis L. K. Hsu’s (1971) 
‘psycho[-]sociogram of [the] human’ 9  and to apply it to the understanding and 
explanation of Tournier’s concepts of the person and the personage, the tendency of 
negatively masking, and the path to the person in PTRIC contexts (A-G). 
6.5 Explicit Cross-Cultural and Interdisciplinary Pioneering Explorations 
Firstly, this is a pioneering study applying Moltmann’s social trinitarian anthropology to 
the problem of the RFS and to PTRIC cultural contexts (C6 to C8). 
Secondly, this is the first dialogue, either direct or indirect, and comparative study 
between Tu Weiming’s New Ruist form and Moltmann’s social trinitarian vision of 
relational selfhood (C8). This has previously never been done by theologians or Ruist 
scholars. 
Thirdly, in order to analytically compare Tu Weiming’s and Moltmann’s responses 
towards the problem of RFS in the light of contemporary social scientific criticisms, the 
cross-cultural and interdisciplinary understandings of the concept of a real self as an 
authentic expression of individual autonomy in light of the problem of the RFS are for 
the first time integrated into this project (C2S1.2 and A-D and A-H). 
  
                                                
9 The term psycho-sociogram is ‘an expansion of the term psychogram among psychologists’ to include a 








A Brief Introduction to the Historical Development after the Formation of Ruism 
 
Ruism was formed as a system during the period of the Warring States (481-221 B.C.). 
Mou Tsungsan 牟宗三 (p. Móu Zōngsān) (1909-95) (1949 in 2003a:1–16) names this 
period as the first developmental epoch of Ruism, in reacting to the collapse of the ‘lǐ yuè 
wénhuà’ 禮樂文化 (the ritual and music culture) of the Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BCE).1 
There is no consensus among contemporary scholars on the existence, development, and 
evolution of Ruism over its more than 2,500 years in Chinese history. However, it is 
generally recognized that there were two major revivals after the first developmental 
epoch of Ruism. In the first developmental epoch, Ruism was systematized in the pre-
Qin period and developing in the Han-Jin period (206 BCE-420 CE) (Yao, Xinzhong 
2013:8–9) after Ruist scholars won the trust of the rulers during the Former Han (or 
Western Han dynasty (206 BCE – 9 CE). However, Ruism receded into the background 
and its prestigious position was replaced by Buddhism after the Han dynasty fell (220 
CE) and the rise of the Tang dynasty which favoured Buddhism. A revival of various 
strands of Ruist philosophy and political culture began in the middle of the nineth century 
and reached new levels of intellectual and social creativity in the eleventh century in the 
Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127) (Overmyer 1986:48–51). 2  This first revival is 
commonly called ‘Neo-Confucianism’, or Neo-Ruism (Berthrong 2005b:993). Mou 
                                                
1 See also Lǐ Ruìquán 李瑞全 (1997) and Hwang Kwangkuo 黃光國 (p. Huáng Guāngguó) (2006:292). 
2 See also Yao Xinzhong (2013:8–9). 
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Tsungsan (1949 in 2003a:1–16) names this period the second developmental epoch of 
Ruism, in facing the challenge of Buddhism from India (Hwang, Kwangkuo 2006:292).3  
Ruism came to dominate China and other East Asian countries over hundreds of 
years (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:1) since the Wu Emperor (157-87 BCE) of the Western Han 
Dynasty established Ruism as the state ideology and dismissed the Hundred Schools (Xie, 
Wenyu 2011:18). 4  Ruism has existed for more than two millennia, ‘as a cultural 
determining force’, educating the whole nation, dominating Chinese culture and thinking, 
and cultivating the Chinese civilization (Cheng, Stephen K. K. 1990:510). Unsurpassed 
by any ideology or religion, it has also been more and more ‘revived … as an ideological 
antidote’ to fight against Westernization in East Asia (‘the Pan-Confucian region’) (ibid.). 
However, to maintain its dominant role, Ruist learning and teaching ‘changed constantly’ 
to fulfil the Empire’s requirement and so survive the challenges from other various 
schools of learning, especially the imported Buddhist’ and ‘[Anglo-European] Western 
learning’ (‘xīxué’ ｢西學｣) (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:4). Consequently, some of the teachings 
in the ancient texts might have been selectively ignored, for example, ‘the employment 
of remonstrance’ (‘jiànzhèng’ ｢諫諍｣) (Pfister 2013a:3),5 reciprocal submission in son-
father and wife-husband relationships (Wáng, Jué 王珏 2014:140), or ‘the advocacy of 
family-based vengeance’ (Pfister 2011:1).6 Others were selectively emphasized (even 
over-emphasized), for example, filial piety (Evasdottir 2005:31–8), ‘legalism’ (Keating 
2004:website), and ‘absolute submission’ (Fu, Zhengyuan 1993:53). 7  Therefore, Fu 
                                                
3 See also Lǐ Ruìquán 李瑞全 (1997). 
4 See also Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:510) and Shizuka (2010). 
5 See also Hwang Kwangkuo (2002:157–8) and Pfister (2013c:11–23).  
6 See also Pfister (2013c:4–11). 
7 Other similar terms used are ‘total submission’ (Levenson 1964:67), ‘unquestioned obedience’ (Tu, 
Weiming 1985:115), and ‘absolute obedience’ (Moskowitz 2007:168). See also David Yaufai Ho 
(1994:350–51, 361), Zhang Hsiaoyang (1996:37), Tu Weiming (1998a:13), Slote (1998:46), Keating 
(2004:website), Hershock and Ames (2006:68, 71), Wang Jue (2014:140), and Watson (n.d.:website).  
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Zhengyuan indicates that it is not easy to ‘disentangle’ the authentic teachings of Ru from 
the ‘misinterpreted and distorted’ ones (ibid., eo).8 There is no consensus among Ruists 
for a standard interpretation version for Ruism. 
In the twentieth century, the second revival movement based on Neo-Ruism arose 
known as New Ruism, Contemporary New Ruism (Berthrong 2005a:995), or Modern 
New Ruism (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:8, 10f.). This third developmental epoch of Ruism 
(Mou, Tsungsan 1949 in 2003a:1–16) is engaged in dialogue with Anglo-European 
Western philosophy in order to respond appropriately to the challenge of an aggressive 
and dominating Anglo-European Western culture (Hwang, Kwangkuo 2006:293).9 
 
                                                
8 See also Arcodia (2003). 
9 See also Lǐ Ruìquán 李瑞全 (1997). To re-establish a Ruist value system under modern conditions and to 
strive for the modernization of Chinese culture and society through communication with and integration of 
western learning and knowledge are key features which differentiate New Ruism from other Ruist schools 




Evidence from Japanese Society:  
Ru-affected Culture and the Problem of Negative Masking 
 
There is a similar problem of selfhood, even worse among men, amongst the post-
traditional Japanese who are also deeply rooted in traditional Ruism. The Japanese are 
another people group in the context of even stronger Ru-based collectivist ideology 
(Morishima 1984:198), hierarchical social structure (ibid.:7), and performance-
orientation (ibid.:183). 1  It is notable that there are still some differences between 
traditional Ruist influences on post-traditional Japanese and Chinese.2 Therefore, the 
studies on the same issue among the post-traditional Japanese are helpful in verifying the 
correlation of Ru-based collectivism and the problem of negative masking.  
Chris Payne (2003:13–15) summarizes that the strong hierarchical society and 
relationships in modern Japan are connected with Confucius’ teaching of obligatory 
submission to elders and superiors. ‘Pleasure, comfort, and acceptance’ are yielded in this 
cultural foundation of hierarchically social relationships among the post-traditional 
Japanese, which are strongly dependence-based and ‘group-based’ relationships. The 
post-traditional Japanese self is concurred by many scholars as being socially ‘embedded’ 
or ‘defined’ (Lebra 1994:107), or precisely the post-traditional Japanese self is a 
‘consciously socialized self’ (ibid.). William Nester (1995:327) explains further that 
‘amae’ (dependence) is the ‘lubricant’ for a social community in which ‘hierarchy, 
                                                
1 See also Nakamura (1964:407–530), Francis L. K. Hsu (1971:37–40), de Vos (1985), Alan Roland (1989), 
and Barnlund (1989:38–40). 
2 According to research by Tu Weiming (2009 in Tu, Weiming and Yi, Junqing 2009:11), South Koreans 
are influenced most by traditional Ruism among the post-traditional East Asian peoples. Japanese is the 
second and Chinese the third. Among Chinese people groups, the ones in Hong Kong are influenced most 
by traditional Ruism, the second in Taipei and the third in Shanghai. However, it seems that there are very 
few selfhood-related studies on South Koreans or at least not published in English (Levi 2013). 
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inequality, and conformity’, instead of ‘equality, liberty, and individuality’, are viewed 
as  just and natural.3 De Vos (1993:135) also points out that in a culture where ‘role 
harmony’ dominates ideally and strongly, ‘equalizing relationships’ is never an aim 
except in the friendship of the same age group.4 
A Japanese psychiatrist, Takeo Doi (1920-2009) (1981:132–3), identifies the 
similar phenomenon of ‘have[ing] no self’ among post-traditional Japanese,5 that had 
been pointed out earlier by George Matheson (1842-1906) and Hiromichi Kozaki (1856-
1938) according to Ballhatchet (1988:359–64). Doi indicates that the sacrifice of the 
‘small self’ for the sake of the ‘larger self’ is still an extolled virtue in modern Japan 
(ibid.:135, eo). Not only the importance of Japanese tradition affixed to the group instead 
of the individual, but also humans cannot even survive without the group. Consequently, 
for the individual, it is easier to ‘act in concert with the group’ (ibid.:135). ‘Self-sacrifice’ 
for one’s superior, one’s family, one’s company, and one’s society and country is a 
prevalent ideology in post-traditional Japanese society (Morishima 1984:91, 117). Doi 
(1986:55–57) calls this trait ‘Japanese group-ism’. A psychologist, Alan Goldman 
(1994:7), concludes that post-traditional Ru-grounded Japanese behave extremely 
‘conciliatory, group-oriented and non-confrontational’ and are always strategically 
concerned with saving face. To sum up and infer from the observation of the above 
scholars, it is understandable that ‘indirect communication’ (Goldman 1994:9) becomes 
a prevalent communicative way among post-traditional Japanese in order to be non-
confrontational and save others’ and one’s own face when conflicts arise.6 Such indirect 
communication might be a sign of the tendency of the RFS. Post-traditional Japanese men 
                                                
3 See also Ballhatchet (1988:364) and Kasulis (1994:85). 
4 See also de Vos (1985:156–69). 
5 See also Doi (1986). 
6 See also Fuki (2002). 
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in the Ru-affected relational society are trained to seek to demonstrate strength and 
domination in their outer appearance and performance and thus pretend externally to 
perform as expected because they are not so internally. In other words, even if post-
traditional Japanese society is traditionally a male-dominant patriarchal society (Payne 
2003:18) and the man is expected to be a stronger figure than a woman (Doi 1981:155), 
the reality is totally reversed. Juzo Itami (1933-97) (1999, cited in Payne 2003:18) states 
from his observation, ‘[post-traditional] Japanese men have always been weak … [post-
traditional] Japanese culture is not one in which men are strong’. Their inner feelings and 
responses are in fact too weak to take action and responsibility, especially in dealing with 
relationships and their emotions. I infer that post-traditional Chinese men and post-
traditional Korean men are the same.7  
In spite of the tendency of reductionism and generalization, the problem of the RFS 
pointed out by Doi is never groundless and invalidated. Doi (1981:140), through 
comparison between the post-traditional Anglo-European Westerners and the post-
traditional Japanese,8 concludes that ‘the absence of a self’ is valued as a virtue in post-
traditional Japanese culture but not in the post-traditional Anglo-European Western 
countries. He finds that ‘the awareness of having a self’ is more difficult for the post-
traditional Japanese than the post-traditional Anglo-European Westerner and attributes 
the cause of their difference to something in the Anglo-European West that is able to 
‘transcend the group’ (ibid.,eo). At the same time of transcending the group, it also gives 
a strong ‘sense of belonging’ to the individual (ibid.:140). I infer that what is able to 
transcend the group Doi mentioned in this context is the ‘God’ in the Anglo-European 
                                                
7 Post-traditional Korea is the most Ru-based East Asian country and there are also similar strong traditional 
Ruist characteristics in post-traditional Korea as in post-traditional Japan and in post-traditional Chinese 
societies (Jones and Il Sakong 1980). However, I have not yet found any study and discussion about the 
issues of the repressed form of self in the post-traditional Korean context in English sources. 
8 See also Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990). 
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Western Christian sense that he discussed in the context of ‘the fatherless society’ in 
modern Japan (ibid.:156). But why is the absence of a self not considered a virtue in the 
modern Anglo-European West? And from where do the different value and culture 
systems come in modern Japan and in the Anglo-European West? Doi did not pursue this 
question further. However, Doi discusses thereafter ‘the fatherless society’ issue and 
suggests it as the complication of ‘the lack of self’ (ibid.:150–57). 
Doi finds that the problem of the ‘generation gap’ in modern Japan nowadays is 
actually the gap between the children or younger generation and their fathers (ibid.:150, 
eo). This gap results from the fathers’ failure to provide their ‘true feelings’ on ‘a set of 
values’ based on which children can live (ibid.:152). The main reason is that the fathers’ 
‘loss of self-confidence’ and their influence on their children has weakened even to 
nothing (ibid.). In Ruth Benedict’s (1989:300f.) language, post-traditional Japanese 
fathers are characterized as ‘depersonalized objects’ as supported by the evidence of Dean 
C. Barnlund’s (1975:85–7) empirical research. What is another paradoxical phenomenon, 
pointed out by Doi, is that ‘there is nothing to convey a true sense of authority although 
power nowadays has become increasingly concentrated and extremely potent’ (ibid.:152). 
Doi calls it ‘a society without a father’ although he admits the impossibility of a ‘totally 
fatherless society’ (ibid.:152, 155, eo).9 It has been noted that what Doi means by without 
a father or fatherless is not the non-existence of a father but a child without a sincere, 
intimate, and transparent relationship with his/her father. 
Doi argues that the phenomenon of a fatherless society can be understood as the 
anger of children at ‘paternal weakness’ for appealing to ‘a stronger father’ and draws 
this theory to explain ‘revolution’ as ‘a psychological slaying of the father’ (ibid.:155). 
Paradoxically, it seldom ends up without creating and worshiping another stronger father-
                                                
9 To the best of Doi’s (1981:152, eo) knowledge, the phrase fatherless society was first expressed by Paul 
Federn, ‘On the Psychology of Revolution: The Fatherless Society, published in 1919’. 
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like figure, such as Vladimir ‘Lenin’, Fidel Castro, Kim Il-sung, ‘Ho Chi-Minh’ (ibid.). 
He even states that ‘Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s appeal to youth all over the world may be 
a reflection of this state of mind’ (ibid.). Although this statement sounds too exaggerated, 
Doi pinpoints the psychological need of a father who can assume his responsibility. 
Hiroshi Wagatsuma’s psychological research (1977:204–205) supports Doi’s observation 
on the causality between the RFS and the fatherlessness and also attributes traditional and 
post-traditional Ruism as an important factor resulting in them. Nevertheless, Peter 
Bankart and Brenda Bankart (1985:689) feel that Wagatsuma’s conclusion on the 
fatherlessness of ‘the once [traditional] Confucian Japanese family’ is probably ‘too 
strong’. Michael Dziesinski’s further study (2004:2) indicates the ‘hikikomori’ (‘acute 
social withdrawal syndrome’) prevalent among the post-traditional Japanese younger 
generation is to some extent the effect of fatherlessness. I find that all of these studies 
disclose the vicious cycle in the post-traditional Ruified Japanese society: the father’s 
RFS results in the fatherless younger generation and the fatherless younger generation’s 
social withdrawal results in the RFS. 
Doi (1981:132–41) also suggests that the issue of ‘fatherlessness’ should be dealt 
with ‘the question of the absence of God’ because the absence of God has been 
progressively taken for granted ever since ‘God is dead’ was stated by Nietzsche (quoted 
in ibid.:156). Post-traditional Japanese men as one of the most urbane peoples in the world 
had committed one of the most brutal holocausts in human history in China, the Nanjing 
Holocaust, and other atrocities during World War II. Is this inhuman behaviour related to 
their problem of loss of self and fatherlessness? Doi does not analyse this sensitive issue. 
However, Charles Bellinger (2010:81) argues that ‘the deepest root of violence is the 
self’s refusal to grow spiritually’. Dziesinski (2004:2) also indicates, by quoting from The 
Atlantic Online, that ‘violence’ is a result of hikikomori, which resulted from 
fatherlessness as aforementioned. This correlation between ‘violence’ and hikikomor, 
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verified by psychiatric experts, aroused the ‘Japanese government’ to take steps to deal 
with the hikikomor problem (ibid.:7). The researches by Doi, Bellinger and Dziesinski 
provide initiatives to investigate further the correlation between the problem of loss of 
self (the RFS) and fatherlessness and also their correlation with violence, other anti-social 





The Definition, Attributes and Types of Collectivism and Individualism 
 
Many scholars tend to generalize individualism as Western and collectivism as Eastern 
and do not specify which kind of collectivism and individualism they are talking about. 
However, Western or Eastern forms of behaviour are not uniform in terms of collectivism 
or individualism and the reasons shaping any variety of collectivism or individualism 
might not be the same. Accordingly, most discussions on collectivism and individualism 
seem to fall into generalization or even reductionism, especially in terms of certain local 
‘cultural patterns’ (Yum, June Ock 1988:375). However, there is no general consensus 
about the scope of individualistic and collectivistic (or holistic)1 explanations and the 
usage and definition of their many key terms (Zahle and Collin 2014a:6, 11). The 
definition and types of collectivism and individualism are introduced briefly here for 
reference. 
1. The Definition and Attributes of Collectivism and Individualism 
At psychological levels, collectivism is more ‘allocentric’ and individualism more 
‘idiocentric’ 2  or in Markus and Kitayama’s language (1991b), ‘interdependent’ 3  vs. 
‘independent’ and in Sampson’s language (1988), ‘ensembled’ vs. ‘self-contained’. 
Personal interests, needs, and goals have priority over collective ones in individualism;4 
                                                
1 It is notable that ‘holism’ is another term denoting ‘collectivism’ (Zahle and Collin 2014a:6, 11).  
2 Triandis et al. (1985). See also Triandis et al. (1988:336). Since collectivism and individualism are cultural 
terms and allocentric and idiocentric psychological terms, there are allocentric persons in an individualistic 
culture and also idiocentric persons in a collectivistic culture (ibid.:324). 
3 As explained in C1F61, interdependent might mean co-dependent in some context when it denotes an 
unhealthy interpersonal relationship. 
4 Hui C. Harry and Triandis (1986:229–32, 244–5) list seven aspects for such interests, needs, and goals: 
(1) ‘one's consideration of the effects of own decision on others’; (2) ‘sharing of material resources’; (3) 
‘sharing of less tangible resources (as in sacrificing some interesting activities)’; (4) ‘willingness to adopt 
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in collectivism, either personal and collective interests needs, and goals are the same, or 
personal interests needs, and goals are subordinated to collective ones if there is a 
distinction between them (Triandis, Bontempo, et al. 1988).5 Accordingly, the sense of 
pursuing harmonious and interdependent interpersonal relationships and concern for 
others is much stronger in collectivism than in individualism.6 Individualism tends to 
have high ‘power distance’7 compared to collectivism (Triandis 1989:509). In terms of 
the in-group, collectivism tends to subordinate personal goals to the collective that is 
usually a steady ‘in[-]group (e.g., family, band, [or] tribe)’ and much of personal 
behaviour might aim at the consistent goals with the ones of this in-group. The individual 
tends to have a stable relationship with the in-group, even being highly costly demanded 
by the in-group. But individualism tends to have numerous ‘in[-]groups (e.g., family, 
co[-]workers, clubs, and motorcycle gangs)’ and much of personal behaviour might aim 
at the consistent goals with various in-groups. The individual tends to leave the in-groups 
which are too ‘demanding’ (Triandis, Bontempo, et al. 1988:324).8 
In comparison, their in-groups, in the eyes of the people in collectivistic cultures, 
are much more homogeneous than their out-groups. But the people in individualistic 
cultures see their in-groups as more ‘heterogeneous’ than their out-groups (Triandis et al. 
1990:1018, 1020). This evidence might manifest that the collectivistic people used to 
think more of ‘groups’ but the individualistic ones more of ‘individuals’ (ibid.:1018, eo). 
Therefore, thinking more of individuals yields the effect of paying more attention to 
                                                
others’ opinions’; (5) ‘worry about self-presentation and loss of face’; (6) belief in correspondence of 
outcomes with others’; (7) ‘the feeling of involvement and contribution in others’ lives’.  
5 See also Triandis (1989:509). 
6 C. Harry Hui and Triandis (1986:244–5). 
7 Power distance denotes the ‘difference between those with power and those without power’ (Triandis 
1989:509). 
8 See also LeFebvre and Franke (2013). 
390 
 
‘heterogeneity’ (ibid.:1018). Thinking more of groups yields the effect of paying more 
attention to homogeneity and eliminating ‘individual differences’ (ibid.).  
It is worth noting that individualism might be misused or misunderstood as the 
synonym of egoism or egocentrism.9 However, they do not mean the same thing (Hayek 
1944:14).10 Accordingly, it is necessary to clarify the true meaning of the relationship 
between individuals and the group in individualism. Hall and Ames (1998:25) point out 
that the equality in Anglo-European Western individualism emphasizes the equality of all 
individuals in front of ‘the law, loci of human rights, and … equal opportunities’ and each 
of them is one member of ‘God’s children’, especially in the group made up by them. Fei 
Xiaotong (1992:67), a Chinese anthropologist, indicates that individualism pursues the 
‘balance’ between individuals and their whole group. Accordingly, individualism yields 
two fruits (ibid.):  
(1) equality: an individual is not allowed to ‘encroach on’ the others;  
(2) constitutionality: the whole group is not allowed to negate the rights of any 
individual except ‘the partial rights’ handed over by them willingly.  
Finally, the attributes of collectivism and individualism can be compared and 
manifested in Chart C.111 although not every item is explained here. It is notable that 
individualism is often viewed as the opposite to collectivism. However, its opposite 
extreme should be totalitarianism, which is also the extremity of collectivism (Hayek 
1944:60). I argue that there might accordingly exist a spectrum of different levels of social 
                                                
9 Tu Weiming (2010 in Tu, Weiming and Fan, Ceng 2010b:20, 23, 103f.). 
10 See also Cheng Chungying and Leung Insing (2004:8). 
11 This chart is the summary and integration of the results of ‘the measurement of the individualism-
collectivism dimension’ (Triandis et al. 1985:397–8) by asking 49 anthropologists and psychologists all 
over the world and ‘multimethod probes of individualism and collectivism’ (Triandis et al. 1990:1006, 
1020) by surveying over 1,000 (social) psychology students and teachers from a variety of cultural 
backgrounds. For more detailed comparative differences between individualism and collectivism, 
especially from the cross-cultural psychological perspective, see Gorodnichenko and Roland (2012). They 
provide a very comprehensive analysis from their survey and summarize it into two valuable charts. 
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behaviour ranging from extreme individualism through different levels of mixed 
individualism and collectivism to totalitarianism. Therefore, collectivism and 
individualism are not necessarily two opposite and mutually exclusive extremities. They 
can be ‘two independent factors’ (Triandis et al. 1986:260).12 
 
Collectivism Individualism 
In[-]group Regulation of Social Behaviour Individual Regulation of Social Behaviour 
More Dissociative and Superordinate Behaviour 
towards Out[-]group 
Less Dissociative and Superordinate Behaviour 
towards Out[-]group 
Much Emphasis on Hierarchy. Less Emphasis on Hierarchy 
Interdependence Self-Sufficiency 
Subordination of Personal Goals to Goals of 
In[-]group 
In[-]group and Personal Goals Are Unrelated 
In[-]group Harmony and Intimacy Is Important and 
Strong in[-]group/out[-]group distinctions 
Confrontation Within In[-]group May Be Good: 
Loneliness 
In[-]group Is Seen as Homogeneous In[-]group Is Seen as Heterogeneous 
Socialization for Obedience and Duty; Sacrifice for 
In[-]group; Focus on Common Elements with 
In[-]group 
Socialization for Self-reliance and Independence; 
Good skills in entering new groups 
Shame Control Guilt Control 
Sense of Common Welfare and Fate with 
In[-]group 
Personal Goals and Fate 
In[-]group Is Centre of Psychological Field Person Is Centre of Psychological Field 
In[-]group Is Extension of the Self Self Is Distinct from In[-]group 
 
Chart C.1 The Attributes of Collectivism and Individualism (Quoted from Triandis et al. 1985:397–8; 
Triandis et al. 1990:1006, 1020) 
 
2. The Types of Collectivism and Individualism 
As disclosed in C1, Hui C. Harry and Triandis (1986:240) distinguish two main types of 
collectivism according to their range: 1. ‘a certain subset of people’; 2. ‘the entire universe 
of human beings’ (Triandis, Bontempo, et al. 1988:333). Chao C. Chen et al. (1997:48) 
name the former ‘horizontal collectivism’ and the latter ‘vertical collectivism’. Theodore 
                                                
12 See also Bhawuk and Brislin (1992:418) and Ames (2006:513–18). It has been noted that, in the past, 
there is always a debate about the concept of individualism and collectivism: they are ‘separate constructs’ 
or ‘different ends of a single bipolar continuum’ (O’Neill et al. 2015). However, this issue is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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M. Singelis et al. (1995:240) emphasized that horizontal collectivism stresses ‘equality’ 
but ‘inequality’ is accepted in vertical collectivism when they originally presented these 
two dimensions of collectivism. June Ock Yum (1988:375) argues that the Ru-based 
collectivism in East Asia is less the former but more the latter, which is ‘a [familistic] 
collectivism only among those bound by social networks’, especially family or kinship in 
Chinese contexts,13 instead of ‘any abstract concern for a general collective body’.  
Liang Shuming (1949 reprinted in 2005:71) draws a diagram illustrating this kind 
of a post-traditional Chinese Ru-based familistic collectivism14 in contrast to what he 
refers to as ‘the Western’ one as shown in Diagram C.1.  
 
Illustration (Liang, Shuming 1949 reprinted in 2005:71): 
1. The size of the fonts indicates the importance of elements (group, family and individual) 
2. The solid lines back and forth with an arrow indicate their direct mutual relationship. 
3. The dotted lines indicate their ambiguous relationships.15 
 
Diagram C.1 Post-Traditional Chinese Ru-Based Familistic Collectivism Illustrated by Liang 
Shuming (1949 reprinted in 2005:71)  
 
                                                
13 Edward Yuitim Wong (2001:5). 
14 See also Li Shuqing (1941a; 1944:102–116), la Barre (1946a:226–32), Solomon (1971:35–8), Kahn 
(1979:121), Metzger (1981:7), David Y. H. Wu and Tseng Wenshing (1985:7–8), Ambrose Y. C. King and 
Bond (1985:29–30), Hsu Jing (1985:99–100), Yáng Màochūn 楊懋春 (1989), Kuo Chienlin and Kavanagh 
(1994:554–6), Xia Guang (1997:119–50), Yeh Minghua and Yang Kuoshu (1997), Fan Ruiping (2010:xii), 
and Shi Yuanyuan (2013:352). 
15 In other words, an ambiguous relation here means that there is no clear boundary. See also Yang 
Zhongfang (1991b:122–3), Stipek (1998:620), and Ames (2006:520). 
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Therefore, according to Liang Shuming’s analysis, this post-traditional familistic 
from of Ruism promotes a system where the priority is placed on the family, then the self, 
and only subsequently the society or the nation. Only if the family, society, or nation is 
threatened by a common enemy, then the society or the nation might temporarily become 
the primary group. In that kind of situation, the hierarchy of value priorities might place 
the society or nation first, then the family, followed by the self.  
This can also explain why Fei Xiaotong (1992:67) criticizes the Ruist collectivist 
selfhood as another type of ‘egocentrism’ in the Chinese collectivist context because the 
primary group or in-group and its harmony is always prioritized over both the individual 
and the secondary group or out-group.16 The above observation is also agreed by other 
scholars’ observations (discussed in C4) and verified by some empirical research among 
Chinese intellectuals.17 
There are different classifications of individualism. One is to classify it into two 
types according to the development of human society: ‘proto-individualism’ vs. ‘neo-
individualism’ (Triandis, Bontempo, et al. 1988:324–9, eo). In proto-individualism, ‘the 
individual is closely related to very few others’ and thus can act independently of others 
quite freely (ibid.:324). This kind of individualism still exists in ‘extremely simple 
societies’ (e.g., in the undeveloped regions, ‘the Arctic, deserts, jungles’) (ibid.:324, 329). 
But in ‘extremely complex cultures (e.g., modern industrial cultures)’, the individualism 
adapts to be both independent from in-groups and distant emotionally from in-groups 
although the amount of in-groups the individual can be related to is far more exceeding 
than in collectivistic societies (ibid.:324). This is so-called neo-individualism. Its 
                                                
16 See also Michael H. Bond et al. (1982a), Leung Kwok and Michael H. Bond (1984), Leung Kwok and 
Iwawaki (1988), and Ambrose Y. C. King (1994:101–106). 
17 Xiè Yào 謝曜 (2005) and Lǐ Chāngjùn 李昌俊 (2010:23–7). 
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characteristics are that one can do ‘one’s own thing and get away with it’ and one is hardly 
influenced by any problem of one’s in-group (ibid., eo).  
Edward E. Sampson (1988:15f.) classifies individualism into two types in his study 
on the indigenous psychology of American individualism: ‘self-contained 
individualism’18 vs. ‘ensembled individualism’. According to the nature of ‘the self-other 
boundary, the understanding of control … and the conceptualization of persons’, the 
characteristics of these two types of individualism are shown in Chart C.2. Sampson coins 
‘field control’ in contrast to ‘personal control’ (ibid.:16f., eo). In an individualistic culture 
of high personal control, the individual tends to be governed not internally but externally 
and be suspicious about and even antipathetic towards social institutions (ibid.:16).19 
However, in an individualistic culture of high field control, the ‘power and control in a 
field of forces … includes but goes well beyond’ the individual (ibid.).  
 
 Self-Contained Individualism Ensembled Individualism 
S e l f - O t h e r  B o u n d a r y Firm Fluid 
Control Personal Field 
C o n c e p t i o n  o f  P e r s o n s Excluding Including 
 
Chart C.2 Two Types of Individualism Classified by Edward E. Sampson (1988:16) 
 
From the characteristics of Sampson’s two types of individualism informed by 
Chart C.2, both types of the former classification of individualism belong to self-
contained individualism. It has been noted that the term ensemble is originally used by 
Marx (1845:14) to reject individualism in order to argue for socialism. Therefore, 
                                                
18 Sampson (1977:770) defines the self-contained person as ‘one who does not require or desire others for 
his or her completion or life; self-contained persons either are or hope to be entire unto themselves’. 
19 See also Hogan (1975:530). 
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Sampson’s classification of individualism supports the aforementioned reminder that 
collectivism and individualism can be two independent distinct categories but they are 
not necessarily two mutually exclusive extremes at the opposite ends of a continuum 
(Triandis et al. 1986:260). 
3. The Differentiation of the Construals of the Self in Collectivism and in 
Individualism 
In discussing the issue of the self, the terms collectivism and individualism tend to be 
either too generalized or misleading as mentioned above and in the thesis. The tendency 
of reductionism is because there is more than one type of both collectivism and 
individualism respectively;20 the tendency to mislead is because individualism is easily 
mistaken for egoism or self-contained individualism. Psychologists have started to use 
more specific terms to denote and differentiate the features of the selves in collectivistic 
and individualistic cultural contexts: the interdependent self and the independent self21 
(Markus and Kitayama 1991a).22 The most significant distinction between these two 
construals of the self is ‘in the functional role of other individuals in self-definition’. Other 
individuals and the social context are essential for both selves. However, ‘others are 
directly involved in the self-definition’ of the unhealthy interdependent self but not of the 
independent self. For it is relationships with others in specific social contexts that are ‘the 
defining features’ of the former self (Markus and Kitayama 1991a:40). The self-defining 
construal of the self distinguishes the features of the selves in collectivism and in 
individualism. However, non-psychologist scholars have not yet adopted this construal 
of the self in their discussions.  
                                                
20 Edward Yuitim Wong (2001:8f.). 
21 There are the other pairs of terms for differentiating these two distinctive selves adopted by psychologists: 
‘the looking glass self’ versus ‘the organismic self’ or ‘the social-psychological me versus ‘the organismic 
I’ (Ryan 1991:227–31). 





Appendix D  
Clarification of Terminology:  
Different Perspectives on the Meaning of the Real or True Self 
 
The RFS or negative masking in its repressed form is a psychological, ethical, relational 
issue influenced by theology, religion, or worldview. Zhai Xuewei (2010:190) points out 
that the studies of mask were ignored in the realm of psychology but have received 
attention from social psychologists.1 Since the term real self or true self denotes different 
meanings in different academic contexts, it is necessary to introduce briefly at least four 
categories of different approaches that define and apply the meaning of the real self or 
true self to their disciplines.  
1.  Social Psychological Perspective  
David L. Hall (1994:219, eo) highlights three elements of consciousness about the self: 
‘knowing, acting, and feeling’. In order to study and discuss the self and its social 
behaviour in differing cultural contexts, Harry C. Triandis (1989:506), a social 
psychologist, understands the self as comprising all overt or covert expressions stated by 
a person, ‘that include the words “I” “me,” “mine,” and “myself” ’ (Cooley 1902, quoted 
in ibid.). This understanding manifests that every aspect of ‘social motivation’ is 
connected to ‘aspects of the self’, including:  
(1) ‘attitudes (e.g., I like X)’;  
(2) ‘beliefs (e.g., I think that X results in Y)’;  
(3) ‘intentions (e.g., I plan to do X)’;  
(4) ‘norms (e.g., in my group, people should act this way)’;  
                                                
1 See also Zhān Qǐshèng 詹啟生 and Lè Guó'ān 樂國安 (2002:27). 
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(5) ‘roles (e.g., in my family, fathers act this way)’;  
(6) ‘values (e.g., I think equality is very important)’ (ibid.).  
Edward Slingerland (2004:336) finds that ‘the social self metaphor’ is a very 
common shared mode in both the classical Chinese and English. This metaphor indicates 
that the large experience of our ‘interpersonal relationships’ helps us to know exactly 
about ‘evaluative qualities of specific social relationship onto our inner lives’ (ibid.).  
The study of the self in social psychology focuses on how people in a cultural and 
social context adapt and cope with its cultural and social system (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:182), 
which is an universal phenomenon and termed as a ‘social exchange’ (Befu 1980). Lin 
Xiaodong (2010:75) finds, through his review on ‘western literature’, that ‘the viability 
of understanding identity as individual forms’ is now questioned because they cannot be 
shaped without the influences from society and culture. Stephanie Lawler (2008:8, eo) 
claims that identity should be comprehended as brought forth ‘between persons and 
within social relations’ rather than ‘as belonging within the individual person’. Matthew 
Adams (2007:163) pinpoints the important role of ‘the cultural norms, traditions and 
sanctions’ in the formation of the self. The self is shaped by way of response, reaction, 
and adaptation in its cultural and social context.  
The real or ‘true self’ denotes the self open and truthful to oneself and others 
(Spitzmuller and Ilies 2010:306–8). In other words, there is no alienation between ‘the 
public self’ and ‘the private self’ (Yang, Guoshu 2002:102)2 or the consistency of the 
expressions and acts of the self, namely that personal consistency or self consistency in 
different situations is very high (ibid.:88-9).3 In order to emphasize ‘the highest form of 
                                                
2 These two terms are used to explain the concept of Tournier’s person (real self) and personage (social 
mask) in a similar way. 
3 The opposite to personal consistency or self consistency is social consistency or role consistency. Both 
Francis L. K. Hsu (1963:164-5), a Chinese anthropologist, and Yang Guoshu (2002:88–9), a Chinese 
psychologist, indicate that because Ru-influenced Chinese is ‘situational[-]determinism’-oriented, the Ru-
based cultural heritage emphasizes more social consistency rather than personal consistency. 
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authentic humanity’ as the ultimate goal of ‘becoming a fully actualized human being’ 
(i.e. a sage), Tu Weiming (1979a:22, eo) defines an ‘authentic’ person to be ‘truthful to 
both one’s [genuine] selfhood and one’s sociality’.4 Jürgen Moltmann (1926-) (1974b:93) 
uses ‘authentic’ to describe the life or the forms of living for a person who is unmasked 
or revealing himself.5 From this perspective, the self is discussed and understood in terms 
of a living and active person which is a changing and embodied being and is dynamic 
instead of static and absolute over time (Rogers 1961:171–2).6 That the self is real or not 
is based on self-consciousness (Tournier 1957). 7  Tu Weiming (1985:57) clearly 
emphasizes that the self, ‘I myself’, in Ruist self-cultivation is as an ‘experiencing and 
reflecting person here and now’. To experience and reflect, a person requires both 
‘intellectual sophistication’ and ‘existential commitment’. This person is the ‘personal I’ 
other than the ‘impersonal self’ because I can think, speak, and act. Therefore, for 
pursuing my authentic self, I cannot hide the inconsistency in the self. He (1985:5) 
explains it as follows: 
The safe distance between what I as a person speculate about in propositional language and 
what I speak as a concrete human being is no longer there. I am exposed, for what I think I 
know is now inevitably intertwined with what I do know. If I am wrong, it is not simply 
because what I have proposed is untenable but also because of a defect in the way I live.  
Tu Weiming indicates that knowing the ‘true self’8 in Ruism is neither through 
grasping cognitively ‘a given structure of objective truths’, nor through acquiring 
‘internalized skills’, but through understanding basically ‘one’s mental state’ and 
                                                
4 Tu Weiming (1985:52, 68) changes this definition later as being ‘honest with oneself and loyal’ or 
‘considerate to others’. See also Tu Weiming (1979a:68–77, 81). 
5 See also Moltmann (1976:3). 
6 See also Tournier (1957), Jung (1966), Francis L. K. Hsu (1971), Tu Weiming (1985:13, 113–16), Zhan 
Qisheng and Le Guoan (2002:29–31), and Kwan Kaiman 關啟文 (p. Guān Qǐwén) (2004). 
7 See also Francis L. K. Hsu (1971), Tu Weiming (1985), and Hall (1994:217). 
8 It is worth noting that the phrase ‘true self’ in Tu Weiming’s New Ruism might denote other two meanings 
in different contexts. In the context of Tu’s New Ruist moral self-cultivation, knowing oneself also entails 
simultaneously transforming, shaping, creating, and perfecting oneself (Tu 1985:19f.), see S2 below. In the 
context of his New Ruist idea of the self, Tu (1989a:108f., eo) adopts the phrase ‘true self’ to denote an 
ideal Ruist self in contrast to ‘the private ego’ characterized by ‘self-centredness (ssu)’ (私). 
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appreciating ‘one’s inner feelings’ (ibid.:19). Therefore, the real or true self used in this 
thesis is understood from a social psychological perspective in discussing the tendency 
of the RFS.  
2. Ethico-Religious Perspective  
Tu Weiming (1985:20) emphasizes that East Asian thoughts, including traditional Ruism, 
Daoism, and Buddhism, weigh ‘how to cultivate oneself’ as important as ‘who and what 
the true self is’, which is related prevailingly to ‘an ethico[-]religious question … with 
epistemological implications’.9 From this perspective, the true self refers to an ideal self 
as explained in F9, which in Tu’s eyes equals the ‘sage’ in traditional Ruism, ‘one’s 
original mind’ in traditional Buddhism, and the ‘true person’ in traditional Daoism 
(ibid.:19). However, their concepts of selfhood are different although they appear similar. 
Since traditional Ruism, Daoism and Buddhism (and its source: Hinduism) also influence 
post-traditional Chinese people and culture deeply, their concepts of selfhood will be 
introduced here for reference. However, comparative studies are beyond the scope of this 
research. 
2.1 Ruism  
The true self in traditional and post-traditional Ruism is a ‘self-realization’ with an ideal 
goal of moral ‘achievement’ through endless ‘self-cultivation’ (Tu, Weiming 1979a:7, 
17).10 Furthermore, the meaning of the true self from a social psychological perspective 
is also subsumed in explaining the meaning of the true self from this ethico-religious 
perspective because being truthful to both one’s selfhood and one’s sociality with 
sincerity plays a very important part in moral achievement for the relational self in 
                                                
9 See also Yang Zhongfang (1991a:27). 
10 See also Tu Weiming (1985:51–65) and Hershock and Ames (2006:11). 
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traditional and post-traditional Ruism (ibid.:19-22).11 Therefore, when the true self is 
mentioned by Tu Weiming, it presents the dual meanings from both social psychological 
and ethico-religious perspectives, at the same time.12 However, based on the frequent 
emphases of self-cultivation in Tu’s interpretation from both social psychological and 
ethico-religious perspectives, the self in Ruism is neither an ‘abstract’ entity, idea, and 
concept isolated from the world (Tu 2002c:30),13 nor based on an ‘abstract idealism’ or 
principle (Tu 1985:60) ‘devoid of psychological and ethical implications’ (ibid.:153). 
However, the self in traditional and post-traditional Ruism is ‘as the person living here 
and now’ (ibid.:57) and a ‘lived reality’ (ibid.:134), and based on ‘concrete practicality’ 
(ibid.:60) and ‘a mode of experience’ (ibid.:153). Tu Weiming presents two interrelated 
ideas as the basis to discuss his New Ruist proposition that ‘human beings arc perfectible 
through self-effort in ordinary daily existence’ (ibid.:19): 
(1) The uniqueness of being human is an ethico[-]religious question which cannot be properly 
answered if it is reduced to biological, psychological, or sociological considerations; and (2) 
the actual process of self-development, far from being a quest for pure morality or spirituality, 
necessarily involves the biological, psychological, and sociological realities of human life. 
(ibid.) 
Tu Weiming refers to the former as an ‘ontological postulate’ (ibid.:20-27) and to 
the latter as an ‘experiential assertion’ (Tu 1989a:24–5). This thesis focuses on the 
behavioural tendency (or custom) of the RFS and follows Tu Weiming’s methodology. 
By this methodology, the real (or true) self refers to the process of self-development that 
belongs to the experiential assertion rather than the ontological postulate. Accordingly, it 
involves a more social psychological perspective than an ethico-religious one. In other 
words, the real (or true) self will be understood from a social psychological perspective, 
but there will be some overlap with an ethico-religious perspective.  
                                                
11 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:68, 73–7, 81; 1985:51–65). 
12 See also Tu Weiming (1979a:68, 73–4. 81; 1985:51–65). 
13 See also Tu Weiming (1985:57, 134). 
402 
 
2.2 Buddhism  
Buddhism developed into eight schools, the doctrines of which are not all the same. 
Buddhism’s general concept of the self is ‘no-self’ (or no-soul), or wúwǒ (無我) (Fleming 
2002:172, eo) and anatman. The doctrines of no-self in Buddhism ‘presuppose a concept 
of emptiness in which the ontological character of things is either dissolved or held to be 
ultimate’ (Hall 1994:226). This concept of ‘no-self’ understands the self as non-existent 
(Huebner and Garrod 1991:343) or rejects ‘the ontological reality of the self’ (Ho, David 
YF 1995:121) and views any notion of a ‘permanent and substantial self’ as an illusion 
which is the cause of suffering (Fleming 2002:173). Buddhist no-self doctrine basically 
denies a ‘permanent, substantial, selfhood’ in the Hindu concept from the aspect of history 
(ibid.:172)14 and views the individual as only ‘an ever-changing combination’ (Huebner 
and Garrod 1991:348), a ‘series composed of thoughts, sensations, volition, and material 
elements’ (de la Vallée Poussin 1914:674, eo). Accordingly, existence is a sequence that 
changes rapidly. Bowker (1970:244–5) describes it by means of a metaphor of film: 
Like the frames of a film being projected on to a screen, there is the appearance of continuity; 
each frame is in fact a separate photograph, but the sequence of each photograph is so close 
that it gives the appearance of continuous movement’.  
Therefore, the entity of ‘an enduring self or ego’ is denied completely (Bodde 1957:66) 
— it is merely in the observer’s mind without ‘reality in itself’ (Kolm 1986:254).15 In 
order to solve the problem of ‘suffering’ practically rather than metaphysically, Buddha 
bases his solution for suffering on the theory: the cause of suffering is ‘desire’, the cause 
of desire comes from the clinging to ‘objects of desire’ and the radical and original cause 
of them is illusion, or wúmíng (無明) and avidya (Fleming 2002:172–3). Accordingly, if 
‘the illusion of a permanent and substantial self’ and the illusion of objects of desire are 
                                                
14 See also Joan G. Miller (1994:32–3). 
15 See also Liáng Qǐchāo 梁啟超 (1936 collected and reprinted in 2001:84–6). 
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exterminated, there is nothing to stick to, no ‘enduring self’ to do it, and nothing left of it 
(ibid.:173). Metaphysically speaking, the state of ‘no me or mine’ is hence the goal of 
self-cultivation for solving the problem of suffering (ibid., eo).16 Buddha’s methodology 
reaches a conclusion that ‘no such self’ is normally ‘assumed to exist’, is spoken, taught, 
and ‘given in experience or justified by reasoning’ rather than by ‘speculative 
metaphysics’ (ibid.). This is so called ‘nirvana’, or nièpán (涅槃) (ibid.).17  Nirvana 
includes the ‘extinction of the illusion of a permanent self, the end of the torment of selfish 
desire, and the end of the cycle of rebirth’ (ibid.:173). If one attains nirvana, then such a 
‘vicious cycle’ of illusion, desire, suffering, and reincarnation is finally terminated. 
Therefore, in Buddhism, no-self is a goal to be attained intentionally by way of self-
cultivation in order to live a better life. In Buddhism, ‘one’s own self’ must be ‘forgotten 
or left behind’ in order to cultivate a ‘true compassion’ for others (Huebner and Garrod 
1991:350). It is hypothetically based on its theory of illusion, namely a reachable state 
subjectively. ‘No-self is the unity of unreal self and real self.’ The true meaning of the 
self is no-self and the true meaning of no-self is the reality of the self.18 Buddhism does 
not deny the existence of the self in terms of secular meaning or the individual personality. 
However, Buddhism views such a self as the secular self or unreal self which is temporal. 
The real self is on the deeper level behind the unreal self. No-self is emphasized as the 
essence of the real self (Chén, Bīng 陳兵 1992:161–5).19 However, in the context of 
Buddhism, the true self as it is tends to be hidden in order to pretend to attain to the state 
of no-self because the self is still suffering from its existence and clinging to the objects 
it desires. It is logical that the process of attaining to no-self in Buddhism also leads to 
                                                
16 See also Huebner and Garrod (1991:349) and Neville (2000:117–19). 
17 See also Joan G. Miller (1994:32–3), Ekmon P. C. Tam (1998), and Melvin W. Wong (2001:12f.). 
18 Péng Yànqín 彭彥琴 et al. (2011:213, 217–20, eo). 
19 See also Péng Yànqín 彭彥琴 et al. (ibid.:218). 
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the RFS while the goal cannot be reached by way of self-cultivation. However, it is 
different from the case of traditional and post-traditional Ruism. In traditional and post-
traditional Ruism, the RFS is the main form displaying the phenomenon of loss of self. 
However, in Buddhism, the RFS is for pretending to attain the state of no-self. In the 
context of traditional and post-traditional Ruism, there is no need to pretend about the 
loss of self. One hides the real self as it is when one is unable to attain moral achievement. 
This leads to the reality of loss of self. 
2.3 Hinduism 
The concept of the self in the Indian philosophical and religious context is monistic and 
metaphysical. Brahman is the ‘only one’ ultimate reality according to Advaita monism. 
Atman (the real or true self) is equivalent to Brahman (Ho, David YF 1995:121).20 Atman, 
‘a non-material realization of the real self’,21 meaning ‘breath or spirit’, is untouched by 
anything material, and ‘permanent and unchanging’ (ibid., eo).22 The atman, as opposed 
to the experiential and empirical forms of self which involve thought, desires, and 
sensations, leads to a completely different understanding of the individual (de Vos et al. 
1985:14). In Hinduism, ‘individuality and specific particulars’ are minimized (Nakamura 
1964:60–67) and the priority of the ‘universal self’ is over the individual self (ibid.:93-
106) because of ‘the concept of the unity of all things’ (ibid.:67-72). Consequently, the 
self in Hinduism is not that of an ‘individual’23 but that of a ‘dividual’ (Bharati 1990:200). 
Therefore, ‘self-inconsistency’ is perfectly acceptable in the eyes of Hindus because they 
do not identify their ‘situational behaviour’ with ‘a reflection of their true self’, but ‘a 
reflection of a lesser entity’ (de Vos et al. 1985:14). Reincarnation changes the body but 
                                                
20 See also Nakamura (1964:68). 
21 de Vos et al. (1985:14). 
22 See also Joan G. Miller (1994:32–3), Vineeth (1997:xv), and Peng Yanqin et al. (2011:213). 
23 An individual in the Hindu traditions is to ‘denigrate’ but not to ‘analyse’ (de Vos et al. 1985:14). 
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not the real or true self (Chakkarath 2010:11). For the ‘true self’ is Purusha (a ‘pure 
consciousness’), namely, ‘a pure witness to nature’s doings’ without identifying with any 
‘part of nature’, including one’s possessions, one’s fate and fortunes, and even one’s body 
(Neville 2000:116f.). It can be only found by means of abstracting from ‘attached 
involvements and the reestablishment of the consciousness as unmoved witness’ 
(ibid.:117). Therefore, it contradicts itself to discuss or construct the self and the real or true 
self in Buddhism and in Hinduism since ‘the notion of owning one’s self is nothing but an 
illusion’ (Ho, David Y. F. 1995:121, eo).24 Jess Fleming (2002:175, 185, eo) concludes in 
his paper that traditional Ruism, Buddhism, and Daoism all lack the constituent for a 
person’s ‘real self’ to be restored or ‘nourished’ which is an ‘eternal, substantial, 
independent core of selfhood’ although all are committed to searching for a ‘real self’. 
They all establish their real ‘personal identity’ in ‘one’s relations to the Other (significant 
others)’ in their own distinctive definition and interpretation while all abnegate ‘the 
existence of any permanent hidden ego or self’. In Buddhism, the Other which provides 
personal ‘identity’ or establishes ‘the only real self’ is ‘karma itself’ or ‘the chain of 
karmic accountability’. 
2.4 Daoism 
Throughout its history (sometimes referred to as the Daoist development of ‘continuous 
renovation’), Daoism has been one of the survivors of ‘the most misconceived traditions 
of antiquity’ (Pregadio 2008). Daoism has the ‘richness and complexity’ of many 
‘schools, lineages, and traditions’ – each of which might lead to a different way, even the 
two terms Daoism and Daoist might not indicate the same realm of Dào 道 (way) (ibid.). 
The Daoist’s general concept of selfhood is basically the other kind of transformation of 
self-realization ‘leading to the embodiment’ of nàshèng wàiwáng 內聖外王 (‘sageliness 
                                                
24 See also Chakkarath (2010:9–11). 
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within and kingliness without’) (Ho, David YF 1995:120, eo). Although Daoism does not 
deny an ontological self, it negates ‘the centrality of the self’, namely that ‘the perfect 
[person] has no self’, 25  and the differentiation ‘between I and other’ in pursuing ‘a 
harmony with both nature and society’ so as to make human society secondary to nature 
(ibid.). Therefore, the conscious true self becomes what Daoism seeks to avoid because 
the sage in Daoism is the one who gives up ‘fixed (personal) ideas’ and takes others’ as 
his own (ibid.:120).26  The basic concept of Daoist selfhood is based on Zhuangzi’s 
statement of ‘wú sàng wǒ’「吾喪我」 in the essay of ‘Qí wù lùn’〈齊物論〉 in 
Zhuangzi.27 However, the interpretations vary among scholars.28  
For Zhuangzi, holding the opposite view to ancient Ruists, ‘the realm of self (roles, 
names, concepts, tradition, [and] ritual)’ needs to be ‘forgotten’ to make genuine 
connection possible — among people to some extent, but primarily with nature as a 
whole. For such realm of self is discordant through ‘creating artificial boundaries’, which 
makes distinctive and unequal, obstructing and damaging the harmony connection 
(Berkson 2005:327) and belongs to ‘the socialized self’ which ‘obscure[s] the inner self’ 
(Berling 1985:104–109). 29 
Jess Fleming (Fleming 2002:177, eo) terms Daoist’s selfhood as ‘non-being’.30 
There are some substantial distinctions between Daoist non-being and Buddhist no-self. 
                                                
25 Or ‘the perfected self, a radically free being whose qualities and whose world are presented in paradoxical 
and fantastic imagery.’ (Berling 1985:102) or ‘The perfect [person] has no self-identity apart from others. 
His freedom from self makes this possible and in this is his freedom.’ (Legge, Russel D. 1979:18, eo) 
26 See also Bodde (1953:57–9; 1957:66), Bauer (1990:66), and Fleming (2002:180). 
27 Hong Chia-Lynne 洪嘉琳 (p. Hóng Jiālín) (2007).  
28 For example, Graham (1969:150–52), Russel D. Legge (1979:13–18), Chén Gǔyīng 陳鼓應 (1983:32–
92; 2008:210–227), Shěn Qīngsōng 沈清松 (1987), Tāng Yījiè 湯一介(1996b), Fāng Dōngměi 方東美 
(2009:102–111), and Chén Shǎomíng 陳少明 (2014). 
29 See also Robinet (2008:6). 
30 In his comparative study of the concepts of self between the Ruists and Zhuangzi, Mark A. Berkson terms 
Zhuangzi’s concept of self as ‘no-self’ in differentiating from the Ruists’ ‘self’ (Berkson 2005). Jess 
Fleming terms Daoist’s selfhood as ‘non-being’ for differentiating from the ‘no-self’ as he terms the 
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For Buddha, the most important thing is to terminate human suffering but for Daoists, 
‘human freedom … to act creatively, spontaneously, flexibly’ means absolutely 
everything (ibid.:177).31 In order to attain this freedom, one must shape oneself ‘on the 
Tao [(i.e. Dao)] itself’ and make oneself liberated from restraints of ‘traditional mores 
and aesthetic norms’ (ibid.). As the Dao in Daoism is not concerned with morality and 
rationality and is ‘unintentional … in constant flux’, all social rules are ‘artificial’ biased 
restrictions and must be deconstructed (ibid.). Therefore, there is not and should not be a 
fixed and expected concept for selfhood. The way ‘really to be who we are (nothing in 
particular)’ (zhēnrén 真人) in Daoism is to let things go and forget ‘oneself and others’ 
instead of ‘making things better’ (ibid.:177-80, eo).32 Wolfgang Bauer (1990, cited in 
Fleming 2002:187 n.18) indicates that ‘the loss of self’33 became the declared aim of 
Daoists because ‘the only real self is the individuated non-being’ (Fleming 2002:185). 
There is ‘a state of deep trance or intense absorption’ in Daoism, termed ‘zuòwàng’｢坐
忘｣(‘sitting in oblivion’) (Kohn 2008:1308). During such a state, one does not feel any 
‘ego-identity’ and the real thing one perceives is merely ‘the underlying cosmic current 
of the Dao’ (ibid.). Kohn describes this mental state in this way: ‘complete unknowing … 
                                                
Buddhist’s selfhood (Fleming 2002:172, 177, eo). David L. Hall terms both Buddhist and Daoist concepts 
of the self’ as ‘no-self’ that have different meanings in different contexts (Hall 1994:226, 232). 
31 According to Jess Fleming, Daoism is still similar to Buddhism in the following aspects: (1) attaining to 
the state of ‘no self’, stressing on ‘the process nature of reality’; (2) emphasizing ‘that all things are 
interconnected’; (3) highlighting the value of ‘minimizing desire and emotion’; (4) making much account 
of the notion of ‘non-being’ or wú (無) (Daoist non-being has been be likened to ‘the concept of emptiness’ 
or kōngxìng (空性) in the ‘Madhyamika’ Buddhism for about two millennia); (5) valuing ‘the infinite depth 
of the here and now, the importance of simplicity, naturalness, and spontaneity, and the frequent efficacy 
of silence, stillness, and inaction’ or wúwéi (無為) (the above are what ‘Zen’ Buddhism emphasizes), and 
‘transformative texts’ (vs. ‘informative texts’ in ‘Western philosophical discourse’) and ‘speech acts’ 
(Fleming 2002:173, 176–7, eo). 
32 See also Ames (2006:135–45, 342–83). 




loss of personal identity and self, and a kind of total immersion in the Non-being of the 
universe’ (ibid.).34  
According to Fleming (2002:177, eo), the worldview of Daoism is an extreme 
‘holism, or organicism’ which views all existing ‘things or persons’ as interconnecting, 
interrelating, and interacting with each other intimately. In Daoism, a ‘person’ is merely 
a ‘process’ instead of an ‘entity’ because a person’s identity is composed of yīn (陰) and 
yáng (陽) ‘equilibrium’ of which is always changing between ‘predictable’ balance or 
unbalance and ‘mysterious unpredictable’ state although they complement each other 
(ibid.:177). In such a holism, one’s self is ‘transfixed’ by the other’s and the other’s is by 
it, so that in such a ‘reciprocal’ relationships, persons are like ‘two mirrors mirroring each 
other’ and ‘everything is left unsettled and indefinite’ (ibid.:180). Therefore, I find that 
everything is relative in Daoism just as David Y. F. Ho (1995:119) states, in Daoism, 
‘Being and nonbeing produce each other; each derives its meaning from the coexistence 
of the other.’ 
By comparing the Three Teachings, I find that in Daoism, non-being, the only real 
self, is a goal to be attained intentionally by way of self-cultivation, in order to live a 
better life. But the better life Daoists pursue is to have freedom, other than Buddhist 
suffering, from any restraints, settlement, and fixation. It is also a hypothetically 
reachable state subjectively as in Buddhism. As Fleming points out, the concept of 
personal identity based on relations with others in Daoist holism is ‘far beyond’ the Ruist 
one which places ‘personal identity as a focal point on a social nexus, ... playing ... roles 
in relation to others’ (Fleming 2002:178). Therefore, the relativity of the self in Daoism 
is significantly different from Ruism (Bauer, Wolfgang 1990, in Fleming 2002:187–8 
n.18). In the context of Daoism, it tends to hide the true self as it is in order to pretend to 
                                                
34 See also Chen Shaoming (2014:48–9). 
409 
attain to the state of non-being. The self is still ‘being’ (ibid.:187 n.15, eo) or yǒu (有) 
and taking action or yǒuwéi (有為). It seems logical that the process of attaining to non-
being in Daoism, just as in Buddhism, would also lead to the RFS while the goal cannot 
be reached by way of self-cultivation. Fleming criticizes Daoism that does not like to 
‘recognize or address ... the problem’ of hiding from self or deceiving to self which would 
cause a ‘split’ identity (ibid.:185, eo). Such a problem is related to the repressed 
behavioural custom of masking. 
3. Anglo-European Western Philosophical Perspective  
The term and the idea of self are listed in the ‘standard vocabulary’ of the twentieth 
century. Contemporary philosophers and psychologists inquire into the self (Grenz 
2001:58). There are varieties of different concepts of selfhood developed in Anglo-
European Western societies (Hall 1994), 35 generally including these aspects: ‘analytic, 
monotheistic, individualistic, and materialistic and rationalistic’ (Johnson 1985:113–
128). Sources of the Self: The making of the modern identity (1989) by Charles Taylor 
(1931-) is a very comprehensive reference work to understand them even if his focus in 
this work is on ‘modern identity’.36 Although the idea of ‘the centred self’ appears as a 
modern innovation, its roots can be traced back to Augustine’s creative concept of ‘turn 
inwards’ (Grenz 2001:16, eo). Augustine attempted to find God as the radical basis of 
‘his mind and will’ and consequently set up an ongoing inquiry to construct the 
‘individual’ human being with ‘the self as the stable, abiding reality’ (ibid.:16). At the 
pinnacle of this inquiry, Abraham Maslow eventually exemplified ‘the self-sufficient, 
                                                
35 See also Johnson (1985). 
36 Roy F. Baumeister’s ‘How the self became a problem: A psychological review of historical research’ 




self-constructing therapeutic self of modern psychology’ (ibid., eo). Such a self is based 
on ‘the mastering self’ that appeared in the Enlightenment (ibid.:16). 
However, the ascendancy of the modern self did not last long. Various thinkers 
forayed into the inner realm and ‘netted a self-focused self’ more through ‘self-
expression’ than through ‘self-mastery’ (ibid.). Stanley Grenz (1950-2005) (ibid.:16f.) 
summarizes this development of seeking the self inwardly as follows: 
By means of autobiography, Montaigne and then Rousseau sought to discover the unique self 
within. The Romanticists added the idea that the self is the expression of the indwelling 
infinite. But what happens when the concept of the infinite within the finite, upon which the 
self-expressive self depends for its sense of stability and for its ability to overcome its own 
particularity, proves to be an unstable centre? The destabilizing of this Romantic self, abetted 
by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and the Vienna modernists (including Freud), is the rest of the 
story. The entire journey reached its climax when Foucault extended Nietzsche's metaphor 
of the death of God to encompass the death of the self as well, an event characterized not 
only by the loss of the self but also by the embracing of its demise. The resultant postmodern 
condition retains a semblance of a self that is constituted by a narrative, that is marked by a 
position in a vast relational web, and that looks to relationships for identity. The modern ideal 
of the stable, unitary self has come to be replaced by the decentred, fleeting self constructed 
in each moment of existence and by Global Soul. ‘ 
Indeed, depending on itself alone is the source of the ‘fragility and instability’ of the 
modern self (Charry 1998:106). 
In other words, even if the Romantic Movement criticizes the Enlightenment, ‘the 
ideal of the centred self’ was not abandoned (ibid.:117). The gate for ‘the loss, dissipation, 
or even deconstruction of the self’ was opened naturally. Consequently, the postmodern 
era appeared in the twentieth century’ (ibid.:118). 
However, the postmodern that detests the self does not mean the beginning of ‘pure 
selflessness’ (ibid.:134). According to Grenz (ibid., eo):37 
The postmodern condition retains a semblance of a self or, perhaps better stared, a trace of 
the now absent self … Rather than being the agent of subjectivity, the postmodern self is a 
self-referential system … a self-producing system … a constant re-creation of itself through 
the selective reorganization of the disorder present in the surrounding world and within 
itself … Viewing it as a self-referential system leads to a highly social conception of the self. 
                                                
37 For the discussions of the postmodern self, see also Efrat Tseëlon (1992:120f.), David L. Hall (1994:223–
5), Anthony C. Thiselton (1995), Kenneth J. Gergen (2000), Kwan, Kaiman 關啟文 (p. Guān Qǐwén) 
(2004), and Paul C. Vitz and Susan M. Felch (2006). 
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Taylor (1989:ix) integrates the understanding of being ‘a human agent’ into a 
succinct description or definition as ‘the senses of inwardness, freedom, individuality, 
and being embedded in nature which are at home in the modern Anglo-European West’. 
This definition of being a human agent is close to the definition of the true self in this 
research although he does not use this term. Some Anglo-European Western 
philosophical concepts of selfhood are also to some extent from psychological and/or 
ethico-religious perspectives, for example, from Christian, theistic, or deistic aspects. 
Some of them are from the aspect of philosophical existentialism which makes the topic 
of the self explicit (Neville 2000:167). For example, according to Plato, the ‘soul’ beholds 
the true self and is above ‘the realm of the material’ (body) (Vineeth 1997:xxi–xxii). 
Therefore, the basic common existential concept of selfhood is ‘the absoluteness in the 
depth of selfhood and … the lucidity of transcendence’ (Jaspers 1965:2). The true self is 
also an inherently unchangeable spiritual being. However, the discussion of the tendency 
of the RFS in this research is not from a philosophical perspective. Therefore, this is not 
the place to go into an extended discussion and comparison of the complicated 
philosophical concepts of selfhood developed in Western history. 
4. Christian Biblical and Theological Perspectives  
In traditional Christian terms, the imago Dei can be understood as the source of the real 
or true self in the creation through the hermeneutics of Genesis 1. After the Fall, the real 
or true self, although damaged, can be redeemed, transformed, renewed, and glorified by 
the creator God. These ontological and eschatological perspectives complement what the 
(social) psychological and the ethico-religious perspectives lack. The model path moving 
from the personage to the person presented by Tournier and adopted by this research is 
beyond what modern psychology can provide (Tournier 1957:23, 223–4).38 This path is 
                                                
38 See also Tournier (1968). 
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discussed in C3S2.4. Through these perspectives, the real self is not only understood as 
the imago Dei in the creation but also as the promised future better self in the new 
creation, by way of the imago Christi and the imago Trinitatis. At the end of his 
conclusion in Sources of the Self, Taylor (1989:520) also places the hope of humans (or 
the self) in the Judaeo-Christian theistic ‘central promise of a divine affirmation of the 
human, more total than humans can ever attain unaided’. All of these discussions are 
explained further in C5 through examining Moltmann’s trinitarian theological 
anthropology based on his social doctrine of the Trinity. These perspectives are also 
included in the comparative analysis of Tu Weiming’s Ruist and Moltmann’s Christian 





The Theoretical Bases for the Issue of the Repressed Form of Self 
 
In dealing with the behavioural tendency of the RFS which is prevalent in PTRIC 
contexts, I found Paul Tournier (1898-1986) is one of very few persons who offers a 
comprehensive discussion of the notion, or in his language a real self and the problem of 
repressed behavioural custom of social masking. Moreover, he is also among the few 
persons who devoted himself in integrating theology and psychotherapy, namely 
integrative psychotherapy (McMinn & Campbell 2007:51), in his transformational 
psychology in the twentieth century (Collins 1973).1 Besides, the transformation from a 
repressed self (a timid one with fear in front of others) to a real self (public speaker) was 
also his own personal experience (ibid.). Since this research is an attempt to deal with this 
social psychological problem of the RFS from a Christian theological approach, 
Tournier’s works afford me a theoretical base to articulate the concepts which are key to 
this research. In this section, Tournier’s paired use of the person and the personage is 
adopted to explain and contrast one’s real self and negative social mask(s) respectively. 
He also indicates why there is an inevitable need to speak of the personage, of the negative 
social masks.  
1. The Person － the Real Self 
In his book The Meaning of Persons (1957) (the English version of his original La 
personage et la personne), the Swiss physician and pastoral counsellor, Paul Tournier, 
contrasts personage with person.2 He defines person as one’s ‘intimate and deeper being’. 
                                                
1 At the last stage of this research, I found David. G. Benner (2012) is another one. 
2 According to the etymology of the term person, it originally meant a mask worn by the actor in ancient 




In his discussion the person is synonymous with ‘true nature’, ‘real nature’, or the ‘real 
self’ (Tournier 1977:9, 46, 79). He recognizes the person as the ‘original creation’ from 
God, as created ‘“in the image of God” (Gen 1:27)’, in contrast to the personage as the 
‘automatic routine’ (to be introduced in the next section) (ibid.: 39, 102). The importance 
and meaning of the person or real self depends on two fundamental elements:  
(1) ‘the free disposition of oneself’ (ibid.:39)(Tournier 1957:39) － one’s ‘autonomy’, 
one’s ‘free choice’, or one’s ‘right of self-determination’ (ibid.).3  
(2) ‘responsibility’ (ibid.).4  
Since, as Carl R. Rogers indicates (1902-87) (1961:171), complete freedom 
demands one taking full responsibility for one’s choices and their consequences, one 
would definitely fail to be one’s real or true self if one refuses, or cannot take, the pressure 
resulting from the free choice one makes. Tracing back the root cause of failing to take 
responsibility for one’s free choice, Rogers suggests fear to be the reason to make one 
either actively decide not to reveal one’s real self or passively escape from deciding to 
reveal it. Don E. Hamachek (1978:246, eo) highlights this ‘courage to be known’ as the 
nature of the real self because it is not easy to disclose one’s self honestly, namely, ‘to be 
perceived by others as we know ourselves to be’, or to exhibit one’s own true attitudes 
and feelings. However, he also points out that such a ‘self-disclosure’ should not express 
candour cruelly without discrimination.5 Besides Rogers (1961:171), Zygmunt Bauman 
(1925-) (1988, cited in Lin, Xiaodong 2010:74–5) also views freedom or free choice as a 
necessary element in the ‘self[-]construction of the self’. But he also recognizes the 
limitation of that freedom which makes the ‘self[-]confirmation of the self’ impossible 
(ibid.). I argue that this limitation of freedom may be understood and explained from the 
                                                
3 Or ‘freedom’ (Rogers 1961:171). 
4 See also Rogers (ibid.). 
5 See also Zhuang Huiqiu (1987a:121–45; 1987c:191–7). 
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perspective of original sin, and so reveals ‘the bondage of the will’ (Luther 1525). In this 
sense the real self is, to some extent, affected, damaged, or limited. Besides, when talking 
about freedom, we must remember that what really affects freedom is not what comes 
from the outside of a person, but the fear that comes from inside in a person’s heart. In 
other words, when one is afraid of the consequences of one’s freedom or free choice, one 
may give it up. 
Inspired by the book I and Thou by Martin Buber (1878-1965) (1937), Tournier 
(1957:129, eo) explains that responsibility must involve the other － ‘the second person, 
the thou’. Accordingly, the true interpersonal relationship between two true selves is a 
‘responsible dialogue’. This responsible dialogue cannot avoid risk while making choices 
because it leaves one ‘open to a reply’, requiring one to reply in turn. It also makes the 
person completely different from an ‘individual’ because the latter only involves 
association but the former communication (ibid.:129). The person communes spiritually 
with others. Tournier (1957:129) criticizes the limitations of ‘the objective scientific 
study’ of human beings because it only takes a human as ‘an individual’ rather than as ‘a 
person’ (ibid.). Such an approach usually isolates the human from his/er ‘environment’ 
(ibid.). Even if it includes environmental factors in its analysis of one’s ‘physical and 
psychical relationships’, it is not able to comprehend one’s ‘spiritual relationship’ and 
‘personal communion’ with one’s associates (ibid.). Moltmann (2000a:333) also makes a 
similar distinction between a person and an individual (as explained in C6S3). Robert 
Kegan (1982:116) not only differentiates these two words but goes further to explain their 
relation. He points out a person’s two indispensable dimensions: individual and 
communal. In order to include the meanings of these two dimensions in denoting a person, 
he coined a new word ‘embeddual[s]’ to highlight an individual person who is always 
embedded in his/er own communal relationships. Such a dialogical concept was 
developed by influential contemporary American pragmatists into a theory which is used 
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to expound ‘the theory of meaning’ (Wiley 2006:19). They assert that conversations 
cannot take place without ‘the presence of selves’ and selves can neither exist without 
conversations or ‘dialogic acts’ (Perinbanayagam 2000:1). 
From the above discussion, the real self (or the person) discussed in this research 
denotes an understanding rooted in social psychology. It does not refer to an absolutely 
isolated self. 
2. The Personage － the Social Mask 
Yet, can one identify easily what one’s ‘own real nature’/real self is? Can people easily 
find their ‘true person’? (Tournier 1957:21, 46) The answer Tournier gives is no, because 
what we can see is only the ‘distorted and varied images’ of the true person due to its 
natural and inevitable sociality (ibid.: 21). In other words, such images are not true to the 
self; they have become the master of the self and they are produced due to the expectations 
of others, which are preventing one from growing as the person. Moltmann (1976:1) 
describes the self-consciousness of losing oneself through such a series of self-reflecting 
statements as: ‘I must find myself again first’; ‘I wish I could be myself again’; and ‘I just 
don’t know who I really am any more’. In other words, being or living out one’s real self 
is to let that self be expressed and disclosed as it is in every moment of its existence 
without pretending to be the expected self valued by others, society or even by oneself. 
But from childhood, many things begin to ‘make up our personages’ (Tournier 1957:33). 
They include our education, interpersonal relationships, experiences in daily life, and ‘our 
titles, honours and decorations’ (ibid.).6 In this process or development, the reality of the 
self is divested in support of ‘an external role or … imagined meaning’ (Jung 1966:173). 
                                                
6  Or ‘putting on official airs’ in Carl Jung’s terms (1966:174). See also Ryan (1991:230) and Jack 
(1993:177–9). 
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Consequently, we become ‘role players’7 (Tournier 1957:33)8 as a natural reflex of self-
defence mechanisms, wearing ‘protective armour’ (ibid.:30) or building up a ‘protective 
barrier’ (ibid.:148).9 William James (1901:294) describes this similar phenomenon, using 
the terms of ‘social selves’ and social ‘images’ instead of social masks: 
[A] [hu]man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry 
an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these his images is to wound him. He 
generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups … From this 
there results what practically is a division of the [hu]man into several selves; and this may be 
a discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let one set of his acquaintances know him as 
he is elsewhere. 
This is what Daniel Goleman (1996:166) calls the ‘shared self’ and the ‘group self’, 
which we create in order to safeguard and hide our true bare hearts ‘behind a mask’ (Jung 
1966:174) or to protect our own inner selves from others’ prying ‘inquiry’ (Saari 
1982:46). In this way, every relationship we have can be either consolidated or 
compromised (Tournier 1957:33).10 Jon L. Saari (1982:46) uses the ‘inner/outer split’ 
(real/social self) to denote such a social mask. In her definition, the inner/outer split refers 
to the three psychological facts: 
(1) external ‘conformity’ is not out of ‘internalized commitment’;  
(2) a social mask is shaped by much publicly disclosed action;  
(3) ‘an explosive or evil potential’ are hidden within the people in an ‘authoritarian 
society’.  
In other words, the real inner self is hidden behind the pretended social self that is 
‘acting consciously and visibly’ at the presence of others (Saari 1982:43). Accordingly, 
people cannot see through the mask.  
                                                
7 ‘We are not only one personage throughout our lives; we are innumerable personages … We are even 
many personages at once’ (Tournier 1957:73). See also Zizioulas (2004:34). 
8 See also Jung (1966:174) and Tournier (1977:9). 
9 Tournier (1957:148) describes this phenomenon vividly as that ‘we conceal our person behind a protective 
barrier; we let it be seen only through the bars. We display certain of its aspects, others we carefully hide.’ 
10 See also Tournier (1977:9). 
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In Ralph H. Turner’s (1999:79) terms, the real self is ‘self as anchored in impulse’, 
and the imposed (or negatively masked) self is ‘self as anchored in institutions’, 
paralleling Sigmund Freud’s (1923 reprinted in 1960) id and superego. Although Turner 
(1999:80f,) uses the term hypocrisy rather than social mask or personage, his (1999) 
analysis of the crucial distinction between these two contrasting selves provides a 
valuable reference for understanding the features of the personage (or the person). Dana 
Crowley Jack (1993:168) quoted Gilbert and Gubar’s (1984:79, 198, 360) term ‘dark 
doubles’ to denote the two divided ‘opposing selves: an outwardly conforming, compliant 
self, and an inner, secret self’. The former self accepts ‘the social norms’ but the ‘desires 
and needs’ of the latter authentic one remain unmet. 
The real or true self is described by Grenz (2001:100–102) as ‘the unique self 
within’, which is found in what one thinks instead of in what one acts. William James 
(1842-1910) (1901:292) identified it as the ‘spiritual self’,11 in contrasting it with the 
‘material self’ (Benner 2012:96–7) 12  and the ‘social self’. In James’ (1901:296) 
definition, the spiritual self is to ‘think of subjectivity’13 by discarding recognition of 
others. It is the ‘self of all other selves’ (Moseley 1991:23, eo) or ‘the innermost citadel 
of selfhood’, which ‘can never be objectified’ (Wild 1969:83). David G. Benner 
(2012:138–41, eo) calls it ‘the essential self: I am’.14  
Therefore, in this sense of the similar conceptualization of the real self and the 
imposed self described above in different ways by scholars, I understand the RFS as 
denoting metaphorically that the spiritual self is hidden, suppressed, denied, or even 
                                                
11 Or in David G. Benner’s language (2012:137–54): ‘the spirit-centred self’. 
12 Or in Romney M. Moseley’s language (1991:23): ‘the bodily self’. 
13 Namely, ‘to think ourselves as thinkers’ (James 1901:296, eo). 
14 Benner (2012:85–154), a psychologist, presents a big complicated but detailed framework for organizing 
consciousness of identity (self) in human development, including four major frameworks: the body, mind, 
soul, and spirit-centred self. There are three or four sub-stages under each framework and totally fourteen 
levels of self. This is a valuable reference for understanding different levels of self from this psychoanalytic 
approach. 
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forgotten under the imposed mask of the social self as these two selves become 
inconsistent.  
To some extent, the personage, which is the automatic routine, indeed represents a 
kind of compromise between an individual person and his/her society, family tradition, 
and social conventions (Zhuang, Huiqiu 1987c:176) because the personages of different 
people touch each other from outside by their external appearances but the persons of 
different people communicate with each other inwardly in a ‘spiritual communion’ 
(Tournier 1957:129). However, in Tournier’s explanation to differentiate persons from 
individuals, he emphasizes that the concept of the person is tied together with ‘the human 
community, a spiritual solidarity, [or] a common patrimony’. Consequentially, in order 
to follow a certain traditional manner of locution, one cannot but participate in ‘the nature 
of the personage’. Speaking succinctly, the personage acts according to ‘yīnggāi’ 「應該
｣  (should)15  or ‘oughts’16  in the context of social relationships and the person acts 
according to ‘xiǎng’ 「想｣ (would like)17, ‘want[s]’18, or ‘inten[d]s’19 in the context of 
personal communion (ibid.:130). The personage can be formed by our ‘instincts … 
egoisms … vanities’ and also by our legitimate or justified ambitions (ibid.:36). Social 
psychological studies on the intergenerational relationships of Chinese people20 resonate 
with Tournier’s observation that, in order to please one’s parents, a child’s personage 
tends to be shaped to conform with the parents’ wish (ibid.:63). In this way, one’s intimate 
                                                
15 Zhuang Huiqiu (1987c:176). 
16 Rogers (1961:168–70, eo). 
17 Zhuang Huiqiu (1987c:176). 
18 Rogers (1961:170). 
19 David Y. F. Ho (1996:159). See also Jack (1999). 
20 Lín Lìyún 林麗雲 (1991b:53–5). See also Wáng Guìhuā 王桂花 (1987), (2010:118–26) Lin Liyun 
(1987), Jīn Shènghuá 金盛華 et al. (2009:1004, 1008–1011), and Zhái Xuéwěi 翟學偉 (2010:118–26). 
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self might be well hidden behind a masking ‘façade’(s), 21  specifically, the ‘socially 
imposed pattern’(s) (ibid.: 9–10).  
In her book, The dialogic self (1999), Roxanne J. Fand (1999:129, eo) describes 
and analyses a concrete case of ‘the self without a mask’ as ‘the socially unformed, 
preoedipal child’.22 To demonstrate such a case with a vivid example, Fand (1999:129) 
quotes an episode of the central character in the novel The Four-Gated City (1993) by 
Doris Lessing (1919-2013), in which Martha Quest moves to London alone to find her 
‘missing self’: 
For a few weeks she had been anonymous, unnoticed － free. Never before in her life had 
she known this freedom. Living in a small town anywhere means preserving 
one’s self behind a mask. Coming to a big city for those who have never known one, 
means … freedom: all the pressures are off, no one cares, no need for the mask. (Lessing 
1993:12) 
Such a real self is purely open, subjectively ‘receptive’ to anything that comes and 
untroubled with ‘anxiety, conflict, and confusion’. On the contrary, it can be asserted 
from Fand’s account that negative masking is due to lack of freedom to be one’s real self. 
It is worth noting that the definition of freedom can vary depending on the context 
or realm in which it is used. The two fundamental characteristics of the person Tournier 
highlights above might provide a basic definition of freedom as discussed in this thesis: 
freedom and responsibility. Freedom without responsibility can be abused. Responsibility 
without freedom can be imposed. This is exactly what the Apostle Paul instructs in 1 
Corinthians 10:23-4, ‘ “All things are lawful”, but not all things are beneficial. “All things 
are lawful”, but not all things build up. Do not seek your own advantage, but that of 
others.’ The exertion of freedom is neither a selfish action nor intended to deprive others 
                                                
21 See also Ryan (1991:230). 
22 Pre-Oedipal is used by Freud to indicate the developmental phase before the Oedipal phase. According 
to Oxford Dictionaries (2014), the Oedipus complex is: ‘the complex of emotions aroused in a young child, 
typically around the age of four, by an unconscious sexual desire for the parent of the opposite sex and wish 
to exclude the parent of the same sex.’ It has been noted that this term was ‘originally applied to boys, the 
equivalent in girls being called the Electra complex’. 
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of advantage, including freedom. Ellul (1973:151–2) decidedly stresses that ‘repression’, 
both social and individual, results from restraining one’s exertion of ‘freedom’ and 
‘independency’. Therefore, the research problem of the RFS in this thesis is identified in 
the social behaviour of responsibility without freedom. The real self, discussed in this 
thesis, is acquired through the social behaviour in freedom with responsibility. 
3. The Inevitability of the Personage －the Social Mask 
One cannot live alone all the time, so one never exists in the confinements of ‘an 
atomic self or substance’, rather one exists within the groups with which one interacts as 
an ‘entire organic being’ (Wild 1969:86, eo). Tournier (1957:131) notes that the person 
cannot exist without the personage, but the personage get its value only when it is an 
‘expression’ of the person. Tournier (ibid.) explains the possibility of a true dialogue in 
spite of the inseparability of the person and the personage: 
If then there is … only one language, that of our words, gestures and signs, in fact of the 
whole movement of our being, that language has two meanings: one nourishes and satisfies 
the personage, while the other, more ‘intrinsic’, always immanent, is always expressed and 
perceived by the person. And there … is the element of security which permits us to believe 
in the person in spite of the evidence of the personage; the key-element which makes dialogue 
always possible. 
Therefore, he (ibid.:75) indicates the inevitability of the personage because one of 
the conditions of personal contact we seek is ‘a certain mutual intelligibility’ in the modes 
of our expression that belongs to ‘the order of the personage’.23 Consequently, through 
performing what Carl Jung (1875-1961) (1966:173) calls ‘alienations of the self’, the real 
self retreats into the less public side of a social scene to let ‘social recognition’ and ‘the 
auto-suggestive meaning of a primordial image’24 have the upper hand. As a result, self-
alienation in support of the collective conforms to ‘a social ideal’ or even simulates ‘social 
                                                
23 Moltmann also observes the same reality of inevitable masking (as mentioned in C3S1.1.2). 
24 Jung (1966:174, 304) defines ‘primordial images’ as ‘the influence of the collective unconscious’ which 
includes ‘unconscious collective ideas (mythical thinking) and vital instincts’. He also calls them 
‘archetypes’ (ibid.:eo), ‘the unconscious world’, or ‘the world of historical images’ (ibid.:299). 
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duty and virtue’ (ibid.). This kind of individual self is identified by Doi (1986:55–6), a 
Japanese psychiatrist, as a very typical and prominent feature in the ‘group-sim’ of 
Japanese society. 
However, for Tournier (1957:13), the problem of personage and person is 
complicated: the personage is inescapably tied to the person even though we in fact 
always prefer to hold on to the sense that the role we play is distinct from who we really 
are. Tournier finds that the ‘pure and unvarnished’ person evades us all the time (ibid.:15). 
He describes the fact in this way: ‘I can never grasp the true reality, of myself or anybody 
else, but only an image; a fragmentary and deformed image, and an appearance: the 
personage’ (ibid.:15, eo). It is only the personage that allows me to glance at the person 
‘at one and the same time’ (ibid.:15). But it also inclines to conceal it from me.. Therefore 
the veiled person is unmasked only in the really responsible behaviour when we cannot 
but take up a true stand in a true dialogue, namely through ‘inner personal communion’ 
(ibid.:130).  
Igorʹ Semenovich Kon (1928-2011) (1986:168), a Russian philosopher and 
psychologist, makes a revealing differentiation between the self and the mask in defining 
them through their relations. He bases the dialectics of the self and the mask on the 
premise of their totally absolute distinction: the mask is not the self and is something 
irrelevant to the I, for the purpose of masking is to hide and conceal the true fact of the 
self through wearing an appearance which does not belong to the self. The mask can 
release one from the constant necessity of guarding against others’ review and judgment 
regarding one’s own prestige and success at conforming to social restraint and to the 
wishes of others. Therefore, masquerade means freedom, means happiness, and means 
candour. However, the mask cannot be neutral to the self. In other words, it is not like the 
mask can be worn up and taken off ad libitum (according to pleasure), so that I am still I 
after taking it off. The mask is not merely painted cardboard or a plastic board. One cannot 
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choose the mask for the self ad libitum, for the mask must compensate for what one is not 
(according to one’s self-evaluation) and what one needs to be (to all appearances) because 
one thinks that who one ought to be or how one ought to behave is contrary to what one’s 
real self would intend.25 A busy person does not need to appear busy; a servile person 
does not need to pretend to be obedient; a cheerful person does not need to wear an 
optimistic mask. It is exactly because of the discrepancy between the true self and the 
mask that one believes oneself to need that we say the mask is external, adscititious, and 
not from the self.  
The sociologist, Stephanie Lawler (2008:101, eo), points out that although the 
majority of people will more or less wear a ‘mask at certain points’ (probably due to ‘self-
preservation’), there is always ‘a real person’ assumed to exist ‘behind the mask’. Most 
of the time, this real person is supposed to be more genuine than the ‘mask or 
masquerade’ (ibid.). 
According to Kon’s and Lawler’s differentiation of the mask and the self, the mask 
almost equates to a false or unreal self. Nevertheless, I do not think it is easy to distinguish 
and separate one’s oughts from one’s intents so distinctly, because what one intends can 
be affected unconsciously by one’s oughts. Self-deception is discussed and recognized 
by psychoanalytic studies as one of the tricks people play on themselves to avoid anxiety 
and pain or ‘to hide … infirmity’ (Tournier 1957:12, 152). 26  However, Tournier 
views one in one’s completeness with both consciousness and unconsciousness working 
within (ibid.:62). He disagrees with the oversimplified explanation that the ‘unconscious 
impulsions’ are out of our real nature but our conscious behaviour merely a personage, 
‘an alien garment’ (ibid.:61). In other words, consciousness influences both the personage 
                                                
25 See also Higgins (1987). 
26 Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) named these tricks ‘defence mechanisms’, and Harry S. Sullivan (1892-
1949) modelled them as ‘security operations’ (Goleman 1996:105, eo). 
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and the person since free choice is essential for the person. William James (1901:297, 
305, eo) emphasized the subjectivity of the ‘innermost self’ and called it the ‘active 
element in all consciousness’. A more neutral, or even sometimes more positive, term 
denoting equivalently to social masking is ‘self-presentation’ (Goffman 1956). Roy F. 
Baumeister (1953-) (1982:3, eo) explains self-presentation as the employ of 
communicating behaviour to real oneself to others in order to please them and to construct 
‘one’s public self congruent to one’s ideal’. However, it is not self-presentation to 
construct ‘a true, real, or private self’. The real or private self is constructed via self-
choices and self-performances (ibid.:4, eo).27  
Furthermore, since the importance and meaning of the person depends on one’s free 
choice and responsibility (Tournier 1957:39), how can an unconscious person assume 
his/her free choice and responsibility? I think that it might be even easier for the personage 
to become more unconscious due to its feature of ‘automatism’ described by Tournier 
(ibid.:113). It is the concept of ‘the collective unconscious’ that Jung (1966) uses to 
explain the problem of ‘persona’ (personage) in his research and works. He says that ‘so 
long as the ego is identical with the persona, individuality forms an essential content of 
the collective unconscious’ (ibid.:304).28  Those observations from Tournier are also 
confirmed by the examples or explanations discussed in some other scholars’ works.29 
We can see that the images of the true person acquire their source from other people 
and the entire environment as well as from the human him/herself (Tournier 1957:21), 
and all these additions cannot be removed completely. Even if negative masking is 
                                                
27 See also Merton (1961:35), Schlenker (1975), Schlenker and Riess (1979), Schlenker and Weigold 
(1990), Yáng Zhōngfāng 楊中芳 (1991a:50 n.2), Tice (1992), Leary et al. (1994), Baumeister (1999b), 
Rafaeli and Harness (2002), Rohr (2004:43), Lewis and Neighbors (2005), and Martin (2006). 
28 Marie-Louise von Franz (1915-1998) (1964:161, eo) explains that ‘the ego’ in Carl Jung’s definition is 
the centre of consciousness and that ‘only if I know a thing is it conscious’.  
29 For example, William James (1901:1, 294–5), the Editorial Board of Zhanglaoshi Yuekan (1987), Daniel 
Goleman (1996), and Zhai Xuewei (2010). 
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inevitable as discussed above, is it indeed hard to find out what the real or ‘unadulterated 
self’30 is? The answer must be negative. As personage is related to ‘the motives of our 
behaviour’, even some of which are unconscious, we have to admit we are profoundly 
uncertain if we are honest. (ibid.:53, 58). Tournier even says that ‘the person pure and 
simple does not exist’ (ibid.:130). 
In the pragmatists’ theory of the self, the dialogical self is more social than 
individual (Wiley 2006:16). For R. S. Perinbanayagam (2000:1, 4 ,5), the self even has 
no ‘continuous existence’ or doesn’t exist per se but ‘only as a facet of interaction’, 
namely ‘a mechanism’. In other words, the self only exists for its function of getting along 
with others from a social perspective. The repressed behaviour of masking indeed exists 
prevalently in dialogical acts but the pragmatists might not be concerned with it as a 
problem because their theory of meaning is ‘an action-based or practical’ one (Wiley 
2006:5). Through ‘addressive actions’, the dialogical discourses decide ‘you and your 
relationship to others’ (Perinbanayagam 2000:2). Because of the ‘practical consequences’ 
orientation (Wiley 2006:5), the existence of self depends objectively more ‘upon the 
reaction of others (Perinbanayagam 2000:3).  
The pragmatists’ concept of the self, therefore, looks very similar to a traditional 
and post-traditional Ruist account of the concept of the self because the selves in both are 
dependent on others and the relationship with others. Since traditional and post-traditional 
Ruist selfhood is the concept of interdependent self, it might not tend to prescribe or 
require consistency between one’s external behaviour and internal attributes (Markus & 
Kitayama 1991a:41). I will discuss this in C4 and C8. 
                                                
30 Tournier (1957:33, 46, 61). 
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4. More Considerations of Some Concepts Concerning the Person 
There are several observations made by Tournier in this context that are worth considering 
in greater detail. They are related to what we might view as virtuous, beneficial, helpful 
or contributing concepts of a human being, especially as found among PTRIC people 
(except Item Five) but they are in fact detrimental to the development of being a real 
person.  
(1) ‘In introspection, … the person vanishes’; the person is ‘buried in’ oneself in 
‘solitude’ but ‘asserted’ when one is in dialogue with others because the person is 
‘made more definite’ through one’s established personal relationships with others, 
even if the others are ‘silent’ in their presence. (Tournier 1957:168). In terms of self-
understanding, Moltmann (1967:65) also has similar concerns about solo self-
reflection without the world. Furthermore, the meaning of this dialogical self with 
others cannot be sustained coherently without a relationship to the creator God. I find 
that, in this sense of dialoguing with others, Tournier’s dialogical self is different from 
the one in pragmatism, for Tournier’s self is not defined entirely by one’s relationship 
to other people by dialogue but is created in the image of God and defined by one’s 
relationship with that Other, God. In Tournier, the person has his/her own meaning 
defined by God, which can be strengthened or weakened through dialogue with other 
people but in the pragmatist’s position that meaning is founded on the practical 
consequences which decide the self as a good or bad dialogical mechanism. 
(2) Indoctrinating others is ‘acting as a personage and not as a person’ (Tournier 
1957:192). The superior, instead of equal, position is taken in dialogical answering 
with ‘advice, exhortation … theories … denunciation … [and] moral uplift’ 
(ibid.:191). Consequently, the personage appears in the superior who inclines to 
confine him/herself to ‘the objective world of things’ but not ‘entering the subjective 
world of persons’ (ibid.). What one is concerned with in this position tends to be 
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‘ideas’ instead of ‘the person’ (ibid.). In this ‘crushing and repressing’ way, the 
personage of the inferior is also induced and imposed because the dialogue is 
substituted by a ‘moralizing or proselytizing’ preaching (ibid.:192). For Tournier, 
only being interested in others as persons can liberate them from wearing the 
personage, and so encourage them towards ‘self-knowledge and sincerity’ because of 
the importance of ‘making a personal decision’ in the formation of the person 
(ibid.:193).  
(3) ‘Prolonged indecision is a poison’ to the person (Tournier 1957:201). The people with 
such indecision arising from ‘inner conflict’ caused by ‘domineering’ others, such as 
parents or superiors might look like personages that lose their selves, for they have no 
clear sense about their own ‘tastes … beliefs … and aim in life’ (ibid.:201). 
(4) Irresistible ‘social conformity’ buries the person underneath his/her personages 
(Tournier 1957:204). When everybody obeys the ‘done thing’ so unquestionably that 
it is too arduous or dreadful to become detached from the flock, such a social 
community turns to be ‘a game of personages’ (ibid., eo). Durkheim (1951:252) also 
points out that obedience to regulation and the authority and power behind it should 
be out of respect, but not of fear, which, Rogers argues as mentioned above, will make 
one decide not to reveal one’s real self. Martin Luther (1520b:30f.) asserts that any 
kind of obedience and other good works would become ‘nothing but mere sham, show 
and pretence’ if it is out of one’s faith in the creator God’s love.  
(5) Self-denial taught and valued in Christianity (e.g. Matthew 16:24-6; Luke 9:23-5) 
‘means … refusing to invent for oneself a conventional personage’ (Tournier 
1957:226). Self-denial has been mistakenly understood as compelling oneself to wear 
a ‘self-effacing personage’, suppressing one’s real judgments and convictions, and 
‘pretending to have others which one has not got’ (ibid.). I find that the real meaning 
of self-denial, therefore, is to entrust one’s life and its direction to God’s guidance, so 
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that He may bring alive one’s person according to His plan and purpose. When one 
desires to seek God’s will, one will certainly dare to assert the real person within them 
because at this stage one’s oughts becomes one’s intents. 
(6) Dependence on one’s own ability results in a ‘new artificial personage over the top of 
the first’ (ibid.:223). For Tournier, the true solution for the problems caused by the 
hindrances within the personage is the ‘grace’ granted by God (to be explored in detail 
immediately below) rather than ‘the pseudo-solution of pathological reactions’ 
(ibid.:220). These pseudo-solutions include ‘one’s own will-power … good 
resolutions … the impulsions of instinct and the determinism of powerful 
psychological complexes’ (ibid.:223). Although they might succeed in overcoming ‘a 
minor failing such as untidiness’, all of them will not eventually strengthen but ruin 
the person’s forces and lead to a lasting conflict and the new ‘slavery of one’s own 
resolutions’. This will not allow flexibility or ‘personal fancy’. Consequently, ‘a state 
of anxiety’ will be the end result (ibid.). 
5. The Self and its Social Behaviour in PTRIC Contexts 
However, it has been noted that the understanding of the self and the repressively imposed 
mask in the PTRIC context is not the same as in other cultural contexts, especially in the 
individualist-oriented context. Can the theoretical bases for the knowledge of the RFS in 
general presented above be applied to PTRIC contexts? In his analytic study of the 
individual differences between the ‘behavioural and personality constructs’, Anthony G. 
Greenwald (1982:139) discusses the correlation between the self’s social behaviour and 
level of (‘intrapersonally oriented’) individualism or level of (‘socially oriented’) 
collectivism. He displays the contrasting features between intrapersonally and socially 




Chart E.1 Intrapersonally and Socially Oriented Psychological Constructs (Greenwald 1982:128) 
 
According to Lu Luo’s (2008) study in testing his contemporary Chinese bicultural 
self theory, all the features of both intrapersonally (individually) and socially oriented 
psychological constructs can be seen in the PTRIC.31 This evidence manifests that the 
theoretical bases for the knowledge of the RFS in general can be also applied to explain 
the self and its social behaviour in PTRIC contexts. We can see that among the features 
in socially oriented psychological constructs, impression management and self-
presentation consistency tend to be directly related to the RFS while the self has no 
freedom to make its own personal choice under the social imposition formed in the other 
indirect socially oriented psychological constructs: conformity, affiliation, social 
comparison, need for approval, public self-consciousness, and high self-monitoring. 
A pioneer of cross-cultural psychology, Harry C. Triandis (1989:506), explores 
further the differences between social behaviours of the self in different social 
environments.32 Based on the distinction of self into ‘private, public, [and] collective’ 
facets (Greenwald and Pratkanis 1984), 33  he uses these as indicators to see their 
                                                
31 See also Chang Weining and Wong Kaishi (2008). 
32 William James (1901:182–94) divides the empirical life of self into ‘material me’, ‘social me’, and 
‘spiritual me’. However, the problem of the repressed form of self is related to the social behaviours of the 
self. James’ division of the self will not be discussed in this thesis due to the limitation of space.  
33 See also Baumeister and Tice (1986:64–8) and Breckler and Greenwald (1986). 
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differences across multiple cultures, differentiated by ‘three dimensions of cultural 
variation (individualism-collectivism, tightness-looseness, [and] cultural complexity)’. In 
this study, he examines cultures from three aspects: ‘the environment, childrearing 
patterns, and cultural patterns’. The definitions of the private self, public self, and 
collective self in Triandis’ and Greenwald and Pratkanis’ studies are integrated and 
displayed in Chart E.2.  
According to their definitions, it is clear that the real self in this research is identical 
with the private self defined by Triandis; it is also clear that the self in Ru-based 
collectivism is more collective than public. June Ock Yum (1988:375) argues that the Ru-
based collectivism in East Asia is more ‘a collectivism only among those bound by social 
networks’ instead of ‘any abstract concern for a general collective body’.34 This kind of 
collectivism might give people the impression of ‘egocentrism’ (Fèi, Xiàotōng 費孝通
1992:67) rather than the typical collectivism (Yang, Zhongfang 1991b:94–5). It will be 
discussed more in C5S4.1.2. 
 
                                                
34 Hui C. Harry and Triandis (1926-) (1986:240) distinguish two main types of collectivism according to 
which range is in view: (1) ‘a certain subset of people’; and (2) ‘the entire universe of human beings’ 
(Triandis, Bontempo, et al. 1988:333). This will be discussed more in C4S4.5. However, although post-
traditional Japanese people are influenced by traditional Ruism as well as post-traditional Chinese people, 
their nation, company, society are generally more important to post-traditional Japanese persons than their 
family as their main collective group. The definitions, attributes, and types of individualism and 
collectivism are given in A-C.  
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Chart E.2 The Definitions of the Private, Public, and Collective Selves (Triandis 1989:507; Greenwald 
and Pratkanis 1984:159) 
 
The findings of Triandis’ (1989:517) study manifest that people in a more 
individualistic culture tend to have a more private self and people in a more collectivistic 
culture a more collective self. When the selves of people are more collective, they are 
more inclined to be influenced or imposed ‘by the norms, role definitions, and values of 
the particular collective’ and behave according to others’ expectations in the collective 
(ibid.). The private self tends to behave in an ‘exchange relationship’ with others (ibid.). 
However, the collective self tends to behave in a ‘communal relationship’ with others, 
and its social behaviour tends to be communal (ibid.). Triandis explains from the result 
of his study that the public and collective selves are more ‘allocentric’ but the private is 
more ‘idiocentric’ (ibid.:508). The public self is higher self-monitoring and situation-
dependent but the private self is more ‘stable’ and ‘situation[-]independent’ (ibid.:508). 
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The collective self tends to subordinate personal to collective goals and benefits but the 
private self does not (ibid.:509). 
In comparison with modern Europeans or North Americans, the post-traditional 
East Asian sense of self is more collective; thus ‘group norms or … goals’ are more 
important among them. Triandis (1989:511) also stated that ‘[modern] China is a 
collectivist’.35 In such a culture, the private self seems unimportant. Therefore, Triandis’ 
cross-cultural study verifies that Tournier’s concept in general can be appropriately 
applied to PTRIC contexts.  
It has been noted that there is not as meaningful a distinction between self (‘zìwǒ’
「自我」) and ego (‘yīwǒ’「一我」) in the psychological studies of post-traditional 
Chinese selfhood as there is in the psychological studies of Anglo-European Western 
selfhood since the self and ego in Chinese language is usually devalued to be self-serving, 
self-caring, and selfish (Yang, Zhongfang 1991a:18, eo).36 This can be explained by the 
Chinese collective self described above.37 
Although Yang Zhongfang does not agree to use the term collective to describe the 
post-traditional Chinese self, she (1991b:101) concludes that the relation between their 
self and society is a relation between ‘bāohán’ 「包含」 (inclusion) and ‘héyī’ 「合一」 
(uniting) instead of between ‘gèrén’ 「個人」 (individual) and ‘zǒnghé’ 「總合」
(summation). In order to attain the ideal of self and society fusing into one (‘róng wéi yītǐ’
                                                
35 See also Triandis et al. (1990:1018f.) and Power (2007:129). 
36 However, Léi Tíng 雷霆 (1991) does deep research on the differentiation between ‘self’ (‘zìjǐ’ 「自己」) 
and ‘ego’ (‘zìwǒ’「自我」). It is worth noting that his English translations for these two words are different 
from Yang Zhongfang’s translation, even opposite for ziji and ziwo. See also Yu Dehui (1987b:5) and Yang 
Zhongfang (1991b:111, 125–32). However, the meanings of the English terms self and ego and their 
distinction might also vary depending on their definitions in the contexts. For example, ego might not 
always denote one’s isolated individuality but also denote one’s sociality (Sherif & Cantril 1947:117, 131; 
Greenwald 1982:112f.). Ego might be even defined as ‘nothing but the social part of man’ (Allport 
1943:458). 
37 The summary of four social psychological studies on self-boundary by Yáng Yíyīn 楊宜音 (1999) 
introduces all the above types of differentiations of the self. 
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「融為一體」), it must make the ‘zìjǐ’ 「自己」(social self) transcend the ‘gèjǐ’ 「個
己」(individual self)38 by means of the work of individual ‘nèizhuǎn’ 「內轉」 (inner-
transformation). In that ideal status, the individual self (‘gèjǐ’ 「個己」) does not exist 
any longer or is ‘decentralized’ (Sampson 1985) or ‘ensembled’ (Sampson 1988).39 But 
even if the term collective is avoided, the traits of the self described by Yang Zhongfang 
seem similar to the traits of the self in the aforementioned collectivism. 
Whichever term is adopted, if it is not given an additional specified definition to 
denote the traits of the self, it always tends to fall into the problems of generalization, 
simplification, and reductionism. A Chinese psychologist, Yang, Kuoshu 楊國樞 (p. 
Yáng Guóshū) (1986a:162), presents a helpful and comprehensive diagram with his 
proposed interactionistic relation among dominant traditional Ruism and ‘Chinese social 
structure’, ‘Chinese socialization practices’, and Chinese ‘social-oriented character’ to 
disclose the traits of post-traditional Chinese self (character).40 Through Diagram E.1, the 
picture of the traits of post-traditional Chinese self becomes clearer than any single term 
can describe. As mentioned above, Lu Luo (2008) present a ‘bicultural self theory’ to 
include and explain the dual ‘components’ of post-traditional Chinese self — the ‘social-
oriented’ and the ‘individual-oriented’ — in the era of collision between tradition and 
modernization. 41  The discussions in this research will focus more on the former 
                                                
38 For explaining the Chinese self, Yang Zhongfang (1991b:97) makes a nuanced distinction between ‘zìjǐ’ 
「自己」and ‘gèjǐ’ 「個己」. He uses geji to represent the narrow self limited in its entity and ziji to 
denote generally the broad self-containing specific other people. According to their definitions, geji is 
translated as the individual self and ziji as the social self in this thesis.  
39 The noun form of ensembled used for describing the concept of social self can be traced to Karl Marx 
(1818-83). Marx (1845:14) argues in his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (1804–1872) that the single individual in 
reality is ‘the ensemble of the social relations’ (Gould 2001:1545). ‘[a]n encompassing self’ is coined for 
this similar ideal self in Tu Weiming’s language (1990a:175; 1985:47, 77, 137). 
40 Yang Kuoshu also comprehensively discusses the features of Chinese self and its social behaviour in 
another work (1988). See also Yang, Kuoshu et al. (2010). 
41 See also Yang, Kuoshu et al. (ibid.). 
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component because the social-oriented self is more related to traditional and post-




Diagram E.1 Yang Kuoshu’s Interactionistic View of the Traits of Post-Traditional Chinese Self 
(Character) (1986a:162) 
 
As manifested in A-G, Francis L. K. Hsu (ibid.:29, eo), the Chinese psychological 
anthropologist, insightfully rendered 人  (rén), the Chinese word for ‘[hu]man’ into 
‘personage’ rather than person. The reason for this rendering is because that the post-
traditional Chinese conception of human is not based on the individual’s ‘separate entity’ 
(ibid.:23) and ‘psyche’ distinct from his/her social roles but on ‘the individual’s 
transactions with his fellow human beings’ (ibid.:29).42 Therefore, the theoretical bases 
for the knowledge of the RFS in general, discussed above, are manifested to be applicable 
to PTRIC contexts. Francis L. K. Hsu’s psycho-sociogram of a human and his concept of 
the personage in Chinese contexts are presented in A-G for reference. 
                                                
42 See also Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:511). 
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Besides, how one’s individual autonomy responds to external oughts from the 
society also decides the formation of the RFS. Based on Kon’s (1986:168) 
aforementioned revealing differentiation between the self and the imposed mask in 
defining them through their relations, two elements must be considered in terms of the 
individual autonomy in responding to external oughts: competency43 and willingness. If 
the person cannot refuse to do what one is either incompetent or unwilling to do, the 
personage will be imposed to be put on in order to pretend to conform to the external 
oughts. The degree of being repressed of the self depends on one’s willingness and 
competency in facing external oughts. The discussion with diagrammatic illustration is 
presented in A-H for reference. 
6. Describing the Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts 
Contemporary Non-Ruist scholars in a variety of disciplines, as mentioned in C1, are 
concerned about the RFS in PTRIC contexts and criticize PTRIC Ruist relational ethics 
and selfhood as its main cause. However, they do not use the same terms and phases to 
describe and discuss it.  
Stephen K. K. Cheng (1990:510), a Chinese senior social worker, draws attention 
to three behaviour traits common in East Asian Ruist contexts, two of which are 
manifestation of a RFS: lack of personality and lack of assertiveness. He (ibid., eo) states: 
First, the East Asian’s lack of personality is traced to the Confucian social institution of Li 
(禮 [p. Lǐ: rites]) … Second, the East Asian’s lack of principled moral thinking is linked to 
the dyadic, relation-based character of the Confucian ethic, its lack of hypothetical reasoning 
and its hierarchical view of human relationships. Third, the East Asian’s lack of assertiveness 
is rooted in the Confucian ideal of [hu]man as a reflection of harmony in the cosmos and the 
Confucian ideal of society as based on the fulfilment of duties rather than the assertion of 
rights. 
Stephen K. K. Cheng’s statement, like most of the scholars in my sources, tends to 
be too reductionist and generalizing, thus more or less overstating, by regarding neither 
                                                
43 The term competency denotes here both the capability to reach external oughts and the capability to look 
likely to reach external oughts. 
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the cultural and ethnic plurality in modern East Asia nor the differences of post-traditional 
Ruist contexts among different modern Chinese societies as mentioned in C1. Neither 
does he consider each of traits as a spectrum with its different degrees. But are these three 
behaviour traits related to Ruist contexts accordingly totally groundless and thus 
invalidated? In this research, I will not examine such kinds of expression by Stephen K. 
K. Cheng, as well as by many other scholars, as either quantitative or qualitative 
statements. I will consider them as evidence stating a tendency and prevalence of a trait 
and examine their validity through other common evidence of observation, empirical 
proof, argument, and interpretation of their sources of influence. 
For example, Stephen K. K. Cheng (ibid.:511) describes the lack of personality as 
lack of ‘a conscious sense of being an individual person’, a lack of ‘any individual 
personality at all’, a lack of ‘central core of personality’, and ‘encasing the personality of 
the individual within the parameters of his prescribed roles’, to the severest extent that 
there is hardly difference between one’s individuality and these roles. I consider this as 
the severest as the loss of self because one’s individuality is dissolved into them. 
Therefore, even though his descriptions of such problems tend to be too reductionist and 
generalizing, if the trait he is concerned about is to some extent prevalent in modern East 
Asia, including PTRIC societies, it cannot be ignored. Joan G. Miller (1994:18) points 
out from an American perspective that social expectations are recognized as ‘external 
impositions’ on the individual self, especially when the self and the role expected are 
sharply distinctive. A Chinese psychologist, David Y.F. Ho (1994:349), observes that 
‘cultural definition imposes a limit on the individual’s freedom of action’, for example, 
Ruist filial piety.44 Therefore, social imposition is obviously a direct cause of a RFS. Lack 
                                                
44 Or ‘group restrictions imposed on [one’s] outer behaviour … in the Chinese case’ (Saari 1982:43). 
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of personality is a description of it. Social imposition on the individual self is not unique 
to but fortified in the PTRIC contexts. 
As explained in C1, the individual self in the Ruist context is a relational self. 
Therefore, the RFS is understood and discussed from a social psychological perspective 
because in this thesis it is developed in the interaction of the individual self with others 
(Spitzmuller and Ilies 2010:306–8).45 I integrate the findings of my exploration of the 
correlation of PTRIC relational selfhood and the RFS expressed in various ways and 
summarize them as follows (Please note that most of scholars discuss Ruism and its 
related issues in a reductionist and generalizing way and thus I interpret them as a 
prevalent tendency at large): 
(1)  The more hierarchical a social structure is, especially within a familial setting,46 the 
easier the individual self tends to become a socially-imposed relational self that can 
lead to selfhood-related problems. Bodde (1953:47–8) points out that in a collectivist 
society,47 hierarchical structure is perceived as an ideal way to organize relationships 
to make it function as a ‘harmonious organism’ for the ‘common good’, a value on 
which traditional and post-traditional Ruism places the ‘greatest insistence’ (ibid.).48 
For ancient Ruists, followed by all later Ruists, take an ordered unequal society for 
granted in order to maintain social harmony (ibid.:47–8, 67–9). Accordingly, 
harmony and hierarchy are twins in contemporary Ruist China (Rhyne 2014:website). 
The corollaries of this are authoritarian-oriented relationships characterized by ‘a 
                                                
45 See also Taylor (1989:33). 
46  The hierarchical social structure includes both the public and private social spheres. Although the 
hierarchical emphasis has been becoming weaker in both realms amongst post-traditional Chinese people 
in general, the concept is still manifested, especially in family social setting, which influences the ethical 
value system, upbringing, education and family relationship and interpersonal relationship in PTRIC 
society. 
47  See also See also Hofstede (1980), Bond et al. (1982b:158), and Ambrose Y. C. King and Bond 
(1985:36). 
48 See also Wu Chinghsiung (1976:81–3), Yeh Minghua and Yang Kuoshu (1997:175, 182), and Wang 
Qian et al. (2007:215). 
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large power distance’ and social imposition on the relational self (Leung, Kwok 
2010:232).49 No wonder ‘yángfèng yīnwéi’ 「陽奉陰違」 (passive resistance)50 or 
‘feigned compliance the norm’ (Pye 1988:80f.) as a display of a RFS becomes post-
traditional Chinese’s popular attitude towards the superior (Liu, Shuhsien 1991:54–
5).51 Henry Rosemont, Jr. (2012:lecture) indicates that the relationships in such a 
social structure are ‘intrinsic to such a self: remove the relationships and there is 
nothing left’. The statement of Rosemont, Jr. is indeed overstating but I think that it 
is meant to exaggerate the dominant role of relationships in shaping this kind of self. 
In confirmation of these observations, Richard H. Solomon (1971:78–80) 
differentiates three contradictions inherent in the Ruist tradition which all involve the 
issue of the self:  
A.  ‘dependency on hierarchical authority versus self-assertion’;  
B. ‘social harmony and peace versus hostility and aggression’;  
C. ‘group’ versus ‘self’. 
Therefore, a socially-imposed relational self in hierarchy-oriented social contexts is 
to some extent unavoidable. Many other different expressions of this RFS in Ru-
influenced Chinese hierarchical social contexts are adopted by scholars in their 
discussions. For example, Ru-influenced social-imposition would lead to the 
tendencies of being very hard to live out the true I.52 In other words, such a socially-
                                                
49 See also Saari (1982:43). 
50 I.e. outwardly obeying but secretly ignoring or ‘obey publicly and defy privately’ (Hwang, Kwangkuo 
1998:30f.). 
51 See also Lin Anwu (1997:73–4). 
52 Li Lukyan 李耀全 and Kwok Hung Biu 郭鴻標 (p. Guō Hóngbiāo) (2005:18f., eo). Other similar terms 
often used by scholars to describe the tendency of the self due to a socially-imposed relational self in a 
hierarchy-emphasized social structure are ‘chénmò [zìwǒ]’「沈默 [自我]」 (silencing the self) (Zhuāng, 
Huìqiū 莊慧秋 1987a) , ‘[zìwǒ de] tuìsuō’「[自我的]退縮」(shrinking back or withdrawal of the self) (Li, 
Lukyan and Kwok, Hung Biu 2005:18f.), ‘méiyǒu zìwǒ’「沒有自我」(Sun, Lungkee 1983 reprinted in 
2004:178, eo; Zhèng, Zhèngbó 鄭正博 1990; Bái, Chóngliàng 白崇亮 2007:31), namely ‘there is no self’ 
(Smith, Huston 2009:180), ‘sàngshī zìwǒ’「喪失自我」 (lose the self) (Lin, Liyun 1987:2), ‘be the 
absence of self’ (Doi 1981:137–8), ‘the losing of [one’s] own self ’ (Wong, Melvin 2001:24), ‘ego deficits 
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imposed relational self, in the five-cardinal relationships in Ruist ethics, tends to be 
‘[bèi] yāzhì xiǎowǒ’ 「[被]壓制」 (suppressed),53 ‘[bèi] biǎnyì zìjǐ’ 「[被]貶抑」
(demeaned) (Sun, Lungkee 1983 reprinted in 2004:17), ‘bèi xiāomǐ’ 「被消弭」
(eliminated). 54  Under this Ru-influenced culture which imposes the priority of 
relationality, the expression of such people is inclined to ‘chéngwéi wěijunzi’「成為
偽君子」 (become a hypocrite) (Dong, Fangyuan 1995:298),55 ‘lack of personality’ 
(Cheng, Stephen K. K. 1990:510, eo), the ‘loss’ of the self (Rosemont 2012:lecture),56 
and ‘having no self’ (Doi 1981:137–8). 
(2)  The more a culture stresses moral self-cultivation (xiūshēn 修身) and filial piety, the 
more performance is highly valued. Many different expressions of the RFS in PTRIC 
contexts with a strong ideology of moral self-cultivation and filial piety are adopted 
by scholars in their discussions. For example, being human (‘zuòrén’ ｢做人｣)57 (Sun, 
Lungkee 1983 reprinted in 2004:22) and ‘being somebody’ (Fleming, Jess 2002:183) 
demands one (Lin, Xiaodong 2010:259–60) to perform to the satisfaction of others 
(Tu, Weiming 1985:47, 55), especially one’s seniors. Accordingly, the problem of the 
                                                
where the self was underdeveloped’ (Wong, Melvin 2001:31). Silencing the self (and depression as its 
result) associated with an unequal relationship has been studied and proved in quite a few researches some 
of which are cross-cultural studies although not in the PTRCI context (Jack 1999:190f.; Jack et al. 2010; 
Sikka et al. 2010; Mauthner 2010; Stoppard 2010; Jack and Ali 2010). 
53 Lin Honghsin 林鴻信 (p. Lín Hóngxìn) (2008b:57). See also Zhū, Cénlóu 朱岑樓 (1988:99–100, 117f.). 
54  Yáng Jiànlóng 楊劍龍  (2012:372). Other similar expressions are such as: to be undistinguishable 
‘móhúhuà’ 「模糊化｣ (Sun, Lungkee 1983 reprinted in 2004:3 of the preface to the revised ed., eo), ‘[bèi] 
yāyì’「[被]壓抑」 (oppressed) (Yeh, Minghua and Yang, Kuoshu 1997:206f., 210; Zhong, Weiqiang 
2005b:13; Hwang, Kwangkuo 2006:174), ‘bèi hūlüè’「被忽略」 (ignored) (Yang, Jienlong 2012:372, 
386), and ‘zāo mòshā’ 「遭抹殺」  (effaced) (Sun, Lungkee 1983 reprinted in 2004:35, eo; Ames 
2006:316) or ‘self-effacing’ (Bond, Michael H. et al. 1982b; Crittenden 1996:270; Stipek 1998:618f.), ‘[gè] 
rén … bèi zhēngfā diào’ 「[個]人 … 被蒸發掉」(the [individual] person evaporates) (Sun, Lungkee 1983 
reprinted in 2004:12). 
55 See also Stephen B. Young (1998:142) and Lin Honghsin (2008b:205–7). 
56 See also Cole (1971:6, 19f.). 
57 Although translated as being human, the phrase ‘zuòrén’ ｢做人｣  in the Chinese context, actually 
emphasizes more doing, behaving, and acting than being. Therefore, it can be translated as behaving or 
acting as human. 
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socially-imposed relational self becomes heightened. When the ones who live in such 
a Ru-influenced society are incapable of performing sufficiently well, they gradually 
become prone to hiding weakness and pretending to be good enough. 
Consequentially, people tend to hide their true feelings and thoughts,58 wear a mask 
(Zhuang, Huiqiu 1987c:172, 187).59  Then the ‘persona’ (‘role performance as a 
mask’)60 endures the self to be diminished ‘zìwǒ yāsuō’ ｢自我壓縮｣ (Sun, Lungkee 
1983 reprinted in 2004:22–3, eo).61 Ultimately, a performance-oriented culture tends 
to suggest a utilitarian form of interaction,62 and hence it reinforces tendencies of 
‘hypocrisy’ (Dong, Fangyuan 1995:298). 
(3)  The more a culture combines Ru-based collectivism, ‘miànzi’ ｢面子｣ (face) culture 
(Yu, Dehui 1987b:4), shame culture, and a strong ideology of harmony 63 (Weber 
2007:230)64 and filial piety all together, all of which are closely related directly or 
indirectly to traditional Ruist teachings, the severer the RFS is in it. Melvin Wong 
(2001:38–43) points out, in this cultural context, not only might one allow one’s true 
feelings and thoughts to be suppressed by others and culture,65 albeit passively and 
                                                
58 Dǒng Fāngyuàn 董芳苑 (1995:298). 
59  See also Lin Liyun (1987:6), Yu Dehui (1987b:6), Liu Shuhsien (1988:263–5), and Zhai Xuewei 
(2010:181–203). 
60 Alister E. McGrath and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:37–8, eo). 
61 See also Lin Liyun (1987:6). 
62 David Y. H. Wu and Tseng Wenshing (1985:9–11). 
63 ‘To sacrifice the small self for the good of the great self’ is highly valued in the Ruist context (Abbott 
1970:295–6, 302; Li, Minlong and Yang, Kuoshu 1998:10, 54; Guō, Qīngxiāng 郭清香 2006:82, 90; 
Broadbent 2010:18), the small self (xiǎowǒ 小我) means the individual person in contrast to the great self 
(dàwǒ 大我), or the social self, referring to the collective group the individual person belongs to. It has 
been noted that, in twenty-first century colloquial Chinese language, the Chinese original noun héxié 和諧 
for English word harmony is used as a verb to mean sarcastically sacrificing the inharmonious parts for 
keeping the harmony of the whole.  
64 See also Bodde (1953:46–51, 67–9), Abbott (1970:302), Kuo Chienlin and Kavanagh (1994:554–7), Yeh 
Kuanghui and Bedford (2003:224), and Wei Xiaohong and Li Qingyuan (2013). 
65 In the traditional Ruist concept of parenting, the children should be taught ‘never [to] reveal [their] 
thoughts and feelings’ (Wu, David Y. H. 1996:146). 
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reluctantly, but also one might get used to suppressing one’s true feelings and 
thoughts actively for the sake of preserving one’s face and suppressing shameful 
feelings. 66  In the scholars’ discussions of the socially-imposed relational self in 
PTRIC contexts, many different descriptions for such an active behaviour of 
suppression of one’s feelings and thoughts are as follows: ‘niǔqǔ yuánlái de wǒ’ 「扭
曲原來的我」 (distort the original I) (Lin, Liyun 1987:2), ‘chénmò de dàduōshù’
「沈默的大多數」(the silent majority),67 and wear a mask as mentioned above.68 In 
the face cultural contexts, there is a lack of recognition of the distinction of sincerity 
and acting (Zhai, Xuewei 2010:344).69 Although sincerity is highly valued in both 
traditional and post-traditional Ruist ethics as mentioned above and discussed in C4 
and C5, a recent research on personal honesty in fifteen western and eastern countries 
discloses that the people in China are the least honest (Hugh-Jones 2016). 
(4)  As mentioned above, the tendency of losing the self (Lin, Liyun 1987:2) and lack of 
personality among post-traditional Chinese persons is highly significant in cultures 
and societies influenced more by traditional Ruism than other cultural forms of life.70 
                                                
66 For example, surveys among junior high school students in Taiwan disclose their low self-satisfaction. 
In explanation of this phenomenon, the psychologist, Yang Zhongfang (1991a:27) attributes it to the 
possible cultural factor that self-satisfaction is not allowed in Chinese Ru-influenced culture which 
emphasizes ceaseless moral self-cultivation. Self-satisfaction and most other words describing a similar 
meaning are negatively viewed as a form of pride that hinders one’s growth in self-cultivation (Yang, 
Zhongfang 1991b:111). 
67 Yáng Màochūn 楊懋春 (1989:341). 
68 Other similar expressions are: ‘[shǐ] zìwǒ … yǐnérbúzhāng’ 「[使]自我 … 隱而不彰」 (to make the self 
implicit yet unclear) (Lin, Liyun 1987:2, eo), ‘bǎ zìwǒ shōuqǐlái’ 「把自我收起來」(to close up my own 
self) (Yè, Pǐnfāng 葉品芳 1991, cited in Yu, Dehui 1991d:6f., eo), ‘to forget or to be away from my own 
self’ (Lin, Liyun 1991b:70), ‘yāpò zìjǐ’ 「壓迫自己」 (to oppress my own self) (Lin, Liyun 1991b:78), to 
live in others’ shadow (Lǚ, Zhèngdá 呂政達 1991:80), ‘jiāochū … zìwǒ’ 「交出 … 自我」 (to surrender 
my own self) (Lu, Zhengda 1991:80), ‘zuòjiàn zìjǐ’ 「作踐自己」 (to humiliate my own self) (Yu, Dehui 
1991b:104), ‘to self-abnegate’, and become ‘wúwǒ’「無我」 (‘selfless’) (Ames 2006:312f.). 
69 Zhai Xuewei (2010:341) even states that ‘the complementarity of Ruism and Daoism is the foundation 
of the philosophy of life as play that is regarded and upheld by Chinese people’.  
70 See also Lǐ Mǐnlóng 李敏龍 and Yang Kuoshu 楊國樞 (p. Yáng Guóshū) (1998:54). 
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In post-traditional Ruism, loss of self is mainly a by-product resulting from 
attaining to ‘moral achievement’ (Fleming 2002:185) by way of self-cultivation in order 
to live a better life in a socially-imposing relational and hierarchical society. But how can 
one have no self, or come to the loss of one’s self, or the absence of one’s self? 
Undoubtedly, it does not mean that one has no existing self but denotes metaphorically 
that one remains uncertain to some degree of ‘what [one’s] real nature’ is (Tournier 
1957:46); or that the meaning of one’s individual self is missing; that one has even 
‘forg[otten]’ or ‘abandon[ed] one’s deeper [individual] self’ (Bond, Jean 1993:back 
cover). In other words, in summary, one’s individual self is hidden behind a social mask 
(Zhai, Xuewei 2010:181–203).71 I will discuss more what this means later. 
From the summary above, many psychologists, sociologists, and scholars in 
religious studies are concerned with this kind of issue of relational selfhood in Ru-based 
cultural heritage that Yang Kuoshu (2002:88–9) calls ‘situational determinism’ in social 
relationships (to be explained more in C4 and C8).72 Having integrated the scholars’ 
concerns, Ru-influenced relational selfhood might result in to some extent:  
(1) ‘the tendency to obey authority blindly’ (Liu, Shuhsien 1996a:111);  
(2) alienation between ‘the public self’ and ‘the private self’ (Yang, Zhongfang 
1991b:131–2), between ‘yīngrán’ 「應然」 (the oughts prescribed for the one’s 
social roles) and ‘shírán’ 「實然」 (the reality or intents in one’s heart) (Yeh, 
Kuanghui 2002:241, eo),73 or between ‘assumed’ (obligatory and imposed) and ‘real’ 
(voluntary);74  
                                                
71 See also Zhānglǎoshī Yuèkān 張老師月刊 (1987). 
72 See also Francis L. K. Hsu (1963:164-5), Theodore T. Y. Hsieh et al. (1969) and Li Changjun (2010). 
73 Intents means what one intends or would like to do. Oughts means what one thinks one should do 
according to other’s expectation. About the discussion and definition of intents from oughts in detail, see 
S3 above. 
74 Hu, HC (1949 quoted in Yeh, Kuanghui 2002:242). See also Yang Kuoshu (2002:102). 
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(3) the tendency to be ‘particularist’,75 which is to value exclusively one’s own ‘primary 
group’ in contrast to any ‘secondary group’, which, relatively speaking, results in 
being indifferent to public affairs, and social morality or righteousness (Zheng, 
Zhengbo 1990:169–70), the norms and measures of which are adjusted according to 
others’ expectation for one’s role and social status,76 thus substantially a kind of 
‘status ethics’ (‘dìwèi lúnlǐ’「地位倫理」) (Hwang, Kwangkuo 2002:155); 77 
(4) the inconsistency of the expressions and acts of the self in different situation, i.e. 
personal inconsistency or self-inconsistency (Yang, Kuoshu 2002:88–9);78  
(5) the obscurity of the boundary between self and other due to the individual is to some 
extent the possession of the superior or the primary group (Pye 1988:58-61-71–74);79 
(6) a lack of self-consciousness of individual self, self-existence, uniqueness, sense of 
direction, object and willingness (Lin, Honghsin 2008a:79);80  
(7) a lack of ‘consciousness with respect to protecting human rights and exploring new 
frontiers’ (Liu, Shuhsien 1996a:111).  
 
                                                
75 Yeh Minghua and Yang Kuoshu (1997:184). 
76 Zhào Zhìyù 趙志裕 (1991:270–81). 
77 Primary group and secondary group are always relative in terms of closeness, importance, and even utility 
in the context of Ruist human relationships. This Ruist feature of relationships is well described and 
explained by a Chinese anthropologist, Fèi Xiàotōng 費孝通 (1910-2005) (English version in 1992:60–
70), in 1948, with his concept and theory of ‘chàxù géjú’ 「差序格局」, namely ‘the differential mode of 
association’ (Chén, Xiǎopíng 陳曉平 2002:23; Lǐ, Xiángjùn 李祥俊 2005:66; Yáng, Yíyīn 楊宜音
2008:154–7). Tu Weiming (2001b:7) call it ‘rén de chàděngxìng’ 「仁的差等性」 (the differential mode 
of benevolence). Through a field survey by Xie Yao (2005), the social behaviour of the differential mode 
of association is proved to exist still even among post-traditional Chinese intellectuals. Scholars use 
different terms to describe and discuss this same Ru-influenced behaviour. A brief summary of it is provided 
in A-K for reference. 
78 See A-DF3. 
79 See also Shenkar and Ronen (1987:565). 




Chart E.3 The Phenomena of the Problems of Self in a PTRIC Society (Hwang, Tsungi 2017 
{forthcoming}: S1) 
 
All these possible tendencies resulting from Ru-influenced relational selfhood 
contribute directly and indirectly to the formation of the RFS in PTRIC contexts. 
However, there is no unified terminology used to describe or define this range of the RFS 
related to PTRIC selfhood in the literature reviewed, partly because they describe 
different degrees of it. Drawing upon the evidence from the related secondary literature, 
I summarize and list the different common expressions of the RFS in a PTRIC society in 
another journal article of mine as shown in Chart E.3. 81 In order to make them be grasped 
easier, I separate them into three rough categories: mild, medium, and severe. Due to the 
lack of literature integrating and discussing these expressions, this rough categorization 
is according to my understanding. The nuanced differentiation in their degrees among 
                                                
81 From my secondary literature, there are innumerable stories of post-traditional Chinese people who share 
their struggle with their repressed form of self regarding their self-disclosure to varying degrees but do not 
always mention their connection with the term Ruism. For examples, as representatives of a much larger 
group of books and articles, see the following: Yu Dehui (1991c:5, 11; 1991d), Liao Huiying (1991:7, 9), 
and Lin Liyun (1991a:12). 
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these different expressions of the RFS in PTRIC contexts deserves to be researched 
through qualitative and quantitative studies to establish a spectrum of the RFS. 
To sum up, the term for the RFS in this research is used to convey the sense that 
one’s real self is repressed before others as it is in every moment of its existence,82 not as 
it was or will be, in other words that one hardly lives out the real self, discloses oneself, 
or allows the expression of one’s real self to be realized. 
 
 
                                                
82 Carl Rogers’ (1961:172, eo) ‘to be all of oneself in each moment’. 
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Appendix F  
The Cause of the Repressed Form of Self 
 
I want to offer a summary of the factors leading to the RFS. Their related main features 
in PTRIC contexts with their relevant sections discussed in C2 will be appended in 
brackets. These factors leading to the RFS are described mainly by Tournier and 
supported by other literature found in psychology and sociology. I classify them into five 
categories as follows. Some of them are mentioned in justifying the existence of the 
problem of the RFS in PTRIC contexts in C1 and C2. Due to the limitations of space, 
they are only enumerated here to show how the RFS is shaped. It is worth noting that 
these various factors regularly overlap, ‘combining’ and ‘interacting’ with each other, 
instead of being individually and exclusively present (Tournier 1957:28). After taking 
root in a persons’ life, they gradually govern one’s ‘attitudes and [one’s] words’ and then 
mould one’s social masks (ibid.:30f.). These five main factors with their primary related 
features in PTRIC contexts include the following main categories: 
(1) the factor of pursuing one’s own ideal (related to moral self-cultivation in C24.2 and 
Ru-based collectivism in C24.3): 
A. for either an ‘altruistic’ end, or an ‘egotistical end’,1 for example, the conquest 
of ‘a woman … money, pleasure, esteem or notoriety’ as an aim (ibid.:30) in a 
utilitarian ideology (Dong, Fangyuan 1995:298); 
B. in order to justify and defend ‘ourselves or our loved ones, or even … our 
opinions and our faith’ (Tournier 1957:30); 
C. because of the force of habit (ibid.:51); 
D. in order to take ‘revenge’ (ibid.:31).  
                                                
1 Pursuing one’s own ideal, no matter whatever one’s aim is for others or for oneself. 
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(2) the factor of adorning and preserving one’s expected and ‘imaginary self’ (Pascal in 
Tournier 1957:32) (related to moral self-cultivation in C24.2 and Ru-based 
collectivism in C24.3): 
A. in order to consolidate ‘prestige’ and to give ‘to others the desired impression’ 
(Tournier 1957:28), or face or ‘miànzi’ 「面子｣ (Yu, Dehui 1987b:4); 
B. in order to play a ‘successful role’ (Tournier 1957: 35-36);2  
C. in order to appear ‘in a favourable light’ (ibid.:36) and to leave a good impression 
in front of others, especially superiors (Yu, Dehui and Gǔ, Bìlíng 古碧玲
1987:67).3  
(3) the factor of tensions created when learning how to survive in a society, especially in a 
settled unequal relationship (Schwalbe 2009:140)4 (related to Ru-based collectivism 
in C24.3 and hierarchical society in C24.4): 
A. because of:  
1. expectations from culture (Rogers 1961:169);5 
2. collectivist ideology which tends to collective interest at the expense of 
individuality (Doi 1981:132–41);6 ‘socialization’ (Jack 1999:191–5); 
3. a ‘sense of guilt … in betraying the group’ (Doi 1981:49);7 
B. because of being ‘imposed’8 upon by: 
1. the ‘necessities of social life’ (Tournier 1957:33);  
                                                
2  See also Alister E. McGrath, and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:37), Moltmann (2000a:289), and Bai 
Chongliang (2007:116). 
3 See also Moltmann (1976:3). 
4 See also Jack (1993; 1999:190f.), Jack et al. (2010), Sikka et al. (2010), Mauthner (2010), Stoppard 
(2010), and Jack and Ali (2010). 
5 See also Jack (1999:191–200). 
6 See also June Ock Yum (1988:374–5), Lin Honghsin (2008b:57), and Yang Jienlong (2012:372). 
7 See also Moltmann (1976:39–41) and Jung (1966:173–4). 
8 This factor would be enhanced when the rejection of the ‘small self’ for the sake of the ‘larger self’ or 
‘great self’ is lauded ‘as a virtue’ and the other way around is ‘negated’ or disparaged (Doi 1981:134, eo). 
See also Tu Weiming (1985:14, eo). 
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2. the ‘totalitarian self’, a group self with strong ‘dynamics of groupthink’ 
(Goleman 1996:105, 182, eo);9  
C. because of ‘modern Taylorized methods of work’10 and living in ‘a mass society’ 
(Tournier 1957:40);11 
D. because of ‘a long schooling’ of standardization starting ‘in the first few days of 
our life’ in ‘the increasing uniformity of’ modern life (ibid.:33, 39);12  
E. because of ‘the herd-instinct’ (ibid.:40), ‘group mentality’, (Doyle 2006:website, 
eo) and ‘shùnzhòng xīnlǐ’ ｢順眾心理｣ (conformist mentality) (Yu, Dehui and 
Gu, Biling 1987:66) or ‘qiútóng xīntài’ ｢求同心態｣  (sameness-oriented 
mindset) (Yang, Zhongfang 1991b:130) in order to gain ‘social acceptance’, 
‘social integration’,13 and ‘social recognition’ (Jung 1966:173);14 
F. through ‘inward emigration’ (‘a passive attitude of opposition’ or ‘an external 
appearance of conformity’) in order to survive in an environment of 
‘dictatorship’ or to seek ‘self-protection from social pressures’ (Moltmann 
1976:39, 41);  
G. because of:  
1. ‘the auto-suggestive meaning of a primordial image’ (Jung 1966:173); or 
2. ‘the influence of the collective unconscious’ which includes ‘unconscious 
collective ideas (mythical thinking) and vital instincts’ (ibid.:174, 304).  
                                                
9 See also Doi (1981:132–41). 
10 ‘Modern Taylorized methods of work’ is through scientific management (analysis and synthesis of work 
flows so as to improve efficiency in economic productivity of labours. As labour became the only means 
in reaching the ends of productivity according to this approach, Tournier (1957:40) worried about its 
negative impact, writing that ‘modern Taylorized methods of work create only personages; they 
dehumanize’ humans, ‘depersonalize them.’  
11 See also Rogers (1961:169). 
12 See also Rogers (1961:168–9) and Fleming (2002:183). 
13 Alister E. McGrath, and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:37). 
14 See also Cole (1971:19f.) and Doi (1981:132–41). 
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(4) the factor of hiding inadequacies because of a lack of ‘self-confidence’ (Doi 
1981:152) and the presence of ‘internal doubts’ (Tournier 1957:50) (related to moral 
self-cultivation in C24.2 and Ru-based collectivism in C24.3): 
A. in order to elude: 
1. ‘personal distress’ (ibid.:31);  
2. shameful self-image (Rogers 1961:168);15  
3. embarrassing situations (Moltmann 1976:3);16 
B. in order to deny and hide ‘contradictions’ (Tournier 1957:46) and quēdiǎn ｢缺
點｣ (weaknesses)17 within;18  
C. because of:  
1. ‘a fear of exposing’ the true self behind ‘façades’ (Rogers 1961:167);  
2. the ‘fear of failure’ (Tournier 1957:36);19  
3. the ‘fear of consequent rejection’ 20  or the suffering from ignorance, 
devaluation, or denigration from significant others (Harter 1997:100);  
4. the anxiety of being criticized and laughed at (Yu, Dehui and Gu, Biling 
1987:67); 
D. in order:  
1. to preserve ‘the forces at work within … instincts, … desires, … feelings’ and 
the potential ‘actions’ (Tournier 1957:48);  
2. to avoid being outstanding;21 
                                                
15 See also Yu Dehui (1987b:5). 
16 See also Goffman (1956:135). 
17 Yu Dehui and Gu Biling (1987:67). 
18 See also Moltmann (2000a:277) and Payne (2003:18). 
19 See also Alister E. McGrath, and Joanna C. McGrath (1992:38). 
20 ibid. 
21 Yu Dehui and Gu Biling (1987:66). See also Doi (1981:150–57) and Moltmann (2000a:273, 275). 
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E. in order:  
1. to avoid a direct ‘self-encounter’ and ‘the naked honesty’ to self (Moltmann 
1976:3);  
2. to refuse to accept the ‘is-ness’ of self (Rogers 1961:181, eo).  
(5) the factor of interacting with others effectively (Harter 1999:100) (related to Ru-based 
collectivism in C24.3 and hierarchical society in C24.4): 
A. in order to avoid conflicts with others (Tournier 1957:34, 46);  
B. because of the ‘incredible power of suggestion’ by others (ibid.:50);  
C. in order to seek: 
1. to ‘please’ (ibid.:63)22 or ‘not disappoint’ others (ibid.:36) and to satisfy their 
‘expectations’ (Rogers 1961:181) and ‘judgements’ (Bond, Jean 1993:back 
cover); 
2. to win the ‘love’ of others, especially ‘parents’ (de Vos 1998:337);23  
3. to gain ‘acceptance, power or approval from the significant people’ (Bond, 
Jean 1993:back cover);  
4. to avoid the pressure due to human relationship or rénqíng ｢人情｣ (favour) 
(Sun, Lungkee 1983 reprinted in 2004:22–3) or guānxì ｢關係｣ (relationship) 
(Lin, Honghsin 2008b:57); 
D. because of:  
1. ‘hàipà quánwēi’ ｢害怕權威｣  (the fear of authorities) (Zhuang, Huiqiu 
1987b:109–19);  
2. being always dominated and constrained by others, especially parents 
(Tournier 1957:137, 212);24 
                                                
22 See also Rogers (1961:170) and Schwalbe (2009:140). 
23 See also Alice Miller (1997:back cover). 
24 See also Alice Miller (1997) and Li Lukyan and Kwok Hungbiu (2005:19). 
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E. in order to counterbalance others, for example, accentuating ‘one’s own 
tendencies in order to counterbalance those of the other’ (ibid.:35); 
F. in order to fulfil one’s own responsibility for others, such as being a counsellor, 






The Person and the Personage in Francis L. K. Hsu’s Psycho-Sociogram of a 
Human 
 
Borrowing the Psycho-sociogram and its concept from Francis L. K. Hsu, it will be 
helpful to use this tool to understand and illustrate the social interaction of the person and 
the personage in post-traditional Chinese cultural contexts. 
Francis L. K. Hsu’s psycho-sociogram of a human illustrated in Diagram G.1 is a 
way to help examine ‘the elements of human existence’ that are used by psychologists 
and psychological anthropologists. Layers 7 and 6 are ‘the unconscious and the pre-
conscious’ elements respectively, formulated by Freud, that consist of ‘repressed or semi-
repressed psychic materials’ respectively. Layer 5 refers to the ‘unexpressed conscious’ 
elements containing the psychic materials ‘generally kept to the individual himself’. 
Layer 4 refers to the ‘expressible conscious’ elements whose contents are ‘ideas and 
feelings which the individual can and does communicate to his fellow human beings’. 
Layer 3 refers to the ‘intimate society and culture’ elements consisting of ‘humans, 
animals, artefacts, and cultural rules’ that the individual has intimate relationships with. 
These intimate relationships tend to be ‘feeling’-oriented instead ‘usefulness’-oriented. 
Layer 2 refers to ‘operative society and culture’ elements consisting of humans, animals, 
artefacts, and cultural rules that the individual has only ‘role relationships’ with. These 
role relationships tend to be ‘usefulness’-oriented instead of ‘feeling’-oriented. Layer 1 
refers to ‘wider society and culture’ containing human beings, cultural rules, knowledge, 
and artefacts, in the same ‘larger society’, whom the individual may or may not be 
associated with. Layer 0 refers to the ‘outer world’ consisting of ‘peoples, customs, and 
artefacts belonging to other societies’ whom the individual has not yet contacted and thus 




Diagram G.1 Francis L. K. Hsu’s Psycho-Sociogram of a Human (1971:25) 
 
Francis L. K. Hsu (ibid.:29, eo) insightfully adopted ‘personage’ (i.e. social mask, 
see A-E) rather than person or ‘personality’ as the ‘English equivalent’ to 人 (rén), the 
Chinese word for ‘[hu]man’. The reason for this rendering is because that post-traditional 
Chinese, as well as post-traditional Japanese, conception of human is on the basis of ‘the 
individual’s transactions with his fellow human beings’ rather than of the individual’s 
‘separate entity’ (ibid.:23) and ‘psyche’ distinct from his/her social roles (ibid.:29). 
When, for example, ‘tā búshì rén’ ｢他不是人｣ (he is not a rén) is a very condemnatory 
saying in Chinese to criticize metaphorically a person whose ‘behaviour in relation to 
other human beings is not acceptable’ (ibid.). It absolutely does not mean he is not a 
human or ‘he is not a human animal’. For in the traditional and post-traditional Ruist 
concept of person, only one who behaves according to ‘the Way of Humanity’ is 
recognized to be a person (Hwang, Kwangkuo 1999:166). Therefore, by Francis L. K. 
Hsu’s definition, the personage consists of layer 4 (expressible conscious) and layer 3 
(intimate society) (Hsu, Francis LK 1971:25, 29). Based on Tournier’s concept and its 
explanation of the person and the personage, the person simply consists of layer 5 
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(unexpressed conscious) and layer 4 (expressible conscious) while putting aside social 
interaction. It has been noted that only the conscious dimension of the person, excluding 
the case of self-deception as mentioned in C2S2.1, C2S4, and A-ES3, will be illustrated 
and discussed in this Psycho-sociogram due to its limitation.1  
It is notable that layer 3 (intimate society) is not equal to layer 4 (expressible 
conscious), for how much the contents in the expressible conscious layer can or will be 
shared by the individual with the people in the intimate society layer depends on the 
degree of the mutual trust and acceptance in their relationships. Layer 2 (operative 
society) is not included in the personage because it requires only a role relationship. 2 In 
other words, when role relationships demand only one’s usefulness to the other rather 
than one’s feeling or truthfulness towards the other, there is no issue of being forced to 
wear social masks due to repressive social imposition.3  
But in Francis L. K. Hsu’s Psycho-sociogram and definition for the personage, there 
is something missing without clear definition. In the personage, composed of layer 4 
(expressible conscious) and layer 3 (intimate society), designated by Francis L. K. Hsu, 
where is the part that refers to expressing oneself to conform to social expectation in 
intimate society but is not the expressible conscious part? I argue that we should designate 
this part as the personage according to the definition of this term (Francis L. K. Hsu’s 
                                                
1 The eschatological dimension of the true self, the redeemed self or the promised future self, is not 
discussed and illustrated here but in C3S1.2, C3S2.4, and C6 to C8. 
2 Due to the limitation of a simple Psycho-sociogram, the clear boundary between layer 3 (intimate society) 
and layer 2 (operative society) is artificial for the purpose of illustration. In fact, the boundary might be 
ambiguous and dynamic and there might be many sub-layers between them, depending on how the 
relationships are defined and developed subjectively by the interacting selves. 
3 Yang Zhongfang (1991a:30, 52) points out that Chinese people are more publically self-conscious than 
privately self-conscious. They like to evaluate themselves by their roles and their performance of their roles. 
Accordingly, they pay less attention to the characteristics of their personality and feelings than their 
interpersonal relationships and the duty of their social roles. The feature related to this will be discussed 
further in C8S3.2.4. According to Yang Zhongfang’s description, Chinese people’s RFS might look like 
this case demanding only one’s usefulness rather than feeling or truthfulness. However, it is actually 
different from this because it is due to repressive social imposition that Chinese people pay less attention 
to the characteristics of their personality and feelings than their interpersonal relationships and the duty of 
their social roles. 
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explanation and also Tournier’s definition as mentioned in A-ES2). There usually must 
be more or less an overlap of layers 4 and layer 3. Accordingly, in considering social 
interaction, the layer 4 in the person can be divided into the independent expressible 
conscious part and this overlapping part (expressible conscious in intimate society); and 
the pure personage, namely wearing a social mask without revealing the expressible 
conscious self, is only the independent part of layer 3 (intimate society) which excludes 
its overlapping part with layer 4 (expressible conscious). In other words, rén in Francis 
L. K. Hsu’s explanation should include the independent part of layer 4, the overlapping 
parts of layer 4 and layer 3, and the independent part of layer 3. The more layer 4 and 
layer 3 overlap, the more the expressible conscious self is revealed in intimate society and 
the less there is the tendency of wearing a social mask. In other words, the tendency of 
wearing a social mask depends on how much layer 4 and layer 3 do not overlap. I 
simplify4 Francis L. K. Hsu’s Psycho-sociogram and illustrate the person, the personage, 
and rén in it as Diagram G.2.  
It is worth noting that we must not misunderstand that Francis L. K. Hsu denies the 
other layers as integral parts of a human (rén) because he designates only layer 3 and layer 
4 to indicate rén. By way of his Psycho-sociogram, he purports to illustrate that the 
Chinese concept of rén is different from the Western concept of a human. He (ibid.:29, 
eo) characterizes rén in this way: 
The concept of jen [rén] puts the emphasis on interpersonal transactions. It does not consider 
the individual psyche’s deep cores of complexes and anxieties. Instead it sees the nature of 
the individual’s external behaviour in terms of how it fits or fails to fit the interpersonal 
standards of the society and culture. 
 
  
                                                
4  As only humans are involved in Tournier’s discussion, I have omitted the cultural elements. For 




Diagram G.2 Modified Concept of Rén 人 , Personage, and Person in the Simplified Psycho-
Sociogram of a Human (Hsu, Francis LK 1971:25) 
 
As more social conformity is demanded by the relationships in layer 3 (intimate 
society), more of the expressible conscious part in layer 4 recedes into layer 5 
(unexpressed conscious). Additionally, as the relationships in the independent layer 3 are 
treated more as role relationships, the independent layer 3 overlaps more with layer 2 
(operative society). Consequently the space for the person reduces and the demands for 
the personage increase. Therefore, the tendency of wearing a social mask is developed. 
At worst, layer 4 (expressible conscious) could totally disappear into layer 5 
(unexpressed conscious), and layer 5 could be totally compressed into layer 6 (pre-
conscious) and Layer 7 (unconscious) and eventually disappear. This extreme case 
happens when ‘the false self can easily get itself mistaken for real’, a delusion that leads 
to the ‘annihilation’ of the real self (Winnicott 1965:133). Accordingly, the person 
disappears and only the personage is left. This is the worst condition of the conscious self 
that is metaphorically expressed as having no self, the absence of a self, or loss of self as 
mentioned in A-E.  
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At best, one’s unexpressed conscious part can be liberated in a healthy 
transformative process of the individual oneself and one’s relationships with others. 
Accordingly, not only can much of layer 5 (unexpressed conscious) be released into layer 
4 (expressible conscious), but also layer 3 (intimate society) increases through absorbing 
layer 2 (operative society), while the independent layer 3 disappears into the overlap with 
layer 4. Therefore, the personage tends to be overlapped completely by the person and 
then the tendency of the RFS reduces or even disappears.  
To sum up, the theoretical bases for the knowledge of the RFS in general is 
manifested to be applicable to PTRIC contexts by means of Francis L. K. Hsu’s Psycho-
sociogram and his concept of the personage in PTRIC contexts. According to my 
modified Psycho-sociogram, the real of true self discussed in this Psycho-sociogram is in 
the conscious dimension of the self, including layer 5 (unexpressed conscious), the 
independent layer 4 (expressible conscious part), and the overlapping part of layer 4 and 
3 (expressible conscious in intimate society). The tendency of the RFS can be understood 
as the result when the expressible conscious self is not able or allowed to be revealed in 





Appendix H  
The Person and Personage from the Perspective of Individual Autonomy 
 
Besides the perspective of social interpersonal relationships, it is necessary and helpful to 
understand them from the perspective of individual autonomy in responding to external 
oughts. Based on Kon’s (1986:168) revealing differentiation between the self and the 
mask in defining them through their relations as mentioned in A-ES3, two elements must 
be considered in terms of the individual autonomy in responding to external oughts: 
competency1 and willingness. 
In facing external oughts, the inner heart of the person will also respond in either 
willing or unwilling ways even if one agrees with the external oughts. If the person can 
choose to do willingly and competently only the agreed parts of external oughts without 
pretending to conform to external oughts what one is either incompetent or unwilling to 
do, the personage will not be put on by the imposition of the external oughts, as illustrated 
in Diagram H.1. 
If the person cannot refuse to do what one is either incompetent or unwilling to do, 
the personage will be imposed to be put on in order to pretend to conform to the external 
oughts, as illustrated in Diagram H.2. The degree of being repressed of the self depends 
on one’s willingness and competency in facing external oughts. At worst, what the person 
can choose to do willingly and competently is very limited. At best, there are no issues of 
one’s incompetency and unwillingness. 
                                                
1 The term competency denotes here both the capability to reach external oughts and the capability to look 
likely to reach external oughts. 
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Appendix I  
The Directions for Dealing with the Problem of Negative Masking  
Suggested by Carl Jung and Carl Rogers 
 
Both Carl Rogers and Carl Jung are concerned about the problem of negative masking 
and suggest a direction to deal with it. In this Appendix, their concepts and suggested 
directions are introduced briefly for reference. 
1. Jung’s Individuation 
In proposing to divest ‘the self of the false wrappings of the persona … and of the 
suggestive power of primordial images’, Carl Jung (1966:174) might be the first to bring 
forth the concept of ‘individuation’ and apply it ‘as a model and guiding principle’ 
(ibid.:110) to analytical psychology and its treatment. He defines individuation as 
‘coming to selfhood or self-realization’, which indicates ‘becoming one’s own self’ or 
‘becoming an in-dividual’ and ‘embracing ‘our innermost, last, and incomparable 
uniqueness’ (ibid.:173). Significantly, individuation is completely distinct from Anglo-
European individualism. In Jung’s explanation, individualism intentionally highlights 
and protrudes ‘some supposed peculiarity’ and devalues the value of ‘collective 
considerations and obligations’ (ibid.). But individuation is ‘a process of psychological 
development’ through which not only is the distinguishing characteristic of the individual 
one fulfilled and one ‘becomes the definite, unique being [one] in fact is’, but also ‘the 
collective qualities of the human being’ are fulfilled more completely (ibid.:173-4). He 
(1966:174) argues that ‘the idiosyncrasy of an individual’ means ‘a unique combination, 
or gradual differentiation, of functions and faculties which in themselves are universal’ 
rather than any unusualness of his/her nature or leading to ‘isolation’ (ibid.:155 n.10). It 
is rather contributive to ‘a better social performance’ or ‘an intenser and more universal 
collective solidarity’ (ibid.) when the distinguishing characteristic of the individual one 
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is taken into account more appropriately than when it is overlooked or ‘suppressed’. Jung 
(ibid.:174) demonstrates his argument by an example: ‘Every human face has a nose, two 
eyes, etc., but these universal factors are variable, and it is this variability which makes 
individual peculiarities possible.’ However since ‘the persona’ or the personage suppress 
one’s individuality, it is indispensable to differentiate what one is from how one appears 
to oneself and to other people (ibid.:195). Then the persona can be disintegrated 
(ibid.:297) for ‘the purpose of individuation’ (ibid.:195).  
Individuation (as Jung understands and expounds it) is about highlighting different 
aspects of a unique individual, particularly those that reflect the collective aspects of the 
human being. Jung’s concept of individuation shows to some extent the similar features 
of perichoresis being applied to describe human relationship as imago trinitatis (see 
C6S7). His concept of individuation is to diversify the unique peculiarity of the individual 
in the universal collective solidarity and to fulfil the collective qualities of the human 
being in the fulfilment of the distinguishing characteristic of the individual. However, it 
is a process of self-transformation that can be practised through religious experiences 
(Jung 1958:157). For Jung (1966:190f.), the psychological aspect is what he is more 
concerned with than philosophical and religious or theological aspects — although he did 
not reject religion like Freud. Also, his religion is more psychological than theological 
because he (ibid.:191, eo) states that the ‘quality of personal immortality so fondly 
attributed to the soul by religion is, for science, no more than a psychological indicium’. 
He views the essence of religion as merely a psychological fact (Lú, Dé 盧德 2009:68–
70). As for how to explain the soul’s ‘religious function’, he argues (1980:13) that it 
comes from the religious nature (naturaliter religiosa) — though he cannot make any 
sense of this concept except within a psychological frame of reference. Therefore, even 
if he admits the existing question of ‘human effort’, he still takes no account of ‘acts of 
grace’ because they are beyond human beings’ ‘control’. He does not deny that the soul 
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is deified in his psychological understanding of religion (Christianity) but attributes to 
God, as having ‘deified’ the soul. 
As mentioned in C2, Jung’s approach to individuation, in pursuing the true self, 
engages in highlighting the uniqueness of the individual’s nature. The human 
relationships in the ways of his description are to some extent like an imago trinitatis or 
similar features of perichōrēsis in Moltmann’s trinitarian theological anthropology. Jung 
diversifies the individual’s unique peculiarity in the universal collective solidarity, and 
fulfils the collective qualities of the human being in the realization of the distinguishing 
characteristics of the individual. However, in terms of such an individuation promoted by 
Jung, Moltmann’s relational trinitarian theological anthropology evidently provides a 
more concrete foundation theologically and practically than Jung. Jung indeed tries to 
picture an ideal path to the true self, but it is almost a self-individuation. Therefore, 
Tournier (1957:23) would criticize it as ‘only mechanisms of the mind’ psychologically 
that are mere ‘of the order of the personage … [but] not of the person’. In Tournier’s eyes, 
Jung’s mechanisms are similar as the studies of ‘all the physiological mechanisms of the 
body’. However, Jung’s individuation in psychology and psychoanalytic therapy might 
substantiate indirectly the implications of Moltmann’s relational trinitarian theological 
anthropology in regard to the problem of negative masking. 
2. Rogers’ Self-Transformation of Becoming a Person  
In dealing with his issue, as part of problems raised by his clients, Rogers does not bring 
forwards opinions of his own, or give direction to the clients. Instead, Rogers (1961:167) 
seeks resolution for the clients’ problems from within themselves to be that self which 
one truly is coming from the clients themselves. He presents his observations taken from 
the therapeutic process of his clients in his book, On Becoming a Person: A therapist’s 
view of psychotherapy (1961). Towards such an attainment, the directions taken by his 
clients are summarized and listed as headings by Rogers as follows (ibid.:167-75, eo): 
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‘Away From Façades … Away From Oughts … Away From Meeting Expectations … 
Away From Pleasing Others … Towards Self-Direction … Towards Being Process … 
Towards Being Complexity … Towards Openness to Experience … Towards Acceptance 
of Others … Towards Trust of Self’.1 Rogers (ibid.:172-6) finds that most of his clients 
have a strong desire ‘to be all of oneself in each moment’ and this desire is not merely 
‘an intellectual value choice’ but rather the groping, tentative, uncertain behaviours of 
moving towards becoming more accurately and deeply the self which one ‘most truly is’. 
Rogers discloses that this process might not be ‘easy’ (ibid.:181). However, he does 
not think any other person (even a therapist), or any other method (even a counselling 
technique) can improve on his client-directed approach. It all depends on the individual 
himself/herself (ibid.:167). Therefore, it is indeed a process of (humanistic) type self-
transformation — his ideas arise from his experience with clients who are, in his view, 
‘self-actualizing people’ (Maslow 1954 in Rogers 1961:167). 
 
 
                                                
1 ‘Towards being complexity’ in this context can be understood as ‘towards becoming all of the complexity 
of one's changing self in each significant moment’ and ‘towards acceptance of others’ as valuing and 
appreciating the ‘experience’ of ‘others for what it is’ (Rogers 1961:172, 174). 
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Appendix J  
Is Anglo-European Individualism a Solution for Overcoming the RFS? 
 
Collectivism in general is criticized as causing the problem of the RFS by the scholars 
because the individuality in it is suppressed for the benefit of the collectivity. However, 
will the problem of the RFS be solved by Anglo-European individualism or mere 
humanistic synthesis of Ru-based collectivism and Anglo-European individualism as Tu 
Weiming argues for his New Ruist relational selfhood? The answer might be no, even if 
the problem of repressive social imposition might disappear.  
The Japanese psychiatrist, Takeo Doi (1981:132–41), suggests that the RFS 
manifested by the issue of fatherlessness in Japanese society should deal with ‘the 
question of the absence of God’. The Chinese sociologist and social psychologist, Zhai 
Xuewei (2010:345), argues that the essential reason for the prevalent issue of negative 
masking in PTRIC societies is the lack of the external personal God in traditional and 
post-traditional Ruism. The Taiwanese historian, Sun Lungkee (1983 reprinted in 
2004:17), takes the similar view as the above two scholars. As Tuan Yifu (1982:162) 
argues, similar questions of Anglo-European individualism arise from the Renaissance. 
These questions ask whether or not there is ‘an authentic self exist[ing] behind the various 
masks’ since individualistic people still need to face ‘the question of self and of the roles 
they could play (ibid.).1 Some Christian writers argue that both collectivism in general 
and Anglo-European individualism can lead to a loss of self when there is no communion 
with God and His people (Grenz 2001:105–118).2 In other words, the RFS might occur 
in both collectivism in general and Anglo-European individualism in general. Therefore, 
                                                
1 See also McCubbins and Turner (2014). 
2 See also Montaigne (1935, cited in ibid.:103), Carver T. Yu (1987:45, 214–33), Grenz (2001:16f., 58, 
134), Gunton (2003:87), Postman (2006), Carkner (2006:6), Ess (2010:114), and Bellinger (2010). 
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the problem of the RFS resulting from the issue of relational selfhood is one of the ethics-
related problems worthy of study. 
Charles K. Bellinger (2010:81–2) rejects Anglo-European Western or modern 
individualism as a source of selfhood by saying that ‘fundamentalism, individualistic 
aestheticism, and utopianism … are forms of immature selfhood’ when they are alienated 
from ‘the call of creation’. Out of their common fundamental problem of rejecting 
‘otherness’, what they try to do is to deny the possibility of becoming ‘mature, balanced, 
and expansive’ in order to hold their current form of ‘immature, unbalanced, and 
contracted consciousness’ (ibid.:82, eo). Through a critique of Anglo-European Western 
individualism, Carver T. Yu (1987:1–146) summarizes three main issues Anglo-
European Western people experience: ‘ontological uprootedness … fragmentation of 
personal identity … and failure of human relation’ (ibid.:45). As for the crisis of self in 
the Anglo-European Western world in the late twentieth century, Alasdair MacIntyre 
(1983) attributed it to a loss of common moral parameters. For Charles Taylor (1989:3), 
the good (or morality) and the notion or sense of the self (or selfhood) are ‘inextricably 
intertwined themes’. The former defines the self because it defines ‘our spiritual 
orientation’ (ibid.:x, 42-7). Its power shapes the self (ibid.:103-105).3 However, can this 
power of the good come from human beings themselves as traditional and post-traditional 
Ruism suggests by moral self-cultivation?  
Although admitting the ‘limits of one’s existential self’, Tu (1985a: 137) 
optimistically presents ‘a transcendent vision that ontologically we are infinitely better 
and, therefore, more worthy than we actually are’ and a Ruist trinity which is formed by 
‘humanity’ with Heaven and Earth. However, this transcendent vision of a Ruist trinity is 
based on mankind’s expectation (ideal) and goodness, rather than the revelation from the 
                                                
3 See also Carkner (2006:8f.). 
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Other who is the Creator and an existing personal Being. When there is no Creator God 
as the source or solid foundation for the self, the real self is either based on oneself, others, 
or relationships, which are the characteristics of Tu’s account of New Ruist relational 
selfhood. Unless being a perfect sage, people whose real selves are based on others must 
incline to conforming to others and being competitive with each other. Grenz indicates 
that emulating others will lead to ‘a lack of self-awareness’? He explains it by quoting 
Montaigne’s theory (1935, cited in Grenz 2001:103) that ‘we seek other lives because we 
do not understand how to use our own. We go out of ourselves because we are ignorant 
of what lies within.’ This, I suggest, is the main reason of loss of self in Ru-based 
collectivism. 
Many modern Christian theologians and philosophers, for example, Colin E. 
Gunton (1999:60), John Macmurray (1999:211),4 Christoph Schwöbel (1992:70–74), and 
D. Stephen Long (2001:19-26), support trinitarian divine goodness to be the most 
meaningful concern for the self (Carkner 2006:6). Bellinger (2010:51) also highlights the 
necessity of the transcendent divine truth for the source of the self by saying that ‘God 
and God’s Word decisively shape how human selfhood and society are evaluated’. 
Through a Western intellectual journey, Grenz (2001:117f., 134) concludes that Anglo-
European individualism leads to the destruction of self even through a process of 
socialization of the conception of the self. Ess (2010:114), following N. Postman (2006), 
also worried about the loss of the modern atomic self, which is crucial for modern liberal 
democracies, in the trend of networking infinitely with others, especially in the era of new 
digital communications. Gunton (2003:86–7) concludes the impasse of the theories of the 
dominating philosophies, either modern individualism or modern collectivism: 
If the person is lost, then so are we, ripe for being swallowed up into an undifferentiated 
mass, the many absorbed into the embrace of the one. Just as philosophically a stress on the 
individual loses the person, so is it socially … Modern individualism and modern 
                                                
4 See also Aves (1999). 
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collectivism are mirror images of one another. Both signal the loss of the person, the 
disappearance of the one into the many or the many into the one, and the reason is that there 
is no mid term between the two features of our life, no way of ensuring the proper being and 
hypostasis of both the universal and the particular. 
Therefore, according to Grenz and Gunton, without communion with God and His 
people, both modern collectivism and modern individualism lead to the problem of the 
RFS. John Zizioulas (2004:27, eo) is also concerned about Anglo-European individualism 
in modern times when ‘the person and personal identity’ are exalted as a supreme ideal. 
He reminds us that the concept of the person and personal identity should be ‘historically 
as well as existentially’ based on and ‘bound up with’ God, instead of an ‘autonomous 
morality’ or a ‘purely humanistic’ existentialism. In other words, what matters is where 
the self comes from and what the centre of the self is. What is the centre of human beings? 
Humankind or God the Creator? 
Bellinger (2010:88) asserts that ‘selfhood is not the starting point for ethics’ 
because the source, the origin, the starting point for ethics cannot be based on 
humankind’s self but on God. According to D. Stephen Long (2001:19–26), ethics should 
be subordinated to theology but not the other way around. Bellinger (2010:88) explains: 
As selves we need to learn to become ethical as a life task; we do not start off with ethical 
maturity as our default setting. If we did, humanity would have no problems at all; there 
would be no oppression, violence, egotism, etc. 
Therefore, ‘ethical reflection’ should start from ‘the will of God’. To be an ethical 
self must first attune to ‘God and one’s created nature’ (ibid.:88-9). In Karl Barth’s words 
(1957:546), the subject of theological ethics ‘is not the Word of God as it is claimed by 
man, but the Word of God as it claims man’. Likewise, so are the two indispensable 
fundamental elements of the person (true self) pinpointed by Tournier in C2: autonomy 
(or freedom) and responsibility. Both of them are what the person needs to possess but 
the person is not their ground and their source of meaning. First, both autonomy and 
responsibility are only meaningful in relation with others. Autonomy refers to the space 
given by others (Gunton 1999:59). In other words, both autonomy and repressive social 
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imposition happen in relationships. The main problem of Anglo-European individualism 
is to hold too much space between each other as human beings (Gunton 1999:55). On the 
contrary, the main problem of collectivism is to give too little. Second, the definition and 
norm for autonomy and responsibility cannot be based on any human being, people group 
or community, or social institution and system but on the Creator God (Huáng, Yùshēng 
黃裕生 2004:948–9).5 For the absolute autonomy and responsibility of the person can 
only come from the Creator God. They can only be defined by the autonomy and 
responsibility in the relationships between the three persons of the triune God and only 
be granted through the relationships between human beings and the triune God. 
Furthermore, all of them precede the relationships in human society (Zizioulas 1999:37–
46).6 I argue that without God, the free self can also be the idol of one’s own construction. 
Only in the presence of the triune God’s grace is true freedom experienced, which is 
freedom apart from the tragedy of sin’s distortion of human beings. 
 But what is the origin and meaning of the individuality realized only in and through 
each other in a community? Gunton (2003:88–89, 99, eo) asserts that its roots are 
ultimately traced to ‘trinitarian relatedness’ of Father, Son and Spirit. This relatedness is 
manifested in the ‘profound meditations in John’s Gospel on the way Jesus and the Father 
exist only in each other, the extended exposition of the claim that from eternity and in the 
incarnation the Word is with God’ and the Word is God.  
Similar terms and concepts to trinitarian relatedness are proposed and examined 
during and after the genuine revival of interest in the doctrine of the Trinity in the late 
twentieth century, such as ‘trinitarian self’ (Bellinger 2010), ‘trinitarian personhood’ 
(Seamands 2005),7 and ‘ecclesial personhood’ (Volf 1998a), ‘relational or social self’ 
                                                
5 See also Macmurray (1936 reprinted in 1971:52). 
6 See also McFadyen (1990:18–31) and Gunton (1999:53–61). 
7 See also Thompson (1994) and Volf (1998a). 
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(Grenz 2001). All of these spring from a ‘desire to free the Trinity from its isolation in 
traditional statements with the consequent lack of relation to practical Christian faith and 
life’. They are to pose a question: Is the triune God ‘the ground and paradigm of true 






Appendix K  
A Brief Summary of Discussions about Chàxù Géjú 差序格局 
(The Differential Mode of Association) 
 
Primary group and secondary group are always relative in terms of closeness, importance, 
and even utility in the context of traditional and post-traditional Ruist human 
relationships. This Ruist feature of relationships, which is characterized as Ru-based 
collectivism in A-C and explained in C4S4.5.1, is well described and explained by the 
Chinese anthropologist, Fèi Xiàotōng 費孝通 (1910-2005), in 1948, with his concept and 
theory of ‘chàxù géjú’ 「差序格局」, namely ‘the differential mode of association’.1 A 
first generation New Ruist, Liáng Shùmíng 梁漱溟  (1893-1988) 2  and Zhu Cenlou 
(1988:116–18) calls it ‘lúnlǐ běnwèi’ 「倫理本位」 (ethics as the standard). Richard 
Solomon (1937-) (1971:106 n.2) suggests it to be ‘relation-centre’. Francis L. K. Hsu 
(1909-99) (1953:10f.) calls it ‘situation-centre’. Some other scholars identify it as 
‘relational orientation’ (‘relationship orientation’) ‘guānxì qǔxiàng’ 「關係取向」, 3 
relationship-determinism,4 ‘other orientation’, or ‘familistic orientation’.5 David Y. F. 
Ho (1998) uses ‘relationalism’, and Yeh Kuanghui (2002:229) uses ‘guānxì zhǔyì’ 「關
係主義」(relationism), to sum up all of the above different terms.6  The typical example 
of such imbalance in canonical Ruist teachings is the famous passage about ‘the father 
                                                
1 Fei Xiaotong (English version in 1992:60–70). See also Chén Xiǎopíng 陳曉平 (2002:23), Lǐ Xiángjùn 
李祥俊(2005:66), and Yáng Yíyīn 楊宜音 (2008:154–7). 
2 Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1949 reprinted in 2005:70–73). 
3 Hwang Kwangkuo (1983:140; 2002:142–50), Ambrose Y. C. King (1985:63), Yang Kuoshu (1986a:160–
62; 1996:244–61), Wen Chongyi (1988:32–5), and David Yaufai Ho 何友暉 (p. Hé Yǒuhuī et al.) (1989). 
4 Yeh Minghua and Yang Kuoshu (1997:183–4). 
5 Yang Kuoshu (1986a:160–62; 1996:244–61). 
6 See also Hwang Kwangkuo (2005; 2009a; 2009b; 2012:187–217). 
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conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father’ in 
Analects 13:18 (trans. by James Legge in 1869, reprinted in 2011a:129). The other two 
passages in Mencius with similar teachings are 7A:35 and 5A:3. It has been noted that 
there have been hot debates on these passages between the defenders and the critics.7 
However, through a literature review study by Cheng, Poshyun 鄭伯壎 (p. Zhèng Bóxūn) 
(1995) and a recent field survey by Xie Yao (2005), the social behaviour of the differential 
mode of association is proved to still exist even among Chinese intellectuals. 
 
 
                                                
7 Guo Qiyong (2004; 2011). 
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Appendix L  
Fatherlessness and the Repressed Form of Self in PTRIC Contexts 
 
Takeo Doi (1981:150–57) pays attention to and studies ‘the fatherless society’ issue in 
post-traditional Japanese society and suggests it as the complication of the ‘lack of self’, 
‘absence of self’, or ‘having no self’ (ibid.:137–8). What Doi means by without a father 
or fatherless is not the non-existence of a father; rather, the expression metaphorically 
denotes a child without a sincere, intimate, and transparent relationship with his/her father 
when the father’ has failed to provide his ‘true feelings’ on ‘a set of values’ as a base on 
which children can live (ibid.:152). Or in Ruth Benedict’s (1989:300f.) language, such a 
father ‘as a respect-object is a depersonalized symbol of hierarchy and of the proper 
conduct of life’. In other words, if a father does not express his true feelings as a father 
directly towards his children, they will be easily prone to feel ‘fatherless’. Fatherless male 
children tend to negatively mask themselves and so later become fathers with negatively 
masked selves (Doi 1981:132–41, 150–58).1 Doi believes that the main reason is the 
fathers’ ‘loss of self-confidence’, which has weakened their ‘influence’ on their children 
even to nothing. Doi (ibid.:152, 155, eo) calls it ‘a society without a father’ although he 
admits the impossibility of a ‘totally fatherless society’2  
 Sun Lungkee 孫隆基 (1983 reprinted in 2004:204–11) also describes this similar 
characteristic in PTRIC culture in which the relationship of father and son is often 
maintained directly instead by the mother herself because the fatherhood is prescribed 
                                                
1  See also Wagatsuma (1977), Sun Lungkee (1983 reprinted in 2004:17, 204f., 209–11), Pittman 
(1993:258–60), Goldman (1994:7), Payne (2003:18), Dziesinski (2004), and Griffith (2011:blog). 
2 ‘This expression fatherless society was first used, to the best of my knowledge, by Paul Federn, a pupil of 
Freud, in his On the Psychology of Revolution: The Fatherless Society, published in 1919’ (Doi 1981:152, 
eo) . 
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and expected to be played as a ‘strict and harsh role’ in an asymmetrical and hierarchical 
view of wulun. This estranged father-and-son relationship makes children depend unduly 
on their relationship with their mother and becomes one of PTRIC cultural factors that 
might result in to some extent the problem of the RFS amongst Chinese people, especially 
men. Sun Lungkee (1983 reprinted in 2004:211) concludes by quoting Lǔ Xùn 魯迅 
(1881-1936): ‘Chinese people are “by default the chaps who can reproduce children but 
is not the father of human. He gives birth to a child but he is not yet the germination of 
human” (Lu, Xun 1973, quoted in Sun, Lungkee 1983 reprinted in 2004:211, eo)’.  
Both Zhū Jiànjūn 朱建軍 (2008:80–84), a Chinese psychologist, and Brian Griffith 
(2011), a Canadian historian, strongly suggest that one of the reasons Confucius 
emphasized filial piety and the absolute authority of the father is that he grew up without 
a father. Not only were ‘Confucius’ and ‘Mencius’ brought up ‘by their mothers alone’, 
but also many successive ‘leading Confucianists’ were, too. 3  According to the 
biographies of major Ruist thinkers since the 1300s, Tu Weiming 杜維明 points out that 
the large majority of them, ‘including Wang Yangming’ 王陽明 (1472-1529), were 
mainly educated in the ‘formative’ years by their mothers instead of their fathers or male 
teachers (Tu, Weiming et al. 1992:72).  
I suggest that fatherlessness and the problem of the RFS influence each other 
reciprocally and their problem will become worse and worse through generations. It is 
imaginable that most of the younger generations who were not treated sincerely, 
intimately, or transparently by their fathers do not know how to establish a sincere, 
intimate, or transparent father-and-son relationship with their own children. Both Takeo 
                                                
3 For example, ‘Kou Laigong’ 寇莱公 (p. Kòulái Gōng) (Original name as Kòu Zhǔn 寇凖) (961–1023), 
‘Ouyang Xiu’ 歐陽修 (p. Ōuyáng Xiū) (1007–1072), ‘the Cheng brothers, Cheng Ho’ 程颢 (p. Chéng Hào) 
and ‘Cheng Yi’ 程颐 (p. Chéng Yí) (ca. 1030s to 1080s), ‘Lü Xizhe’ 呂希哲 (p. Lǚ Xīzhé) (1039–1116), 
‘Gu Yanwu’ 顧炎武 (p. Gù Yánwǔ) (1613–1682), or ‘Wang Tingzhen’ 汪廷珍 (p. Wāng Tíngzhēn) (1757–
1827) (Griffith 2011:blog). 
474 
 
Doi and Sun Lungkee take the same viewpoint that in contrast to post-traditional Japanese 
and Chinese cultures, there is no such prevalently severe problem of the RFS in modern 
Anglo-European Western Christian culture (Doi 1981:133)4 even if this is not unique to 
the post-traditional Japanese and Chinese (Pittman 1993:258–60).5 The studies discussed 
in A-B show that fatherlessness in modern Japan comes from the lack of self in 
masculinity. As for this similar fatherlessness among post-traditional Chinese people or 
even in the modern West, more researches and surveys are worth doing. However, these 
observations reveal that the problem of the RFS in post-traditional Chinese and Japanese 
society tends to be significantly more severe among men than women. 
 
 
                                                
4 See also Sun Lungkee (1983 reprinted in 2004:17). 
5 See also Doi (1981:157–8). 
475 
Appendix M  
The Difference of Meaning between the Terms Ruism and Confucianism 
 
Rú (Teachings of the Literati) literally means literati. When it indicates a system of 
thought or teachings, its synonyms in Chinese are Rújiāo 儒教 (Education of the Literati) 
and Rúxué 儒學 (Scholarship of the Literati). Rujiao can also mean Religion of the 
Literati (Tan, Jonathan Y. 2003b:100; Yao, Xinzhong 2013:1). The English term 
Confucianism1 was not used until the nineteenth century to indicate its original name Rú 
儒, which is prevalent not only in Chinese societies, but also in Japan, Korea and some 
other East Asian countries (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:1).2 
Ru was not created or founded by Confucius 孔夫子 (551–479 BCE). It is he who, 
in the pre-Qin period (551-221 BCE), studied it comprehensively, systematized it, 
contributing the primary redefinition of Ru as a ‘religio-ethical’ tradition transmitting 
ancient culture.3 It is also known as a doctrine that established ‘private schools’ in order 
to teach and preserve the passed-on Chinese canonical texts dealing with history, ritual, 
music, and poetry (ibid.:1f., 8).4 Therefore, the term Confucianism and the major Chinese 
tradition it names would not be sustainable alone on the basis of the person named 
Confucius (Tan, Jonathan Y. 2003b:100). In other words, Ruism has never been based on 
a ‘faith in Confucius’ (Tu, Weiming 1998a:5).5 Therefore, in the contemporary context, 
                                                
1 Confucianism came from Confucius, the Latin transliteration of 孔夫子, used by the Jesuits in the 
sixteenth century (Yao, Xinzhong 2013:1; Nielsen n.d.:1), Confucianism might also have been coined by 
them (Nielsen n.d.:1). 
2  See also The Chinese Culture Connection (1987:152–4), Hofstede and Bond (1988:12f., 16), Tong 
Cheekiong (2007:275), Park Zhang Jie et al. (2010:582), Chen Yingyeh et al. (2012:131), Lu Yu 
(2013:Lecture), Sangchul (2016:16), and Nielsen (n.d.:1),. 
3 See also la Barre (1946b:382). 
4 See also Wu Chinghsiung (1976:83–4) and Kuiper (2011:63). 
5 See also Yao Xinzhong (2013:1). 
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which is to say post-traditional, when most Ru-influenced Chinese are no longer 
worshipping Master Kong (Confucius), the term Ruist/Ruism, rather than 
Confucian/Confucianism, might be a more helpful and pertinent description. For the latter 
might exclude the Ruism/Ruists prior to Confucius or not associated to Confucius’ 
school6 and include the meaning of worshipping the person of the Sage, Confucius, which 
would lead to other kinds of distortions. Robert Eno (1990:6f., 190-97, 206) might be the 
first person in Anglophone contexts to use Ruism/Ruist in place of 
Confucianism/Confucianist; some others also follow this usage, such as Lauren Pfister 
(1995:55), David Elstein (2014:24), Peregrine de Vigo (2014:9, 16), Sòng Bīn 宋斌 
(2016:blog), Diane Obenchain (199?, cited in Pfister 1995:55). 
 
 
                                                
6 Lauren Pfister (1995:55). 
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Appendix N  
The Cultural Design of Ru-Based Collectivism Observed in the Social Sciences 
 
Zhèng Zhèngbó 鄭正博 (1990:169–70) and Zhuāng Huìqiū 莊慧秋 (1991:156–8), both 
Chinese psychologists, indicate that the traditional values of Ru-based collectivism and 
its concomitant RFS, are parts of the ‘wénhuà shèjì’ ｢文化設計｣ (cultural design) of a 
post-traditional Ru-based cultural heritage. This was also been identified as ‘wénhuà 
yuánxíng’ ｢文化原型｣ (cultural prototypes) by Yu Dehui (1987b:3, eo), another concept 
mentioned in C1S2.2. 1  Both Zheng Zhengbo (1990:169–70) and Zhuang Huiqiu 
(1991:156–8) argue that a RFS is specifically the product of a traditional Ruist cultural 
design promoting authoritarian-oriented interpersonal relationships, where one is not 
encouraged to express one’s own opinions before authority,2 even after the authority is 
dead.3 Zheng Zhengbo (1990:169–70) pointed out that post-traditional Chinese persons 
still tend to value one’s own ‘primary group’ exclusively in contrast to any ‘secondary 
group’,4 so that they may even become indifferent to public affairs, social (or public) 
morality (or righteousness) and ‘justice’.5 This is a distinctive feature of post-traditional 
                                                
1 See also Ambrose Y. C. King’s (1982:126–35), Sun Lungkee’s (1983 reprinted in 2004:12–40) and Yang 
Zhongfang’s (1991b) discussions in detail about the cultural design of Chinese self mainly based on 
traditional Ruism. Notably, Yang Zhongfang, unlike Sun Lungkee, hesitates to use the term collectivism to 
describe the form of post-traditional Chinese self that results from this basic cultural influence. 
2 Chien Chinlung 簡晉龍 (p. Jiǎn Jìnlong) (2013:13–18). Discussed also on Yang Kuoshu (1994:110–14) 
and Fox (1997). 
3 Analects 1:11. 
4 Wén Chóngyī 文崇一 (1990:52–6). Yum June Ock (1988:378–80) also highlights such a Ruist feature of 
human relationships as ‘sharp distinction between in[-]group and out[-]group members’ (Zhái, Xuéwěi 翟
學偉 2010:103–5, 227–34), which in Chinese are ‘zìjǐ rén’ ｢自己人｣ and ‘wàirén’ ｢外人｣ (Gù, Yújūn 顧
瑜君 1987, eo; Zhāng, Qiáng 張強 2003). All of these terms and discussion might be based on William 
Graham Sumner’s (1906:12f.) pioneering differentiation of the ‘we-group, in-group’ from the ‘others-
groups, out-groups’. See also Wilson and Pusey (1982:206). 
5 See also Liáng Qǐchāo 梁啟超 (1902:12f.), la Barre (1946b:381), Cho Hyunyi (2000:307), and Chén 
Xiǎopíng 陳曉平 (2002:25). 
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Ru-based collectivism (See also A-K). Triandis (1989:517) pointed out on the basis of 
evidence from his survey that the distinction between the primary and secondary groups 
is more significant in determining ‘social behaviour’ in a collectivistic culture than in an 
individualistic culture. Drawing on strict definitions of individual, relational, and 
collective selves in social psychological research, such perceptions of in-group and out-
group differentiation are characteristics of the collective self, but not of the relational self 
(according to the professional usage in social psychology). 6  Admittedly, the post-
traditional Ruist cultural design is collectivist-oriented based on this evidence.7 
However, the boundaries between the small self and the great self in PTRIC 
contexts are ambiguous and variable.8 The delimitations of primary groups and secondary 
groups can be quite flexible, varying according to situation-orientation, 9  utility-
orientation,10 or ‘opportunism’ (la Barre 1946b:381).11 This complexity is also manifest 
in discussions of the meaning of the term guanxi 關係 (‘connection and network’), the 
                                                
6 Serena Chen and Andersen (2008:246). See also Turner et al. (1994:456, 462), Brewer and Gardner 
(1996), Sedikides and Brewer (2001:2), and Sedikides et al. (2011:98–9). 
7 Or more precisely speaking, the context of the post-traditional Ruism cultural design tends to activate the 
collective self. According to important findings of recent research in social psychology (Sedikides and 
Brewer 2001; Chen, Serena and Andersen 2008; Sedikides et al. 2011), individual self, relational self, and 
collective self co-exist in a person’s self-concept, and the different forms of self are activated by different 
contexts. However, the three different selves do not contribute to a person equivalently, depending on the 
motivations shaping the self-concept. The findings of another study disclose that ‘the individual self has a 
motivational status elevated above that of the relational and (especially) collective self … This type of self 
(the individual self) … sits closer to the motivational core of being human’ (Sedikides et al. 2011:104f.). 
8 June Ock Yum (1988:378, 380). See also Zhuang Huiqiu (1987a:131), Yang Zhongfang (1991b:122–3), 
and Yang Yiyin (1999:154–7). 
9 Han Kueihsiang 韓貴香 (p. Hán Guìxiāng) and Li Meichih 李美枝 (p. Lǐ Měizhī) (2011:11). It is notable 
that Francis L. K. Hsu (1953:11, eo) does not attribute Chinese character of situation-orientation to the 
factors of ‘introversion and extroversion’. In comparing the feature of situation-orientation among Chinese 
to the feature of individual-orientation among Americans, he states that ‘the Chinese tends to mobilize his 
thought and action for the purpose of conforming to the reality, while the American tends to do so for the 
purpose of making the reality conform to him’. 
10 Zhuang Huiqiu (1991:157). 
11 See also Francis L. K. Hsu (1953:10), Lau Siukai (1978), Gu Yujun (1987), Wen Chongyi (1990:54–6), 
Cho Hyunyi (2000:307), Bedford and Hwang Kwangkuo (2003:133–4), Hwang Kwangkuo (2006:36–46), 
Wong Ying and Jeanne Tsai (2007:213), and Zhai Xuewei (2010:227–34). 
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broader and nuanced conception of modern relationships in post-traditional Chinese 
society. Luo Yadong (1997:44) defines the Chinese word guanxi in the following manner: 
[It is a] concept of drawing on connections in order to secure favours in personal relations. It 
is an intricate and pervasive relational network which Chinese [persons] cultivate 
energetically, subtly, and imaginatively. It contains implicit mutual obligation[s], 
assurance[s] and understanding[s], and governs Chinese attitudes towards long-term social 
and business relationships.  
I find that certain aspects of these mutually obliging relationships, especially the 
more harsh and demanding ones, can manifest the tendency of a RFS.12 In other words, 
as Suddath (2006:239, eo) points out, that when a traditional Ruist ideology of ‘harmony 
and unity’ are taken as virtues in a post-traditional cultural design so that they are seen as 
a ‘preordained social pattern’ (Edwards 1986:44), these virtues can outweigh ‘individual 
liberty’ even as they define ‘Chineseness’. 13  They become ideals of a ‘unique 
individuality’ expressed through ‘self-abnegation’ within relationships that shape a post-
traditional Ruist concept of self. 
 
 
                                                
12 Hall and Ames (1998:24) use ‘preestablished social patterns’ and R. Randle Edwards (1986:44) uses 
‘preordained pattern’ to explain the similar features as does Zheng Zhengbo by the concept of cultural 
design. 
13 Guo Qingxiang (2006:90) highlights that in Ruism ‘gōngzhōng’ 「公忠」 (loyalty to the public) is 
always the eventual appeal in solving the conflicts between the individual and society and thus the 
individual benefit and development of personality are damaged. 
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Appendix O  
A Brief Criticism of Moltmann’s ‘Christian Universalism’ 
 
While this is not the place to go into an extended and detailed discussion of all related 
issues about universalism due to the limitation of space, a brief criticism of Moltmann’s 
‘Christian universalism’ is provided here for reference. First of all, it is notable to point 
out that Moltmann’s position is unlike others supporting general universalism because his 
‘Christian universalism’ supports the important truths of sola gratia (grace alone), solus 
Christus (Christ alone), and sola fide (faith alone).1 Nevertheless, he rejects some other 
Christian doctrines and the historical reality of humans’ resistance to God’s will, based 
on his own theologically ideal picture of God. For example, by arguing for the implied 
universalistic teachings in some biblical verses, he (1996:240–43, eo) seems to make 
intentionally ambiguous or unacceptable the teachings and warnings of ‘double outcome 
of judgment’2 in the Bible. I argue that these verses about God’s final judgment at Jesus 
Christ’s second coming (mainly in Revelation), especially the dire consequence of hell 
and ‘eternal judgment’ (Hebrews 6:2), ‘eternal punishment’ (Matthew 25:46), ‘eternal 
chains’ (Jude:6), ‘eternal fire’ (Matthew 18:8), and ‘eternal destruction’ (2 Thessalonians 
1:9), are more straightforward and unequivocal than those ambiguous verses he claims 
about universal salvation.3 Does every human being escape the hell of eternal fire? Will 
only a single outcome of the Last Judgment happen as he (1996:243) claims? On the one 
hand, he stresses that God establishes justice and righteousness and puts the unrighteous 
                                                
1  These are three of the five solae summarized as the basic beliefs of the Protestant Reformation 
(Helopoulos 2017:5). The other two are sola Scriptura (Scripture alone) and soli Deo gloria (the glory of 
God alone). See also Stephen J. Wellum (2015a:6; 2015b:79). 
2 Double outcome of judgment denotes the two outcomes of the Last Judgment: ‘believers into heavenly 
bliss’ and ‘unbelievers into the torments of hell’ (Moltmann 1996:236). 
3 See also the arguments for a double outcome of the Last Judgment in Scripture by both Emil Brunner 
(1946 quoted in Moltmann 1996:239) and Gerhard Ebeling (1979 quoted in ibid.). 
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right (ibid.:243-4). On the other hand, he tends to argue that universal salvation is not 
related to ‘the outcome of history’ and the ‘inevitable actuality of redemption’ but ‘God’s 
salvific intention’ and ‘the possibility of redemption’ (ibid.:243). Is universalism only 
about possibility and God’s intention? If the answer is positive, then the possibility of 
double outcome does exist. However, Moltmann unequivocally denies the possibility of 
double outcome (ibid.:255). If God’s Judgment definitely ‘puts [all] things to rights’ as 
he claims (ibid.), are those biblical claims and their horrible descriptions only a paper 
tiger coined merely for posing a threat to the unwilling? Besides, throughout human 
histories, there have been billions of people who passed away without accepting the 
‘crucified God’ as their redeemer. Where did they go and where are they now? I do not 
find Moltmann’s account of ‘Christian universalism’ to be convincing, especially on the 
basis of these biblical claims. Moltmann (1996:241–46) admits that his universalism is 
based on ‘theological argument’ or ‘decision’ (ibid.:241-2) rather than on biblical grounds 
because ‘universal salvation and a double outcome of judgment are … both well attested 
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Hebrew, or Greek English Equivalent 
addressive  the adjective form of address 
Adventus  the present of what is still to 
come 
Advaita  a Vedantic doctrine that is 
associated especially with 
the Indian philosopher 
Shankara (c.788–820) 
analogia relationis  analogy of relations 
anatman  no-self or no-soul 
avidya  illusion 
bǎ zìwǒ shōuqǐlái  把自我收起來 to close up my own self 
basileia  kingdom 
bèi biǎnyì zìjǐ  被貶抑 to be demeaned 
bèi hūlüè  被忽略 to be ignored 
bèi rén kàn de  被人看的 to be viewed by others 
bèi xiāomǐ  被消弭 to be eliminated 
bèi yāyì  被壓抑 to be oppressed 
bèi yāzhì xiǎowǒ  被壓制 to be suppressed 
bèizǔ  背祖 betraying ancestors 
búxiào  不孝 unfilial 
Ch’an (p. chán) 禪 Zen 
ch’i (p. qì) 氣 energy 
chàděng de ài 差等的愛 the private-to-public priority 
of loves or  
the differentiated loves 
chāoyuè nèizài 超越內在 surpassing the immanence 
chāoyuè wàizài  超越外在 transcending the externality 
chāoyuè  超越 surpass or transcend 
chàxù géjú  差序格局 the differential mode of 
association 
chèdǐ xiāochú  徹底消除 eliminated completely 
chéng  誠 sincerity 
chéngwéi wěijūnzi  成為偽君子 become a hypocrite 
chénmò de dàduōshù  沈默的大多數 the silent majority 
chénmò zìwǒ 沈默自我 silencing the self 
chih te chih-chüeh (p. zhì 
de zhíjué) 
智的直覺 ability of intellectual 
intuition 
chih (p. zhì) 智 wisdom 
 
Chineseness  the quality or state of being 
Chinese 
chónggǔ de jiàzhí 
qǔxiàng  
崇古的價值取向 past time orientation 
chuántǒng yǔ xiàndài  傳統與現代 tradition and modernity 
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Hebrew, or Greek English Equivalent 
chūrén tóudì  出人頭地 to become honoured and 
distinguished among 
others, or to excel the 
common 
cíhuì  詞彙 vocabulary 
circumincessio  reciprocal indwelling and 
mutual interpenetration 
closedness  the state of being closed 
completable  able to be completed 
coram Deo  in the presence of God 
creatio originalis  original creation 
creation nova  new creation 
dài … miànjù  戴 … 面具 wear a mask 
dàrén  大人 the great person 
dàtǐ  大體 the great body 
dàtóng shìjiè  大同世界 the stateless world of the 
great unity 
dàwǒ  大我 the great self 
demut tWmD> likeness 
Dengism  Dèng Xiǎopíng (鄧小平) 
Theory of series of 
political and economic 
ideologies. 
dé zhī zéi  德之賊 the … thief … of virtue 
dividual  a single human being who 
can be divided, in contrast 
to individual who cannot 
be divided 
divisa  divided 
dìwèi lúnlǐ  地位倫理 status ethics 
doxa do,xa glory 
dominum terrae  being lord of the land 
dōngyà héxīn jiàzhí  東亞核心價值 East Asian core values 
dynamis δύ ναμις potentiality 
eikona eivko,na image 
embeddual  an individual person who is 
always embedded in his/er 
own communal 
relationships 
enclosedness  the stated of being enclosed 
energeia  actuality or activity 
experienceability  the quality of being 
experienceable 
fàn xiào zhǔyì  泛孝主義 pan-filialism 
fàndàodé zhǔyì de shèhuì  泛道德主義的社會 pan-moralistic society 
Futurum  the future of what has 
already come 
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Hebrew, or Greek English Equivalent 
gè rén … bèi zhēngfā 
diào  
個人 … 被蒸發掉 the individual person 
evaporates 
gèjǐ  個己 individual self 
gèrén  個人 individual person 
gloria Dei  glory of God 
gloria Dei est homo  the glory of God is human 
Godforsakenness  the quality or state of being 
Godforsaken 
gōngdé  公德 public morals 
gōngjùxìng de lǐxìng 
chuántǒng zhǔyì  
工具性的理性傳統主義 instrumental rational 
traditionalism 
gongsi yiti  公私一體 the public and private form 
into one body or ‘a balance 
of public and private (De 
Bary’s translation)’ 
gōngzhōng  公忠 loyalty to the public 
Gottoffenheit der 
gottgeschaffenen Welt 
 the openness of God to the 
world God has created 
guāngzōng yàozǔ  光宗耀祖 glorifying and illuminating 
the ancestors 
guānxì qǔxiàng 關係取向 relationship-determinism, 
other orientation, or 
familistic orientation 
guānxì zhǔyì  關係主義 relationism, emphasizing the 
social human practices and 
the context of individual’s 
transaction and mutual 
relations 
guānxì 關係 ‘connections and networks’ 
(Tu Weiming’s translation) 
hàipà quánwēi  害怕權威 the fear of authorities 
héxié  和諧 harmony 
héyī  合一 uniting 
hikikomori  acute social withdrawal 
syndrome 
homoiōsis o`moi,wsij likeness 
hsiang-yüan (p. 
xiāngyuàn) 
鄉愿 the hyper-honest villager, 
believes that ‘being in this 
world, one must behave in 
a manner pleasing to this 
world’ 
hsin (p. xīn) 心 heart 
hsüeh tso-jen (p. xué 
zuòrén) 
學做人 learning to be human 
hù lài  互賴 interdependent 
imago Christi  image of Christ 
imago Dei  image of God 
imago mammonis  image of Mammon 
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Hebrew, or Greek English Equivalent 
imago per conformitatem 
gratiae 
 the image of the conformity 
of grace 
imago per similitudinem 
gloriae 
 the image of the likeness of 
glory 
imago satanae  image of Satan  
imago Trinitatis  image of Trinity 
in re  in reality 
in se  in itself 
in spe   in hope 
individua substantia  individual substance 
indivisa  undivided 
jen (p. rén) 仁 benevolence or humaneness 
jiànzhèng 諫諍 the employment of 
remonstrance 
jiāochū … zìwǒ  交出 … 自我 to surrender my own self 
jìnxiàodào  盡孝道 fulfilling filial piety 
jinxing  盡性 the complete realization of 
human nature 
jíquán 極權 totalitarianism 
jìzǔ  祭祖 worshiping ancestors 
juésè lúnlǐ  角色倫理 role ethics 
jūnzi réngé  君子人格 the noble human’s 
personality 
jūnzi  君子 noble human or profound 
person 
justitia originalis  original justice 
klēronomos klhrono,moj heir 
koinōnia koinwni,a koinonia 
kōngxìng  空性 emptiness 
lǐ yuè wénhuà  禮樂文化 the ritual and music culture 
lǐ  理 the reality known as the 
principle 
lǐ 禮 rituals or the rules of 
propriety 
liǎn  臉 face or mask 
liǎngmiànxìng 兩面性 double-facedness 
liàngshǎo zhìchà  量少質差 few in quantity and less in 
quality 
liángzhī xìtǒng  良知系統 self-conscious value system 
liǎnmiàn  臉面 face, mask, or external 
prestige 
lǐjiào 禮教 Ruist code of ethics 
lǐxiǎng zìwǒ  理想自我 ideal self 
lǐxìng běntǐ  理性本體 rational being 
lǐxìng zhìshàng zhǔyì  理性至上主義 ration supremacism 
lúnlǐ běnwèi  倫理本位 ethics as the standard 
lunli  倫理 ethics 
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Hebrew, or Greek English Equivalent 
méiyǒu zìwǒ  沒有自我 there is no self 
metamorphoomai metamorfo,omai be changed in form, be 
transformed 
metamorphoumetha metamorfou,meqa being transformed 
miànzi  面子 face or external prestige 
mínjiān de 
xiǎochuántǒng  
民間的小傳統 the small folk tradition 
móhúhuà  模糊化 to be undistinguishable 
morphē morfh,  form 
nàshèng wàiwáng  內聖外王 sageliness within and 
kingliness without 
naturaliter religiosa  religious nature 
nàzài chāoyuè  內在超越 immanent transcendence 
nèizhuǎn  內轉 inner-transformation 
nièpán  涅槃 nirvana 
niǔqǔ yuánlái de wǒ  扭曲原來的我 distort the original I 
opera trinitatis ad extra  the works outside the Trinity 
opera trinitatis ad intra  the works within the Trinity 
pa (p. bà) 霸 hegemony 
pao (p. bào) 報 reciprocity 
passiones trinitatis ad 
intra 
 the emotions within the 
Trinity 
perichōrēsis pericw,rhsij perichoresis 
persona/personae  the actors’ varieties of masks 
possibilitas  potentiality 
potential  efficacious power 
prosōpοn pρό σωπόν the actors’ varieties of masks 
qiútóng cúnyì  求同存異 unity in diversity 
qiútóng xīntài  求同心態 sameness-oriented mindset 
qū tiān yǐ cóng rén  屈天以從人 making Heaven succumbed 
to humans 
quánqiú lúnlǐ  全球倫理 global ethics 
quēdiǎn 缺點 weaknesses 
qūlǐ  曲禮 minute rituals 
quo ad nos  to us 
relationalism  relationism 
rén de chàděngxìng  仁的差等性 the differential mode of 
benevolence 
rén 人 human 
rén  仁 benevolence or humaneness 
rěn 忍 endurance 
réngé zhǔyì 人格主義 personalism 
réngé zūnyán  人格尊嚴 dignity of human personality 
réngéhuà de shàngdì 人格化的上帝 personalized God 
renlun (p. rénlún) 人倫 ethics of human relationships 
rénqíng 人情 favour 
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Hebrew, or Greek English Equivalent 
rénwén jīngshén  人文精神 humanist spirit 
rényì dàodé  仁義道德 morality of benevolence and 
righteousness 
róng wéi yītǐ  融為一體 fusing into one 
Rú  儒 Teachings of the Literati 
Rújiā jīngshén de 
dàchuántǒng 
儒家精神的大傳統 the great tradition of the 
Ruist refined intellectual 
spirit 
Rújiāo 儒教 Education of Literati 
Rúxué chuàngxīn  儒學創新 Ruist creativity 
Rúxué  儒學 Scholarship of Literati 
sangang  三綱 the three bounds of dyadic 
relationships 
sàngshī zìwǒ 喪失自我 lose the self 
Sānjiāo  三教 Three Teachings 
shén  神 spiritual 
shēnfèn lúnlǐ 身分倫理 role ethics 
shèngrén  聖人 sage 
shēngtài yìshí  生態意識 ecological consciousness 
Shèng-Wáng Shùn  聖王舜 Sage-King Shun 
shen-jen (p. shénrén) 神人 a spiritual being 
shen-tu (p. shèndú) 慎獨 self-watchfulness when 
alone, vigilant solitariness 
shénxué de shícún 
céngmiàn 
神學的實存層面 the existential dimension of 
theology 
shèqún 社群 community 
shǐ zìwǒ … yǐnérbúzhāng  使自我 … 隱而不彰 to make the self implicit yet 
unclear 
shírán 實然 the reality or intends in one’s 
heart 
shùnzhòng xīnlǐ  順眾心理 conformist mentality 
shūtú tóngguī  殊途同歸 different roads leading to the 
same goal 
sìduān  四端 the four germinations of the 
four basic human feelings 
similitude/similitude  likeness 
Sìshū Wǔjīng  四書五經 the Four Books and Five 
Classics 
situatedness  the state of being situated 
sīyù héngliú  私慾橫流 cross-flowing lusts 
social trinitarianist  social trinitarian theologian 
sola fide  faith alone 
sola gratia  grace alone 
sola Scriptura  Scripture alone 
soli Deo gloria  the glory of God alone 
solus Christus  Christ alone 
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Hebrew, or Greek English Equivalent 
summorphos su,mmorfoj having the same form, 
sharing the likeness 
sugklēronomos sugklhrono,moj joint-heirs or co-heirs with 
Christ 
tā búshì rén  他不是人 he is not a rén (human) 
tāzài shìjiè  它在世界 believing the existence of the 
other world 
te (p. dé) 德 virtue 
telos  an ultimate object or aim 
theosis  humankind’s eschatological 
becoming-one-with-God 
threeness  the quality or state of being 
three in number, often 
employed to denote the 
Triune God in Christianity 
tiān rén bù yī 天人不一 the disparity between 
Heaven and humans 
tiāndìrén sānhéyī  天地人三合一 a trinity among Heaven, 
Earth and humanity 
tiānmìng  天命 the mandate of Heaven 
tiānrén héyī  天人合一 the complete unity between 
humanity and Heaven 
tres personae  three persons 
tselem ~l,c ,  image 
una substantia  one substance 
uprootedness  the state of being uprooted 
utilitarianistic  the adjective form of 
utilitarianism 
wàirén 外人 out-group members 
wàizài chāoyuè  外在超越 external transcendence 
wéijǐ zhī xué  為己之學 learning for the sake of the 
self 
wénfǎ  文法 grammar 
wénhuà shèjì  文化設計 cultural design 
wénhuà yuánxíng  文化原型 cultural prototypes 
wénhuà Zhōnghuá  文化中華 cultural Chinese 
wénhuà—xīnlǐ jiégòu  文化—心理結構 cultural-psychological 
structure 
wénmíng duìhuà  文明對話 dialogue among civilizations 
wǒ  我 I 
wú  無 non-being 
wǔlún  五倫 five dyadic relationships 
wúmíng  無明 illusion 
wúwéi  無為 inaction 
wúwǒ  無我 no-self or no-soul or selfless 
xiǎng  想 would like, wants, or intends 
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Hebrew, or Greek English Equivalent 
xiānghù gǎn tōng  相互感通 reciprocal perceiving and 
connecting 
xiànshí shìjiè  現實世界 the real world 
xiǎorén  小人 the small person 
xiàoshùn  孝順 filial piety 
xiǎotǐ  小體 the small body 
xiǎowǒ  小我 the small self 
xìngběnshàn  性本善 the intrinsic goodness of 
human nature 
xìngèshuō  性惡說 the badness of human nature 
xìngshànshuō  性善說 the goodness of human 
nature 
xīnlǐ jiégòu  心理結構 psychological structures 
xīnlǐ yuánxíng  心理原型 psychological prototypes 
xiūshēn  修身 moral self-cultivation 
xīxué  西學 Western learning 
xūgòu  虛構 meaningless to construct 
xūtuō wàizài  虛脫外在 prostration inside with 
hypocrisy outside 
yālì 壓力 pressure 
yáng  陽 yang 
yángfèng yīnwéi  陽奉陰違 passive resistance 
yāpò zìjǐ  壓迫自己 to oppress my own self 
yì 義 righteousness 
yílǐ  儀禮 ceremonial rituals 
yìlùn xìtǒng  議論系統 commenting system 
yǐn è yáng shàn  隱惡揚善 concealing the faults of 
others and praising their 
good points 
yīnggāi  應該 should 
yīngrán 應然 the oughts prescribed for the 
one’s social role 
yīn  陰 yin 
yīwǒ 一我 ego 
yǒu  有 being 
yǒuwéi  有為 taking action 
Psuchē yuch , life 
zāo mòshā  遭抹殺 to be effaced 
zàowùzhě 造物者 the Creator 
zhèngzhìhuà rújiā de 
dàotǒng  
政治化儒家的道統 the tradition of the Way 
expressed in politicized 
Ruism 
zhēnrén  真人 true person 
zhēnshí de  真實的 real, true, authentic, genuine 
zhēnshí zìwǒ  真實自我 actual self 
zhēnwǒ  真我 real self 
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zhìchéng  至誠 absolute sincerity 
zhīchǐ jìnhū yǒng  知恥近乎勇 knowing shame is the 
beginning of courage 
zhōngyōng zhī dào 中庸之道 keeping to the middle way 
zìjǐ kàn zìjǐ  自己看自己 to be viewed by ourselves 
zìjǐ rén 自己人 in-group members 
zìjǐ  自己 myself 
zìjué zhòngzǔ  自覺重組 reorganization of self-
awareness 
zìsī 自私 selfishness 
zìwǒ de tuìsuō 自我的退縮 shrinking back or withdrawal 
of the self 
zìwǒ guānzhào  自我觀照 self-contemplation 
zìwǒ yāsuō  自我壓縮 the self to be diminished 
zìwǒ 自我 self 
zǒnghé 總合 summation 
zuìè 罪惡 evils 
Zukunft  the present of what is still to 
come 
zuòjiàn zìjǐ  作踐自己 to humiliate my own self 
zuòrén chénggōng  做人成功 success in being somebody 
zuòrén 做人 being human 
zuòwàng 坐忘 sitting in oblivion 
 
 
